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Résumé - summary 
Cette thèse étudie la légitimité démocratique normative de la politique étrangère et de sécurité 
européenne après Lisbonne. La littérature existante traite des manifestations spécifiques d'une 
telle légitimité, mais s'abstient d'une évaluation inclusive qui prend en compte les multiples 
dimensions de la démocratie. Par conséquent, le caractère multiforme de la démocratie est négligé. 
Pour y remédier, la thèse réalise un audit démocratique de la politique étrangère et de sécurité 
commune de l'UE. Étant une évaluation systématique et complète de la situation démocratique 
d'un système politique ou d'une politique spécifique, un tel audit démocratique vise une 
appréciation inclusive. En tant que méthode, il implique une attitude non spécifique et flexible 
envers l'évaluation démocratique qui, étant donné la présence de multiples traditions 
démocratiques en Europe et les particularités de la politique étrangère, en fait une approche utile 
pour évaluer la politique étrangère de l'UE. Partant de la définition concise de la démocratie 
comme ‘contrôle public et égalité politique’, la thèse propose tout d'abord un cadre d'évaluation 
composé de huit critères : l'octroi du droit de gouverner, l'autorité budgétaire, la participation et le 
débat public ; la transparence et l’obligation de donner des raisons ; et les possibilités de 
surveillance et d’annulation. Chacun de ces critères est davantage opérationnalisé par un ensemble 
d'indicateurs spécifiques. Ensuite, l'audit évalue systématiquement la politique étrangère et de 
sécurité de l'UE en fonction de chacun des critères. Il examine ces critères à la fois séparément et 
en relation les uns avec les autres. De cette manière, la thèse présente un aperçu détaillé des forces 
et faiblesses démocratiques de la politique étrangère de sécurité commune de l'UE et montre les 
interconnexions qui existent entre elles. Elle révèle également la présence de trois tendances sous-
jacentes qui peuvent expliquer ces résultats à un niveau plus fondamental. Ces tendances sont la 
présence d'une opposition intergouvernementale-supranationale confuse et d'un décalage 
structurel entre les règles et les pratiques, ainsi qu'un cadre parlementaire compliqué dans lequel 
la répartition des responsabilités entre le Parlement européen et les parlements nationaux reste 
souvent floue. 
This thesis studies the normative democratic legitimacy of the post-Lisbon European foreign 
security and defence policy. Existing literature deals with specific manifestations of such 
legitimacy but refrains from an inclusive evaluation that considers multiple dimensions of 
democracy. Hence, the many-faceted character of democracy is overlooked. To address this, the 
thesis carries out a democratic audit of the EU’s common foreign and security policy. Being a 
systematic and comprehensive appraisal of the democratic state of affairs of a political system or 
policy, such a democratic audit aims for an inclusive assessment. As a method, it involves a model-
unspecific and flexible attitude towards democratic evaluation, which – given the presence of 
multiple democratic traditions within Europe and the particularities of foreign policy – makes it a 
useful approach to assess the EU’s foreign security and defence policy. Starting from the concise 
definition of democracy as ‘public control with political equality’, the thesis therefore, first of all, 
proposes an assessment framework composed of eight criteria: licensing to govern, budget 
authority, participation and public debate; transparency and reason giving; and oversight and 
overrule. Each of these criteria is further operationalised through a set of specific indicators. 
Thereupon, the audit systematically evaluates the EU’s foreign security and defence policy against 
each of the criteria. It looks at these criteria both separately as well as in connection to each other. 
In that way, the thesis presents a comprehensive overview of specific democratic strengths and 
weaknesses of the EU’s foreign security policy and shows the interconnections that exist between 
them. It also reveals the presence of three underlying trends that can explain these findings at a 
more fundamental level. These trends are the presence of an unsettled intergovernmental-
supranational divide, a structural discrepancy between rules and practices, and a complicated 
parliamentary setting in which the division of responsibility between the European parliament and 
national parliaments rests often unclear.  
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Introduction: towards a systematic assessment of the CFSP’s 
democratic credentials  
In June 2017, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
presented the first progress report on the implementation of the EU global strategy in the area 
of security and defence1. Adopted in November 2016 by the Council of the European Union2, 
and replacing the previous European Security Strategy of 2003, this global strategy expressed 
the ambition of strategic autonomy for the European Union (EU) and enlists several strategic 
priorities for the years to come.  
In the summer of 2017, European heads of State and government, at a summit in Brussels, 
decided a new European defence plan3. The plan, which has been announced as a move from 
military cooperation to defence integration4, and even as the development of a “truly European 
defence”5, foresees in the launch of several new initiatives in the field of security and defence. 
As a first of these initiatives, a European Medical Command was created in December 20176. 
In reaction to the international turmoil caused by US-president Donald Trump’s recognition of 
Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, many voices called for the EU to take up a more decisive role 
in the on-going Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While the Belgian minister of foreign affairs, for 
instance, declared that “the EU can […] play an important role to help parties to resume 
dialogue”7, his French homologue, Jean-Yves Le Drain was quoted saying that "we've been 
waiting already for several months for the American initiative, and if one is not forthcoming 
                                                 
1 Implementing the EU Global Strategy Year 1 europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/implementing-eu-
global-strategy-year-1 [14.12.17] 
2 Foreign Affairs Council, 14 November 2016, Council conclusions on implementing the EU global 
strategy in the area of security and defence consilium.europa.eu/media/22459/eugs-conclusions 
-st14149en16.pdf [13.12.17]. 
3 European Council conclusions on security and defence, 22.06.17 consilium.europa.eu/ 
en/press/press-releases/2017/06/22/euco-security-defence/ [13.12.17]. 
4 European Political Strategy Centre, In Defence of Europe ec.europa.eu/epsc/publications/ 
strategic-notes/defence-europe_en [13.12.17]. 
5 Federica Mogherini, Defence and development: concrete action for a stronger Europe, 30.11.16 
federicamogherini.net/difesa-sviluppo-scelte-concrete-uneuropa-piu-forte/?lang=en [13.12.17]. 
6 EUObserver, 13.12.17, “Medical HQ to spearhead EU military push” euobserver.com/foreign/ 
140269 [13.12.17]. 
7 Federal Public Service Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem - Only dialogue and multilateralism can lead to 
peace, 07.12.17 diplomatie.belgium.be/en/newsroom/news/2017/jerusalem_only_dialogue 
_and_multilateralism_can_lead_to_peace [13.12.17]. 
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then the European Union will have to take the initiative."8 EU High Representative Federica 
Mogherini, for her part, reconfirmed the EU’s position in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, by 
expressing her continuing support for a two-state solution9.  
On 11 December 2017, the Council of the European Union confirmed the ongoing sanctions 
against the Democratic Republic of Congo, consisting of an asset freeze as well as a ban on 
entering the EU for 16 individuals10.  
While at first sight, the above-cited events could seem unconnected or even anecdotal, in reality 
they are as many examples of the continuing development of a European foreign security and 
defence policy. They are continuing evidence of how the European Union acts towards the 
world outside its borders to “safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, 
independence and integrity” (art.21.2 (b) TEU). They are as many examples of how the Union 
acts daily on the international scene in the name of 500 million people. 
But what, in turn, do these people have to say about this policy? What is their control over this 
foreign policy carried out in their name? What say do they have over the sanctions that are 
proclaimed and executed in their name? What is their control over the persons that express 
position in their name? How can they control the defence operations said to be carried out to 
protect their interests and their security? And how can they define the overall direction of a 
policy that shapes their common destiny and position in the world? In a democracy, these are 
legitimate and important questions that merit an extensive answer. 
It is these questions that are central to this thesis.  
In that way, it is true; this thesis does not set on uncharted territory. For some time now, a 
growing body of research occupies itself with issues of democratic legitimacy in the context of 
the EU’s foreign security policy. However, very little of this research discusses this question in 
an overall way. That is, those studies that, in some way or another, deal with matters of 
democratic quality of European foreign policy, essentially cover specific manifestations of 
                                                 
8 EUObserver, 11.12.17, “Israel presses Jerusalem claim in EU capital” euobserver.com/foreign 
/140231 [13.12.17]. 
9 Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the joint press statement 
with Rex Tillerson, Secretary of State of the United States, 05.12.17 eeas.europa.eu/ 
headquarters/headquarters-homepage/36757/remarks-high-representativevice-president-
federica-mogherini-joint-press-statement-rex_en [13.12.17].  
10 OJ L 328, 12.12.2017, p.19. 
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democracy in a free-standing way. They do not come to an evaluation that takes into account 
multiple dimensions of democracy in an integrated and interconnected manner. In that way, 
existing literature does not recognize enough the many-faceted character of democracy in its 
discussion of European foreign security and defense. So far, a comprehensive assessment of 
this policy’s democratic qualities and shortcomings is missing. This hinders our understanding 
of how different aspects of the complex idea that is democracy interconnect within the context 
of the EU’s foreign policy. This, in turn, hampers our understanding of this policy’s democratic 
strengths and weaknesses and what must be taken into account in order to overcome these last 
ones (or for that matter reinforce the first). This thesis aims to remedy this by carrying out a 
democratic audit of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). 
To frame that endeavour, this introductory chapter starts with a brief overview of how we came 
to today’s CFSP. This gives some historical context to the policy in question and explains how 
it is formally built up. This will help to understand the systematic discussions of the policy’s 
democratic strengths and weaknesses in the second part of the thesis. Thereafter, a discussion 
on the current state of the literature will help substantiate the previous claim that current 
literature does omit to deal with the question of European foreign policy’s democratic 
legitimacy in a comprehensive manner. Thereupon, I will come to explain the main steps 
through which the announced audit will be developed and carried out.  
1. A common foreign policy for Europe 
The idea of a European foreign security and defence policy dates back as far as the early days 
of European integration. Although for a long time not amongst the most visible manifestations 
of European cooperation, a common foreign security and defence developed over the years.  
After two failed attempts to add a foreign policy dimension to an initially purely economic 
cooperation – the European Defence Community aborted by the French National Assembly in 
1954, and the subsequent Fouchet-plan, which also never got materialised – a European 
Political Cooperation (EPC) is launched in 1970. This EPC searches to improve the information 
exchange between Member States (MS) about major foreign policy issues and is meant to help 
them formulate common positions (Dinan 2004, 143). Although being rigidly 
intergovernmental, it means a first successful step towards closer cooperation in matters of 
foreign security and defence and a stepping-stone for the creation of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) by the Treaty of Maastricht (ToM, 1993). Adopted as Title V of the 
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Treaty, the CFSP constitutes the second pillar of the newly created EU. But, although this CFSP 
receives two proper instruments, called common position and common action (art. J.2 and J.3 
ToM), the absence of a common European response to the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia 
almost immediately reveals its fundamental lack of efficiency. Being common only but in name, 
it remains an inherently intergovernmental policy in which every decision demands unanimity. 
In the highly reactive domain that is foreign policy, such an approach evidently proves 
problematic. Subsequent treaty reforms, therefore, try to remedy shortcomings, essentially by 
searching the establishment of a more Europeanized common foreign policy. First of all, the 
Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA, 1999) introduces an additional instrument, the common strategy 
(art. J.3(2) and creates the post of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (HR, art. J.16). Assisted by the also newly created Policy planning and early warning 
unit, this HR must help improve the visibility of the CFSP. Additionally, Amsterdam formalizes 
the so-called Troika. Composed of the HR, the Commissioner for External Relations and the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the country holding the rotating EU-presidency – who presides 
the General Affairs and External Relations Council11 – this Troika contributes to the external 
representation of the Union and the implementation of the CFSP. The Treaty of Nice (ToN, 
2003) introduces further changes. On the institutional level, the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC) is integrated in the Treaty (art. 25 ToN), hence replacing and reinforcing the 
already existing Political Committee. This PSC brings together representatives of the Member 
States and is placed under the authority of the Council of the EU. It assures political scrutiny 
and the strategic direction of crisis management operations. The Treaty of Nice also introduces 
the possibility of an enhanced cooperation in any of the areas referred to under Title V of the 
Treaty – though except for matters having military or defence implications” (art. 27b ToN). 
However, defence matters are not completely left aside. In addition to the CFSP, efforts are 
also undertaken to create a common policy in the field of security and defence. While 
Maastricht does not take concrete measures in this domain – except for stipulating that the 
Western European Union (WEU) will henceforth be “an integral part of the development of 
the Union” (art. J.4 ToM) and referring to the future possibility of creating a common defence 
– it is the Treaty of Amsterdam – together with the Franco-British Declaration of Saint-Malo 
of 4 December 1998 – that can be seen as the actual beginning of a European Security and 
                                                 
11 One of the key configurations of the Council of the EU, the General Affairs and External Relations 
Council (GAERC) is, since Lisbon, split up in the General Affairs Council (GAC) and the Foreign 
Affairs Council (FAC). 
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Defence Policy (ESDP, since Lisbon denominated the Common Security and Defence Policy, 
CSDP). The main priorities for this ESDP are the so-called Petersberg tasks. Initially defined 
during a WEU-summit in 1992 and incorporated in the EU Treaty in Amsterdam, these tasks 
cover three types of missions: (1) humanitarian and rescue tasks, (2) peacekeeping tasks and 
(3) tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making12. At the same time, 
a non-military crisis management mechanism is proposed “to coordinate and make more 
effective the various civilian means and resources, at the disposal of the Union and the Member 
States”13. An important step for the further development of the ESDP is the publication of the 
first European Security Strategy (ESS), “A secure Europe in a better world”. Accepted by the 
Brussels European Council of December 2003, as a reaction on Europe’s highly disconcerted 
answer to the Iraq-crisis (Biscop 2004, 9), this document is one of the main guidelines for 
external actions developed by the EU. 
Further changes to the EU’s common foreign security and defence result from the Treaty of 
Lisbon (2009)14. This most recent reform treaty provides a new institutional fundament for the 
European Union. The old pillar structure is officially abolished, the European Council (EC) is 
incorporated in the Treaty and becomes one of the official institutions of the EU (art. 13 TEU) 
while receiving a permanent president (art. 15.5 TEU), and the EU as a whole obtains legal 
personality (art. 47 TEU). Among the most remarkable novelties, however, are those introduced 
in the field of foreign and security policy. A new High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy is introduced (art. 18, 27 TEU). Replacing the High Representative 
old style and uniting the former Troika in one person, (s)he wears a triple hat. (S)he is at the 
same time Vice-president of the Commission responsible for external action, President of the 
Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) and head of the European External Action Service (EEAS). 
This newly created EEAS for its part is a functionally autonomous body independent from the 
Council and the Commission, acting as kind of European foreign ministry (only not to be called 
so) with a worldwide network of diplomatic delegations to currently 144 third countries and 
international organizations worldwide15. Also, the Common Security and Defence Policy 
                                                 
12 WEU Council of Ministers (Bonn, June 1992) – “Petersberg Declaration” weu.int/documents/ 
920619peten.pdf [24.11.16]. 
13 European Council (Helsinki, 10-11.12.1999), “Presidency Conclusions” consilium.europa. 
eu/en/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/acfa4c.htm [24.11.16] 
14 Consolidated version of the treaty on European Union (TEU) (Including the Consolidated version 
of the treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)), OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 13–390.  
15 EEAS, EU in the world eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/area/geo_en 
[23.08.17] 
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(CSDP) has been made an integral part of the CFSP (art. 42.1 TEU). All these changes are 
supposed to make the EU – including its foreign and security policy - more effective, but also 
more transparent and democratic (cf. Radtke 2012, 41). However, these changes also make it 
increasingly difficult to continue classifying this policy as unambiguously intergovernmental. 
That is, although European foreign policy is clearly not supranational, it goes further than a 
simple multilateral cooperation between completely independent countries. While its basic 
direction is defined by the European Council, European foreign security and defence policy 
subsequently is further decided upon and carried out through an intricate complex of both 
national and European actors and means. In that way, it has in fact become a mixed, multilevel 
governance system (Smith 2004, 742‑45, cf. Chapter IV, 3.2 infra for a further discussion on 
this point). 
2. Studying European foreign policy 
With the gradual development of a common European foreign policy, also a distinct field of 
academic inquiry emerged. Bringing together traditional Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), 
International Relations Theory (IR) and European Integration Theory (Smith 2009), a new 
literature develops from the 1970ies onwards, with a focus on foreign policy cooperation 
between European States and case studies about the working and results of the EPC. Especially 
since the Treaty of Maastricht and the launch of the Common Foreign Security and Defence 
Policy, this led to a considerable body of literature, essentially evolving around four axes (cf. 
Tonra and Christiansen 2004b, 3‑5; Nitoiu 2016, 14‑21).  
A first strand of research concerns the processes within the EU that underpins its international 
capacities and focuses on the development of decision-making and policy within the CFSP. 
These studies look at the role and functioning of the competent institutions and search to 
understand the internal conduct of the CFSP and how this evolves. With the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty and the important changes this involved for the EU’s foreign security and 
defence action, many recent articles, chapters or books deal with these questions. Within these 
studies, attention goes to the overall institutional organisation of the CFSP/ CSDP (Klein and 
Wessels 2013; Koutrakos 2012; Radtke 2012; Puetter 2011; Thym 2011; von Ondarza 2008; 
Wessels and Bopp, 2008), the creation and the organisation of the EEAS (Juncos and Pomorska 
2015; Spence and Bátora 2015; Helwig et al. 2013; Bátora 2013; Vanhoonacker and Reslow 
2010; Murdoch 2012), the role of the High Representative (Helwig 2015, 2013; Helwig and 
Rüger 2014; Denza 2012; Rüger 2011; Kaddous 2008), or the position and powers of the 
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European Parliament (EP) within foreign policy (Rosén 2015, 2011; Herranz-Surrallés 2014; 
Wisniewski 2013, 2011; Barbé and Herranz Surrallés 2008).  
Secondly, we find a number of studies dealing with the actual performance and results of the 
EU’s foreign policy. Essentially these studies focus on the output of European foreign policy 
while looking at what the EU does (or does not) in the world. Through geographical (Viceré 
2016; Baltag and Smith 2015; Juncos 2013; Grono 2010) or thematic (Portela 2014, 2010; 
Hillion 2014; Giumelli and Ivan 2013; Pirozzi and Sandawi 2009) case studies, questions are 
asked about what the EU does, obtains and realizes in the field. More general, attention goes to 
how the EU’s foreign security performs and to its impact (Smith 2013; Dijkstra 2011; 
Blockmans and Wessel 2009).  
A third literature follows, which looks upon European foreign policy from a national 
perspective. Attention here goes to the role, position or actions of (a particular) Member 
State(s) in this domain and the relationship between their proper foreign policy and the CFSP 
(Flers 2012; Lehne 2012; Jones 2011; Hillion and Wessel 2008; Miskimmon 2007; Wivel 
2005). Several studies here look also at the role of national parliaments (Huff 2015; Huff 2013; 
Anghel et al. 2008; Gourlay 2004).  
Finally, there are those studies that inquire into the nature of the EU’s foreign policy. They 
deal with how, for instance, its underlying narrative or perceived identity determines its 
international behaviour. In other words, this research is interested in the competing visions that 
exist about the CFSP and how these could explain the EU’s role as an international actor. More 
theorized than the previous strands, studies of this type try to understand and conceptualize 
what drives EU foreign policy (Bickerton 2011; Sjursen 2011a, 2007; Smith 2004; Tonra 2003; 
Peterson and Sjursen 1998). In this context, the EU’s international role and actions are also 
evaluated through classical conceptions of foreign policy, originating from International 
Relations Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis (Piana 2005; Carlsnaes et al. 2004; Tonra and 
Christiansen 2004a). 
As a transversal trend throughout these strands of literature, attention nowadays increasingly 
goes to the issue of democratic legitimacy (Nitoiu 2016, 7). Although democratic legitimacy 
in European foreign policy had not been completely ignored before (cf. Bieber 1990), it is 
mainly over the last fifteen years that it gained more and more popularity in the study of the 
EU’s foreign policy. In line with the discussion about the EU’s possible democratic deficit (see 
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i.a. Follesdal and Hix 2006; Moravcsik 2002; Schmitter 2001, 2000; Majone 1998) which 
emerged after the Treaty of Maastricht and the difficulties that surrounded its coming into force 
(Bellamy and Castiglione 2003, 10); and concurringly with a mounting political attention – 
especially from the European Parliament which regularly asks for greater parliamentary 
scrutiny – the EU’s foreign policy’s democraticness has become a recurring topic of debate, 
both empirically and theoretically.  
In that way, it is difficult to maintain that democracy tends to receive very little attention in the 
European foreign policy literature – as has been claimed by Michael Smith (2008, 185). But as 
indicated at the beginning of this introduction, an important problem with this democracy 
literature is its dispersed approach. Research about the democratic legitimacy of European 
foreign policy mainly discusses specific manifestations of such legitimacy separately; but it 
refrains from an evaluation that comprehensively takes into account multiple dimensions of 
democracy. Attention goes to how the European Parliament or national parliaments scrutinize 
the CFSP (cf. supra), and to how they (can) cooperate in these matters (Herranz-Surrallés 
2014b; Wouters and Raube 2012; Peters, Wagner, and Deitelhoff 2010; Mittag 2006); or to 
questions of transparency (Rosén 2015, 2011; De Baere 2013; Stärkle 2011, Abazi and 
Adriaensen 2017), public debate (Kandyla and de Vreese 2011; De Vreese and Kandyla 2009; 
Peter et al. 2003; Kratochvíl et al. 2011). or the democratic control of European defence in 
particular (Fanoulis 2017, Wagner 2007, 2006; Hilger 2002). Yet few studies deal with the 
question of democratic legitimacy in an overall way. Exceptions to this trend exist, but they are 
few; and so far, they seem not to point towards the emergence of a new, more comprehensive, 
approach in the literature on the democratic quality of the EU’s foreign policy.  
There is for instance a noteworthy paper from Anne Elizabeth Stie (2008), published in the 
RECON Working Paper Series16, in which she attempts to launch a more comprehensive 
discussion on the topic. In this paper, Stie outlines an analytical framework allowing for an 
assessment of the democratic legitmacy of the EU’s second pillar’s decision-making system. 
Starting from a deliberative perspective on democracy, the author proposes five normative 
criteria of democratic legitmacy: (1) inclusion of affected and competent parties, (2) openess 
and transparency, (3) neutralisation of assymetrical power relations, (4) deliberative meeting 
places, and (5) decision-making capacity. The institutional and procedural aspects of the EU’s 
foreign policy could be evaluated against these criteria for their democratic qualities or lack 
                                                 
16 Reconstituting Democracy in Europe reconproject.eu/ [18.10.17].  
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thereof. However, the paper neither proposes how such an evaluation should be organized, nor 
does it carry out an actual analysis of the CFSP’s democratic legitmacy. And it seemed not to 
have triggered much follow-up. No further research follows that carries out an actual 
assessment according to the analytical framework proposed.  
Also the previously cited study by Evangelos Fanoulis (2017), could be mentioned as a more 
comprehensive effort to assess the democratic quality of European foreign policy. Using data 
coming from semi-structured interviews of policy makers actively involved in the EU’s foreign 
policy and a qualitative comparative analysis of Eurobarometer Reports, the book demonstrates 
how the Common Security and Defence Policy suffers from a democratic deficit. Thereupon it 
proposes ways to remedy the policy’s legitimacy. Yet, the focus of this work lies, as pointed 
out before, with the CSDP in particular and not with the CFSP in general. Besides, while the 
study starts from the empirical analysis of a supposed democratic deficit in the CSDP and makes 
suggestions for improvement; it altogether rests an essentially theoretical investigation within 
the framework of a quite specific - agonistic – perspective on democracy. This makes the book, 
as one reviewer (Ewers-Peters 2017, 1‑2) notes, “at times arduous and intractable, for a non-
expert on Foucault and his notion of governmentality”. Besides, probably due to its very recent 
publication, but just like the paper by Anne Elizabeth Stie, the book so-far seems not to have 
triggered further debate (yet).  
All in all, existing literature, and certainly more empirical research, on European foreign 
security and defence policy therefore largely ignores the many-faceted character of democracy 
and overlooks the importance of the interconnection and interplay between different aspects of 
democratic legitimacy. In fact, rather separated – what we could call – sub-literatures exist; 
each of which deals with the question of democracy in European foreign policy in its own way 
and from a different angle. And often they do so without much attention for and linkage with 
the other sub-literatures. Hence, the different findings continue to stand on their own and do 
not coagulate into a systematic examination of the European Union’s foreign policy’s overall 
democratic state of affairs.  
A second, interconnected – and, in fact, underlying – problem lies with the absence of a clear 
democratic legitimacy concept. That is, even research that explicitly refers to the democratic 
legitimacy of the European Union’s foreign policy as its main point of inquiry, generally omits 
to give a clear, unequivocal definition of what it exactly means by this concept. 
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3. A comprehensive assessment of the EU’s foreign policy’s democratic legitimacy 
3.1 Contributions of the thesis 
Considering this double shortcoming of fragmentation and recurring ambiguity about the 
concrete meaning of democratic legitimacy in current research about European foreign policy, 
the main goal of this thesis is to evaluate the democratic legitimacy of the EU’s foreign 
security and defence policy in an overall manner. Starting from a clearly delineated 
understanding of democratic legitimacy, the purpose of this study is to provide a systematic and 
comprehensive discussion on the topic, which outlines both strengths and weaknesses of 
different dimensions of democracy and the interconnections that exist between them. In that 
sense, the thesis not just aims to understand if, but also how the EU’s foreign policy is 
democratically legitimate. To do so, the project essentially takes the form of a democratic 
audit (DA) of European foreign policy. Additionally, by using the Democratic Audit approach 
to assess the democratic state of affairs of the EU’s foreign and security policy, the thesis also 
serves a second goal. That is, so far, this method has been used to evaluate the overall 
democratic quality of a political system (polity), but never to evaluate a policy. Hence, by 
applying it to the concrete field of EU foreign policy, the thesis also contributes to the further 
development of this assessment methodology.  
3.2 Outline of the thesis 
This research will develop along the following lines:  
Part I sets out the theoretical and methodological foundations of the thesis. Therefore, I start by 
discussing the key concepts of democratic legitimacy. Considering what I said before about the 
recurring ambiguity regarding what exactly is understood by democracy and democratic 
legitimacy in the context of a specific research, I elaborate on what I mean to look at in the 
context of this thesis when I talk about democratic legitimacy. In that context, I will argue for 
a normative focus on democratic legitimacy (Chapter I). Subsequently, I also explain why in 
fact we should bother about democratic legitimacy in the context of foreign policy in the first 
place (Chapter II). Thereupon, attention turns to democratic auditing, as I discuss the origin and 
specificities of said method and explain why I will use it to assess the democratic legitimacy of 
European foreign policy (Chapter III). Based upon these considerations about democracy and 
foreign policy on the one hand, and democratic auditing on the other hand, I then elaborate on 
the concrete assessment framework that underpins the intended audit (Chapter IV). Finally, I 
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will discuss the methodological choices underlying it, as well as present the different types of 
sources and data that are used for the audit (Chapter V).  
Part II then will be devoted to the actual audit of the EU’s foreign policy’s democratic 
legitimacy. In line with the audit framework presented before in Chapter IV, the different 
criteria of democratic legitimacy are assessed and their connections and mutual influence 
discussed (Chapter VI to XIII). In that way, I will carry out a systematic inquiry of the EU’s 
foreign policy’s normative democratic legitimacy. 
Part III, finally, consists of two chapters. First, I will come back on the main findings and the 
way in which they connect as a comprehensive assessment of the CFSP’s normative democratic 
legitimacy. This chapter will close the actual audit (Chapter XIV). Thereupon, I will also return 
to the democratic audit method and the analytical framework I developed in that regard to assess 
the democratic legitimacy of a foreign policy. Building on the actual audit from the second part, 
the advantages for assessing the democratic quality of foreign policy are considered and 
possible tracks for further research discussed (Chapter XV). 
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Part I: Theory and methodology 
- 
Developing a framework for democratic audit 
This study aims at evaluating the democratic legitimacy of European foreign policy. In light of 
that objective, it is important that we understand what democratic legitimacy in fact is all about. 
Therefore, Chapter I presents three main views that exist about the concept of democratic 
legitimacy, while discussing what assessing such democratic legitimacy implies under each of 
these views. Departing from this discussion, I then elaborate on democratic legitimacy within 
the concrete context of my own research about European foreign policy. Chapter II 
subsequently deals with the question of why in fact we should study democratic legitimacy in 
the context of foreign policy. Discussing the changing views on the role and position of foreign 
policy over time, it continues by presenting arguments in favour of a democratic foreign policy. 
But, how to study the democratic quality of a foreign policy? In that regard, Chapter III will 
discuss the democratic audit method that I will use to do so. Starting with a discussion of other 
assessment methods, this chapter elaborates on the key characteristics of this method and 
explains its main advantages in relation to the assessment of not only political systems, but also 
concrete policies, including foreign policy. Subsequently, the pivotal chapter of this first part – 
Chapter IV – proposes the actual audit framework that I will use to carry out the democratic 
assessment of the EU’s foreign security and defence policy. It presents and discusses eight 
criteria as well as more precise indicators for each of them. Finally, with Chapter V, the first 
part is closed by a discussion of the measurement method, as well as the different kinds of data 
that will be used to substantiate the assessment. 
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I. Understanding democratic legitimacy 
Summary: A key element of this thesis is the notion of democratic legitimacy. This chapter 
argues that such democratic legitimacy can essentially be understood in three ways: as 
‘acceptability’, as ‘acceptance’, or as a combination of both these dimensions. Starting from 
a discussion of each of these legitimacy approaches, I then elaborate on how democratic 
legitimacy will be concretely dealt with within the context of this thesis, and why exactly I 
opt for that approach. 
1. Democratic legitimacy: opposing views 
What it means to say that a political order is democratically legitimate is not a question that 
may expect to obtain an unequivocal answer. Democratic legitimacy is one of these concepts 
that Brice Gallie (1955) would describe as essentially contested. Given that its main element – 
legitimacy, as for that matter, also connected concepts like power or authority –represents a 
cluster of different phenomena (Kratochwil 2006, 305), there is no unanimity about its exact 
connotation. Both in the academic literature and in the public debate it is regularly called upon 
without much further explanation. Or, with reference to Curtin & Meyer (2006, 112), 
“legitimacy is more often invoked than described and it is more often described than defined”. 
Fundamentally, however, we can say that democratic legitimacy means two things (cf. Peter 
2016; Schneller 2010, 1; Cheneval 2005, 1; Zürn 2004, 260), namely philosophical 
acceptability or social acceptance.  
Firstly, from a normative point of view, legitimacy refers to the philosophical acceptability of 
a political system or decision; that is, its inherent worthiness to be recognized (Habermas 1976, 
39). It is about a claim of authority being well-founded, i.e. being justified in some objective 
way (Bodansky 1999, 601). In that sense, democratic legitimacy is about the qualities formally 
possessed by a polity or policy that provide it with moral arguments for calling itself 
democratic. Institutions, rules, laws, governance arrangements or the actions and behaviour of 
individual rulers are characterised as possessing democratic legitimacy if they comply with a 
combination of predefined procedural norms or substantive values. Dealing with the conditions 
under which the members of a democratic constituency ought to respect a decision (Peter 2009, 
4), democratic legitimacy from this perspective implies the accomplishment of a concrete set 
of normative democratic justifications and is seen as a formal aspect of a system or policy. A 
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legitimacy-crisis occurs when the polity or policy fails to objectively present such justifications. 
In practical terms, from this acceptability point of view, democratic legitimacy can be tested 
against a selection of predefined criteria. Essentially, the task of the researcher, then, is to define 
and justify such criteria, after which to apply them to a given system or policy. Subsequently, 
the polity or policy in question can be considered more or less democratic to the extent that it 
lives up to these predefined normative democratic criteria.  
Yet, the problem with the acceptability perspective, so its critics say, is that by merely applying 
a normative yardstick it overlooks the fact that it is not because a political arrangement formally 
has the necessary elements to be called democratic, that it automatically feels as such. 
According to the contrasting acceptance approach, legitimacy, therefore, should not be 
understood in terms of a rule’s inherent qualities, but in terms of its popular recognition. 
Legitimacy, in these terms, concerns the voluntary acceptance of a rule by those who are ruled 
by it; is about a situation where citizens believe that political authority is being appropriately 
exercised and therefore deserves to be obeyed (Bernauer et al. 2016, 2). Said otherwise, it is 
what turns power into authority (Schmitter 2001, 2). Excluding any recourse to normative 
standards (Mommsen 1992, 20), democratic legitimacy thus refers here to an empirical concept 
describing if and how people perceive a rule as democratic. From this Weberian point of view, 
democratic legitimacy is about the factual acknowledgement (or, for that matter, rejection) of 
a system or policy as being democratically legitimate because it is believed to be (cf. Blatter 
2007, 518; also: Charlton 1986, 23). In this sense, “legitimacy prevails as long as the people 
support – or at least do not challenge – democratic institutions and decisions” (Peter 2009, 56) 
and a legitimacy crisis exists when the people start to doubt about the possibility to obey these 
institutions and decisions any longer (cf. Hennis 1976, 13). In this regard, the role of the 
researcher shifts from developing and applying normative benchmarks of democracy, to 
exposing the motivations and processes underlying the popular ascription of legitimacy to a 
specific political order. 
However, just as normative acceptability, also empirical acceptance can be criticized for 
bearing an inherent shortcoming when rigorously followed as the sole source of democratic 
legitimacy. In its radical form, such a consent-oriented vision after all could bring us to the 
Solonian conclusion – as was famously argued by Pierce Butler at the American federal 
convention – that the people not necessarily need the best government that could be devised, 
“but the best they would receive” (Madison, 1787). Such a reasoning in the end could open the 
door to a kind of brave new world, the perfect authoritarian regime in which the illusion of 
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democracy is optimized in such a way that the people indeed believe to live in a democracy and 
consequently perceive the regime as legitimate.  
Therefore, in addition to these basic accounts, a third vision on democratic legitimacy has been 
proposed. It starts from the argument that on their own, neither normative acceptability, nor 
social acceptance presents a sufficient argument for democratic legitimacy. According to this 
integrative approach, democratic legitimacy arises from the mutual acknowledgment between 
the normative and the descriptive dimension (Cheneval 2005; Weiler 1991, 416). That is, 
these dimensions are clearly distinct, yet interconnected and equally necessary elements with 
neither of them being able to make for democratic legitimacy on its own (Rosanvallon 2008, 
19). This concretely means that normative democratic rules are important, but only have real 
political relevance when their accomplishment is recognized by society as a reason for the 
allocation of legitimacy to the system or policy in question. On the other hand, recognition too 
is not per se enough (Cheneval 2005, 2; Bellamy and Castiglione 2003, 10). As pointed out 
before, it is not because a system is recognized as democratically legitimate, that it necessarily 
is democratic in a normative sense. So, recognition must be accompanied by, and follow out of 
a normative democratic framework. A political system or decision must not only be recognized 
as democratic, but also be worthy of such recognition (Habermas 1979, 178). Or, with reference 
to Beetham (2013, 21), the belief in democratic legitimacy needs some democratic substance. 
Summarized, we could visualize these three conceptualisations of democratic legitimacy as 
follows (Figure 1):  
Figure 1: Concepts of democratic legitimacy 
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Albeit the idea of democratic legitimacy as the interplay of acceptability and acceptance has a 
strong theoretical appeal, to assess it in that way confronts the researcher with the problem of 
the concrete, day-to-day, correlation between both dimensions. Although a certain positive 
correlation between acceptability and acceptance could be assumed, concluding an overall 
causal relationship would be problematic. First, as a meta-analysis of different studies about 
the public understanding of democracy suggests, when citizens reflect on the normative value 
of democracy, they primarily identify it in relation to the freedom it assures and the social 
benefits it provides, and only to a lesser degree in terms of institutions and processes (Dalton 
et al. 2008, 4‑6). Hence, insofar as an interaction between the people’s acceptance of a rule and 
its democratic acceptability can be observed, this seems mainly determined by what the 
democratic system offers (substantive output) and less by how it assures popular involvement 
(procedural input). This observation seems further confirmed by research about popular 
participation. Notwithstanding that such participation holds a strong normative claim, studies 
suggest that people do not care about it that much (Dahl 2000, 38; Mudde 2004, 558). 
Furthermore, as people permanently act within a given social context, their appreciation of 
democratic quality will also be guided by subjective and intersubjective beliefs such as 
traditions, identities, and cultures. This means that the acceptance of a rule as democratic does 
not only follow out of rational calculations about the material benefits or individual utility of 
that rule but is also defined by the collective ideas and norms in which the people’s 
understanding of the world is embedded (cf. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2006, 393). Arguably, the 
(history and values of the) regime that people are living in, will also orient the way these people 
understand democracy and what they consider to be democratic (Ferrín Pereira 2012). Someone 
from Switzerland, for example, will plausibly have a different understanding of democracy than 
a French or British resident. Taking all of this into account, the researcher wishing to assess 
democratic legitimacy in an integrated way obviously awaits a complex endeavour. Before a 
researcher can turn attention to if and how the acceptance of a political system or policy links 
to concrete characteristics of democratic acceptability, (s)he first needs to operationalize what 
(s)he considers acceptable. Thereupon, (s)he also needs extensive data about the presence of 
such normative characteristics in the context of that system or policy as well as a good 
understanding of the people’s actual acceptance of the political system or policy, including the 
impact thereon from other, subjective and intersubjective factors. Only then will (s)he be able 
to reasonably evaluate the interlinkages between both dimensions of democratic legitimacy. 
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2. An empirical approach to the evaluation of normative democratic legitimacy 
Each of the three perspectives on democratic legitimacy presented above has its inherent 
problems. The first two, on the one hand, could be criticized for presenting incomplete visions 
of reality. The third, however, confronts us with difficulties of a practical order, as its in-depth 
understanding arguably needs data from various academic fields and different strands of 
research. In the most ideal and complete case the study of democratic legitimacy should look 
at both acceptability and acceptance in an interconnected way. Such study should consider the 
normative democratic legitimacy of a political rule, as well as its empirical legitimacy; and 
thereby assess how they mutually influence and determine each other. However, while from a 
real-world point of view, the integrated approach covers most comprehensively what 
democratic legitimacy is about, examining the interconnections between acceptability and 
acceptance, logically only makes sense once enough knowledge is available about both these 
dimensions, as well as about (which) other factors (that) influence such interconnections.  
Regarding European foreign policy, such basic knowledge is currently not sufficiently 
available. An evaluation of its democratic legitimacy in line with the integrative perspective 
would therefore be problematic. With regard to acceptance – and although polls should of 
course not be confused with the reality of public opinion itself (Sinnott and Lenzi 1997) – 
Eurobarometer research shows a continuously high Europe-wide support for a common 
European foreign policy, including a common defence. According to the standard Barometer 
of Spring 2017, 66% of the respondents are in favour of a common European foreign policy, 
and even a greater number, 75%, is favourable to a common defence17. This consistently 
confirms previous results, which have been equally high18. But, more elaborated research would 
be necessary to see if such general findings are indeed an accurate representation of the public 
acceptance of these policies. Besides, these data do not tell us where such large support comes 
from and, most importantly, how it connects to the EU’s common foreign security and defence 
policy’s actual democratic quality. That is, they do not tell how the acceptance of European 
foreign policy relates to its acceptability. About this last element, the problem is that current 
research about the normative democratic legitimacy of EU foreign policy does not suffice to do 
                                                 
17 Standard Eurobarometer 87, Spring 2017 – First Results, p.31 ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice 
/publicopinion/index.cfm/ResultDoc/download/DocumentKy/79565 [11.08.17]  
18 Cf. for instance: Standard Eurobarometer 83, July 2015, pp.162-77 ec.europa.eu/COMMFront 
Office/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/yearFrom/1974/yearTo/2015/surve
yKy/2099 [08.10.17] 
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so. With references to what I previously said about the existence of different sub-literatures, 
research about the EU’s foreign policy’s actual democratic attributes is too fragmented and 
incomplete to serve as the basis for a comprehensive acceptability-acceptance assessment. As 
I mentioned in the Introduction, democracy related research on the EU’s foreign policy is 
certainly available; but, existing studies mainly focus on separated manifestations of 
democracy. Hence, they mostly omit to look at democratic quality in an inclusive way. Taking 
into account these considerations, this study’s focus lies with the first dimension of 
democratic legitimacy, i.e. democratic legitimacy in terms of normative acceptability. Said 
otherwise, it pursues a comprehensive evaluation of the inherent democratic quality of the 
European Union’s foreign policy.  
Though the study’s basic approach to democratic legitimacy thus is essentially normative, the 
actual assessment will go further than simply checking if the EU’s foreign policy responds to 
certain normative standards of acceptability. I will also try to establish how and to what degree 
it does so (cf. Bühlmann et al. 2012, 116). After all, democracy (neither in terms of 
acceptability; nor, for that matter, in terms of acceptance) is not an all-or-nothing affair in which 
a dichotomous distinction could be made between presence and absence. Democracy is a 
continuous concept that includes various degrees (Bollen 1991, 9‑10), and should be dealt with 
accordingly. To the extent that the classical normative approach is essentially preoccupied with 
the plain presence or absence of formal attributes of democracy, it neglects to look at how these 
attributes interact with reality. The mere existence of formally democratic institutions or 
procedures, however, does not in itself deliver democracy. When, for instance, participation is 
put forward as a key characteristic of democracy, a radically normative approach tends to focus 
on the formal possibility for such participation to take place, and not (or at least less) at its real 
existence and practice. The present study in contrast envisages a wider understanding of the 
realisation of normative characteristics; including both their formal presence and their actual 
employment (cf. Chapter V, 3 infra). In that sense, it applies a more empirical focus on 
normative democratic legitimacy. It should be clear however that this empirical working 
method does not include a verdict about its acceptance, but simply means that I will include – 
where possible and useful – an assessment of the actual use that is made of normative attributes; 
that is, an assessment that goes further than merely monitoring if a normative requirement is 
formally accomplished. 
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3. Conclusion 
Democratic legitimacy as a concept essentially means two things. On the one hand, from a 
normative point of view, democratic legitimacy is about acceptability, and deals with the 
inherent democratic qualities of a political rule. On the other hand, the acceptance idea 
interprets it in terms of the people recognizing such rule as democratic. In addition to these 
basic accounts, an integrative approach conceptualizes it as resulting from a combination of 
both acceptability and acceptance.  
In the context of this thesis, I will look at democratic legitimacy in terms of normative 
acceptability. Without denying, nor diminishing the relevance of acceptance as an integrated 
part of overall democratic legitimacy, I opt for that focus because a comprehensive 
understanding of acceptability is imperative for further, more inclusive acceptability-
acceptance research; and because such a comprehensive understanding of its acceptability is 
not yet (sufficiently) available regarding European foreign policy. With regard to the actual 
assessment of such acceptability, I however opt for an empirical approach that goes further than 
the purely normative approach. The evaluation of the EU’s foreign policy’s democratic 
legitimacy will look behind its formal democratic characteristics by not so much judging if such 
characteristics are present, but by evaluating how they are present.  
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II. Foreign policy and democracy 
Summary: Under this heading, I discuss why it is relevant to study the democratic legitimacy 
of foreign policy. I look at the complicated relationship between foreign policy and 
democracy and offer arguments for a democratic foreign policy.  
Of course, the question can be asked why one should, as a matter of fact, care about the 
democratic legitimacy of European foreign policy? To fully grasp this question, it is important 
to distinguish between its two main elements, foreign policy and European. This chapter 
elaborates on the arguments for democracy in relation to foreign policy in general. Further on 
(Part II, introduction), I will discuss the particular arguments with regard to European foreign 
policy. 
1. Foreign policy and democracy: a changing relation 
It has been argued for a long time that democracy is incompatible with foreign policy. 
Classical writers, such as John Locke or Alexis de Tocqueville had strong doubts about the 
democratic participation of the people in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. 
According to John Locke (1821 [1689], 329) for instance; the law-making power, an assembly 
of representatives, is usually too numerous and too slow in matters which require a fast and 
effective execution, as does foreign policy. Alexis de Tocqueville (1836, 2:103, 99) on the other 
hand, wrote that foreign policy calls for the use of almost all those qualities in which a 
democracy is deficient. Therefore, it should be executed outside of the direct and daily influence 
of the people. Foreign policy should be a prerogative of the executive (cf. Jefferson 1790; Hegel 
1911 [1821], §329) and “cannot be placed at the service of a parliamentary majority without 
being forced into wrong paths” (Bismarck 1922 [1887], 195). This line of thought continued 
to resound even through twentieth century Realist theories. Gabriel Almond (1956, 372), for 
instance, contends that “[the] situation of extraordinary gravity [of foreign policy], […] put 
the utmost strain on our capacity to make and maintain a foreign policy which is both 
democratic and effective.” Democracy in foreign policy would, so its critics claim, lead to both 
disruption from below and derailment from above. The popular pressure to which democratic 
government must respond would drive foreign policy of the path of cool reason and calculated 
reflection necessary to deal with an anarchistic and complex world, and democratic leaders 
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would be influenced – especially during elections – by incentives not always in line with the 
wisdom and foresight needed to conduct a foreign policy (Nincic 1992, 5‑6). 
More recently however, conceptions of foreign policy have changed, and over time it has 
been increasingly perceived as a normal public policy (Kessler 2002, 167‑92). An important 
cause for this desecration of foreign policy lies with the fact that it can call less and less upon 
its high politics status as a reason for democratic exemption. Especially since World War I, the 
idea that foreign policy could be safely left exclusively in the hands of professionals lost its 
appeal (Carr 1946, 2). Also, as the international scene is no longer only the playing field of 
States (also international organizations, NGOs or multinational enterprises have become active 
on the global level) and it cannot be argued anymore that foreign policy solely deals with issues 
of State survival and territorial integrity; the Realist vision on foreign policy as a set of purely 
rational actions which only concern the power of the State and which in the end are external to 
the people’s daily life (cf. Morgenthau and Thompson 1985), is difficult to maintain. After all, 
by dealing with topics of (international) security and peace or the protection and defence of 
interests, foreign policy impacts on citizens’ lives in many ways. The deployment of military 
missions not only has political and fiscal repercussions (i.e. how much can be dedicated to other 
policy domains), but even put citizens’ lives at risk (Wagner 2007, 3; also: Headley et al. 2012, 
viii). So, when, for instance, the EU Member States decide to oppose Russia’s policy towards 
Ukraine by imposing sanctions on the country, the subsequent retaliation measures by means 
of a boycott against European import impact on the lives of EU citizens. In that way, foreign 
policy decisions are clearly not neutral. Therefore, it is increasingly questioned whether they 
should not also respond to certain democratic principles. Likewise, the argument of complexity 
does not hold: it can indeed be questioned how complexity could be an argument against 
democracy (Eriksen 2011, 1173), as amongst today’s public affairs foreign policy is certainly 
not the only complex matter. In short, as Helene Sjursen (2007, 2, also: 2013a, 144) states, “in 
practical terms, it is becoming increasingly difficult to argue that democratic accountability 
and openness should be set aside when [matters of foreign security and defence] are 
discussed”. Furthermore, public contestation of foreign policy actions (such as protests against 
participation in military actions abroad) or other expressions of international commitment by 
citizens are certainly not suggesting a popular disinterest in the content or implementation of 
foreign policy justifying its exclusion from democratic procedures, common to other, domestic 
policies (Cohen 2000, 5‑6).  
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Moreover, research increasingly affirms that democratic control of foreign policy usually 
improves the quality of the latter (Koenig-Archibugi 2002, 69; Schultz 2001). That is, a growing 
body of political research demonstrates that democracies tend to be more successful in their 
foreign security endeavours (Reiter and Stam 2002) and that they do have to devote fewer 
resources to them (Fordham and Walker 2005). Also from a democratic peace point of view – 
claiming that democracies do not make war on each other (Weart 1998; Russett 1990; and in 
an earlier version, also Paine 1920 [1776], 53‑54)19 – it obviously follows that especially the 
policy actions through which external relations are defined should not escape basic democratic 
procedures.  
2. Foreign policy, different but not insurmountably different  
Notwithstanding the changing outlook on democracy and foreign policy, foreign policy remains 
a particular setting. Sudden international developments can require rapid and decisive action, 
sometimes difficult to reconcile with the classical democratic procedure which tends to be 
rather incremental and slow. Given this particular setting, it is for instance still true that 
diplomacy often needs a certain degree of secrecy (cf. Chapter IV, 5.2.1 infra) and that 
especially in matters of foreign policy, we need to guard a delicate balance between democracy 
and efficiency (Cohen 2000, 10). More concretely, foreign policy proves different from other 
governmental affairs, mainly for three reasons: 
• First of all, foreign policy is different from domestic politics in that law-making is less 
central to it (Sjursen 2011b, 1072). In reference to a distinction introduced by Luuk van 
Middelaar (2016, 3-4), foreign policy could be categorized as ‘politics of events’ rather 
than ‘politics of rules’. That is, more than about the establishment of norms, the 
distribution of welfare or the organisation of public services, foreign policy is about 
(re)actions and decisions to be taken in the light of unforeseen events. Foreign policy is 
essentially about responding to the outside world and about defining the polity’s 
behaviour towards other international actors and events. It is about setting strategic 
goals and policy positions, rather than about defining the rules for the internal 
organization of the own society. In doing so, foreign policy is directed towards peoples 
and territories over which the policy makers, in fact, have no formal authority. Instead 
                                                 
19 For an overview of democratic peace theory literature, see: Rummel, R.J. (2009), Democratic 
Peace Bibliography - Version August, 2009 hawaii.edu/powerkills/DP.BIBLIO.2009.HTML 
[09.05.16].  
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of focussing on the laws that shape the own polity and the regulation of the relations 
between citizens within that polity, a foreign policy aims to influence the actions, 
behaviour, and even the law making of other polities (cf. Adnan 2014, 657‑58).  
• Secondly, in foreign policy, possibilities for agenda setting are restricted. Although 
it is surely justified under democratic governance to expect citizens to have the 
opportunity to decide what are political matters and what should be brought up for 
deliberation (Dahl 1989, 112‑14), this is simply not always possible in foreign affairs. 
Often, if not most of the time, the foreign policy agenda is determined by external 
changes and sudden events. Different from domestic agenda setting – although of course 
occasionally also triggered by singular events – foreign policy often does not emerge 
gradually but tends to be determined by crises and dramatic occurrences, and to be 
driven by a continuous stream of exogenous policy events (Wood and Peake 1998, 
173‑74, 182). Indeed, it can be argued that policy actors altogether do not choose their 
foreign policy (Hill 2003, 292‑97). 
• Additionally, there is the less direct impact of elections on the foreign policy process as 
such. Thomas Zweifel (2006, 15) states that the particularity of the international context 
is the absence of elections. It can be maintained that his is true, not only for international 
organizations but, up to a certain degree, also for foreign policy. Although key foreign 
policy actors of course can be elected – and notwithstanding foreign policy issues surely 
can play a role during elections and even have a decisive impact on their outcome 
(Saldin 2009) –we can still argue that concrete, day-to-day foreign policy as such seems 
at least less than other, domestic policies directly defined by the results of elections. 
This does not mean that there could (and will) not be any impact from the public opinion 
and the people’s political behaviour on the foreign policy (Aldrich et al. 2006); but 
taking into account the specific characteristics of the international game as well as the 
essentially reactive nature of foreign policy and the limited agenda setting possibilities 
mentioned before, it can be understood that foreign policy is less predictable and 
sometimes more difficult to plan on the long term. In that way, the outcomes of elections 
tend to impact more limitedly on the daily, on-the-field foreign policy actions, especially 
where it concerns issues of security and defence. 
While it is true that these ‘structural differences’ – making foreign policy different from 
domestic policy areas – do not exempt such foreign policy from democratic scrutiny (Sjursen 
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2011b, 1072); we should not overlook how they impact on the way in which democracy can 
and will be assured. Indeed, as argued before, foreign policy has consequences for citizens and 
therefore may be expected to be democratically answerable. Yet, even when we demand such 
democratic answerability with good reason, we should keep in mind that it can likely not be 
realized in precisely the same way and through exactly the same channels as other, domestically 
oriented policies…. 
3. A democratic foreign policy 
If foreign and security policy were to be democratic, what would it look like (Sjursen 2013b, 
143)? In other words, when could a foreign policy, normatively, be called democratic? Which 
standards does it have to meet? In modern politological literature, a large variety of normative 
democratic criteria have been developed. Depending on different ideological or theoretical 
backgrounds, different norms have been put forward which a system or policy must meet if it 
wants to be classified as democratic (cf. Lord 2008; Stie 2008; Held 2006; Barber 2003; 
Lijphart 1999; Dahl 1989). However, classical paradigms – focusing mainly on elections and 
the involvement of the people – tend to apply less to foreign policy than they do to other – 
domestic – policies. Moreover, just as for other, domestic, policies, the sole fact that the foreign 
policy in question is laid down by an elected executive is thereby, I believe, an inadequate 
guarantee for its democratic legitimacy. That is, just like Gerry Mackie (2009, 129) or Karl 
Popper (1971, 120‑25), I do not agree with the one-sided focus on leadership selection we find 
in the writings of Max Weber (1968, 1450‑51) or Joseph Schumpeter (1994, 269‑73). In 
modern, liberal societies, the competitive election of decision-makers can – although a 
necessary – not be a sufficient foundation for democracy (cf. also: Rothstein 2009). Therefore, 
also other ways need to exist to make a foreign policy democratic and criteria – without direct 
reference to law-making or popular control of the agenda, and a recognition of the more limited 
impact of elections – are needed to judge this policy’s democratic quality. 
To provide such criteria with valid foundations, explicitly anchoring them in democratic theory, 
the next chapters will proceed by advocating for democratic auditing as an assessment method. 
Starting from a normative argument for democracy (cf. Merkel and Bühlmann 2011, 34; Saward 
1994, 6‑7) – which will also help to reinforce the claim that there are no sufficient grounds for 
exempting foreign policy from the basic democratic principles that rule other policy domains – 
a set of further democratic conditions will be argued for. These conditions, in fact, are 
requirements, or criteria, that a foreign policy must arguably have incorporated in its actual 
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working to be classified as normatively democratic. They are minimum standards against which 
to judge a foreign policy. To enable their actual assessment, I then will formulate specific 
indicators for each of them. 
4. Conclusion 
Foreign policy has particular traits, making it different from other, domestic, policies. However, 
the democratic exemption that historically has been argued to follow out of these particularities 
increasingly lost its pertinence. Although foreign policy indeed presents a less central role for 
law making, has limited possibilities for agenda setting, and is less defined by elections, given 
that it impacts on the lives of citizens just like other policies, foreign policy is nowadays 
commonly expected to respond to certain democratic norms. In Chapter IV, I will discuss 
criteria that enable us to assess how well a foreign policy lives up to such norms. 
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III. Auditing democratic legitimacy 
Summary: The evaluation method underlying the assessment of the EU’s foreign policy’s 
normative democratic legitimacy used in this thesis is essentially that of a democratic audit. 
This chapter therefore discusses this method by looking at its origins and key characteristics, 
while arguing why it presents a good evaluation tool, not only to assess overall political 
systems, but also more specific policy’s, including foreign policy.  
1. Assessing democracy 
The assessment of a polity’s democratic qualities is an old idea. Having its early roots in the 
work of Aristotle on the comparison of different theories of government and existing regimes 
(cf. Beetham 1999, 567) to find the sort of political community that is superior to all (Aristotle 
2013, 25), it also represents an important element in the writings of Alexis de Tocqueville who’s 
‘De la démocratie en Amérique’ in a certain way presents a qualitative democratic assessment 
avant la lettre. However, it is especially in more recent times that (comparative) studies about 
the democratic nature of regimes and countries gained importance as a distinct field of political 
research. Starting with the work of Lipset (1959) on the socio-economic requisites for 
democracy and the early work of Robert Dahl (1956) in which he compares Madisonian, 
populistic and polyarchal democracy, we see the emergence of an increasingly complicated 
classification of different types of democracy (cf. Held 1987; Hendriks 2010) and the testing of 
existing systems against (one of) these models. This leads to both studies aiming to examine if, 
and to prove that democracies tend to fare better than non-democracies as well as quantified 
comparisons between different countries’ levels of democracy. In addition, we also see how, 
since the last decade of the 20th century, the assessment of democracy has been increasingly 
driven by a more practical and policy-oriented purpose.  
Thus, basically, three types of democracy assessment can be distinguished (cf. Beetham 2004, 
2). First, there are those studies that focus on the link between democracy and various economic 
variables (cf. Maravall 1997; Diamond 1992; Waisman 1992). Secondly, we have the so-called 
league tables. Presenting a ranking of countries based on a quantified evaluation of their 
democratic or human rights record, these indexes such as the Freedom House Index (Freedom 
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House)20, Polity IV (Centre for Systemic Peace)21 or the Democracy Index (Economist 
Intelligence Unit)22 are mainly developed by private organisations. Finally, there are the 
assessments of individual countries that essentially serve a policy purpose. Carried out, or 
requested by government agencies or international organisations, these studies do not only 
search to understand but also to give input to future policy. On the one hand, by identifying 
possible deficits of a democratic order in third countries and preconceiving their rectification 
as a political precondition for international cooperation or development aid, they (can) (help) 
define the way in which the evaluating entity approaches the country in question (cf. Sorensen 
2013; Stokke 2013). In a similar vein the EU takes democracy as a precondition for accession 
and monitors its state and development in candidate countries23. On the other hand, such kind 
of policy-oriented assessments can also concern an internal self-evaluation. An example of this 
is the Dutch Legitimacy-monitor (Hendriks et al. 2011, 2013, 2016) 
The emergence of these policy-oriented assessments, however, in turn also leads to a changing 
focus in academic research and stimulates a reorientation towards a more qualitative approach. 
That is, more fine-grained assessments emerge that take distance from the classical league 
tables which essentially chart a country’s overall democratic performance relative to that of 
others; but do not so much tell how that country’s democratic quality takes form and of what 
different aspects it is composed. Interesting examples of such elaborated qualitative 
assessments can be found with Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem), or with the Democracy 
Barometer (DB). 
Varieties of Democracy concerns a large project co-hosted by the University of Gothenburg 
and the Kellogg Institute at the University of Notre Dame. It is a large-scale project that aims 
to conceptualize and measure the degree and types of democracy for all countries in the world 
(in June 2018, the dataset covers a total of 201 countries), over a long period of time (since 
1900). Starting from the observation that we “cannot mark [democracy’s] progress and 
setbacks” if we “cannot measure [it] in sufficient detail and with the necessary nuance” 
(Lindberg et al. 2014, 159), V-Dem at the same time acknowledges the complexity of 
democracy as a system of rule that goes beyond the simple presence of elections. The project 
                                                 
20 freedomhouse.org/reports [08.12.17]. 
21 systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html [08.12.17]. 
22 eiu.com/topic/democracy-index [08.12.17]. 
23 European Commission, Conditions for membership ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement 
/policy/conditions-membership_en [07.12.17]. 
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thus adopts a multidimensional and disaggregated approach. More concretely, it takes into 
account seven Key Principles which “taken together offer a fairly comprehensive accounting 
of the concept [of democracy] as employed today” (Coppedge et al. 2017a, 3‑4). While each of 
these principles represents a different variety of, or approach to democracy, and none of them 
embodies on its own all meanings of democracy; together they essentially cover what 
democracy in all its diversity has been- or is understood to be. These principles are: (1) electoral, 
(2) liberal, (3) majoritarian, (4) consensual, (5) participatory, (6) deliberative and (7) 
egalitarian. For each of these main types, the researchers then have defined some 50 
components and sub-components. These in turn are evaluated through a total of around so far 
450 indicators (there are no indices for majoritarian and consensual democracy yet). These 
indicators are of three types. First, there are those that concern observable facts and that can be 
found in existing secondary sources. They do not require additional coding. Approximately a 
quarter of the indicators are of this type. Secondly there are indicators for which data is gathered 
from country-specific sources (approx. a quarter of the indicators). And finally, there are 
indicators that are evaluated through country specific expert knowledge (approx. half of the 
indicators).  
Together with the previously mentioned long-scale historical approach, it is especially this last 
group of indicators that makes for the particularity of the V-Dem project (for a comparison with 
other measurement projects, see: Coppedge et al. 2017b). These indicators are namely 
essentially assessed by country experts – mainly academics or policymakers who are nationals 
of and/or residents in a country, with profound knowledge about that country and of a specific 
substantive area (usually 15-20 per country)24. Moreover, in contrast for instance with the 
previously mentioned Democracy Index, V-Dem shows clear transparency with regard to who 
these experts are.  
The Democracy Barometer, for its part, is developed by the University of Zurich and the Social 
Science Research Center Berlin. It starts from an explicit critique on established democracy 
measurements such as Freedom House or Polity IV. These classical indexes are said to suffer 
from a major shortcoming: as they are based on a too minimalistic – or on the contrary, too 
detailed – democracy concept, they are insufficiently differentiated to grasp the nuances 
between established democracies (Bühlmann et al. 2012, 118). The DB therefore proposes a 
                                                 
24 Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) pol.gu.se/english/varieties-of-democracy--v-dem-/data 
[17.10.17]. 
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new democracy index. Based on a middle range concept of democracy, it especially focuses on 
the evaluation of established democracies. Important thereby is that the Democracy Barometer 
takes the time to extensively explain its normative and theoretical foundations. Taking into 
account elements of both liberal and participatory models of democracy, it starts from the 
premise that a democratic system searches for a balance between the interdependent values of 
freedom and equality and therefore requires control. From these three constituting principles of 
democracy the Barometer subsequently derives nine functions, from whose degree of 
accomplishment the democratic quality of the system depends. To concretely evaluate these 
accomplishments, the DB operationalizes the nine functions by disaggregating each of them in 
two components (total: 18), which then finally are measured through several sub-components 
(total: 51) and indicators (total: 100)25. 
The Democracy Barometer does not look at concrete policy outputs to evaluate a system’s 
democratic quality. However, it is interesting to note that it does not only look at formal rules 
neither, but also at actual democratic praxis (Merkel and Bühlmann 2011, 34). Besides, the 
Democracy Barometer recognizes the inherent complexity of democracy by acknowledging 
that the simultaneous maximisation of the nine functions is – although theoretically desirable – 
most unlikely (Bühlmann et al. 2012, 123). Thus, the Barometer has – starting from a ‘best 
practice’ scale developed on the basis of a blueprint of 30 established democracies26 – examined 
the quality of 70 established and new democracies while measuring the differences that exist 
between them, both at the level of individual functions as well as the overall, aggregated state 
of democracy. 
In that way, the Democracy Barometer offers an assessment of democratic quality that runs 
deeper than most other measurements. By arguing for a well-defined concept of democracy, 
while at the same time fully recognizing the inherent and multivariable complexity of 
democracy, the DB has the advantage of being both comprehensive and discriminatory. Thus, 
the Barometer makes it possible to understand better how democracy internally takes form and 
offers a greater understanding of the democratic strongholds and weaknesses of a given polity. 
On the other hand, however, just like V-Dem, the Democracy Barometer ultimately stays a 
quantifying exercise, in which qualitative assessments are translated in numerical values. Such 
                                                 
25 democracybarometer.org/concept_en.html [11.08.17] 
26 That is all countries that have constantly been rated as full-fledged democracies by both the 
Freedom House and the Polity index from 1995 to 2005 (Bühlmann et al. 2012, 527). 
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‘quantification’ indeed could claim validity from a methodological point of view because it 
facilitates comparison between cases. Yet, we can agree with Beetham (2004, 3) that “there is 
considerable room for subjectivity, not to say arbitrariness, in translating qualitative 
judgements into quantitative measures”. Also, in that way, the rich data and extensive 
assessment risks to be pushed into the background, until in the end only the overall numerical 
score of a country will be remembered. 
Showing important similarities with the Democracy Barometer where it concerns the 
argumentation for a clear democracy concept, and with both V-Dem and the Democracy 
Barometer regarding the selection of numerous indices through which to measure the different 
elements of a democratic order is democratic auditing. This more radically qualitative – but 
therefore also less comparative – approach searches for a profound assessment of democratic 
quality. As the assessment of the EU foreign policy’s democratic legitimacy carried out in this 
thesis applies this method, the remainder of this chapter will deal with this Democratic Audit 
in more detail. 
2. Democratic audit: a different way to measure democracy 
The idea of a democratic audit originates with a research project set-up at the University of 
Essex in 1991. Funded by the Joseph Rowntee Charitable Trust, the project’s main purpose has 
been to conduct a systemised inquiry into the democratic quality of the UK’s public life and 
institutions, and to provide more rigorous evidence about the country’s state of democracy on 
the eve of the millennium. Said otherwise, the DA aims to construct a ‘balance sheet’ about the 
democratic condition of the UK and to ascertain the enduring strengths and failings of its 
political arrangements that lie beyond the individual character of policy and politicians 
(Beetham and Weir 2002, 4). Such a first assessment, then, can also serve as a benchmark; that 
is a point of reference to assess future democratic developments. As a theoretical starting point, 
the audit defines democracy in terms of two related principles, being public control and political 
equality (cf. Chapter IV, 1, 2 infra). As, however, these principles are too general to be 
effectively measured as such, they are separated into four distinct yet overlapping dimensions. 
Each dimension then deals with a set of so-called Democratic Audit Criteria (DACs) through 
which these basic principles can be assessed in practice (Beetham 1994, 28‑31). These 
dimensions concern (1) the presence of free and fair elections, (2) an open, accountable and 
responsive government, (3) guaranteed political and civil rights and freedom, and (4) a publicly 
active citizenry. In that way, in total 30 DACs are put forward. Formulated as a question (“how 
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far”, how equal”, “to what extent”), each audit criterion deals with a specific feature of the 
UK’s political system and public life and searches the data that are required to evaluate how 
democratic this feature is (Beetham 1999, 570‑71, for an overview of the audit criteria: 1994, 
36‑39). The data that are used are generally of three kinds. First, there are legal rules that govern 
the rights, powers and responsibilities in a specific area. Secondly, there is the evidence about 
how (well) these legal rules are implemented in practice. And, finally, the DA of the UK looks 
for negative indicators, pointing out specific democratic deficiencies or failures. As a standard 
against which to measure these data, the UK’s audit departs from international standards of 
good practice, however with respect for the local context and the interdependencies that (can) 
exist between the different constitutive elements of a democratic political system. In addition, 
where such good practice standards are less developed or accepted, standards are also derived 
from rules and principles defined by international organisations or treaties (Beetham 1999, 
571‑74). In practical terms, given the size and the complexity of the endeavour, the actual audit 
takes form through different studies each focussing on another dimension of democracy as 
defined through the theoretical outline of the concept (Beetham 2002; Weir and Beetham 1999; 
Klug 1996). 
Given that the idea of democracy underlying the UK audit and the criteria that are used are not 
specific to the British political system but generic for democratic systems in general, they can 
be applied to assess democracies elsewhere. Building on the Democratic Audit of the United 
Kingdom, a do-it-yourself audit package has therefore been developed by the International 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). Allowing citizens to answer the 
simple questions ‘How democratic are our country and its government’ and ‘What are the 
strengths and weaknesses of our democracy?’ (Beetham et al. 2008, 18), citizens in any country 
can use it to assess their own country’s level of democracy. Basically, the method proposed for 
IDEA’s State of Democracy Assessment Framework (SDAF) is similar to the UK audit. Starting 
from the same principles of public control and political equality, it also looks at different aspects 
of the democratic life. It moves away from a focus on the simple existence of democratic 
institutions but looks at their performance too. Yet, at the same time, the actual audit framework 
has undergone important revisions. These are introduced to grasp better the considerable 
variation that exists with regard to the practical, organisational forms of democracy. Hence, in 
the course of the process of developing the SDAF, the four dimensions used in the UK audit 
became fifteen (for an overview, see: Beetham et al. 2008, 26), yet with fewer questions for 
each. Where it concerns the interpretation and emphasis given to each questions of the 
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framework, the selection of evidence and the final judgement, this has been a matter for the 
country assessors as they think appropriate (Beetham 2004, 5). The same goes for the choice of 
benchmarks and standards against which to measure the evidence. After all, the framework may 
well be guided by the premise that democracy is a universal value and aspiration; it also 
recognizes that the actual organization of a democratic system is context-sensitive and results 
from various historical processes and regional differences (Beetham et al. 2008, 20, 285). In 
that way, since its launch in 2000, the framework has so far been used in 24 countries27 – 
ranging from what are traditionally recognized as established democracies, such as Australia 
(Sawer et al. 2009) or the Netherlands (Andeweg and Thomassen 2013), and relatively new 
democracies like Latvia (Rozenvalds 2005) or South Africa (Calland and Graham 2005), to less 
evident cases such as Mongolia (Landman et al. 2006) – to assess (parts of) their democratic 
organisation and system. Hence, similar to the Democracy Barometer or Varieties of 
Democracy, the IDEA audit offers a wide-range assessment tool, applicable to developed and 
developing democracies alike. 
Not using the IDEA framework, yet also explicitly referring to the democratic audit approach 
as its method of assessment, is Christopher Lord’s (2004) study about the democratic state of 
the European Union. Starting from the observation that the EU is commonly criticized for being 
a political system in democratic deficit, the question is asked about the nature of that deficit. 
More specifically, the audit aims to determine if this deficit is brought about by any actual 
democratic shortcomings. In other words, it looks at the democratic qualities or deficiencies 
that pertain to the EU’s overall political system or to some of it parts in particular (Lord 2004, 
1). In doing so, this research is the first attempt to apply democratic auditing beyond the specific 
framework of the State. Again, this audit starts from the same basic definition of democracy. 
Following an account about why the European Union ought to be democratic and a reflexion 
on the particularities and complexity of the EU’s governance system, as well as on which 
models of democracy should be applied to the EU, it derives indices of democracy through a 
series of clearly argued steps. Concluding that the dominant cleavage on what would count as 
a democratic European Union is one between different visions of consensus democracy, and in 
reference to Ferry’s (2000, 10) argument that European integration has to have/ has a ‘double 
normative reference point’ – to know, both national democracies and individual citizens – it 
presents 12 ‘European Democratic Audit tests’ (EUDA’s), organised along five attributes of 
                                                 
27 idea.int/data-tools/tools/state-democracy-assessments/assessments-worldwide [11.08.17] 
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democratic governance. These are citizenship, authorisation, representation, accountability 
and constitutionalism (Lord 2004, 25‑29). For its actual assessment, then, it looks at specific 
procedures and instruments, each institution of the Union, the three pillars (of which the Union 
was officially still composed at the time of appraisal), as well as the EU as a whole and 
processes of institutional design. In that way, a picture is drawn of the EU’s democratic situation 
that takes distance from the classical generalisations for or against the presence of a democratic 
deficit. Thus, the audit evaluates the performance of the Union with regard to the different 
democratic attributes and the relation that exists between them. By doing so, it considers the 
EU’s democratic quality in a more comprehensive way. 
3.  Democratic audit: main features 
What, now, are the main features of democratic auditing, and why do I contend that it is a useful 
approach for the assessment of the EU’s foreign policy’s democratic legitimacy?  
Looking at the above account of the methodology’s subsequent applications, democratic 
auditing can be defined as “a systematic assessment of institutional performance against 
agreed criteria and standards, so as to provide a reasonably authoritative judgement as to how 
satisfactory the procedures and arrangements of the given institution are” (Weir and Beetham 
1999, 4). It concerns a systematic and comprehensive appraisal of the democratic state of affairs 
of a political system and, in that way, does not so much look at if something is democratic, but 
how it is democratic (cf. Baker 1999, 2). Democratic auditing implies an in-depth and 
comprehensive scrutiny of the state of democracy of a given system.  
In that way – and although it shares some common features and methodological problems with 
other forms of democratic assessment – democratic auditing is different in a number of 
significant aspects (Beetham 1999, 568). Essentially, we can distinguish four key features that 
are decisive for democratic auditing as an assessment method: 
• Although many attempts to determine a coherent assessment framework for democracy 
exist, these discussions traditionally tend to be embedded in a detailed and well-outlined 
vision on what democracy ought to be. Based on an understanding of democracy as for 
instance competitive elitist (Held 2006, 157; Lijphart 1999, 10‑25) or deliberative (Held 
2006, 215; Stie 2008)28, competing sets of assessment criteria have been proposed. In 
                                                 
28 For an interesting summary of different models of democracy, see: Hendriks 2010, 25. 
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the end, however, these first and foremost evaluate how well a political system agrees 
with that specific, presupposed model and not how democratic it is from a larger 
perspective. Democratic auditing, however, is more model-unspecific. Admittedly, in 
the concrete applications discussed before, there is reference to liberal democracy (UK 
audit, IDEA) or to consensus democracy (EU audit), but these concepts are used as a 
generic starting point, rather than as a precise and clearly demarcated objective. 
Democratic auditing does not put forward an idealised vision of democracy. It does not 
understand democracy as an all-or-nothing affair but recognizes that the species 
democracy shows considerable variations (Beetham 1999, 577) which may have been 
realised through very different institutional forms (cf. Beetham 2004, 13). Thus, 
democratic auditing offers a generalizable method of appraisal that in the end could 
enable us to evaluate different forms of democracy without philosophical presumptions 
about which of them is better. 
• In line with the above, it follows that the democratic audit method is also more flexible 
with regard to the actual audit criteria. First, as criteria are not derived from a specific 
model, but from a generic conception of democracy, the evaluator has more liberty 
regarding their selection. In fact, (s)he is invited to take argued responsibility over the 
criteria that (s)he judges most appropriate for the assessment of a given political setting 
(Beetham 1999, 578, 579; cf. also Baker 1999, 4). Furthermore, criteria are formulated 
in generalizable terms (Beetham 1994, 31). Thus, they allow the assessment of how well 
– that is to what extent, and not only if yes or no – distinct democratic practices do live 
up to them. After all, if what counts as democratic is less definitive and open to 
legitimate variation between political systems, criteria must be sufficiently general to 
evaluate these different practices in their own right. Criteria are rules against which to 
test concrete practices, not definitions of or descriptions for such practices. Hence, they 
“must be couched in sufficiently general terms [that] enable us to distinguish those 
differences that comprise legitimate variations of practice from those that constitute 
deviations from a given standard of democracy” (Beetham and Weir 2002, 17). 
• Departing from the “conviction that a functioning democracy requires many 
interdependent elements which, though separable for analytical purpose are all 
necessary to the effectiveness of the whole” (Beetham 2004, 8), the democratic audit 
method scrutinizes democracy in a holistic manner without losing out of sight its 
different, constitutive parts. While looking at both individual attributes of democracy as 
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well as the overall state of affairs of a democratic rule (Beetham and Weir 2002, 4; Lord 
2004, 4), the Democratic Audit addresses both strengths and weaknesses of structures 
and procedures, and the interactions and trade-offs that can exist between them. It goes 
beyond a one-on-one discussion of different democratic characteristics and assesses 
them in an interconnected way, though without aggregating these assessments into one 
overall single score of democracy (Beetham 1999, 569). By doing so, democratic 
auditing fully acknowledges the inherent complexity of democracy. 
• Finally, democratic auditing involves the combination of a normative understanding of 
democracy with empirical findings. It is a normative approach in that it starts from a 
basic definition of democracy, based on which different normative criteria are 
identified; but it proposes an empirical assessment that connects these normative criteria 
with findings on the concrete practices of an actual political system. Drawing on a mix 
of qualitative as well as quantitative resources, it assesses actual democracy. In that 
sense, it can be classified as an ‘applied normative analysis’ (Beetham 1999, 577). 
Taking into account these characteristics, the audit process then materializes through a 
combination of five, more or less consecutive research phases. Much like, for instance, also the 
Democracy Barometer, a democratic audit starts by arguing for an inherently defensible concept 
of democracy based on clearly articulated democratic values. As we have seen, these concern 
the key principles of public control and political equality (for a discussion about why exactly 
these principles, cf. Chapter IV, 1, 2 infra). As these principles, however, are too large to serve 
as precise assessment tools (Beetham et al. 2008, 21) they should be made measurable. 
Although the different audits mentioned before can be somewhat confusing on this point – as 
they differ with regard to the procedure through which they deduce measurable assessment 
criteria, as well as their choice of wording in this regard (cf. Chapter IV, 6 infra) – the point 
here is that the evaluator needs to come to a comprehensive set of concrete units of assessment 
through which to assess how these key principles shape and define the actual institutions, 
procedures and practices of the political system or policy in question. Thirdly, the benchmarks 
of assessment need to be determined. That is, the evaluator needs to argue for the standards of 
measurement: how will (s)he make his/her judgement about how well the criteria are lived up 
to? Subsequently, a large deal of time and effort will have to go to the collection of the relevant 
information and evidence that will enable such judgement. Finally, these data then must be 
reviewed in light of the criteria and measurement standard defined before in order to reach a 
systematic assessment. 
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4. Democratic audit and the EU’s foreign policy 
So far, the democratic audit method has been used to assess the overall democratic quality of 
individual countries, and the EU. These audits have looked at the democraticness of a political 
system, and have only considered specific policies, where this is judged relevant to the 
evaluation of said system. In that sense, the focus of current democratic auditing essentially lies 
with what Hendriks et al. (2013, 7, 11) have called system legitimacy. Yet, following these 
authors in their distinction between such system legitimacy and two other objects of legitimacy, 
namely actors and policy, I contend that democratic auditing also could be used to assess the 
democratic quality of a specific policy domain. Being an integrated combination of possible 
laws and actions coming from one or more public authorities, linked to proper budget lines and 
a distinct administrative structure, guided towards a more or less clearly defined set of 
objectives (cf. Rose and Davies 1994, 54), distinct public policies are, in fact, political 
subsystems which therefore can be expected to meet certain democratic standards as well, 
independently from the global political system from which they emanate. Hence, they should 
be evaluated accordingly. 
That is why I consider the method particularly appealing to assess European foreign and 
security policy. First of all, given the presence of different democratic traditions within the 
European Union, it is unrealistic to suppose the presence of a commonly agreed model against 
which its democratic quality could be evaluated (cf. Lord 2004, 6). This seems even more the 
case where it concerns its foreign policy. National foreign policies are strongly embedded in 
distinct identity images present within the different EU Member States and have developed 
according to contrasting narratives (Tonra 2011). Therefore, their factual functioning as well 
as the way this will be democratically perceived, vary widely. That is why measuring the 
European Union, and in particular its foreign policy against a specific, previously decided idea 
about the concrete form of democracy will prove unsatisfactory. Furthermore, foreign policy 
has some particularities that make it difficult to apply classical paradigms of democracy that 
we find in most established democracy models (cf. Chapter II supra). All of this, however, does 
not mean that the EU and its foreign policy cannot be democratic and should not be evaluated 
in that regard. Democratic auditing allows us to do so. Given its model-unspecific approach 
and its inherent flexibility regarding the actual indices of assessment, democratic auditing 
enables the appraisal of the democratic qualities and shortcomings of European foreign policy 
in a realistic way. Besides, the applied normative approach the method advocates corresponds 
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with the empirical focus on normative democratic legitimacy that I previously argued for 
(Chapter I, 2 supra). 
Regarding this last point, an additional clarification about the concept of normative democratic 
legitimacy and its use in this thesis, is appropriate. Where previous audits say to assess the 
quality of democracy, or the state of democracy, I explicitly opt for the use of democratic 
legitimacy in its normative sense as the focus of assessment. I do so in order to keep reminding 
what exactly it is that we are evaluating. That is, when assessing the quality or the state of 
democracy, we are in fact looking at its inherent acceptability and, thus, at but one of two 
dimensions of a larger concept. So, even where for the fluidity of the text I will talk about 
quality of democracy, state of democracy or even simply use democracy, it should be kept in 
mind that ultimately, these concepts refer to normative democratic legitimacy. 
Finally, two further remarks are also in order about the exact topic of study.  
First, previously, I briefly discussed the development of the European Union’s foreign security 
and defence policy over time (cf. Introduction), and I repeatedly explained how this thesis is 
interested in evaluating this policy’s normative democratic legitimacy. In this context however, 
it should be understood how the idea of a democratic audit essentially concerns a snapshot. The 
first audit carried out about the UK looked at the country’s state of democracy “at the eve of 
the millennium” (cf. supra) and other audits too dealt with democracy at a given point in time. 
Based on different subsequent audits, one could engage in a discussion about the democratic 
evolution of the system or policy in question over time; but every audit as such is about the 
democratic state of affairs at a given moment (cf. Chapter XV, 1 infra). In this study, the focus 
lies on the Common Foreign and Security Policy/ Common Security and Defence Policy as it 
results from the last treaty reform. That is, the democratic assessment will be one of this policy, 
as it emerged from the changes introduced in Lisbon. Operational for more than seven years 
now, this post-Lisbon EU foreign policy is sufficiently established to have developed its proper 
dynamics. As such, it increasingly manifests an identity distinct from pre-Lisbon times. While 
the post-Lisbon CFSP may not yet be a fully-fledged, mature policy sub-system, it certainly is 
a nascent one (cf. Sabatier 1998, 111). Therefore, it deserves attention in its own right. Pre-
Lisbon aspects will, of course, get attention and be taken onto account where relevant to this 
democratic assessment. But, the focus will be on the institutions, procedures, decisions and 
actions as they are currently in place. Concretely, the audit covers the European foreign policy 
for the period 2010-2016, with some date going to 2017. 
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Besides, I wish to emphasize how the focus of this research lies with the CFSP as a policy of 
the European Union, and not with the European Union as a system. Just as system-oriented 
audits do not so much look at specific policies when they reflect on these systems’ democratic 
legitimacy (cf. supra), this audit will not directly concern itself with more general questions 
about the democratic legitimacy of the EU’s overall system, processes and structures. As I 
mentioned in the introduction, a lively debate indeed continues for many years about the 
democratic legitimacy of (aspects of) the EU in general. These discussions look at (elements 
of) the constitutional structure of the EU (i.a. Risse & Kleine 2007; Fossum & Menéndez 2005), 
at individual institutions such as the Commission (i.a. Tsakatika 2005; Matláry 1998) and the 
European Parliament (i.a. Wessels & Diedrichs 2002; Scully 2000; Niedermayer & Sinnott 
1998), or at the electoral process (i.a. Bol et al. 2016; Piedrafita & Renman 2014; Norris & Reif 
1997). Over the course of many years they brought together various (and repeatedly very 
different) views about the presence or not of a democratic deficit. Yet, whereas they deal with 
the democratic legitimacy of what the EU is, this thesis looks at the democratic legitimacy of 
what the EU does in a specific field of action. While in first instance this distinction between 
the democratic legitimacy of the EU in general and the democratic legitimacy of a specific EU 
policy field could seem somewhat artificial or arbitrary, I believe it is the best way to find the 
democratic particularities of the policy in question. To understand democratic strengths and 
weaknesses that are linked to the CFSP as such, we must focus our discussion on that CFSP, 
without mixing it up immediately with questions about EU democratic legitimacy more in 
general.  
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I argued for the use of democratic auditing as the method of assessment to be 
used for the appraisal of the EU’s foreign policy’s normative democratic legitimacy. Although 
different approaches of democratic assessment exist, democratic auditing seems particularly 
promising in this regard. The DA does not start from a very precisely elaborated definition of 
democracy but refers to the general principles of public control and political equality. These 
principles are essentially shared in some form or another by different manifestations of 
democracy. Starting from these principles, the method invites us to use of a more flexible 
assessment framework. Democratic auditing does not presuppose fixed criteria but asks the 
evaluator to argue for a set of criteria that (s)he judges most suited to assess the presence of 
both key principles within the context of the concrete political object under study. In that way, 
democratic auditing enables us to assess polities as well as policies even if they are of a rather 
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atypical kind, as is the case for European foreign policy. In the following chapter, I will turn to 
presenting the actual assessment framework through which the democratic legitimacy of 
European foreign policy will be audited. 
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IV. Auditing the democratic legitimacy of foreign policy: 
establishing the criteria 
Summary: This chapter offers an audit framework for the assessment of the normative 
democratic legitimacy of foreign policy. It presents the theoretical underpinnings of such 
framework and elaborates on concrete criteria and indicators of assessment. 
In the previous chapter, I mentioned as one of the main features of democratic auditing that it 
does not work based on predefined, standardized assessment criteria linked to one specific 
model of democracy. Yet, “[t]he starting point of a democratic audit is to find a defensible 
conception of democracy from which specific criteria for assessment can be derived” (Beetham 
1999, 570). Such a conception has been found in the concise definition of democracy as “public 
control with political equality”. Summarizing the idea that in a democracy, public decisions on 
questions of law and policy should be directly or indirectly controlled by the citizens of the 
community, the vast bulk of whom have equal political rights29, this definition limits itself to 
presenting the key attributes of democracy that are present – under whatever form this may be 
– in the various manifestations of democracy that exist. However, the actual audit criteria that 
follow out of this definition still must be decided. Depending on the historical and cultural 
background and the particular experiences of a system or policy, we can imagine the presence 
of various value preferences for how the attributes of the definition should and can be delivered 
(Lord 2004, 10). This means that the argumentation for the criteria lies with the auditor, who 
must make an authoritative claim for the criteria (s)he considers most appropriate in the given 
case of evaluation. 
In what follows, I start by elaborating on the key principles of democracy that lie at the basis 
of the democratic audit. After reflecting upon the philosophical foundations of these principles, 
                                                 
29 The extended definition I propose here pays tribute to the wording used by Albert Weale (2007, 
18), but it differs from it on an important aspect. Where I follow the idea of public control as a key 
attribute of democracy, Weale speaks out for public opinion, while putting aside the claim of public 
control as too strong a requirement. The basis of his argument lies in the observation that 
elections – considering them a central element of any democratic system – in many cases such as 
coalition-based governments do not really determine who is to govern. Elections, so he continues, 
“simply record the aggregated judgements of […] citizens, they cannot determine a coherent set of 
principles of public action, which is what would be required for the notion of popular control”. 
However, as I am about to argue (cf. infra) for a set of multiple criteria that together clearly exceed 
the simple notion of democracy as elections, this doubt about public control as key principle of 
democracy, loses its pertinence.  
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I discuss their practical implications for the study of democracy. On the basis thereof, I will 
propose a set of democratic criteria for the evaluation of (European) foreign policy. Finally, 
the chapter discusses empirical indicators, enabling the concrete assessment of each criterion. 
1. Searching for a definition of democracy: why democracy? 
Assessing the democratic legitimacy of a system or policy requires assessment criteria that 
enable such a judgement. Together, these criteria should aim to embrace what is needed to 
deliver democracy. Underlying these criteria, however, we need a clear vision about what is to 
be understood by democracy (cf. Lauth et al. 2000, 12). That is, we must be explicit about what 
exactly the criteria are meant to evaluate. In that context – as already pointed out before – this 
study follows previous democratic audits (Lord 2004, 10; Baker 1999, 4; Weir and Beetham 
1999, 6‑9) in their use of “public control with political equality” as the fundamental definition 
of democracy (also: Beetham 1994, 28; Hadenius 1992, 9) and the starting point for the 
elaboration of an argued set of relevant democratic criteria. Yet, why exactly can we take this 
to be the basic definition? On what grounds can we argue that ‘public control with political 
equality’ is a comprehensive conception that goes to the essence of all democratic experiences, 
independent of their actual particularities or form? And what exactly does it imply? 
Except for the idea that democracy is about a form of politics that links government to the 
people – and given the inherently vague nature of this “people” – the understanding of what 
characterises a democracy has varied widely through time and space. Democracy means 
different things to different thinkers and people (Tilly 2009, 73; also: Dahl 1998, 3), and 
therefore it is said to be impossible to provide a definition of democracy that everyone accepts 
(Bollen 1991, 5). This, however, we can contend, does only concern the definition of democracy 
in terms of its concrete form of organisation, but not its basic, philosophical meaning (cf. 
Beetham 1994, 27). The existence of various and sometimes even contradicting manifestations 
of democratic organisation does not mean the absence of a theoretically solid and internally 
coherent conception of democracy, underlying these different manifestations. 
To grasp democracy in this essential way we can start from the simple question of why 
democracy? What are the fundamental arguments in favour of democracy, justifying its moral 
claim of superiority over other forms of political organisation and decision-making? In that 
regard, two main justification categories can be distinguished. That is, in philosophical terms, 
democratic argumentation basically develops along two dimensions: intrinsically, in reference 
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to its inherent qualities, and consequentially, in reference to its outcomes (Christiano 2015; 
Rosanvallon 2008, 14; Lord 2008).  
Intrinsic justifications contemplate the democratic procedure as such. Considering Immanuel 
Kant’s (1785, 87‑88) “supreme principle of morality” that is the autonomy of the will, and the 
liberal claim that individuals – “being all equal and independent” (Locke 1821 [1689], 191) – 
are morally autonomous agents entitled to judge for themselves what is good and right, it can 
indeed be argued that these individuals should be able to control all decisions affecting their 
own lives (Rawls 1993, 38). Given, however, that such decisions often deal with issues 
transcending the individual, and concern the many, we need a system of governance that would 
enable individuals to take control collectively over the organization of their own life and the 
world they are living in (Cohen 1971, 26‑70). Democracy is said to be such a system. Therefore, 
as an ideal of self-determination (Bohman 2007, 66), it is intrinsically right and its realization 
a value worth aiming for.  
Consequentialism in turn, locates the value of democracy with its substance. From this point 
of view, democracy as a decision-making method is essentially justified as a means to uphold 
other values (such as peace, freedom, prosperity and all kinds of rights) against arbitrary or 
corrupted rule (Pettit 2003, 242‑46; Moravcsik 2002, 606; Ryan 1998, 392). The absence of 
democracy, on the contrary, contributes to poor and damaging government (cf. Beetham and 
Weir 2002, 6). So, this instrumental account sees the importance of democracy not so much in 
its inherent, moral necessity but rather in the presumption that its operation over time produces 
better results for the people than any feasible alternative mode of governance (Arneson 2003, 
122). 
Although difficult to conceal in their radical forms of pure proceduralism and instrumentalism, 
modern democratic thinking generally refers to both strands of arguments to justify that a 
system or policy is democratic and therefore legitimate. On the one hand, the substantive 
critique to pure proceduralism as being susceptible for irrational and low-quality outcome 
(Peter 2009, 66), indeed must be taken seriously. But, on the other hand it is rightly understood 
that a consequentially pursued instrumental logic will prove untenable; as it departs from the 
impossible premise that there is an ideal outcome that can be identified independently of the 
democratic process (Peter 2016). Therefore, most current democratic thinking bases its 
argumentation in favour of democracy on a balanced conjuncture of both procedures and 
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substance. In this sense, democracy is both an end in itself, as well as a means towards other 
ends. 
2. Defining democracy: Public control with political equality 
It is from the combination of the two main justifications categories that the fundamental 
definition of democracy from which the audit starts can be derived; as notwithstanding their 
different philosophical starting points, both types of justification have in common that they 
require public control with political equality.  
2.1 A concise, but comprehensive definition 
On the one hand, the combination of these two principles indeed assure a decision-making 
process in which the public will be able to author its own laws (cf. Habermas 1992, 57). Once 
we accept the idea that all men are created equal and hence recognize that “none are so defintely 
better qualified than the others that they should be enthrusted with making the collective and 
binding decisions” (Dahl 1989, 98), it arguably follows that, in the end, all men should be able 
to control in an equal way those decisions that affect them. Said otherwise, from men’s inherent 
autonomy, follows his right to control, not only the decisions that concern him individually, but 
also those that bind them collectively with other individuals. As each individual has these same 
rights, they have an equal right to control collective decisions. 
On the other hand, also when we locate the value of a democracy in its ability to produce policy 
outcomes that are non-arbitrary and respecting the rights of all, such democracy can be but a 
system in which there is a right of control, equaly shared by all. After all, starting from Lord 
Acton’s (1907 [1887], 504) presumption that “power tends to corrupt […]”, it first of all 
follows that the power to make collectively binding decisions should be controlled if it is not 
to favour the individual interests of those holding such power (and those that are close to them) 
over the interest of the community at large. Secondly, for as long as the ability to control is not 
equally shared by all, there will always be some that can suffer arbitrary rule that does not 
respect their rights. Therefore, the power to control “should be distributed as widely and as 
evenly as possible” (Heywood 2002, 68).  
Thus, ‘public control with political equality’ can be argued to be the most suited to satisfy both 
intrinsic and consequential justification standards of democracy and therefore can be seen as a 
concise but comprehensive definition of democracy (cf. Beetham et al. 2008, 20‑21). Besides, 
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the centrality of public control and political equality as the key democratic values also finds 
validity in an historical account of democracy. Throughout history, always when demands for 
democracy were made, essentially these two ideals gave the inspiration; and precisely these 
principles posed problems for the opponents of democracy (Beetham and Weir 2002, 8). In 
relation to this definition of democracy, a system or policy hence can claim normative 
democratic legitimacy to the degree that it complies with the two basic principles. That is, 
normative democratic legitimacy is present, when a polity or a policy in some way or another 
answer to the fundamental demands of public control and political equality. 
2.2 A system- and model-unspecific definition  
First, it t should be noticed that, looking at the above argument, there indeed is little reason why 
this definition would only apply to polities, and not also to more particular policies. 
Furthermore – and this is even more central to the endeavour of this thesis – given this idea of 
democracy, it seems truly an indefeasible claim that democracy should only apply to internal, 
domestic matters; as none of this could indeed argue for an exclusion of foreign policy from 
the basic democratic principles of control and equality. Neither can it be maintained that the 
people should not themselves in an equal way determine how they want to organize their 
relation with other peoples and the world outside the borders of their own polity; nor is it 
reasonable to claim that democracy is the best means to uphold certain values, but only at a 
domestic level. After all, how could democracy keep up – as it has been claimed (cf. De 
Tocqueville 1864, 460‑69; Paine 1920 [1776], 53‑54; Singer and Wildavsky 1993, 194) – such 
values as peace and security, when it would not play a role in the development of a polity’s 
actions on the international scene, i.e. when it does not matter in foreign policy? 
Furthermore, the definition of democracy as public control and political equality indeed shows 
independence towards actual political institutions and practices. It only premises that in a 
democracy the political power of the elites must be minimized and that of the non-elites 
maximized (cf. Bollen 1980, 372) and that there needs to be public control of such political 
power, without for that matter presenting a precise prescription of how this should be attained. 
Thus, the definition does not express a preference for a particular political model. In that sense, 
we could say that it incorporates the idea that it does not matter if the democratic cat is white 
or black, as long as it catches mice… That a system or policy functions along the lines of, for 
instance, a direct democracy, a deliberative democracy, a consociational democracy, or a 
combination between different approaches, in the end, is not essential. For as long as it assures 
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both the key requirements of democracy, it is normatively acceptable. In that sense, it is also 
worth noting that neither this definition, nor its philosophical justifications, unilaterally links 
democracy to the State. Intrinsically, the people shall decide themselves how much public 
control and political equality they wish to attempt beyond the State. Consequentially the 
question is simply which political level is most suited to produce the democratic outcomes 
wished for (cf. Lord 2008, 4‑5). Again, different approaches may well exist about how decision 
are (to be) taken at the international level; in the end, the question is if the approach (or the 
combination of approaches) in place respect(s) and assure(s) the basic requirements of 
democracy.  
3. Public control and political equality in the context of European integration 
This last point deserves particular attention in any debate about democracy and the EU (and by 
extension about democracy and EU policies).  
Throughout the process of modern European integration, and especially since the 1970’s, a 
debate has evolved between so-called intergovernmental- and supranational accounts of said 
process (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2006, 201). Being both theories of integration and methods of 
decision‑making in international organizations (McLean and McMillan 2009), these 
approaches do not only represent different theoretical views about how European integration is 
happening, but also political views about how it should happen. The terms of 
‘intergovernmentalism’ and ‘supranationalism’ indeed have been given different meanings in 
the literature (Bickerton et al. 2015, 705; cf. also the subsequent discussion: Schimmelfennig 
2015; Bickerton et al. 2015). However, on a basic level they concern different visions about the 
role and involvement of people and States at the international level. On the one hand, the 
intergovernmental perspective sees the process of integration and international decision-
making as one in which States (can) fully control the situation and conditions, as well as the 
result of cooperation. On a practical level, these States are represented by their governments, 
which are considered the paramount actors at the international level. Given that unanimity is 
required, no decision can be forced upon a State. This means that national sovereignty is not 
directly undermined (cf. Nugent 2017, 436) and that each participating State can ultimately 
decide the nature and extent of the international action. In an intergovernmental context, there 
is in fact no autonomous policy-making at the international level but only an agreement to act 
together if all States involved wish to do so. Supranationalism on the other hand, sees a 
transfer of authority and decision-making power to the international level (cf. Hurrell 2018). 
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Said otherwise, it defines a situation in which there exists an authority that is higher than that 
of a State (Heywood 2002, 148). It involves States working together in a way that does not 
allow them to retain complete control over developments; they may be obliged to do things 
against their preferences or will because they do not have the power to stop decisions taken at 
the international level (Nugent 2017, 436). 
3.1 Intergovernmentalism and supranationalism: theoretical implications for democracy 
Returning to the basic definition of democracy, it is obvious that the differences between both 
approaches have consequences for where and how to assure public control with political 
equality. The primary concern of intergovernmentalism or supranationalism does not lie with 
how to democratically organise the EU. In practice, however, their concrete implementation of 
course has different implications for that democratic organisation.  
Given that under intergovernmentalism, the supreme authority stays within the realm of the 
individual State, so too can public control with political equality. Due to the absence of 
autonomous decision-making at the international level, democracy can essentially be assured 
by separated national citizenries each controlling their respective government at the national 
level. Whereas however from a national point of view democratic legitimacy is obtained when 
individual citizens indeed have an equal opportunity to control their government; from the 
overall, international point of view an additional step is necessary. For a common international 
action to be considered democratic, people should not only exercise equal public control at each 
national level, but this control by each of the different peoples should be equally assured with 
regard to the final decision. For this last one to be the case, the States that represent them should 
be equal. In that way, under intergovernmentalism, ‘political equality between people’ 
translates itself on the international level in ‘political equality between States’. It is in relation 
to this last kind of equality that unanimity finds its full democratic importance and becomes 
more than just an arrangement between States at the international level. Because of the 
considerable differences between resources and powers of different States, unanimity in the end 
is necessary to assure their equality. Just as in certain cases measures beyond the simple maxim 
of one-man-one vote are introduced or argued for to assure actual equality between 
individuals30, unanimity avoids that certain States – and therefore their people – could be 
                                                 
30 We can think for instance about the obligations for political parties to put a minimum number 
of women on their electoral lists, or an assured number of seats in a legislative attributed to a 
national minority. 
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structurally overplayed and their considerations not be taken into account. Thus, summarized, 
Intergovernmentalism incorporates ‘public control with political equality’ through a two-step 
approach: citizens control their government at the level of the national community and because 
of the unanimity rule they can be reassured that their control counts as much as that by the 
citizens of the other national communities. 
Under supranationalism on the other hand, things are more straightforward. Once the State-
level is no longer the ultimate level of authority, and common decisions can be taken beyond 
the will of individual governments – as is the case in a situation of supranationalism – citizens’ 
control of their respective government at the national level (either directly, or through means 
of a body of elected representatives, i.e. a parliament) does no longer suffice to assure their 
actual control over the final direction of policy. Given that the locus of decision-making exceeds 
the national level, so should its public control. Therefore, more direct channels of public control 
of the international level are necessary, for instance by means of an international representative 
assembly. Within the European Union, the European Parliament can play an important role in 
this regard. But also the institutionalized cooperation between national parliaments can be a 
way to assure supranationalized public control. 
3.2 Intergovernmentalism and supranationalism: practical implications for European 
integration and European foreign policy  
In practice, the European Union has long crossed the threshold of being a mere 
intergovernmental regulatory agency (Wiesner 2008, 117). Hence, it cannot be upheld – as had 
been argued by authors such as Majone (1998) or Moravcsik (2002) – that the question of 
European democratic legitimacy can be answered exclusively through the State level. As there 
are limits to how far a political system can be controlled through the democratic institutions of 
another (Lord 2004, 181‑82), today’s democratic legitimization of the EU can no longer be laid 
solely by its constitutive Member States (Bärenreuter and al. 2008, 1). 
This is also true for the specific field of European foreign and security policy. While foreign 
policy continues to follow an integration-logic of its own in which unanimity remains an 
important rule (cf. art. 24.1, art. 31.1 TEU) and the role of supranational institutions is still 
limited, the constant and various interactions between actors at national and European level 
makes foreign policy-making less distinct from other EU policy areas than before (cf. 
Vanhoonacker and al. 2010, 3). So, notwithstanding that it has been less supranationalized than 
most other European policies, foreign security and defence policy cannot claim to have 
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remained completely intergovernmental neither (cf. Sjursen 2011a). Even more so since the 
introduction of the Lisbon changes, European foreign policy has essentially become a 
multilevel governance system in which both intergovernmental and supranational actors and 
procedures are involved (cf. Introduction). This is important, and must be recognized as such, 
when evaluating this policy’s democratic credentials. Given that the EU’s foreign policy-
making exceeds a purely intergovernmental method, both the intergovernmental and 
supranational dimension will have to be taken into account. And, this should not just be done 
separately, but also together, as part of an integrated approach that does justice to the policy’s 
intricate nature. In practice, we must look at the actual structures and procedures for what they 
are. Without a value judgement about their intergovernmental or supranational character as 
such, the primary question we must ask ourselves is if they respect and assure the overall 
democratic legitimacy of European foreign policy; and what their democratic qualities and 
shortcomings are.  
Formulated in this way, this seems self-evident; yet a look at both the ideas of practitioners and 
the literature shows us that, apparently, it is not. For instance, among the 15 CFSP-officials 
interviewed by Fanoulis (2017, 147-50), six (directly or indirectly) categorize this policy as 
clearly intergovernmental, being solely decided and democratically controlled by the Member 
States. In the literature, on the other hand, the problem is not that there is no attention for the 
supranational level, but rather the contrary… As Helene Sjursen (2013b, 143) accurately points 
out, existing literature on democracy and EU foreign policy focuses almost exclusively on the 
role of the European Parliament (cf. also the previous remark on this point; Introduction, 2). In 
doing so, the specific nature of the EU’s foreign policy has not always been paid much attention. 
The comprehensive assessment in this thesis could contribute to remedy this. 
4. From defining democracy to developing a democratic assessment framework 
As explained earlier, the principles of public control and political equality are too general to be 
directly applied as assessment tools. To be assessed, these principles are to be operationalized. 
Therefore, this section presents a set of further democratic criteria. The next section then will 
formulate specific indicators that enable the actual assessment of each of these criteria.  
Given that previous democratic audits deal with political systems, they have chosen their 
assessment criteria accordingly. In that way, the Democratic Audit of the UK, inter alia, 
proposes six Democratic Audit Criteria to assess the public control and political equality of the 
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election process, or contains seven DAC’s related to a democratic society. Or, Lord’s audit of 
the EU proposes Democratic Audit tests that relate to citizenship or general representation. Yet, 
as this study focuses on a foreign policy, this requires some changes in the reflection on 
democratic criteria. After all, these criteria no longer concern popular control of a system under 
conditions of political equality but must help us assess how well a specific foreign policy – that 
is its procedures, as well as the institutions and actors involved – is equally controlled by the 
public. 
4.1 A preliminary note on the selection of the assessment criteria 
On a practical level, the eight criteria and related indicators that were finally retained and will 
be presented hereafter, result from an evolving process of selection (cf. Beetham 1999, 575). 
As such, they follow from both an extensive reading of democratic theory and previous audits, 
as well as recurring discussions and exchanges with other researchers on this topic. 
On a theoretical level, the selection of the criteria has been guided by a normative democratic 
approach to foreign policy in accordance with the Kantian principle (i.a. 1880 [1787], 550) that 
‘ought implies can’. That is, I looked for criteria that are not only philosophically defendable, 
but also practically feasible (cf. Weale 2007, 8‑9).  
‘Practical feasibility’, however, should not mean ‘practical existence’. It is not because 
something is not yet done or does not yet exist, that it cannot be reasonably expected or 
imagined. Or in line with John Rawls (2001, 5), “the limits of the possible [should] not [be] 
given by the actual”. Hence, instead of confining our expectations to the realm of the existent, 
‘ought implies can’ should encourage us to search for what may be reasonably desirable. To 
make things concrete: from a normative point of view, it could for instance arguably be asserted 
that for a foreign policy to be democratic it is desirable for non-elected public officials to be 
under direct parliamentary control. If there cannot be found insuperable practical objections 
making this desire conclusively unreasonable, it should be considered ‘practically feasible’ and 
therefore in line with the precept of “ought implies can”. The fact, then, that so far, such 
extensive parliamentary control over non-elected officials does not actually take place – i.e. the 
observation that no, or at least very few political systems do implement such kind of control in 
their actual working – does not inherently constitute an argument against it. Of course, practical 
inexistence can be an argument against a desired rule, in the sense that it can be an indication 
for such rule to have been already proven unreasonable. But, this, then, should be examined 
and demonstrated – and not just supposed – by those who oppose the desired rule. This 
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understanding of the ‘can’ in ‘ought implies can’ as something that could be theoretically 
possible and not just as the realities that already exist, moreover, prevent us from a self-fulfilling 
status-quo biased outlook on what might be possible… (cf. Valentini 2014, 790-91, also : 2017, 
23-25) After all, if what is considered possible always depends on what already exist, then we 
ultimately would be trapped in a circular reasoning in which ‘something is impossible because 
it does not yet exist and therefore is impossible’. 
4.2 The assessment criteria 
Based on David Easton’s (1965) system theoretical approach; a policy can be analysed as a 
circular process, in which (1) input leads via (2) throughput to (3) output; and the feedback to 
this output as well as the observance of the throughput to new input (Wiesner 2008, 97). 
Notwithstanding the exceptionalities of foreign policy, this process essentially also applies to 
this policy area (Lauwerier 2009, 27; Ginsberg 2001, 23). Linked to the above outlined 
definition of democracy this entails that for each of these three policy phases people must 
have an equal chance to ultimately control its development. Hence, the question here 
concerns the ways and means through which the organisation of a policy gives effect to the key 
principles within each policy phase. Although, in that regard, there is no definite rule to 
conclusively determine the totality of such means, I argue here for a set of generally recognized 
properties or attributes of democracy that are logically entailed by the key principles of 
democracy. These requirements, we can say, are more precise conditions of democracy that 
need to be met to realize the basic principles. Inherently, they may not be fundamental, 
philosophical principles of democracy, but they are commonly accepted as relevant and 
important criteria of it. Given their more precise scope, the way each of these democratic criteria 
is lived up to, and hence contributes to equality and control, then, can be appreciated through a 
set of concrete indicators. It is through the combined testing of the way and level to which the 
democratic criteria are lived up to, that the overall democratic legitimacy of the policy in 
question can be assessed and appreciated.  
Starting with the input side of the policy process, we can distinguish four such criteria. In the 
first place, as the possibilities of the people to define the foreign policy agenda as such are 
strongly bounded (cf. Chapter II, 2 supra) – the people can difficultly determine what may be 
acted upon because of the highly volatile international environment which often asks for rapid, 
case-specific action – its democratic role regarding the foreign policy’s input, is significantly 
reduced to that of the ultimate authorizer. This first of all implies that the people must, in one 
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way or another, keep control over who may act in their name, i.e. who will have the authority 
to decide. It is crucial that the public has at least the final say regarding who gets the license to 
govern. However, as indicated before, on its own, this popular control over the selection of 
decision-makers is not a sufficient guarantee of democratic quality. Another dimension of 
authorization – not dealing with the personnel having power, but with an indispensable means 
of power – therefore concerns the policy’s budget and how it is defined, executed and 
controlled. Besides authorization, input is also about participation and public debate. Given 
the more limited role of elections in the context of foreign policy mentioned earlier, 
participation deals with the degree to which normal people or their representatives can influence 
the decision-making process in the field of foreign policy through other means. Public debate 
emerges as a significant tool in this process (Sunay 2012, 34).  
To substantiate such participation and to nourish the public debate, it is important that the 
foreign policy’s throughput – i.e. the process of actual policy-making – is sufficiently visible 
to the outside world. Such a need for visibility leads in the first place to a demand for 
transparency – for instance by giving access to relevant documents. But, also reason-giving 
– i.e. the practice of providing reasons for decisions by those who make them – can help to 
increase the visibility, and in that way, enable an equal public control of the foreign policy. In 
connection to the particularities of foreign policy, the relevance of these criteria is certainly 
determined by the restricted agenda-setting problem. In light of the reactiveness and rapidity 
often inherent to foreign policy and because of which foreign policy does not (always) follow 
from a long public process, transparency and the communication of those reasons that lie at the 
basis of the policy actions in question are all the more crucial to give the public an equality 
shared possibility to exercise control.  
Finally, to further secure the democratic quality of the foreign policy, there is also need for a-
posteriori control. After all, not only should the people, à priori, control the nomination of 
power holders and the delegation of power; but also, afterwards – once those nominated have 
used the power bestowed upon them and have decided on concrete actions – there are no 
principled reasons to deny the people the equal exercise of their role of supreme authority. 
Hence, public control of the output first of all means oversight – the act of monitoring the 
execution of a task or activity – by a legislative body or societal actors. This completes on a 
more active level the public access to the foreign policy’s throughput. Besides, control over the 
output also means that there exists an ultimate possibility of overrule; i.e. the possibility to 
alter or even undo a decision.  
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So, where the previous criteria of authorization, participation and visibility are mainly 
characterized by an ex-ante approach – i.e. they concern equal public control before a decision 
is taken – there is also a need for control of the result of the foreign policy process, i.e. control 
of the actual policy, once it is implemented in the field. Here again, we see a link with the 
previously cited special characteristics of foreign policy. Bearing in mind that foreign policy is 
less defined by classical law-making procedures, this changes the role of the parliament which 
normally, as direct representative of the people, plays a central role and even has the last word. 
As this is different in foreign policy, oversight and overrule are crucial to assuring public 
control.  
Thus, we distinguish three clusters of democratic criteria, depending on the policy phase to 
which they are mainly linked. First, there are the input-related demands of authorization and 
participation – (1) licensing, (2) budgeting, (3) participation and (4) public debate – secondly, 
we have the throughput-dimension of visibility, which involves the criteria of (5) transparency 
and (6) reason-giving, and finally the output-criteria of a-posteriori control – (7) oversight and 
(8) overrule. Together, these criteria cover the whole policy process. 
However, as Madison (1788, §51) already pointed out, “In framing a government which is to 
be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the 
government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself […] 
experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions”. Therefore, in addition 
to these three clusters of democratic criteria, an independent and encompassing principle of 
legal security should be considered when proceeding for a comprehensive evaluation of a 
policy’s democratic legitimacy. While not being an element of democratic legitimacy in and of 
itself, the existence of a formal, legal basis is important to each of the previously presented 
democratic properties. Being a central feature of the modern Rechtsstaat with which liberal 
democracy, as we know it today is indissolubly connected, the presence of a set of clear legal 
rules providing a codified basis to the concrete implementation of the above criteria guarantees 
their lasting character. This legal anchorage is necessary to prevent those in power from 
subverting the democratic rules in place (cf. Riker 1982, 250) and indispensable to secure the 
continuity over time of “public control with political equality”. In other words, it assures 
durability of democratic commitments. 
This brings us to the following overview of democratic criteria (Figure 2):  
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Figure 2: Democratic criteria 
4.3 Some additional remarks on the assessment criteria 
First, it should be noted that notwithstanding the singular characteristics of foreign policy, the 
democratic criteria outlined here are essentially non-specific. As explained before, their 
concrete relevance indeed may be impacted by the particularities of foreign policy. Essentially, 
however, they concern policy related attributes of democracy which as such are not only 
pertinent for, or linked to foreign policy, but which are selected and (re)formulated in such a 
way as to cope with the particularities of foreign policy and to compensate for the more difficult 
applicability to policy-making of classical, more system oriented, paradigms. At the same time, 
their general character and the comprehensive, open, way in which they are formulated, avoids 
that they are too case-specific. After all, as said before, the democratic audit calls upon the 
evaluator to argue for those (sets of) criteria that (s)he deems most appropriate for the 
assessment of a concrete political context. In extremis, however, this could lead to an 
assessment framework that only applies to only one case. This is not ideal. Better therefore is 
to argue for criteria though specific enough to cover a specific case, that are formulated in 
general terms; hence making them suitable to assess at least somewhat similar cases. 
Secondly, I also wish to underline here that I do not presume these criteria and the indicators 
through which they are to be assessed to be of exclusive relevance to State-originated foreign 
policies. As neither intrinsically, nor consequentially it can be upheld that democracy should 
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only apply to State-level politics (cf. supra); and given the fact that action on the international 
scene is nowadays no longer the sole prerogative of State actors (cf. Coolsaet 2006, 254‑59); it 
follows that democratic criteria ought to apply to non-state foreign policy – such as for instance 
supranational foreign policy – too. Finally, whereas the criteria represent distinct components 
of democratic legitimacy on a theoretical and analytical level, we cannot expect them to occur 
in a clear-cut manner once we turn to their empirical evaluation. Hence these criteria of 
democracy are not mutually exclusive, but completing and building on each other (Stie 2012, 
49); and, in the end they should enable us to reach an overall inclusive appreciation about a 
(foreign) policy’s normative democratic legitimacy. In that way, the added value of the 
evaluative scheme presented here lies, I believe, precisely therein that it transcends the single 
focus on just separated manifestation of democratic legitimacy, but instead looks at them in an 
encompassing and interconnected manner. 
Finally, a note should be made about the use of the concepts of input, throughput and output as 
elements of the assessment framework. This understandably could bring readers to assume a 
simple equivalence with the ideas about input- and output-legitimacy put forward by Fritz 
Scharpf (1970, 21-28; 1999, 16-28) and throughput-legitimacy introduced by Vivien Schmidt 
(2013, also: 2014). Yet, as a matter of fact, this is not the sense in which I use them here. With 
regard to these concepts, I essentially use them as practical stepping stones for the selection and 
structuring of criteria that together cover the whole process of foreign policy-making and -
governance, and not in terms of different channels of legitimacy. As pointed out before (this 
Chapter, 4.2), the aim of the criteria is to help us assess if people have an equal chance to control 
the foreign policy, and this along the whole chain of its development. In reference to the 
legitimacy-trichotomy mentioned just previously each of the criteria in that sense relate to either 
input-legitimacy or throughput-legitimacy. This becomes especially relevant in relation to the 
output-related criteria. Legitimacy in relation to output is commonly conceived in an essentially 
consequential manner as the – perceived – effectiveness and desirability of a policy-outcome 
for the people (cf. Scharpf 1999, 16, 20‑22). In that way, output-legitimacy is about the content 
of a policy and this content’s acceptance. However, this is not how it is to be understood in the 
present assessment framework. As part of a democratic audit that concerns itself essentially 
with the quality in terms of the normative acceptability of procedures and arrangements (cf. 
Chapter III, 3 supra), the output-criteria do not concern the content of the output as such. Rather 
they deal with ways through which such output can be - and actually is subject to equal public 
control. In other words, they are criteria of output-control, not of output-content.  
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In the next section, I will proceed by discussing the democratic criteria in more detail, while 
outlining concrete, empirical indicators for each of them.  
5. From democratic criteria to empirical indicators for foreign policy 
As the idea of this audit is not one of a simple yes-no judgement (cf. Chapter III supra) but an 
assessment of how (well) the EU’s foreign policy performs in relation to public control under 
political equality, the indicators that follow are of such kind as to enable us to measure to which 
degree each criterion indeed (helps to) meet(s) these principles. 
5.1 Input – authorization, participation and public debate 
5.1.1 Licensing to govern: delegation of power 
Contemporary society is too complex and polities are often too vast for each public action to 
be decided by the whole of the population or even by one single body of representatives. 
Therefore, it became common that “those authorized to make political decisions, conditionally 
designate others [what I call here licensing] to make such decisions in their name and place” 
(Strøm 2000, 266).  
The conditional nature of licensing implies that it contains an effort of screening and selection, 
helping to sort out good from bad agents and nominating those that are believed to be the most 
suited to act in the people’s name (Lupia 2006, 45). While such an endowment of another party 
with the discretion to act (Brandsma and Schillemans 2012, 1) principally involves the selection 
or removal of those holding public office by the public at large through electoral nomination – 
especially regarding those having primary political responsibility – in no regime are all 
governmental offices filled by elections (Alvarez et al. 1996, 4). There are always situations in 
which persons are holding public decision-making power without being nominated through 
direct voting. This is particularly the case for bureaucratic officials. While the presence of such 
non-elected agents is surely not confined to the single domain of foreign policy, it can be 
especially tricky in this policy field. Given the already mentioned necessity of secrecy and the 
fact that foreign policy sometimes requires rapid and decisive (re)action, it can arguably be 
assumed that their decisional independence and impact tends to be more pronounced in this 
domain. That is why it is even more important that their nomination is somehow democratically 
controlled, when not by direct election, then through other means. 
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Questions therefore are how officials – certainly those in key positions – in the foreign policy 
administration (on headquarters or at diplomatic missions) are nominated for office. When not 
directly elected, who appoints them? By whom and how are they authorized to take decisions? 
When key decision-makers are not directly elected, it is crucial to look at how well the 
delegation of decision-making power to these actors is democratically controlled. So, in case 
that key decision-makers are not directly elected but appointed, does this appointment take 
place in an open and transparent manner, and can the people or their elected representatives 
scrutinize the chain of delegation through which such appointment takes place?  
In addition, however, it is also important to know who defines the nomination procedures that 
apply to the actual licensing. After all, these procedures are in no way neutral and self-evident, 
but are the result of previous discussions and decisions. More generally, they are part of the 
foreign policy’s overall governance structure. Therefore, it should be asked how this 
governance structure has come about. That is, who has been involved in the definition of, and 
the final decision about this governance structure? 
Concretely, this brings us the following indicators: 
1. Officials, holding key positions in the foreign policy decision-making structure are 
either directly elected by the people, or appointed in a transparent and open way.  
2. There is room for close, popular or parliamentary, scrutiny of the procedure and process 
of appointment and removal. 
3. When not the people directly, at least their elected representatives have a clear say in 
the development or the reformulation of the foreign policy’s overall governance 
structure and the nomination procedures that are part of it. 
5.1.2 Budget authority 
Often overlooked as an aspect of (foreign) policy-making, the budget plays a crucial role in the 
democratic development of a policy. The budget is a key input element: he who has authority 
over the budget, controls in a significant way the policy based on that budget. Again, especially 
in the context of foreign policy, this is particularly relevant; reason for which I discuss it here 
as a distinct criterion for the democratic evaluation of foreign policy. 
Given the more limited control over the foreign policy as such – and in addition to the possible 
selection of key foreign policy makers – it is through the authorization and control of the budget 
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that the people, or their representatives, can have some say in the day-to-day foreign policy. 
That is why for instance, the framers of the US constitution explicitly allocated the power to 
raise and support armies to the Congress, while additionally specifying that “No appropriation 
of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years”31. 
So, opportunities for meaningful public involvement in the budget process are an important 
component of a stable democracy (NDI 2003, 5). Especially when considering that this budget 
is funded with taxpayer money, it is self-evident that public expenditure must, in one way or 
another be put under the control of those who pay for it. Therefore, it needs to be examined 
how this public involvement is organized with regard to foreign policy. 
Ordinarily, the executive decides the budget, which subsequently needs the approval of the 
legislature. Although foreign policy expenditure will normally be enlisted in this budget, the 
situation is again somehow different from other policy fields. While in domains such as for 
instance education or agriculture, budget lines can be largely planned, this is less the case in 
foreign policy. Given the more crisis-driven character of this policy and the need for rapid 
action that suddenly can appear it is more difficult to define all expenditure in advance. This 
raises the following questions: who decides over the foreign policy budget, not only in general 
terms but also in case of urgent matters? Is foreign policy expenditure generally included in the 
normal budget and thus reviewed by the legislature, in the same manner as in other policy 
fields? And, what about sudden, urgent, funding? Who can decide about it, elected or non-
elected officials? And, can a directly elected body check this expenditure in some way? 
The following budget related indicators could thus be put forward: 
4. In general lines, the foreign budget is integrated in the normal budget and overviewed 
by a directly elected body which has the final say on its adoption. 
5. In case of necessary urgent spending, elected officials take the final decision; and a 
directly elected body can, at least ex-post, scrutinize this spending. 
 
 
                                                 
31 US constitution, section 8 – Powers of Congress gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-110hdoc50/pdf/ 
CDOC-110hdoc50.pdf [09.05.16] 
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5.1.3 Participation 
Participation is important to democracy in that it assures the possible involvement of those that 
are impacted by a decision to take part in its development. In its practical form, we can 
distinguish two ways through which such participation takes form.  
First, following Joana Mendes (2011, 1849), participation can be understood as the possibility 
for non-institutional actors to take part in decision-making. Although it is true that such 
participation does not render foreign policy wiser, nor makes it more efficient, it helps including 
the viewpoints of the affected and competent parties (Stie 2008, 5‑6). Therefore, it can be 
maintained that it makes it more democratic (Battistella 1996, 133). Under the condition that 
possibilities for participation are equally shared – both in rights as well as actual practice – it 
can help to increase public control under political equality. Hence, an important question 
pertains to whether there are possibilities for societal guidance of the foreign policy, given the 
limited impact of elections? In other words, (how) can the civil society make its voice be heard 
in the foreign policy debate; and does it do so? Do citizens, directly or through civil society 
organizations (CSOs)32, have access to foreign policy makers and can they impact on (the 
direction of) foreign policy?  
Yet, a second, representative form of participation should certainly be looked at too. Given that 
in today’s large and complex polities, it seems neither practically feasible nor even ethically 
advantageous that everyone should participate directly (Gutmann and Thompson 2009, 31; 
also: Habermas 1992, 210) – and taking into account the particularities of foreign policy – it 
follows that (if there is) day-to-day participation (this) will mostly happen through elected 
representatives. Thus, in addition to non-institutional actors, also the involvement of non-
executive institutional actors is of importance. That is, we must also look at means for 
parliamentary participation. Thus, subsequent measurements for this criterion are for instance 
if the foreign policy decision-making structure has implemented a system for regular 
consultation with a directly elected body (e.g. parliament or parliamentary committee for 
foreign affairs) and if such a body can influence the direction and concrete realization of the 
                                                 
32 Civil society organizations concern all kinds of civic organizations (popular movements, 
pressure groups, platforms, churches, trade unions, …). In that sense, the concept goes beyond 
what is commonly referred to as Non-governmental organisations (NGOs). While every NGO can 
be said to be a CSO, not every CSO is an NGO.  
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foreign policy in question. In contrast with subsequent criteria of oversight and overrule, 
participation is hence about an active involvement in the production of the foreign policy.  
Resumed, this presents us with the following indicators: 
6. (Popular participation) Individual citizens or civil society organisations have access 
to foreign policy makers and their visions and ideas are dully considered. 
7.  (Parliamentary participation) A directly elected body participates actively in the 
conduct of the foreign policy. Not only is this body regularly informed about the 
overall direction of the foreign policy as well as about specific dossiers, but it can also 
weight on the overall direction of the foreign policy. 
With regard to popular participation, it should be pointed out, that as a criterion it in fact finds 
itself on the crossing between democratic legitimacy as acceptability and as acceptance. (The 
level of) participation, after all, could function as an indicator for the people’s (lack of) 
acceptance. In this research, however, it will be looked upon as an element of acceptability. 
That is, I evaluate it here as an element that contributes to the normative democratic quality of 
a (foreign) policy, not as a(n) (possible) expression of the people’s support for such policy. 
5.1.4 Public debate 
Indissolubly linked with (popular) participation – as it presents an important impetus to it – is 
the presence of an elaborated public debate. Such public debate can heighten people’s eagerness 
and preparedness for participation. Public debate offers a communication channel among the 
people, as well as between the people and the decision-makers. It is through public debate that 
the people can interact and talk about (the same) political issues (De Vreese 2007, 5‑6). As it 
presents the people with the diversity of views about foreign policy formulated by opinion 
makers or offered by interest groups, political parties, and other organizations; public debate 
can stimulate autonomous opinion formation and empowers the civil society to influence the 
decision-makers (Eriksen 2005, 342). That is why the existence and form of a public debate on 
foreign policy can be considered a pertinent criterion for this policy’s democratic quality. 
Question then, is not only if there is room for public debate about foreign policy or if such a 
debate does take place; but also, how to measure this. Given that the availability and 
consultation of information are both a sine qua none for public debate to take place, as well as 
a sign that it actually is taking place, these are valuable means through which to evaluate the 
existence and nature of such public debate. In that regard, we first and foremost can look at 
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media coverage. As the media and their content play a crucial role in stimulating and organizing 
public debate – even to the point that this relationship often proves to be so indisputable that 
such media coverage can almost be equated with the public sphere (De Vreese 2007, 7; cf. also 
Risse 2015, 113‑15) – I opt to focus on (the existence of) media coverage as a proxy for 
measuring public debate. Additionally, it could also be looked at if and how the public informs 
itself through other means; for instance, by actively consulting information provided for by the 
foreign policy’s relevant political and administrative actors on social media platforms. In 
practice, this brings us to the following two indicators: 
8. The foreign policy in question is spoken about in the media; the decisions, actionsand 
actors of the foreign policy are reported on and discussed by different media sources. 
9. The public can, and does, inform itself directly on the actions of the foreign policy 
actors and the development of the foreign policy. 
5.2 Throughput –visibility 
5.2.1 Transparency 
Transparency has been increasingly referred to as an indisputable element of good governance. 
Both in scholarly and popular debate the case is made that it is a necessary precondition for 
public consent and accountability, and, by extension, for democratic legitimacy. In fact, the 
concept of transparency has become such a powerful, pervasive cliché of modern government, 
that Christopher Hood (2006, 3) even describes it as having attained quasi-religious 
significance (cf. also: Piotrowski 2010, 17). Simply defined as being the opposite of secrecy – 
with the last one meaning deliberately hiding your actions and the first one deliberately 
revealing them (Florini 1998, 50) – transparency is about enabling citizens to know what is 
going on inside the government and, in that sense, helps to bring those into power closer to the 
citizens (Rosanvallon 2008, 330; also: Den Boer 1998, 105). Being a formal right of access to 
documents and information about decisions or institutional practices and working methods 
(Curtin and Mendes 2011, 104; also: Asian Development Bank 2010, 9), it is argued to be a 
necessary condition for public opinion formation (Manin 2012, 214‑15) and has been claimed 
to render more effective the use of other public and political rights, such as the freedom of 
speech, as well as to have a civilizing effect on deliberation and public decision-making (Naurin 
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2007, 11‑39)33. More fundamentally, as a lack of transparency can give an advantage to certain 
resourceful groups – which have the means to obtain the information that concern them or at 
least is relevant to them, independent of its large public accessibility – it could be particularly 
detrimental for the fundamental democratic principle of political equality (cf. Bühlmann et al. 
2012, 128). 
Question however should be asked as to how to reconcile such transparency with the need of 
secrecy. Although the debate about transparency vs secrecy is not unique to foreign policy (for 
a general discussion, see Gutmann and Thompson 1998, 95‑127) it certainly is of particular 
relevance to this policy field, as it is essential to its actual functioning. Given its particular 
sensitivities and a recurring need for decision-making speed, foreign policy can arguably not 
function well without – at least some – secrecy. As research indeed points out that secrecy has 
to be recognized as a useful, and in that sense often even necessary tool for foreign security 
policy to be successful (cf. Colaresi 2014, 45‑65), this confronts us with a tangible tension 
between two seemingly incompatible demands. While transparency forms a well-substantiated 
element of democratic governance, and democratic governance arguably reinforces a foreign 
policy’s success (cf. Chapter II, 2 supra); secrecy too holds a valid claim. It contributes to a 
foreign policy’s efficiency and as such seems to be indispensable to this same success (cf. 
Thompson 1999, 182; also: Chinen 2009)34. Said otherwise, transparency may well contribute 
to a foreign policy’s input legitimacy; secrecy helps assuring its output legitimacy. 
To solve this secrecy dilemma (cf. Figure 3), we should abstain from a vision on transparency 
as an intrinsic value – i.e. abandoning its quasi-religious status – and understand it in an 
instrumental way (cf. Heald 2006; also Dror 2000). Accepting that transparency and secrecy 
are not antagonistic faces of a good-bad divide, but two sides of a continuum, helps us 
comprehend that secrecy should not be a problem. For as long as the general reasons for such 
secrecy are justified and communicated and its principles and guidelines are publicly debated 
and regulated; that is when the rules and reasons for secrecy themselves are transparent, secrecy 
                                                 
33 With regard to this last point, it should be noted that this claim is not without contestation. As 
discussed by Simone Chambers (2004), there is also the contrary argument of plebiscitary reason, 
telling that “the glare of publicity makes it difficult to argue reasonably”. This could lead to a public 
debate in which misinformation, flattery, or simply telling the audience what it wants to hear, 
become prevailing elements. From this point of view, rather than improving the quality of the 
public debate, (too much) transparency would hamper it. 
34 With “success” here defined as the degree of public benefit of the foreign policy in question; that 
is, how well the foreign policy in questions does serve the interest and well-being of the polity in 
which name it is executed.  
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can happen in a democratically legitimate way (Thompson 1999, 185). If this is the case, it is 
indeed reasonable to argue that “actors may operate, when needed, within given parameters, 
in secrecy without violating democratic norms” (Eriksen 2011, 1174). 
Figure 3: the secrecy dilemma 
 
In practical terms, it should thus be asked how to organize transparency in foreign policy, both 
democratically valid and efficiently reasonable. To that aim, I contend for the existence of four 
rules which taken together assure transparency as well as democratically controlled secrecy and 
which can be used as indicators against which to evaluate a concrete foreign policy in this 
respect. 
10. The public has access to all relevant foreign security related documents35 according 
to the same rules and procedures applying to other, internal policy fields. In practical 
terms, there exist recognized procedures and institutionalized structures (such as for 
instance a digitally accessible register of documents) ensuring convenient access to 
documents related to the foreign policy in question. 
11. If reasons of public or private interests justify the restriction of such access; that is, 
when the content or existence of documents is concealed from the public; clear-cut 
reasons are formally accounted for and publicly communicated, at least when asked 
for. 
12. Restrictions do not simply result from executive discretion but have precise legal 
foundations36. The rules for transparency and secrecy are not defined by the executive 
holder of the document alone, but in active consultation with a directly elected body. 
Concretely this means that the decision to keep specific information hidden from the 
                                                 
35 Whatever their medium, cf. note 146 infra. 
36 Cf. Right2Info, Exceptions to Access - General Standard right2info.org/exceptions-to-access/ 
general-standards [24.03.16] 
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public may well result from the executive’s own considerations, but the framework 
of such considerations and the boundaries of the executive’s space to conceal are the 
result of democratic deliberation. 
13. If confidential information is sealed from public access, at least some directly elected 
persons have access to these secret documents and highly secured information. 
5.2.2 Giving-reasons requirement 
Intrinsically linked with the previous condition of transparency, there is, what Martin Shapiro 
(1992) calls the giving-reasons requirement. Concretely, this means that policy actors must be 
able to explain why they are doing what they are doing. Or, as Pitkin (1967, 206) puts it, they 
must not only tell what is right, but also why it is right. Good reason-giving is supposed to show 
how it is that the action in question makes sense (Ferejohn 1993, 228). It must present a viable 
justification for the action. The underlying ideas is that by giving reasons for their decisions 
and actions, decision-makers commit themselves more closely to their policy (cf. Schauer 1995, 
657). Hence, compelling them to give such reasons will reinforce the link between decision-
makers and the results of their decisions and actions; which then can be judged in relation to 
these reasons. Following from this, the argument goes that decision-makers take better 
decisions when they are required to give reasons for them. In that way, it is a device for 
enhancing democratic influence on the administration (Zweifel 2006, 21). Again, this is a 
criterion that is of great importance for the specific domain of foreign policy as well as at odds 
with its inherent characteristics. The question of reason-giving focuses essentially on the 
availability of one specific kind of information, namely that about the origins and motivations 
behind foreign security policy programs and actions. It concerns the availability of documents 
or other sources enabling insight to the public about why a foreign policy is decided. Given the 
strongly executive driven functioning of foreign policy, clear reason-giving would certainly 
avail its democratic credentials; but, considering the need for secrecy, reasons cannot always 
made public. In situations such as peace treaty negotiations or when strategic/ tactical 
manoeuvres are concerned, it is understandable that concrete reasons often cannot be 
communicated. Hence, the right balance needs to be found. 
Although it is not easy to put out encompassing rules, two general indicators could be 
formulated as follows: 
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14. Reasons for foreign policy decisions and actions need to exist and as long as their 
disclosure does not jeopardize the coherent and smooth execution of the foreign 
policy, or endanger public or private interest, they are made widely and easily 
accessible, for instance through public statements or in policy documents, on websites 
or through the mass media. 
15. When however, secrecy is arguably justified, at least some elected representatives 
know about the reasons behind specific decisions. 
5.3 Output and feedback –à posteriori control 
Once a foreign policy has been put into motion and concrete actions have taken form, 
democratic concerns should still not be left aside. It is one thing to control the input and 
throughput of a policy process, but its results should escape equal public control neither. Hence, 
two criteria are added here which are essentially criteria of ex-post accountability. In contrast 
to those outlined before, these criteria are in nature retrospective; that is, they come into play 
once a policy is decided, and (first) actions are implemented. 
According to Pelizzo & Stapenhurst (2012, 23), the concept of accountability shows two 
different stages: answerability and enforcement. Answerability – referring to “the obligation of 
an accountee (government, agencies and public officials) to provide information about 
decisions and actions and to justify them” – can be achieved ex-ante through for instance the 
above discussed obligations of budget-control, transparency or reason-giving; but could also be 
obtained through oversight after the facts. Enforcement, on the other hand, “suggests that the 
public or the institutions responsible for accountability can sanction the offending party or 
remedy the contravening behaviour”. A main tool of enforcement is overrule. 
5.3.1 Oversight 
Oversight exists in a relationship where an individual or an institution and the tasks they 
perform (the overseen), is subject to another’s supervision (the overseer) (cf. Pelizzo and 
Stapenhurst 2012, 23). Departing from the axiom that no power should go unchecked (cf. 
Madison 1788, §51), such supervision relationship presents a key element of liberal democracy 
since long time past. Related to the fundamental obligation of a “representative assembly […] 
to watch and control the government; to throw the light of publicity on its acts; to compel a full 
exposition and justification of all of them which any one considers questionable” (Mill 1861, 
104); and insofar the ultimate democratic principal, the people, cannot efficiently oversee the 
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executive themselves, legislative oversight – that is the oversight of the executive by the 
elected legislative branch – arguably is the democratically most important among these mutual, 
interinstitutional supervisions. In line with McCubbins & Schwartz (1984), Schick (1976, 
519‑20) or Harris (1965, 9) we can define such legislative oversight in a strict sense as review 
after the fact. It concerns the set of investigatory activities performed by a directly elected body 
to evaluate the implementation of a policy; it is about the procedures through which a 
parliament can discover that executive decision-makers (didn’t) behave in an acceptable 
manner or (didn’t) act according to general norms, the public interest, judicial rules, or prior 
agreements. Or, with reference to Mintz and DeRouen’s (2010, 30) argument that “a decision-
maker is accountable if she must explain, or is expected to explain, a decision and believes that 
she can be rewarded or punished because of it” (also: Bovens 2007, 450), oversight is about 
what the legislature does to obtain such explanations from an executive decision-maker and if 
it succeeds in obtaining them. It involves an ex-post dialog initiated by the legislature, which 
can force the executive to share with this legislature information that the later might not 
otherwise receive (Strøm 1994, 37). Following this definition, different parliamentary 
procedures and instruments can be discerned through which the legislature retrospectively can 
review the executive policy actors’ actions and overall behaviour: meetings and debate, the 
organization of hearings, the possibility to ask questions and to make interpellations, or audits 
and reports.  
Starting from the distinction between police patrol and fire alarm (McCubbins and Schwartz 
1984), in which the second form builds on a possibility for “individual citizens and organized 
interest groups to examine administrative decisions”, it should however be noted that the 
legislative way is not the only channel of oversight through which to check the executive. In 
reference to the traditional distinction between horizontal and vertical accountability (Pelizzo 
and Stapenhurst 2012, 23‑24; Stapenhurst and O’Brien 2005; O’Donell 1998, 1994, 61) – with 
the first referring to “the capacity of State institutions to check abuses by other public agencies 
and branches of government”, and the second to “the means through which citizens, mass 
media and civil society seek to enforce standards of good performance on officials” 
(Stapenhurst and O’Brien 2005, 1‑2)37 – we can discern an additional form of oversight, 
                                                 
37 It should be noted, that in that sense, this conceptualisation of horizontal and vertical clearly 
contrasts with the vision advocated by Mark Bovens (2005, 2006) for whom horizontal and 
vertical relates to the kind of hierarchical power relationship between an agent and the actor 
demanding accountability: in case of horizontal accountability the principal has no formal power 
over the agent; in case of vertical accountability it does.  
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emerging directly from society. This societal oversight more precisely consists of supervision 
executed by different actors, rooted in the larger society and operating outside the structures of 
government. Given their outsider position and different (specialised) backgrounds and working 
methods, they can act as surrogates to legislative oversight, naming and shaming problems in 
specific areas or revealing large-scale patterns of behaviour and action difficult to apprehend 
from within (Rubenstein 2007, 626, 628‑29). Hence, they could add a significant dimension to 
the overall democratic oversight of a policy. Generally, four types of external watchdogs can 
be distinguished. First, being the most routinely among the societal actors of oversight 
(Rosanvallon 2006, 72), the media could play an important role as scrutinizer of public policy. 
Secondly, academic research too can fulfil this role: in a more hidden, but often also more in-
depth manner, think tanks and research institutions can follow the daily operation of a specific 
policy. In doing so, they can expose what decision-makers are doing, hence offering guidance 
to a balanced an informed public debate. Thirdly, also specific Civil Society Organisations can 
“closely examine government policy and approaches from their particular areas of expertise, 
drawing public and political attention to aspects and approaches that have been ignored, 
overlooked or misunderstood” (Caparini and Fluri 2006, 14). A last kind of external oversight 
is directly by citizens. Of course, even if these actors exist, question remains if they will actually 
take up the role of external watchdog, barking when they sniff fire? Also, will their alarm be 
heard by enough other citizens who are not directly involved in the oversight activities 
themselves (and, in that way, could it help discouraging violations of whatever kind by an 
executive policy actor)? And, along the same line, it can be asked if it will serve as a fire alarm 
to the legislature? That is, will elected representatives pick up societal actors’ alarm as source 
and stimulus to their own oversight work (cf. McCubbins and Schwartz 1984, 166)?  
Such oversight as ex-post supervision by the legislature and societal actors is of particular 
importance in foreign policy. Because of the traditionally still strong foreign prerogative of 
executive power, and due to reasons of traditional secrecy and external agenda setting (cf. 
Chapter II, 2 supra), there is a tendency in foreign policy that the executive is better informed 
about specific issues and has better access to specialized information than the other organs of 
government, let alone the people. Following from this, the foreign policy executive risks doing 
as pleases him, without much consideration for general opinions and convictions present in 
society, or preliminary determined guidelines. More than in other, domestic public policies, 
there is an elevated risk of executive discretion; the departure of the executive actions from the 
initial positions agreed upon by the time of selection and delegation (cf. Calvert et al. 1989, 
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589). Given this particularity of foreign policy, ex ante accountability mechanisms (screening 
and selection, the definition of working procedures…) may have little appropriateness in 
containing possible agency loss. Oversight can compensate this. Based on the legislature or 
societal actors following as much as possible the daily foreign policy – even without necessarily 
having immediate access to all the information that led up to it or having the possibility to 
directly impact on its elaboration – it at least can reveal problems in the executive’s actions and 
behaviour. Oversight hence could serve as a building block for assuring ex-post accountability. 
Applied to foreign policy, I thus put forward four oversight indicators: 
16. (Legislative oversight) There exists institutionalized monitoring by a representative 
legislature. Through regular meetings, (the possibility of) asking questions or formal 
hearings and audits, directly elected representatives can monitor the daily actions and 
behaviour of the foreign policy actors.  
17. (Societal oversight) Through journalistic, academic non-governmental as well as 
individual citizens’ supervision, problems within the daily developments of the 
foreign policy can be revealed.  
18. (Societal oversight) The results of this oversight are (or at least can be) picked up by 
citizens who themselves are not directly involved in the oversight activities.  
19. (Societal oversight) The legislature uses oversight by societal actors as fire alarm 
input to its oversight efforts. 
5.3.2 Overrule 
The concept of overrule represents a longstanding principle in political thought with reference 
to, inter alia, the writings of John Locke (1821, 370‑401) on the dissolution of government and 
of Montesquieu (1777, 321) on the annulment of decisions. Building on pre-democratic ideas 
of consent and resistance (Rosanvallon 2006, 129‑51), overrule is essentially about undoing or 
altering a previous decision. Also called veto powers, it is the most salient of consequences an 
actor may face when he is called to account, as it is the only one that with immediate effect 
impacts on the policy process38. In the fast-paced policy field that is foreign policy, it can 
therefore be argued to be the most efficient and far-reaching means to ensure ultimate public 
control. For that reason, I present it here as a distinct criterion. 
                                                 
38 The others being deauthorization and imposing (pecuniary or other) sanctions - Kaare Strøm 
(2006, 63). 
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Essentially, overrule it is nothing more than a plain and public revoking of a decision. In the 
case of overrule, the decision-making actor is in fact simply stripped from his right to decide, 
at least in a specific case. In a democratic constellation, this specifically means the possibility 
for the citizens to reverse decisions taken by their elected representatives; and for citizens or 
their elected representatives to reverse decisions taken by the executive. A good example of 
such overrule power in the context of foreign policy is the ratification procedure through which 
international treaties are ratified (or not) through referendum or by vote in the parliament. 
Furthermore, also the need for parliamentary approval before troops are sent on a mission 
abroad or regarding the prolongation of such a mission, could clearly be categorized as overrule. 
It becomes apparent from this account that overrule connects with participation in that it deals 
with the possibility of active popular or parliamentary involvement in the policy process. 
However, where participation as described before deals with the input side of the decision-
making chain; overrule, while focussing on output, is in fact a participation of the last chance. 
It is an ultimate chance for the people or their representatives to impact on the course of a 
policy, even after that policy has already been executively decided upon.  
Question here is thus, if such overrule power exists. Do institutional checks subject particularly 
critical decisions taken by certain foreign policy actors to the veto power of other public actors 
or third parties (cf. Strøm 2000, 271)? More concretely, can the people directly, or a directly 
elected body in their name, suspend or reverse foreign policy decisions, when not agreeing with 
them? How is this overrule organized and with regard to what kind of decisions is it to be 
invoked? Although it could prove detrimental to the efficiency of a policy if such power should 
exist about each and every decision, when it comes to fundamental orientations of the foreign 
policy, it can be claimed as crucial to its democratic legitimacy. 
Summarized, this brings us to the following indicator: 
20. The people, or their elected representatives, hold the institutional possibility to 
overrule executive decisions with regard to the fundamental orientations of the 
foreign policy; or when issues of war and peace and the deployment of troops are 
concerned. 
5.4 Legal basis  
Finally, to the eight systemic criteria for democracy outlined before, I add a last, overarching 
principle that presents itself in the context of today’s modern Rechtsstaat as self-evident; 
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namely, the existence of clear legal rules. Defining how for instance monitoring, appointment 
or participation in the context of foreign policy is formally organized, such rules can help avoid 
an all too easy undoing of these democratic settings. 
Although the concepts of Rechtsstaat – to be understood as a polity in which the exercise of 
public power is regulated and constrained by the law39 – and democracy are certainly not the 
same; in contemporary liberal democracies, they are inextricably linked. In that way, 
democracy is not only a necessary precondition for maintaining the Rechtsstaat (Habermas 
1992, 13) but the Rechtsstaat in turn can also be seen as a fundamental insurance for democracy. 
The constitutional checks it provides for, protect the democratic system against the 
encroachment of government as well as the wants of the majority rule (cf. Hayek 1991, 221‑25). 
So, a legal basis, setting in stone those principles believed to be important for a democratic way 
of government, should assure the lasting stability of the system and avoids the (democratic) 
dismantling of these conditions necessary for democracy. Their non-respect then, may lead to 
legal procedures before a competent and independent court. This is crucial, as “without this, all 
the reservations of particular rights and privileges would amount to nothing” (Hamilton 1788, 
§78).  
With regard to a democratic foreign policy, this means that the above-mentioned criteria merit 
backing by constitutional or other legal provisions. First, it is important to know if such a formal 
codification exists. Do we find legally binding texts on this matter, and, if so, on which legal 
level? Are the rules outlined in a constitution (written or not), in a law or in other legal 
regulations? Is for instance, the nomination procedure of those holding foreign policy power, 
or the way their accountability is organized legally framed? Other questions are also what for 
instance a parliament could undertake if the executive does not respect its rights of consultation 
or participation in foreign policy. Or, if citizens or interest groups can initiate legal action when 
not at all agreeing with a foreign policy line or concrete action? 
Hence, three additional indicators ensuring the durability of a normatively democratic foreign 
policy are: 
                                                 
39 Cf. Deutscher Bundestag, Basic law for the Federal Republic of Germany, art. 20(3): “The 
legislature shall be bound by the constitutional order, the Executive and the judiciary by law and 
justice” bundestag.de/blob/284870/ce0d03414872b427e57fccb703634dcd/basic_law-data.pdf 
[09.05.16] 
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a. Licensing, budget control, participation, public debate, transparency, reason-giving, 
oversight and overrule are backed by clear legal regulations. 
b. Those who may be affected by it can denounce the non-respect of these legal rules. 
c. A competent court can scrutinize foreign policy under the same conditions as other – 
internal – policies. 
It should be underlined that the presence of a clear legal basis is as such not an independent 
criterion for democracy but rather a transversal rule to be taken into account when looking at a 
policy’s democratic state of affairs. When evaluating the EU’s foreign security and defence 
democratic legitimacy, the legal dimension will not be discussed as a separated criterion, but, 
when relevant, be dealt with throughout the discussion of each individual democratic criterion. 
6. Some further reflections about the assessment framework 
I explained before how, in contrast to previous democratic audits, the focus of this assessment 
lies with a policy process and not with a political system, and how therefore an assessment 
framework had to be developed that is adapted to the democratic assessment of such a process. 
Yet, question can be asked as to how the democratic criteria of this framework relate to those 
argued for in previous audits; or for that matter in other assessment frameworks.  
In this regard, some preliminary “words about words” (Dahl 1998) are in order. Just as I opted 
for the use of normative democratic legitimacy instead of democratic quality or state of 
democracy (cf. Chapter III, 4 supra), I have chosen for criteria and indicators as the units of 
assessment. This could lead to some confusion, when one would compare the assessment 
framework with those developed by previous authors, as various terminologies have been used 
to describe the different levels of assessment. Both the UK audit and the IDEA assessment 
framework for instance start by formulating a set of “mediating principles” or “values” that 
give more content to the key principles. Where it concerns then the actual assessment 
framework, the UK audit however continues by determining “Components” for each of which 
it specifies indices, called “Democratic Audit Criteria”. The IDEA assessment framework, on 
the other hand, is based on sections of “Overarching Questions” (also called “Criteria”) and 
“Research Questions”. Christopher Lord, in his audit of the EU, in turn speaks of “Democratic 
values” and “EU Democratic Audit tests” (for a summary overview of different assessment 
frameworks and their respective units of assessment, see Annex 1). In this thesis, however, I 
opt for the use of “Criteria” and “Indicators” to describe the main levels of assessment. I do so, 
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because I believe that from a methodological point of view these are quite undisputed, intuitive 
concepts, the analytical meaning of which is generally understood without much need for 
further explanation.  
When now, we compare the criteria with corresponding assessment levels within other 
frameworks (cf. Annex 1), we not only find obvious differences, but also unmistakable 
similarities between my criteria and those used before (whatever they may have been called). 
The reason therefore is not surprising, yet logically follows from what already has been said 
before. On the one hand, previous democratic assessments contain some criteria that clearly 
relate to the political system in general. As I have pointed out when introducing the assessment 
framework used in this thesis (cf. this chapter, 2 supra), this concerns criteria that focus on the 
Election process or relate to Citizenship. But also criteria of Social rights – a category proposed 
by Michael Saward (1994, 17), with conditions that concern the access to adequate health care 
and education – or Individual liberties, can be categorised as essentially polity related. While 
these criteria can be valid means through which to evaluate the democratic quality of an overall 
political system, they are less suited to evaluate the democratic legitimacy of a policy. With 
regard to Control of the agenda, proposed by Dahl’s Polyarchy (1989, 112‑14); and although 
this could well be used as a criterion for most internal policy processes, it has limited relevance 
in the particular context of foreign policy (cf. Chapter II, 2 supra). The same for instance also 
goes for impartiality. As a key feature of qualitative government (Rothstein & Teorell 2008, 
166), impartiality is about treading people alike “irrespective of personal relationships and 
personal likes and dislikes” in the exercise of public power (Cupit 2000, cited in: Rothstein & 
Teorell 2008, 170). Given that the absence of such impartiality could lead to political inequality, 
this incorporates a valid demand when government actions are essentially directed towards the 
citizens of the own polity. In case of public policies in what we may call ‘human processing 
areas’ (such as education, healthcare or labour-marked programs), public authorities have 
considerable discretionary powers (Rothstein 2009, 314). In such a context, the predictability 
of what authorities can do to individual citizens indeed is highly important. Yet, foreign policy 
is not directed towards the own citizens. It does not search to organize social and political 
relationships within the own society, but to organise the actions to take and strategies to follow 
in a polity’s relationship with others. In that sense, impartiality has less urgency here. On the 
other hand, the criteria I choose as relevant means to assess the democratic legitimacy in foreign 
policy, are not unique for foreign policy. They are general criteria for democracy, which 
however are of specific importance for foreign policy. Accordingly, also the indicators by 
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which each criterion is further operationalized are formulated with specific attention for the 
foreign policy context. In that way, these criteria and indicators – of course – do not stand apart 
from those proposed by others. If we look for instance at the first criterion of Licensing to 
govern, its link with Authorization – put forward as a “mediating value/principle” by the UK 
audit and the IDEA assessment framework, or as a “democratic value” in Christopher Lord’s 
audit of the EU – is obvious. The same goes for Transparency, which we can directly retrace 
as a “mediating value” with IDEA and as a “function” within the Democracy Barometer; but 
which also links with the Enlightened understanding proposed as a “democratic criteria” by 
Robert Dahl, or the Open government, which is part of the UK Audit first “component”. In that 
sense, even the criteria for which we do not seem to find some overlap with those proposed in 
other assessment frameworks – this essentially concerns Budget and Reason-giving – are not 
unique for foreign policy and of no use for the assessment of other policies or even a political 
system. Yet, both these criteria are – as I argued in their respective discussion – of particular 
importance to foreign policy, due to the inherent reactive nature of this policy. 
So, when comparing the assessment framework used in this thesis with others, things can be 
summarized as follows: I have averted the use of criteria that are essentially system oriented 
and I have added criteria that are of particular relevance to the democratic legitimacy of foreign 
policy. Other criteria may well be found under one form or another in other democracy 
assessment, yet I have reformulated them for the specific case of foreign policy and defined 
their indicators accordingly. 
With regard to this last point, I recall here the previous remark about the focus of this research 
(cf. Chapter III, 4). While the criteria presented here as part of the assessment framework could 
indeed be used to assess the democratic legitimacy of a political system in general, this is not 
what they will do here. To make things concrete, with regard to transparency for instance the 
focus will be with how (well) it is lived up to in the context of the EU’s foreign policy and not 
so much with EU transparency in general. The same goes for the role of specific actors or 
institutions. Thus, the question here is less if and why for instance the European Council as 
such may (not) be considered democratically legitimate, but rather if and how the role and 
actions of said Council as an actor of the EU’s foreign security policy are democratically 
legitimate. 
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7. Conclusion 
To enable the systematic democratic audit of the EU’s Common foreign and Security Policy, 
this chapter did three things. First, it elaborated on the basic conception of democracy that 
underlies such audit. Starting from this definition it subsequently argued for the relevant criteria 
of evaluation. Finally, it elaborated in more detail on each of these criteria while presenting 
concrete indicators for the measurement of each of them. 
In line with previous democratic audits, I adhere to a concise definition of democracy as “public 
control with political equality”. Starting from the fundamental question of why democracy, I 
followed the argument that such public control with political equality answers most 
convincingly to both the intrinsic and consequential demands for democracy. So, I opt for this 
definition on the argument that it describes in the most basic way the key principles of 
democracy, commonly shared by different, factual manifestations of such democracy.  
Understanding public policy as a circular process, I subsequently looked at how such public 
control with political equality can be assured throughout the different phases of this process. 
For each phase – input, throughput and output –criteria were put forward in this regard: 
Licensing to govern, Budget control, Participation and Public debate; Transparency and 
Reason giving; and finally Oversight and Overrule. One transversal criterion – Legal basis –
was added to capture the endurance over time of the democratic criteria. 
Finally, attention turned to the practical measurement of these criteria. Therefore, their 
theoretical and philosophical reasons were looked upon in more detail and for each criterion, 
empirical indicators were proposed. These indicators will enable the practical assessment of 
each criterion. 
A schematised overview of the complete assessment framework can be found in Annex 2. 
In follow up to this discussion of criteria and indicators, the next chapter will deal with some 
methodological choices underlying the data - and information gathering that will be used for 
the actual assessment of the EU’s foreign policy’s democratic state; hence concluding the first, 
theoretical part of this thesis.  
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V. Evaluating a foreign policy’s democratic legitimacy: what, 
how? 
Summary: This chapter deals with the methodological questions and choices that underlie 
the democratic audit. It explains the method of measurement, and why it has been chosen 
for. It also discusses the problem of scaling; that is the question about the standards against 
which the results of the measurement will be appreciated. Finally, it also explains the main 
channels of data gathering that lie at the basis of the empirical assessments and how to 
aggregate and connect the results of such assessments to come to a more comprehensive 
understanding of the EU’s foreign policy’s democratic legitimacy.  
Having conceptualized 8 systemic criteria and 20 indicators, comprehensively anchored in 
democratic theory, and one transversal rule, how exactly to use them for an assessment of the 
democratic quality of a foreign policy? How to proceed concretely? Under this heading, I reflect 
upon the overall measurement system and standard, and present the way of data gathering. In 
doing so, this chapter completes our reflexions on the democratic audit method, hence closing 
the first part of the thesis. 
1. Method of measurement 
Most established democracy indexes, such as the Freedom House Index40, the Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index41 or the Democracy Index42 are quantifying measurement systems. 
Although they start from a qualitative level of analysis, they continue by translating the 
gathered data into numerical values, based on a detailed codification system. 
Although such an approach certainly could prove advantageous when dealing with a large set 
of cases to evaluate or to compare – such as all the countries in the world in case of the 
Democracy Index – it is less appropriate when attention goes to a single case. When focussing 
on the democratic quality of one political system or working on a distinctive dimension or 
policy – especially when the democratic research on this policy is still rather limited, as is the 
case of foreign policy – an overall qualitative approach indeed seems more suited. Hence, in 
line with previous audits, I propose to apply a qualitative measurement. Though rather a blunt 
                                                 
40 freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world [22.11.16]  
41 bti-project.org/de/startseite/ [22.11.16] 
42 eiu.com/ [22.11.16]  
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measurement, a qualitative approach has the advantage that it applies well to a single case, such 
as the evaluation of the democratic quality of a specific foreign policy, i.c. the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy. Due to the in-depth, contextual and holistic character of qualitative 
research (Cambré and Waege 2003, 318), it makes it possible to combine various kinds of data 
and information in a meaningful way. Based on the proposed model of 8 criteria and 
corresponding indicators, it enables us not only to determine how well (1) an individual 
indicator is met; but, by looking together at the results for different indicators, we can also 
assess the democratic success of (2) a criterion, (3) a policy phase and, finally, (4) the normative 
democratic legitimacy of the overall foreign policy. Such a qualitative approach, however, 
brings with it important implications, both in relation to the data that are to be collected and 
studied, as well as to how precisely to evaluate these data in light of the indicators, criteria and 
key principles. This last point, more specifically, confronts us with the question of the 
measurement standard(s) that are to be/ can be used.  
2. Measurement standard 
An important question remains how to know that a foreign policy does – or does not – live up 
to a specific indicator, i.e. what is the standard against which the results for an indicator are 
measured? Bühlmann et al. (2012, 131‑33) distinguish in this respect between three different 
types of standard: (1) an ideal typical reference, in which case the results for a criterion are 
tested against a theoretical democratic norm; (2) neutral, international standards, based on for 
instance UN recommendations or international law and (3) standards distilled from an overall 
evaluation of best- and worst practices. I agree that the first option is lacking political realism 
(cf. Geuss 2008, 8‑9) and the second is problematic because such international standards are 
not always available (Bühlmann et al. 2012, 132). Therefore, I am favourable to the third. Yet, 
given the rather limited research about the democratic legitimacy of foreign policy currently 
available such a best-worst practice standard is difficult to apply. Apart from research about 
EU foreign policy, only few studies deal with the democratic dimensions of specific foreign 
policies (cf. Blick and Weir 2009; Born 2002) or for that matter with the democratic legitimacy 
of foreign policy in general. Besides, as pointed out before (cf. Introduction), the existing 
research on European foreign policy rarely looks at democratic legitimacy in an encompassing, 
interconnected way. It generally focuses on one specific expression or element of democracy, 
mostly the role of the European Parliament or the legitimacy of EU’s military action. Given 
this absence of a comprehensive body of previous research on the democratic legitimacy of 
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different foreign policies, a best-worst scale would show limited workability for the evaluation 
of a foreign policy’s democratic legitimacy. So, where an audit looking at an overall system, 
could still depart from international standards of good practice (cf. supra, Chapter III; Beetham 
1999, 571‑72), trying to use such externally derived standards would prove rather dissatisfying 
in this study.  
I therefore propose to use what we could essentially call an argumentative standard. That is, 
as a useful external standard is, yet, missing, the allocation of a measure will have to be rooted 
in a profoundly argued and well-established study of the foreign policy in question. In that 
sense, it is for the assessor to define what (s)he thinks to be a good level of attainment (Beetham 
2004, 10; also: Lauth et al. 2000, 14). The standard of measurement is essentially the result of 
the personal judgement of, and assessment by the evaluator. Based on personal evaluation and 
argued investigation, the allocation of a value judgment, then, is an exercise deriving its 
worthiness from its internal coherence and persuasive potential. We should be aware of possible 
shortcomings and pitfalls of an evaluation based on such personal judgments, as in the end it 
could be seen as subjective, if not to say arbitrary. But, when used with precaution and modesty, 
such an approach has the advantage of being able to work in the rather unexplored territory that 
is the study of the democratic legitimacy of foreign policy. As long as the researcher explains 
his/ her choices and takes responsibility over them, this should not be a problem. And, in any 
case, such a critique, in fact, should always be anticipated, no matter what approach – 
qualitative or quantitative – or which measurement standard is used. After all, “any democracy 
assessment is inescapably judgmental in character” (Beetham 2004, 5); and in that sense, it is 
in any case “essential that empirical evidence on which judgements are based should be sound 
and the normative and other assumptions involved should be transparent and publicly justified” 
(ibid.). When the researcher’s inherent subjectivity on which the attribution of a value is based 
on a soundly argued, coherently embedded argumentation, supported by externally verifiable 
data (Lord 2004, 9), then such a method is certainly defendable. 
3. Data gathering 
Another, and most crucial, step is to find the data that will allow me to reach a judgment. That 
is, to find the information that can help develop a well-founded argument about whether or not 
(and how) the EU’s foreign policy complies with the indicators and hence how well it scores 
on each criterion. The question thus is, which data to collect and where to find them. 
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First of all, we need information about the formal rules that apply to the EU’s foreign and 
security policy. In reference to the transversal principle of legal basis, the study of the rules and 
structures in place, and a clear understanding of how they incorporate the democratic principles, 
is indispensable throughout the analysis. In this regard, the relevant sources essentially concern 
official documents. Among these documents that can offer relevant information about the 
formal rules and organisational structures are the EU-treaties, the rules of procedure of the 
relevant institutions, interinstitutional agreements, decisions of the High Representative and of 
other actors such as the (European) Council or the Parliament. But also, organisational charts, 
budget related documents, official reports or policy documents concerning concrete lines of 
action should be looked at. While many of these documents are directly available on the EU 
website, others will have to be obtained through formal demands for access and informal 
contacts with the relevant, responsible, actors. Relying on an evaluation of official practices as 
described in these documents (in whatever format they are available), I thus will examine how 
well European foreign policy formally fulfils the predefined norms.  
However, notwithstanding formal procedures will indeed help us to evaluate the democratic 
quality to a certain degree, they certainly do not tell everything. In fact, they only present the 
formal, legal basis of the democratic situation. Yet, there can be a gap between the de jure 
compliance of the foreign policy to the outlined democratic rules and the de facto realization of 
these principles (cf. Beetham et al. 2008, 34; also: Bühlmann et al. 2012, 131). Hence, we also 
must consider the reality of the everyday practice. Or, as Mathur & Skelcher (2007) accurately 
point out, only looking at democratic hardware is not enough, also the democratic software – 
the informal day-to-day practice – must be taken into account. This is even more important 
because the aim of the audit is not so much to establish if the foreign policy is democratic, but 
how democratic it is (and how this democracy is actually made for). For instance, when dealing 
with issues such as participation or transparency it does not make much sense to only look at if 
they are formally present. It should also be looked upon if and how they are concretely 
implemented and used. To that end – and in addition to the different documents mentioned 
before – three further sources will be taken into account. First, different kinds of publically 
available sources, such as, inter alia, parliamentary questions and debates, but also press articles 
from newspapers and other media sources; as well as reports originating for instance from 
NGOs, research organisations or public (non-EU) institutions will be scrutinized for 
information about if and how European foreign policy complies with the democratic criteria. 
Also relevant is metadata about the data obtained from these sources; to be obtained from third 
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sources or to develop myself. By this I mean statistical data on for instance parliamentary 
questions, media references, or the NGO’s participating in the EU’s foreign policy. Such 
metadata can help gain an understanding that goes beyond the individual case, as it provides us 
with more systematic information about overall trends or recurring patterns in the European 
foreign policy’s normative democratic qualities and shortcomings. Secondly, and especially 
useful to bring our understanding beyond a simple reading of formal rules, is primary 
information from relevant political, administrative, or civic players. Such information really 
brings the daily democratic practice into the evaluation. Essentially, it concerns here 
information that will be obtained by e-mail or telephone from (members of) EU-institutions and 
other relevant actors, as well as through a systematic survey among national parliaments. 
Finally, of course also existing academic literature will be scrutinized and its findings 
integrated. This will help avoiding a reinvention of the wheel: where previous, recent research 
contains clear empirical findings about specific democratic aspects of the EU’s foreign security 
policy, this, of course, forms a useful input to the audit. In reference to the above typology of 
research about the EU’s foreign policy (cf. Introduction), useful literature in this regard can 
mostly be situated within all first three strands, focusing on the CFSPS internal decision-
making, its performance and results and the role of Member States; as well as – of course – 
with those authors that have already dealt with (aspects of) democratic legitimacy in European 
foreign policy before. With respect to this last strand of research, the comprehensive approach 
of the thesis has the advantage that it brings together and combines the different sub-literatures 
that I previously explained to exist in this regard (cf. Introduction). 
Table 1, summarizes the different types of data that will be used and why or how to obtain 
them. 
Although a rich variety of data can be obtained by combining these different sources, I admit 
that here too modesty should be in place. First of all, it should be recognized that the data will 
not so much concern the “best that could be imagined, but the best that are available”. As it is 
unlikely that I will find or obtain all the data that I wish for, it is indeed “more likely that [I] 
will have to settle for making the best possible use of the limited and flawed data” (Lord 2017; 
cf. also Hendriks et al. 2013, 17‑18). Furthermore, an additional challenge inducing modesty, 
lies in “the sheer size and complexity of the audit task if it is to be comprehensive and carry 
authority for the weight of its evidence” (Beetham 1999, 575). This certainly applies to this 
project. Most previous audits are rather large scale, government-led or society-led multi-
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authored projects (cf. Beetham et al. 2008, 291). This research, however, concerns the work of 
one author. It essentially concerns a desk study carried out by an individual agent of assessment.  
Table 1: Information and sources - overview 
 
4. Aggregating 
A last question concerns how exactly to go from the assessment of a single indicator to a 
criterion and so further to an inclusive appreciation of democratic legitimacy. As appraising 
how well the EU’s foreign policy scores on a single indicator, is not the same as appraising the 
overall democratic legitimacy of this policy, it is important to reflect for a moment about how 
to combine the assessments of different indicators when looking at a higher level of analysis, 
such as a criterion, a policy phase, or the overall foreign policy. Said otherwise, how to 
aggregate separated findings into a general assessment of democratic legitimacy? 
Theoretically speaking, aggregation is about “whether and how to reverse the process of 
disaggregation that was carried out during the conceptualization phase” (Munck and 
Verkuilen 2002, 22). A way to do this is by looking at the indicators’ and criteria’s mutual 
connections and interdependency (cf. Bühlmann et al. 2008, 119). The different criteria do not 
stand completely independent from one another, yet present different characteristics of a same 
policy. Hence, probable shortcomings in for instance licensing, could maybe be compensated 
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by a good score on transparency (cf. Strøm 2000, 265‑66). If so, this should be taken into 
account in the overall evaluation of the democratic legitimacy. Therefore, a double, normatively 
balanced aggregation has to apply: from indicators to criteria and from criteria to the overall 
democratic legitimacy, both based on a case-by-case evaluation. For the same reason that I have 
opted for an assessment standard that basically relies on the researcher’s inherent opinions and 
personal judgement – namely the earlier mentioned lack of an extensive research corpus with 
regard to the issue of democratic legitimacy and foreign policy – I believe that in first instance 
the balancing of the different indicators and criteria and the evaluation of their respective weight 
in the analysis of the overall democratic legitimacy has to be conducted according to the 
researcher’s soundly argued, coherently embedded opinion. This means that the aggregation of 
the results for the different indicators and hence the evaluation of the foreign policy’s overall 
democratic legitimacy, will be based on the researcher’s arguments rather than on previously 
outlined rules. In this context, it is important to keep in mind how a simultaneous optimization 
of all the democratic criteria could prove rather implausible in practice (cf. Chapter III, 1 supra) 
and how thus “the exact balance between [the criteria] must be a matter of judgement and 
emphasis” (Beetham and Weir 2002, 11). 
5. Conclusion 
Before finally getting to the actual assessment of the EU’s foreign security and defence policy’s 
democratic legitimacy in the second part of this thesis, this chapter dealt with some final 
methodological aspects of the audit method. It more specifically discussed four points, being 
the measurement method, and the issues of scaling, data gathering and aggregating. Common 
to these methodological attributes is the essentially qualitative way in which they are 
approached. Summarized this means that, essentially, the evaluation will follow out of the 
researcher’s - in concreto my – argued judgement. Such an approach of course could be 
criticized for being too personal, and hence automatically biased. But, I contend here that this 
has not per definition to be the case – and as such not more than with other approaches – at 
least not as long as it refers to clearly defined criteria and is based on verifiable evidence and 
internally coherent argumentation. Hence, such a qualitative approach can present a valuable 
way to assess the democratic legitimacy of a concrete case such as European foreign policy that 
is until now scarcely studied in a comprehensive way. 
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Part II: Application 
- 
Assessing the democratic legitimacy of European foreign policy  
This second part of the thesis contains the actual democratic audit of the EU’s foreign security 
and defence policy. Using the assessment framework developed before, this part presents an 
evaluation of this policy’s democratic legitimacy. 
But why in fact do so? After all, in line with Bellamy’s and Castiglione’s (2000, 65) observation 
that “much of the empirical literature just assumes what is by no means self-evident, namely 
that the EU ought to be democratic”, one could say the same about the EU’s foreign policy… 
However, two arguments, do indeed justify such an assessment. First, as has been pointed out 
before (Chapter IV, 2.2), neither the principal democratic idea of ‘public control with political 
equality’, nor its philosophical justifications, unilaterally link democracy to the state. Therefore, 
also policies beyond the state, such as these developed within the framework of the EU, should 
respond to certain democratic principles. In the same vein, I have explained why foreign policy 
cannot be exempt from basic democratic rules applying to other, domestic policies. As the 
democratic exemption that historically has been argued to follow out of the particularities of 
foreign policy increasingly lost its pertinence, foreign policy indeed should comply with certain 
democratic norms (Chapter II). Bearing in mind this double argument, European foreign policy 
– about which Ronald Bieber already noticed that the “forms of [its] activities […] do not differ 
fundamentally from the instruments at the disposal of other subjects of international law” (cf. 
also Smith 2002, 1) – should in no way be an exception. Recognizing the aforementioned 
arguments as theoretically valid means admitting that European foreign policy has to function 
along the same democratic baseline as every other set of public actions. This becomes all the 
more important, when considering that “foreign and security policy appears as the last great 
hope for those anxious to foster progress towards ‘ever closer Union’” (Bickerton et al. 2011, 
2), and has been “invoked as a way of countering the internal legitimacy problems faced by the 
EU in recent years” (Bickerton 2011, 101), thus occupying an increasingly important position 
in the construction of the EU’s political identity (cf. also Fanoulis 2017, 5‑6). Besides, certainly 
a policy claiming to “consolidate and support democracy” (art. 21.2 (b) TEU) can be expected 
to demonstrate itself adequate democratic foundations (cf. Lord 2011, 1138‑39). Or, with 
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reference to Michael Smith (2008, 185), as European foreign policy represents the interest of 
hundreds of millions of Europeans, its democracy quality certainly is worth great attention from 
both the public and academics. 
Therefore, the following chapters will look more precisely whether and how the EU’s foreign 
security and defence policy assures public control with political equality within its structures 
and processes. Each of these chapters will deal with one of the eight, previously outlined 
democratic criteria. 
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VI. Licensing to govern in EU foreign policy 
Summary: This chapter assesses licensing within the EU’s Common foreign security and 
defence policy. Therefore, it looks at the appointment of the central political actors, being 
the High Representative, the European Council and its permanent president, and the Council 
of the EU; as well as the nomination of key administrative officials within the EEAS, the 
Political and Security Committee and Coreper II. It also discusses how the current CFSP 
governance structure has been developed. 
Multiple political and bureaucratic actors play a role in the elaboration and daily execution of 
the EU’s foreign security and defence policy. As we will come to see, none of these actors is 
appointed as the result of a direct electoral process – i.e. general elections that, among others, 
determine such appointment. Yet, as argued in the foregoing discussion about licensing to 
govern (cf. Chapter IV, 5.1.1 supra) this should not mean that these appointments are not to be; 
or cannot be democratically controlled. This chapter evaluates how this is done in case of the 
CFSP. The first section deals with the actual appointment procedures (indicator 1 and 2). In the 
second section then, I look at the development of the CFSP’s overall governance structure 
(indicator 3).  
1. How are key CFSP officials appointed?  
Since Lisbon, a central political role in European foreign policy is first of all officially reserved 
for the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Art. 18 TEU 
stipulates that The European Council, acting by a qualified majority, with the agreement of the 
Commission president, appoints this High Representative. As a member (and even vice-
president of the Commission) the HR is also required, following his/her nomination by the EC, 
to appear for the appropriate European parliamentary committee - in case the Foreign Affairs 
Committee (AFET)43. Although the Parliament officially only decides on the investiture of the 
Commission as a whole (art. 17.7(3) TEU), it showed its informal strength in these matters. In 
2004 it forced, for instance, Commission president Barroso to replace the Italian candidate 
                                                 
43 European Parliament, Rules of Procedure – Rule 106, Annex XVII europarl.europa.eu/sides/get 
Doc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+RULES-EP+20130521+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN 
[27.04.16]  
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Buttiglione after a negative hearing44 and in 2010 it prompted Rumiana Jeleva to step down as 
Bulgarian commissioner designate45; but also constrained Jean-Claude Juncker to reshuffle his 
team after refusing the former Slovenian prime-minister Bratušek as new Commission vice-
president for energy46. Yet, at the same time, the case of the HR, however, seems different. 
Following an intergovernmental bargain47, Ashton was not so much the nominee of one 
country, but the result of a collective decision of the heads of State and government and part of 
a sensitive equilibrium of European top jobs (cf. Barber 2010). So, notwithstanding the results 
of Ashton’s parliamentary hearing were rather ambiguous48, there was no formal protest against 
her nomination. Many MEP’s seemed unconvinced of her qualifications for the job, but it 
showed out that they had little room for manoeuvre. Given that the nomination of the 
Commission was already strongly delayed, they did not want risking to cause a new crisis by 
unravelling the agreement reached by the heads of State and government49. As to Federica 
Mogherini, Ashton’s successor in the Juncker-Commission, the setting was not different. She 
was a choice made by the European Council about which the Parliament had nothing to say. 
The fact that, following Mogherini’s hearing of 6 October 2014, AFET seemed at least more 
positive towards her nomination by the heads of State and government50, in that sense does not 
make any real difference. The ‘special position’ of the HR in comparison to his/her 
Commission-colleagues by the way also comes forward from his/ her possible dismissal. 
Where, under normal conditions the Commission president can ask the resignation of an 
individual commissioner (art. 17.6 TEU), and the EP could push him/ her to do so through the 
adoption of a resolution asking the individual commissioner to resign, matters are less 
straightforward where it concerns the High Representative. The relevant provisions of the 
                                                 
44 European Parliament, Evaluation letter Rocco Buttiglione europarl.europa.eu/hearings 
/commission/2004_comm/pdf/lt_buttiglione_en.pdf [27.04.16] 
45 EUObserver, 19.01.10, “EU commission vote delayed as Bulgarian nominee steps down” 
euobserver.com/news/29296 [03.02.16]  
46 Euractiv, 08.10.14, “Cañete safe after EPP-Socialist deal, but Bratušek is out” euractiv.com/ 
sections/eu-priorities-2020/canete-safe-after-epp-socialist-deal-bratusek-out-309041 
[27.04.16] 
47 Cf. EUObserver, 19.11.09, “Little-known British peer emerges as top candidate for EU foreign 
minister”, euobserver.com/institutional/29022 [27.04.16] 
48 European Parliament, Evaluation letter Catherine Ashton event.europarl.europa.eu/hearings 
/static/commissioners/eval/ashton_eva_en.pdf [27.04.16] 
49 De Morgen, 11.01.10, “EU vertegenwoordiger buitenlands beleid overtuigd niet” demorgen.be/ 
dm/nl/990/Buitenland/article/detail/1052692/2010/01/11/EU-vertegenwoordiger-
buitenlands-beleid-overtuigt-niet.dhtml [27.14.16]  
50 European Parliament, European Parliament’s hearings: Federica Mogherini: High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy and Security Policy - 6/10 ephearings2014.eu 
/post/99339258991/federica-mogherini-high-representative-of-the [18.03.15] 
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Treaty regarding the termination of the HR’ mandate provide for three different procedures 
which may trigger his/her resignation. First of all, the previously mentioned article 17.6 TEU 
gives the Commission president the right to ask for resignation. Secondly, art. 17.8 TEU and 
art. 234 TFEU give the European Parliament the possibility to vote a motion of censure of the 
Commission which when accepted would also lead to the resignation of its VP, the High 
Representative. Finally, art. 18.1 TEU gives the European Council the possibility to end the 
HR’s term of office by the same procedure as that applied to his/ her designation. Where the 
first two provision both concern the mandate of the HR as Vice-President of the Commission, 
the last one on the other hand deals with dismissal as regards the other functions of the HR. 
However, the Treaty is silent both on the consequences of the termination of the HR only in her 
capacity as Commission-VP as regards the other functions of the HR, as well as the other way 
around. While in theory one could therefore conclude that the HR could continue to exercise 
his/her remaining mandates not directly affected by the resignation, depending on which 
procedure is followed, this would raise a number of practical difficulties because the three main 
functions of the HR are closely interrelated from an institutional point of view and form an 
integrated part of the institutional architecture introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon (EEAS, e-
mail 07.06.18). In practice, therefore, it seems that as a matter of fact we will not really know 
what happens in case one of the competent actors involved wishes for the HR’s resignation for 
as long as this situation does not emerge…  
Of course, as the High Representative is being nominated by the European Council - bringing 
together the most high-ranking, elected, Member State politicians - it could be argued that this 
sufficiently ensures his/ her democratic appointment (cf. Ludlow 2002). But, doubts could be 
raised about the validity of this argument.  
First of all, as the EC does not decide with unanimity on the matter, but with qualified majority 
(cf. supra), the intergovernmental argument of equality among MS (cf. Chapter IV, 3.2 supra) 
caves in. Even in case of unanimity, the equal power of each participant in the previous 
discussion could of course be questioned; but in the end, they all must agree. This altogether 
assures an equal say over the final decision. Yet, once the unanimity rule abandoned and 
decisions can be taken against the will of a limited number of national governments, this 
disproportionally disadvantage less powerful Member States. Where it concerns the actual vote, 
the loss of veto power may well be the same for all Member States; with regard to the foregoing 
discussion, the position of those representing smaller Member States is unequally hampered. 
To make it obvious: when Germany or France would have problems with a particular candidate, 
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it can be doubted that the European Council would proceed to a vote. If, however, Malta or 
Luxembourg were to be opposed to someone’s nomination as High Representative – and given 
that unanimity is not necessary – it can be wondered how much their position would even be 
considered. In that sense, the use of QMV threatens the sovereignty of Member States that 
unanimity protects (cf. Sieberson 2010, 922). As QMV introduces a certain autonomous 
decision-making at the level of the Council, it incorporates a move towards supranationalism. 
Yet, given the above account of the EP’s bounded hands with regard to the HR’s nomination, 
this move is so far not accompanied by an equal development of supranational control. The 
situation here is different from QMV within the context of the ordinary legislative procedure. 
The ordinary legislative procedure concerns supranational decision-making under the 
community method. In that case, the final vote by the Council concerns a proposal by the 
Commission and is part of a comprehensive legislative process in which also the EP is involved 
as direct representative of the people. And, in the end, even national parliaments could intervene 
by means of the subsidiary control mechanism (the so-called yellow or orange card).  
Furthermore, when these leaders decide on the appointment of the political head of the 
European diplomacy behind closed doors without subsequently leaving to the public some 
conclusions of their meeting (de Schoutheete 2012, 47‑48), this obviously hampers public 
control. Formally, conclusions are published after each European Council, but these are of a 
general declaratory nature. They give no insight whatsoever in the EC’s decision-making 
process. Regarding the appointment of the HR, they only mention the appointment, and not, for 
instance, if – and in that case which – heads of State and government were opposed51. All of 
this means that, with respect to the appointment of the High Representative, these heads of State 
and government can difficultly be controlled at their respective national level. 
These heads of State and government, in their capacity of the European Council, are the other 
key political decision-makers of the CFSP. Upgraded by the Treaty of Lisbon to the status of a 
formal EU institution (art. 13 TEU) – thus confirming the EC steady ascent as the virtual centre 
of European governance (cf. Puetter 2011, 27‑28; also: Pernice 2004, 33) – they can be seen as 
the top of the CFSP decision-making hierarchy. In that sense, they not only appoint the High 
Representative, but they also define the CFSP as such (art. 24 TEU) and identify the strategic 
interests of the Union (art. 26 TEU). Hence, they act like a collective head of State (de 
                                                 
51 See for instance for the appointment of Mogherini in 2014: Special Meeting of the European 
Council (30 August 2014) – Conclusions data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-163-2014-
INIT/en/pdf [15.12.17]. 
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Schoutheete 2012, 60). Each of them is - just as the members of the Foreign Affairs Council 
(bringing together the ministers of foreign affairs of the Member States) - elected in his or her 
respective country. As to the permanent president of the European Council, (s)he is nominated 
with qualified majority by the European Council itself. Neither the European Parliament or 
national legislatures, nor any other directly elected body can formally influence his/her 
appointment. Although it could be argued that a body of course should have the right to decide 
internally who shall preside it, in this case such argument is flawed. Given that according to art. 
15.6(d) TEU this president “shall, at his level and in that capacity, ensure the external 
representation of the Union on issues concerning its [CFSP], without prejudice to the powers 
of the HR” his/her role exceeds that of a simple secretary or coordinator within the European 
Council, but gives him/her a clear political capacity in context of CFSP decision-making. In 
that way – and similar to what has been said previously about the High Representative – this 
permanent’s president nomination currently lacks the necessary democratic control.  
Not well suited for the role of daily executive of the CFSP/CSDP, the European Council 
however has to leave this task to the Foreign Affairs Council and the High Representative 
(Devuyst 2012), as such assisted by the European External Action Service. This foreign 
service - considered as one of the most significant changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon52 
- is composed of officials coming from the Commission and Council, as well as diplomats 
seconded from the Member States, and committed to assist the HR in fulfilling his mandate 
(art. 27.3 TEU). Although in general the European Parliament quite successfully flecked its 
muscles where it concerned this new service (cf. infra), about the appointment of key EEAS 
officials it had to climb down. Eager to install US congressional-like hearings, a parliamentary 
proposal written by Elmar Brok and Guy Verhofstadt called for a system in which appointees 
to senior EEAS posts, including key EU ambassadors, but also EU Special Representatives 
(EUSRs)53, would be compelled to appear before the relevant parliamentary committee before 
taking up their duties54. The HR, however, made clear already during her hearing before the 
                                                 
52 Council, Conclusions of the 3010th Council Meeting, Press Release, 26.04.10, 8967/10 (Presse 
89), p.8 consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/114045.pdf 
[09.06.14] 
53 Not introduced into the EEAS formal hierarchy but appointed by the Council they are an 
important foreign policy instrument at the disposal of the Member States, cf. Tolksdorf (2012).  
54 European Parliament, Proposal for the establishment of the EEAS. Working document by Elmar 
Brok (AFET), and Guy Verhofstadt (AFCO), rapporteurs on EEAS, 06.04.2010, p.5 europarl.europa. 
eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/afco/dv/working-doc-eeas-final-06/working-doc-eeas-
final-0604.pdf [27.04.16] 
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Parliament that she “remain[ed] unconvinced of the idea of hearings for top posts”55; a vision 
reiterated by the Council decision of 26 July 2010, establishing the organisation and functioning 
of the EEAS, which states that “the High Representative will be the appointing authority”56. 
The HR’s Declaration on political accountability (DPA) of 3 August 2010 further clarifies this 
position. Newly appointed heads of delegations to countries and organisations which the EP 
considers as strategically important, as well as EUSR’s, may be invited to appear before AFET 
for an exchange of views before taking up their posts. But, as the DPA states explicitly, these 
exchanges of view are no hearings and they will take place in a format agreed with the HR57. 
Early October 2010, in the lead up to the nomination of EU-ambassadors to China, Georgia, 
Japan, Lebanon and Pakistan, the European Parliament tried to hold public exchanges of views 
before their formal appointment. Ashton intervened by cancelling the meetings, while recalling 
that these must take place after the appointments and behind closed doors. She reminded 
everybody that these hearings are in no way so-called Congressional-style hearings and that she 
is the appointing authority58. Thus, public exchange of view may be organized by the EP, but 
such hearings are purely informal. MEP’s have no formal power whatsoever to veto the 
nomination of EEAS senior staff when not satisfied by the results of a hearing. The High 
Representative can nominate her staff without the need for any legislative approval. Given the 
HR’s own democratically doubtful appointment, this arguably can be considered a democratic 
shortcoming. But then again, on the other hand, it can indeed be supposed that - as AFET chair 
Elmar Brok claimed - “If someone goes before the European Parliament and it is a total 
disaster, then it will be difficult for Ms Ashton to keep them”59. 
Finally, when looking at todays overall CFSP governance structure, we have to recognize that 
although key roles may officially well have been taken by the HR and the EEAS, the European 
Council and its permanent president, and the Council; this is not the whole story. In the CFSP’s 
complex institutional soup (Sjursen 2007, 2), two rather hidden, bureaucratic organs should not 
                                                 
55 European Parliament, Summary of the hearing of Catherine Ashton – Foreign Affairs, 11.01.10 
europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=en&type=IM-
PRESS&reference=20100108IPR66978 [09.06.14]  
56 Council, Decision of 26 July 2010 (2010/427/EU) eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/eeas_ 
decision_en.pdf [09.06.14] 
57 Draft Declaration by the High Representative on political accountability, OJ C 2010, 03.08.10, 
pp.1-2, point 5. 
58 EUObserver, 18 .11.10, “Game, Set and Match to Ashton on Diplomatic Hearings” euobserver. 
com/24/31300 [09.06.14] 
59 EUObserver, 01.09.10, “EU parliament to arm-twist Ashton on appointments” euobserver. 
com/institutional/30712 [09.06.14] 
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be forgotten: The Political and Security Committee (PSC, art. 38 TEU) and Coreper60 (art. 
16 (7) TEU). Holding a linchpin position in the EU’s foreign policy-making system (cf. Duke 
2005), both the PSC and Coreper are composed of Member State representatives at 
ambassadorial level. They have the assistance of a seemingly uncountable number of working 
groups and specialised committees61, situated within the Secretariat of the Council and 
composed of representatives of the MS. Not created by the Treaty, but established by Council 
act62, the most central amongst these are the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the 
Committee on civil aspects of crisis management (CIVCOM). Other important behind-the-
scene roles in the daily conduct of the CFSP are played by the EU Military staff and the Policy 
Planning and Early Warning Unit. Albeit being located within the EEAS, these are also 
composed of personnel seconded from the Member States. Although the creation of the EEAS 
arguably laid down the foundation for an increasing Brusselization of foreign and security 
policy (cf. Cini and Borragan 2016, 249; Juncos and Pomorska 2013, 30) – a Brusselization 
also reinforced by the increased possibilities for enhanced cooperation (art. 20 TEU), which 
since Lisbon also may apply to defence matters – the presence of these diplomatic bodies and 
their preparatory groups and committees seems to confirm the still important intergovernmental 
touch of this policy (cf. Introduction, 1; Chapter IV, 3.2 supra). With regard to their 
appointment, each of the members of these organs is nominated at his or her own national level. 
Although in that sense it is difficult to give a common appreciation about how this is done, it 
can be arguably concluded that this is generally an executive prerogative. There is indeed no 
standard way in which national parliaments are engaged in European security affairs (Peters et 
al. 2010, 9) but an enquiry among national parliamentary chambers63 teaches us that European 
national parliaments arguably have no role in the appointment of senior foreign policy officers. 
PSC and Coreper II nominations are no exception to this rule. Except for Hungary, were the 
approval of the National Assembly is necessary, or Germany and Latvia where the parliament 
must be consulted about both nominations, and Poland where a hearing is organised for Coreper 
                                                 
60 In its composition of COREPER II, prepared by the so-called Antici group. 
61 For a detailed view of these committees and working groups, see: General Secretariat of the 
Council, List of Council Preparatory Bodies, 5183/16 POLGEN 3, 18.01.16 data.consilium.europa. 
eu/doc/document/ST-5183-2016-INIT/en/pdf [03.05.16.16] 
62 Other preparatory bodies are set up by, or with the approval of, Coreper (cf. EU Council RoP, 
art. 19.3, also: consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/preparatory-bodies/ [26.01.16])  
63 In the autumn of 2016, I sent an online questionnaire to each of the national parliamentary 
chambers (cf. Annex 3), with one questionnaire being sent to both chambers of the Spanish Cortes 
Generales. Together, this made for a total of 38 questionnaires that have been sent out. 31 
chambers from 25 Member States answered. Where data coming from this questionnaire are 
being used, I will henceforth refer to it as “Questionnaire among MSP”. 
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II appointees (but not for the PSC); national parliaments appear to have no role in the 
appointment of their country’s PSC or Coreper ambassador. Different to the US Senate which 
has – as it has been mentioned before – the power to reject presidential nominees to ambassador 
posts64, European parliaments are overall excluded from any appointment power in this matter. 
In light of the above-mentioned formal bureaucratic and intergovernmental character of these 
bodies this should, as such, not be problematic. Yet, especially where it concerns the PSC, the 
problem is that it can be reasonably doubted if it is just that… While Coreper may still be 
categorized as the Council’s preparatory body65, this is more difficult  the PSC. The PSC is a 
key policy-shaping instrument (Howorth 2010, 3), which according to the Council’s own 
communication on the matter, is not only “responsible” for the CFSP and CSDP, but more 
explicitly so, “ensures political control and strategic direction of the EU’s crisis management 
operations”66. Thus, while “the PSC ambassadors remain under the hierarchical control of 
their respective Ministry of Foreign Affairs, their capacity to influence thinking and opinion 
both at home and in Brussels is considerable” (Howorth 2010, 18). In that sense, the Committee 
has even been characterised as “governing in the shadow” (Juncos and Reynolds 2007). From 
this point of view then, the limited parliamentary control exercised over their appointment 
becomes more problematic. When the PSC indeed is no longer a purely intergovernmental 
body, the members of which just represent the interests and preferences outlined by their own 
governement; but a body that does take political decisions outside “the charmed circle of 
diplomacy” (Juncos and Reynolds 2007, 144; also: Howorth 2014, 141‑47); then it(s) 
(appointment) should be controlled accordingly. Considering that this is currently not the case 
– neither at the European, nor at the national level – this is an important democratic licensing-
flaw in the EU’s foreign policy. If possible, the fact that a representative of the HR now chairs 
most of these CFSP working groups, including the PSC - but with an exception for Coreper 67 
                                                 
64 US Constitution, Art. II, Section 2, §2 gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-110hdoc50/pdf/CDOC-
110hdoc50.pdf [09.06.14] 
65 Council of the European Union, Corper II consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/preparatory-
bodies/coreper-ii/ [26.10.17]  
66 Council of the European Union, Political and Security Committee (PSC) consilium.europa. 
eu/en/council-eu/preparatory-bodies/political-security-committee/ [26.10.17]  
67 According to art. 19.4 EU Council RoP, Coreper is continued to be chaired by the country holding 
the rotating presidency and the PSC by a representative of the HR (cf. Council Decision 
2009/937/EU, OJ L 325, 11.12.2009, p.35). With regard to Coreper it should of course not be 
forgotten that this is not a CFSP-specific body, but a preparatory organ of the EU Council in 
general. For the other preparatory bodies art. 19.4 RoP refers to the above-mentioned List of 
Council preparatory bodies (cf. note 61 supra). Except for the European Military Committee and the 
Military Committee Working Group – which are neither chaired by the rotating presidency, nor by 
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– complicates things even further. After all, in this way, these formally intergovernmental 
bodies now are chaired by a supranational official, the appointment of which happens without 
much parliamentary (let alone popular) scrutiny (cf. the earlier mentioned lack of EP 
involvement in EEAS nominations). 
Finally, three EU agencies exist in the context of foreign security and defence (Rehrl and 
Weisserth 2010, 47): the European Defence Agency (EDA), the EU Institute for Security 
Studies (EUISS) and the European Satellite Centre (SatCen). These are decentralized bodies, 
each delivering specific informational tasks in support of European foreign policy. Although 
the EP has long expressed a desire to be involved in the appointment of the heads of these 
bodies, their director (in case of the EUISS and SatCen) or chief executive (in case of EDA)68 
is appointed or designated by the steering board of the agency on a proposal of the MS and the 
HR69. This happens without any parliamentary involvement. The rationale behind this is triple. 
A 2011 study on the oversight of security and intelligence agencies, commissioned by the 
European Parliament, argues that these bodies are meant to be autonomous and non-political 
and therefore the EP’s involvement risks undermining their independence. Besides, so it is 
substantiated, the selection process involving representatives of the MS is already cumbersome 
and involving the EP would only complicate this further. Finally, the report brings forth the 
intergovernmental argument according to which the involvement of the MS assures sufficient 
control (Wills and Vermeulen 2011, 22‑23)70. The validity of these arguments, however, is 
questionable. First of all, it is unclear how exactly it is that these agencies would be more 
independent when there is no parliamentary involvement in the nomination of their directing 
officials? How is that someone nominated through a diplomatic bargain would be more 
independent, autonomous, and non-political; especially in the European context where mutual 
balances of influence and interests between 28 capitals must be taken into account throughout 
such diplomatic processes? Democratically even more dubious are the two other reasons for 
                                                 
a representative of the HR, but have an elected chair – the CFSP/CSDP relevant preparatory bodies 
are chaired by a representative of the HR.  
68 Formally speaking the HR is head of EDA, the chief executive is the head of staff and legal 
representative of the agency. See: Council decision defining the statute, seat and operational rules 
of the European Defence Agency and repealing Joint (Council Decision 2011/411/CFSP, OJ L 183, 
13.07.2011, pp.16-26).  
69 Interinstitutional Working group on regulatory agencies (2010), Analytical Fiche No 7 – 
Appointment and the dismissal of the director, p.1 europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/ 
files/docs/body/fiche_7_sent_to_ep_cons_2010-12-15_en.pdf [15.08.17] 
70 Notwithstanding this report deals with intelligence and security agencies, there seems no 
reason to suppose that these arguments would not apply to foreign policy agencies too. 
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excluding the Parliament. Although understandable from an efficiency point of view, the 
cumbersomeness of a nomination process should not be a reason to downsize democratic 
control over it. In line with what has been said about the limited control by national parliaments 
and government’s executive prerogative concerning the nomination of senior officers, also the 
intergovernmental argument can be disclaimed as contradicting truly democratic licensing. 
2. How is the CFSP overall governance structure defined?  
Where it concerns the overall institutional architecture of the CFSP (cf. Wessels and Bopp 
2008, 16), since its creation by the Treaty of Maastricht, it has evolved gradually and seemingly 
without much concrete parliamentary backing (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014, 93‑95). 
Although, the EP has to a certain degree been involved in the Intergovernmental Conference 
(IGC) preceding each treaty reform (cf. Christiansen 2002, 43‑46), it must be recognized that 
key evolutions in CFSP, especially regarding CSDP, mainly result from an ad hoc process 
initiated by national governments only to be formalized in the Treaty afterwards. With the 
Declaration of Saint-Malo (December 1998), France and the UK launched a European 
cooperation in the field of security and defence which was welcomed a week later by the 
European Council of Vienna. The concrete implementation was afterwards outlined by the 
European Council of Cologne (June 1999) and Helsinki (December 1999). Subsequently, this 
important, new aspect of foreign policy was only to be introduced in the EU’s constitutional 
setting by the Treaty of Nice (art. 17). In this process, neither the European Parliament, nor the 
national parliaments seemed to have played a significant role. Besides, at least at the initial 
stage, it can be wondered what the concrete say by other governments has been. The declaration 
was agreed upon by France and the UK with little or no advance notice to anyone. Yet, it was 
already welcomed by the other heads of State and government shortly after (Hunter 2002, 
31‑32). Therefore, a profound common debate seems to have been rather unlikely; at least so 
where it concerns the basic principles and direction. 
Does the same pattern hold after Lisbon?  
In terms of substance, the Lisbon treaty as such has expanded the range of activities which falls 
within the scope of the CSDP. However, the treaty again merely formalizes existing practice 
(Koutrakos 2012, 201). Subsequent evolutions, however, seem to indicate a more inclusive 
development, not solely defined by Paris and London. In November 2010 defence cooperation 
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between France and the UK was deepened out with the so-called Lancaster House Treaties71 . 
Although this bilateral agreement does not set this out as an objective (even to the contrary one 
could argue), at least from the French side it seems to be understood as a possible stimulus for 
European defence in the long term (cf. Kandal & Perruche 2011, 25). And, while it is valid to 
assume that the initiative indeed pushes for further EU defence integration (Jones 2011); it 
seems more than Saint-Malo part of a larger discussion. This could be due both to the fact that 
Lancaster itself so far has produced rather little, if it were not “[the] birth [of] a new sub-field 
and research agenda in Europe, with an array of conferences, seminars, journal special 
issues and PhD theses” (Panier 2015); as well as the presence nowadays of many other actors 
expressing their voice on the matter. Not only the European Council and individual (or groups 
of) Member States, but also the EEAS, the European Commission, the European Parliament or 
the Interparliamentary Conference on CFSP/CSDP expressed their opinion and/ or launched 
their own ideas (Legrand 2016, 5‑10).  
Furthermore, the European Parliament for its part has taken up a more decisive role regarding 
the main two institutional CFSP novelties introduced by Lisbon, the new High Representative 
and most of all the European External Action Service. As Lisbon is silent on the specifics of 
this service’s organisation – the distribution of posts amongst the different institutions and the 
MS, the scope of policies it shall oversee, the authority structure and appointment procedure as 
well as its precise functioning in the conduct of the EU’s foreign affairs are initially left open 
(Koutrakos 2012, 197) – vehement turf-wars have been fought over its establishment72. A 
central discussion during the negotiations on these new CFSP actors dealt with the conception 
of the EEAS. Main question was if it was to be an intergovernmental body, working under 
Council auspices or a supranational organ within the Commission structure (Radtke 2012, 48). 
Throughout the debates leading up to Lisbon, the European Parliament emphasized the 
importance of a HR and EEAS under scrutiny of the EP and integrated into the Commission73. 
When however, it got clear that at least this last claim would not be acceptable for the Member 
                                                 
71 Treaty between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French 
Republic for Defence and Security Co-operation gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ 
uploads/attachment_data/file/238153/8174.pdf [09.12.14]  
72 Cf. Euractiv, 09.03.10, “The EU's new diplomatic service” euractiv.com/future-eu/eu-s-new-
diplomatic-service-linksdossier-309484 [27.05.16]  
73 European Parliament, Resolution on the annual report from the Council to the European 
Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of CFSP, including the financial implications for 
the general budget of the European Communities - 2003 (8412/2004 - 2004/2172(INI)), art. 9 
europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P6-TA-2005-0132+0+ 
DOC+PDF+V0//EN [09.06.14] 
 112 
States74, the Parliament started to investigate alternative ways to hold its grip over this new 
institution (Raube 2012, 70‑74). Backed up by art. 27 (3) TEU - stating that the EP should be 
consulted about the set-up of the EEAS - the Parliament saw it fit to put strong pressure on the 
newly appointed HR Ashton to enhance its leverage over the external service. Eventually this 
leaded up to two - although informal - politically important texts: the before-mentioned 
Declaration on Political Accountability assuring an enhanced - although still restricted - EP’s 
involvement in CFSP affairs75; and a Statement by the HR on the organization of the EEAS 
Central Administration (SCA) confirming some central base lines of the EEAS structure as 
were asked for by the Parliament76. As urged for by the EP77, the SCA i.a. assures the 
appointment of a Director General for Budget and Administration within the EEAS 
administration. Finally, in October 2010, the EP consented with the launch of the diplomatic 
service by approving its staff regulation, financial regulation and its 2010 budget78, however 
not after having obtained additional concessions on financial oversight79. It follows from this 
outline that the EP took part in the negotiations from the beginning and its influence on the 
EEAS-structure obviously goes beyond the simple consultation provided for in art. 27§3 TEU 
(cf. Wisniewski 2013, 91‑101).  
3. Conclusion: licensing to govern in CFSP, normatively democratic? 
Does the EU’s foreign and security policy show to be democratically legitimate where it 
concerns licensing to govern? The picture is rather mixed. Notwithstanding for instance the 
European Parliament has since Lisbon obtained increased leverage over the appointment of the 
High Representative through the fact that the nominee for the position must appear before 
                                                 
74 Cf. EUObserver, 20.10.09, “Poland sets out vision for EU diplomatic corps”, euobserver.com 
/institutional/28851 [10.06.14] 
75 Draft Declaration by the High Representative on political accountability, OJ C 2010, 03.08.10, 
pp.1-2 
76 Council, Elements for the statement given by the High Representative to the plenary of the 
European Parliament on the basic organisation of the EEAS central administration (12401/10 ADD 
4), 20.06.10 register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2012401%202010%20 ADD 
%204 [09.06.14] 
77 European Parliament, European Parliament legislative resolution of 8 July 2010 on the proposal 
for a Council decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External 
Action Service (08029/2010 – C7-0090/2010 – 2010/0816(NLE) - P7_TA(2010)0280) 
europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P7-TA-2010-0280+0+ 
DOC+PDF+V0//EN [09.06.14]  
78 Euractiv, 21.10.10, “EEAS to be born on Lisbon Treaty anniversary” euractiv.com/future-
eu/eeas-born-lisbon-treaty-annivers-news-498990 [09.06.14]  
79 European Voice, 14.10.10, “MEPs win concessions on EEAS”, europeanvoice.com/article/ 
imported/meps-win-concessions-on-eeas/69147.aspx [09.06.14] 
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Parliament in the same way as this was previously already custom for the other Commissioners; 
the investiture of the first incumbents also showed the Parliament’s limits. In both cases, that 
of Ashton and Mogherini, it was clear that the Parliament had not much to say about their initial 
appointment. While in the concrete context of the HR’s appointment by the European Council, 
the intergovernmental argument is called into question because individual governments do not 
seem to hold ultimate control over the process, the actual nomination of the High Representative 
so far involves rather weak democratic scrutiny. Given however the fact that Ashton and 
Mogherini are the first HRs new style, it is difficult to draw general conclusions from this. The 
same can be said about the permanent president of the European Council, being only created 
under Lisbon. After all, before the last European elections it was for instance not at all certain 
that the Parliament would succeed its coup de force regarding the nomination of the 
Commission president and yet a precedent could have been created80.  
When looking at key EEAS office holders, at first sight, the Parliament’s role seems even more 
constrained, lacking any formal power about their appointment. However, when compared to 
classical State practice still common in EU MS, the EP seems not doing so bad after all. Hence, 
more problematic are the other, intergovernmental CFSP-organs. Where the European 
Parliament could be said to have at least some informal control over major appointments within 
the EEAS; the appointments for PSC and Coreper II and their advising committees – and for 
that matter also the three independent agencies – seems lacking any parliamentary backing. 
Being the real centroid of daily decision-making, they seem to hold more political power than 
formally recognized. Although, executively appointed in their respective country, it can be 
wondered – especially in case of the PSC – to what extend the members of these bodies are 
simple country representatives, just expressing the will and preferences of their respective 
governments. In that regard, it may be questioned if these organs actual independence from any 
control by the people or their directly elected representatives does not pull away the decisional 
centre gravity from those who are democratically speaking the supreme principal. The EU’s 
foreign policy-making system has assured some democratic scrutiny of the EEAS; yet the fact 
that the selection and appointment of the other central day-to-day actors of the CFSP – the 
intergovernmental PSC and Coreper and their advisory committees – stay out of popular or 
                                                 
80 Cf. EUObserver, 23.01.18, “Spitzenkandidat system here to stay, MEP’s warn capitals” 
euobserver.com/institutional/140656 [28.01.18] 
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parliamentary reach has incriminating consequences for the democratic legitimacy of the EU’s 
CFSP overall licensing.  
Where it concerns the policy’s general governance structure, it must be admitted that it has been 
developed for the largest part without citizens or parliamentary input. Especially the CSDP has 
mostly grown on national governances’ initiative without much involvement from the European 
Parliament or the national parliaments. While recently some changes are maybe under way 
(with a more proactive attitude from other actors, including the EP or even the 
Interparliamentary Conference on CFSP/CSDP), the overall initiative in this policy lies with 
(key members of) the European Council. This could be problematic, not only for public control, 
but also for political equality. Although the members of the European Council are elected, or 
parliamentary controlled at their respective national level, it can at least be wondered how 
exactly they are democratically licensed to act as the definer of the EU’s CFSDP and the 
identifier of the EU’s strategic interests. If the European Council acts as a collective head of 
state, it does so following which elections or based on which mandate? Each member of the 
European Council indeed has a national mandate, but it is not clear where their common, 
European mandate comes from81. After all, national parliaments may well select or control their 
government, “but they rarely do so  EU politics” (Auel et al. 2015, 284).  
Regarding the CFSP more in general, however, the European Parliament has gained influence 
in the process in the run-up to Lisbon. Especially  the construction of the EU’s Foreign Service, 
the Parliament has successfully pushed through some of its visions, thus obtaining for itself a 
stronger grip on the EEAS than initially probably had been thought possible. In light of what 
has been said  other, intergovernmental bodies holding a role in Europen foreign policy that 
actually exceeds the one they are formally appointed for; this can be considered a positive 
evolution. 
                                                 
81 Ewoud Lauwerier, “Pourquoi les leaders nationaux ne font pas de bons leaders européens”, 
Sauvons l’Europe, 27 November 2013 sauvonsleurope.eu/pourquoi-les-leaders-nationaux-ne-
font-pas-de-bons-leaders-europeens/ [09.06.14]  
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VII. Budget authority in EU foreign policy 
Summary: Under this heading, I look at the way the EU’s foreign security and defence 
budget is decided. I discuss the normal budget procedure and the funding of the EEAS, as 
well as the rules that apply to operational expenditure with military of defence 
implications. Regarding this last point, both the “costs lie where they fall” principle and 
the Athena mechanism are considered.  
Where it concerns its financing, the CFSP is confronted with a typical problem of democratic 
foreign policy. For reasons of its – at least partially – reactive nature, it is not possible to preview 
completely how, when and where expenditure exactly will emerge. Ergo, these expenditures 
can prove difficult to be defined in advance. Also, the complex multilevel character of this 
policy – in which the EU - and Member State levels have to interact very closely and are 
sometimes even difficult to distinguish – becomes particularly concrete where the budget is 
concerned. 
In line with the two budget-indicators previously established (indicator 4 and 5) the following 
discussion looks at both the normal budgetary procedures as well as the one applying to 
expenditure that is not included in the general budget. Yet, given the complex interwovenness 
between, on the one hand, these two budget lines, and, on the other hand, the EU budget and 
Member State expenditure; both indicators are discussed together. 
1. How is the CFSP budget determined and organized? What in case of urgent spending? 
Where it concerns the foreign and security budget, Lisbon didn’t make any changes to the 
general procedure for financing of expenditure connected to the CFSP82. The overall rule 
iterates that administrative as well as operating expenditure to which the implementation of the 
CFSP gives rise is included in the Union budget; except for operating expenditure with military 
or defence implications, or when the Council unanimously decides otherwise. In these cases, 
the costs shall be charged to the Member States in accordance with their GNP83 (art. 41 TEU). 
Given that the EU does not dispose any ‘common’ defence capabilities, in terms of a European 
army, this military – non-military expenditure distinction is indeed somehow logic 
                                                 
82 Summaries of EU legislation: Common Foreign and Security Policy europa.eu/legislation_ 
summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/lisbon_treaty/ai0025_en.htm [ 31.03.16]. 
83 Again, unless where the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise. 
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(Miskimmon 2012, 163). Though, it follows that there does not exist a single mechanism for 
financing the CFSP. The CFSP budget instead forms a complex and fragmented structure, 
combining different, supranational and intergovernmental, financial rules and procedures (cf. 
Terpan 2015, 222‑23).  
When expenditure is covered by the normal Union budget, the budgetary procedure established 
under art. 312-9 TFEU does apply. This means that the European Parliament and the Council 
jointly exercise budgetary functions (art. 14.1, 16.1 TEU, art. 314 TFEU), as they both must 
give their approval about a proposition from the European Commission. So, especially since 
Lisbon formally abolished the traditional distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory 
expenditure84 which the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) had previously 
established in art. 272.4, the Council and the Parliament are formally on an equal footing about 
the decision on the entire EU’s annual budget, including the financing of the CFSP (Sautter 
2011, 573). Besides, following the 2006 Interinstitutional Agreement (IIA), the EP has to be 
kept informed at least five times a year about civilian CSDP missions and operations and their 
implications for the CFSP budget. This happens through the organization of so-called Joint 
Consultation Meetings (cf. Chapter XII infra). In that way, the EP’s budget power in CFSP 
certainly is substantial – it could even be argued that the “hardest” competencies of the EP in 
CFSP are in the budgetary field (Diedrichs 2004, 38) – and the Parliament is not afraid to yield 
it, if needed to the point of using it for “democratic blackmailing” (Thym 2006, 113‑17).  
As to the EEAS, after strong discussions the European Parliament successfully obtained for the 
integration of its financing in the overall EU budget and thus ensured itself full budgetary 
power85. While the intergovernmental financing of this service was initially an option 
(Vanhoonacker and Reslow 2010, 14‑15; cf. also the previous discussion about the build-up of 
the EEAS, Chapter VI, 2 supra); art. 8 of the Council decision of 26 July 201086 confirms that 
the EEAS’ operating, as well as administrative expenditure falls under the regular EU budget. 
Hence, a section of the EU budget is now foreseen for the EEAS’ administrative expenditure 
                                                 
84 European Parliament, Fact Sheets on the European Union. The Union’s expenditure 
europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_1.5.2.html [31.03.16]  
85 Cf. European Parliament, EU foreign service: EP links budget approval to agreement on EEAS 
organisation, Press release, 16.04.10 europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP 
//TEXT+IM-PRESS+20100416IPR72928+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN [31.03.16]  
86 Draft Declaration by the High Representative on political accountability, OJ C 2010, 03.08.10, 
pp.1-2, point 5. 
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and its operative costs remain within the Commission section of the budget87. Also, the High 
Representative committed herself to giving the Parliament full budgetary oversight over her 
service, including signing off on its yearly budget88. This gives the Parliament a decisive and 
direct voice in the yearly establishment of the EEAS financing. Although the extent to which 
this right gives tangible policy leverage to the Parliament is (still) unclear – as “refusing 
approval for the EEAS’ budget is a ‘nuclear option’ that would shut down the service 
completely and is unlikely to be contemplated even in the most serious of crises” (Furness 2013, 
114) – at least within certain limits, the Parliament seems not afraid to actually use it. During 
the last budgetary procedure [2016] for instance, the Parliament has used its budgetary power 
over the EEAS to bring the HR towards a rebalancing between EU officials and national 
officials within the service’s corps, or to reinforce its strategic communication and counter-
propaganda capacities; as well as tried to push (yet without success on this point) for greater 
coherence between EU delegations and EUSR’s (MEP, e-mail 13.02.17). In that way, budgetary 
oversight could certainly constitute a very important political instrument for the EP to control 
the HR (Raube 2011, 15).  
As however indicated before, not all European foreign policy related expenses are covered by 
the general EU budget.  
First, the situation is clearly different in case of operational expenditure with military or 
defence implications. Essentially, the Member States bear these expenses according to the so-
called “costs lie where they fall” principle. Agreed upon by the Council of 18-19 February 2002 
in the context of the EU Police Mission in Bosnia & Herzegovina89, this has become an 
established practice, meaning that – comparable to NATO-practice – every participating State 
covers the expenditure related to its own personnel and equipment. Since 2004, this principle 
is complemented by the so-called Athena-mechanism90 covering some overall expenses such as 
                                                 
87 See for example: Definitive Adoption of the European Union’s General Budget for the Financial 
Year 2013, (2013/102/EU, Euratom), 08.03.13, Section III – Commission: Titel 19 – External 
Relations (II/239), and Section X – European External Action Service (I/515) eur-lex.europa.eu/ 
budget/www/index-en.htm [31.03.16]. 
88 EUObserver, 24.03.10, “Ashton makes concessions to parliament on diplomatic service” 
euobserver.com/news/29748 [31.03.16]. 
89 Council, 2409th Council meeting - General Affairs - Brussels, 18/19 February 2002, 6247/02 
(Presse 30 - G), Annex 4, art. 3 europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-02-30_en.htm [31.03.16] 
90 The mechanism is revised every 3 years. Currently. Cf. Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/528, OJ L 
84, 28.03.2015, pp.39-63.  
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headquarters or transport to the theatre of action91 (cf. von Ondarza 2008, 21). Approximately 
this covers some 10 to 15% of all costs92. The mechanism is financed from the Member States’ 
national budgets in accordance with their respective GNP93. Eligibility for common funding 
assumes that there was unanimous support in the Council and means that the costs in question 
are met by all MS (except Denmark, which has an opt-out94), whether they participate in the 
operation or not95. It has, however, to be emphasized that this common funding is in no way 
subjected to the normal EU budget procedure but continues the intergovernmental logic of the 
“costs lie where they fall” principle. All of this implies that the responsibility for these expenses 
lies at the national level. Thus, similar to the appointment of the members of the 
intergovernmental CFSP/CSDP committees (cf. Chapter VI, 1 supra); the national level should 
be taken into account too in order to evaluate the normative democratic quality of the CFSP 
budget procedure.  
Doing so, presents us with an ambivalent picture, as there are great interstate differences  
budgetary authority in the context of security and defence. Looking for instance at the on-going 
military CSDP mission, EUTM Mali (launched: 18 February 2013)96, we see a completely 
different approach between the two largest contributors to this mission. France (initially 207 
soldiers) and Germany (initially 71 soldiers)97, together providing more than 50% of the total 
number of troops, proceed in almost opposite ways where it comes to the follow up of the 
mission, and especially the way the own expenditure is internally defined and controlled. In 
Germany, the federal government sends an official proposal to the Bundestag on 19 February 
2013, requesting permission for the deployment of German soldiers in the context of EUTM 
Mali. This government proposal also contains detailed information on the expenditure this will 
                                                 
91 Summaries of EU legislation: The mechanism for financing military operations (Athena) 
europa.eu/legislation_summaries/foreign_and_security_policy/cfsp_and_esdp_implementation/l
33281_en.htm [30.03.16].  
92 European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution of 21 May 2015 on financing the Common 
Security and defence Policy (2014/2258(INI)), P8_TA-PROV(2015)2014, art. 22 
europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-2015-0214+0+DOC 
+PDF+V0//EN [31.03.16]  
93 Unless the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise (cf. art. 41.2 TEU). 
94 Protocol on the position of Denmark, Part II, art. 6. OJ C 304, 10.11.1997, pp.101-102.  
95 Ministère de la Défense, Delegation for Strategic Affairs, How does CSDP work? 
defense.gouv.fr/english/das/international-relations/european-defense/how-does-csdp-work/ 
how-does-csdp-work [02.07.14]  
96 Cf. EEAS, EUTM Mali eutmmali.eu/ [30.03.16].  
97 EUTM Mali, Conférence de presse du Général Lecointre à Bruxelles, 11.03.13 eutmmali.eu/?p=211 
[30.03.16]. 
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bring about for Germany98. On 28 February 2013, the Bundestag decides in favour of the 
proposal99. In France on the other hand, the parliament is largely set-aside in this question. Only 
on 16 January 2013, five days after the start of the French intervention, the Assemblée Nationale 
is officially informed100. Where it concerns the French participation in the subsequent EU 
mission, even when Prime Minister Ayrault, according to art. 35 of the French constitution101, 
on 22 April 2013 officially asks for the prolongation of the French participation to the Mali 
mission, no concrete budget whatsoever is mentioned102. The French case is far from an 
exception. Only a minority of national parliaments does have to approve the budget for 
participation. In Hungary, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and Poland, the parliament is only 
informed about the costs of participation after the mission has been launched, and in the case 
of Austria, Greece, Malta and Portugal, the parliament seems even not to be informed at all 
(Questionnaire among MSP, cf. Table 2). These findings correlate with an earlier DCAF study 
(Born et al. 2008, 15‑31) which also demonstrates that in multiple Member States the 
parliament has not to approve at all the country’s participation in CSDP missions. In that way, 
it seems clear that Lisbon did not made a change. National parliaments’ budget powers in this 
matter are often limited to an annual approval of funds for external operations, as part of the 
overall national defence budget (cf. Table 2, also: Gourlay 2004, 195) and do not concern 
specific missions. 
From a democratic point of view, this is not only dubious within the specific context of the 
Member State in question, but also at a European level. Linked to the account of what the basic 
definition of democracy as public control with political equality implies in an 
intergovernmental context, it is obvious that this situation hampers the equality dimension. Not 
everyone (through the intermediary of his/ her elected representative(s)) has the same rights 
and opportunities to control the budget of military missions that, after all, are carried out in their 
name. This is all the more relevant, as the missions in question do not concern simple case-by-
                                                 
98 Deutscher Bundestag, Eintrag der Bundesregierung, 19.02.13 dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd 
/17/123/1712367.pdf [31.03.16]. 
99 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 17/225, 28.02.13, p.27974 dip21.bundestag.de/ dip21 
/btp/17/17225.pdf [31.03.16]. 
100 Premier ministre, Discours à l'Assemblée nationale relatif à l'intervention militaire au Mali, 
16.01.13 gouvernement.fr/premier-ministre/discours-a-l-assemblee-nationale-relatif-a-l-
intervention-militaire-au-mali [04.06.13]. 
101 Art.35 stipulates that when a foreign intervention exceeds 4 months, the government shall seek 
approval of the National Assembly for this mission assemblee-nationale.fr/connaissance/ 
constitution_11-2011.pdf [04.06.13].  
102 Assemblée nationale, Compte rendu intégral. Séance du lundi 22 avril 2013 assemblee-
nationale.fr/14/cri/2012-2013/20130224.asp [04.06.13]. 
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case coalitions between independent States but are actions developed as part of a 
comprehensive common policy, carried out under EU flag (cf. Chapter XIII, 1 infra). In that 
sense, these inter-State difference become structural inequalities as to how the people can 
control that policy.  
Table 2: budget competencies of national parliaments in EU military or civilian missions 
 
1 = yes, 0 = no, empty = not answered. In case of a bicameral parliament and where both the houses 
answered, I combined the results.  
(source: Questionnaire among MSP) 
a. Budgets are discussed by the National Council as part of an overall approval of the annual budget 
(in the Budget Committee and during budget plenary debate) 
b. The competent committee can discuss an executive proposal for participation, considering all 
aspects of such participation, vote an internal decision and send a report to the plenary. 
c. Chamber of Deputies: costs of military operations are discussed at committee level (usually, in the 
FA - and the Defence Committee) – Senate: one Committee on Foreign, Defence and Security Affairs 
which discuss military mission (and budgetary implications). The decision on the budget is a part 
of the decision on the deployment of military forces. Therefore, the Senate is informed prior to the 
approval. An ex post information is not automatically provided, but may be requested by the Senate. 
d. If not foreseen in the overall budget law, the competent committee has to approve for the 
contributions. 
e. The National Assembly approves costs of EU missions as part of the general vote on the defence 
budget.  
f. A draft budget is sent to both Chambers for an opinion of both the responsible Committee and the 
Committee dealing with financial matters, to be delivered within 20 days. Should the Government 
not be willing to comply with the Committees' recommendations, it can express further remarks for 
the Committees to rule again within 10 days. After the 10 days term is expired, the Government can 
adopt the budget. Until such time as the above-mentioned procedure is completed, Ministries are 
authorized monthly expenditures proportional to what has been solicited from Parliament.  
g. The competent committee prepares approval of the budget, decision is taken by plenary. 
h. The Chamber is not systematically informed; no specific law or regulation about the costs of the 
mission is to be adopted. The costs can be controlled in the bill concerning the implementation of 
the budget. 
i. The Defence Committee often requests information on the cost of the missions. 
j. Pursuant to Article 66.2 of the Spanish Constitution -whereby the Cortes Generales shall adopt the 
State's Budget-, Article 4.1 of Organic Act 5/2005 on National Defence confers upon the Cortes 
Generales the function of approval of the relevant budget appropriations also in the field of Defence.  
k. The Riksdag approves the Government's overall budget in each expenditure area on a yearly basis. 
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l. Government expenditure is approved by the House of Commons as a whole, but the cost of individual 
missions would not be separately approved. - The House of Lords EU External Affairs Sub-
Committee scrutinises such budgets but the Government takes the decision. 
As to the common costs of such missions, financed through the Athena-mechanism, the EP’s 
concern that this mechanism lacks transparency and “does not afford an overview of all the 
financial implications of missions conducted under the CFSP” surely points out a certain 
democratic budget weakness. In that way, also after Lisbon, it seems still the case that “there 
is a lack of democratic control over military policy activities and the related spending” 
(Bendiek and Withney-Steele 2006, 2). This is problematic, as it can indeed be argued that the 
democratic control of the financial aspects is “one of the most important issue[s] when it comes 
to […] comprehensive [parliamentary] participation in CFSP/CSDP”. And, in this context, it 
may indeed be asked if “the creation of large common budget, especially for conducting and 
common participation in civil/military missions and operations is [not] the most appropriate 
approach and the right way to actively involve all the European countries in this most important 
area of common European interest” (Questionnaire among MSP, 16.12.16). 
Secondly, also in case of civilian crisis operations, the situation is somewhat particular. 
Notwithstanding such missions are generally funded through the regular EU budget, in practice 
the hands of the European Parliament are bound, as it is the Council that decides on their actual 
launch (art. 28 TEU). Since 2006 the Council commits itself to send the European Parliament 
an estimate of the costs envisaged, whenever it adopts a decision in the field of the CFSP 
entailing expenditure, and this no later than five working days following the final decision103. 
However, it is not clear what the Parliament can do with this information other than taking note 
of it. Besides, the Council can always unanimously decide to finance such civilian missions 
outside the EU budget (art. 41 (2) TEU), i.e. by means of national contributions. Of course, this 
makes control by the EP virtually inexistent. In such a case of national funding of civilian 
operations, we see ourselves confronted with a situation similar to the one that was described 
before for military missions, namely the existence of great inter-State differences  how these 
expenses can be democratically controlled by a body of directly elected representatives at each 
national level. 
Where it concerns urgent spending needs, we essentially see the same opposition between the 
overall, supranational, rule and an intergovernmental approach where it concerns military and 
                                                 
103 IIA of 17 may 2006, replaced by: IIA of 2 December 2013, OJ C 373, 20.12.2013, pp.1-11, art. 25.  
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defence expenditure. Art. 41.3 of the Lisbon Treaty foresees the establishment of specific 
procedures for urgent financing in the context of CFSP by urging the Council to take, in 
consultation with the European Parliament, the necessary measures. The Council, however, has 
not yet decided on either mechanism. Neither the Specific procedures for guaranteeing rapid 
access to appropriations in the Union budget, nor the Start-up fund have been taken care of until 
now (cf. infra). Hence, civilian crisis operations are normally paid through the regular EU 
budget, which provides financing for emergency cases as well as preparatory measures through 
two distinct budget lines (article items 19 03 01 05 – Emergency Measures – and 19 03 01 06 
– Preparatory and Follow-up Measures). In case of military rapid response operations, however, 
costs are again borne by Member States. According to art. 26 of the Athena-mechanism MS 
can pay contributions in advance, or within five days following the Council decision to launch 
the mission.  
In reaction to the complexities of the CFSP budget, a review process has been launched by the 
European Council of 19-20 December 2013. Initially mostly an affair of the EU’s 
administration – within the Council and the EEAS – and of the Member States, the European 
Parliament seems to have seized the opportunity and since 2015 assumed a more prominent 
role in the debates104. A report on financing the Common Security and Defence Policy, written 
by the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Budgets was adopted in plenary 
on 21 May 2015105. In this report, the EP – although “acknowledg[ing] that military operations 
are financed by the Member States outside the EU budget and that their common costs are 
covered by the Athena mechanism” (§ 22, also: MEP, e-mail 13.02.17) – deplores the limited 
progress that so far has been made, as well as “calls on the Council to initiate, during the 
current budget year, the setting-up of the start-up fund (foreseen by Article 41(3) TEU)” (§ 22). 
Yet, as the response of the Commission to the parliamentary resolution confirms that “Member 
States are not keen on the creation of [such] a start-up fund for military CSDP financing106”, 
nothing has changed so far. Given that the next revision of the Athena mechanism had been 
                                                 
104 European Parliament, At a glance. Financing of CSDP missions and operations, February 2016 
europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2016/577958/EPRS_ATA%282016%29577958_EN
.pdf [30.03.16]  
105 European Parliament resolution of 21 May 2015 on financing the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (2014/2258(INI)) europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language 
=EN&reference=P8-TA-2015-0214 [24.04.17]. 
106 European Commission, 22 July 2015, SP(2015)470, p.4 europarl.europa.eu/oeil/spdoc.do? 
i=25593&j=0&l=en [24.04.17].  
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planned for 2017107 but has not started at the time of writing, it is still to be awaited if, in the 
process, the European Parliament will search, and succeed, to assure for itself a reinforced 
position as budget authority. 
2. Conclusion: CFSP budget, normatively democratic? 
Where it concerns the democratic credentials of a foreign policy’s budget, two simple questions 
can be asked: what about the general budget procedures, and what if rapid expenditure is 
necessary?  
As to the first point, the CFSP budget – including the EEAS ‘operating and administrative 
expenditure – is for the largest part integrated in the normal EU-budget. This EU-budget, 
proposed by the European Commission, is subject to approval of both the Council and the 
European Parliament. As the EU’s budget includes both own resources and contributions from 
Member States as its sources of income, it can be understood as both supranational and 
intergovernmental. The double approval by both the Council (with unanimity for the 
multiannual framework and QMV for the annual budget) and the Parliament of the actual 
budget then assure the necessary equal public control at both the European and the national 
level. 
Exceptions however exist where the normal budget procedure does not apply. These exceptions 
essentially concern military and defence related expenses; but can also apply to civilian 
missions. The essential difference with the normal budget procedure is the more limited role of 
the European Parliament. When these exceptions apply, expenses stay under direct control of 
the Member States. In that case, however, we see structural differences between Member States 
in relation to how these expenses can be democratically controlled and we see how in many 
Member States the parliament plays but a limited role. Given that such missions are not mere 
ad-hoc coalitions but are part of a common policy that binds the Member States together beyond 
the single case of just that mission, structural Inter-State differences about how their budget can 
be subject to public control, leads to inequality in the overall control of that policy all together. 
Due to the budget-system of EU military missions, and the role of these missions as an 
instrument of the EU’s overall foreign and security policy, the actual public control that people 
                                                 
107 Ibid. 
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can exercise over this foreign policy can vary according to the national citizenry they adhere 
to. 
More generally, the complex budget structures of the CFSP leads to an uncertainty that can be 
harmful for its democratic control. As explained, for example, while civilian missions are 
normally funded out of the normal EU budget, the Council can at any occasion decide otherwise 
and choose to finance them outside the EU-budget. This makes for a situation where it is never 
sure in advance where exactly the democratic control is to be situated and through which 
channels it will have to be exercised. 
 125 
VIII. Participation in EU foreign policy 
Summary: This chapter discusses participation by citizens directly or by civil society 
organisations, as well as by both the European- and national parliaments. First, it looks 
at direct democracy at the national- and the EU-level and if or how this is used to impact 
on foreign affairs. Subsequently I use data from the EU’s Transparency Register to assess 
the involvement of CSOs in matters of foreign security and defence. Regarding 
parliamentary participation, I turn to the general involvement of the EP, and the 
competences of national parliaments in case of the deployment of European military or 
civilian missions. 
As only the licensing of the policy makers cannot be deemed enough to assure democratic 
dominion and given the more limited impact of elections on foreign policy, other forms of 
citizens’ involvement deserve attention. Therefore, question should be asked if (members of) 
the society at large can make their voice be heard, and in the end even influence the direction 
of the foreign policy. In that regard, I made the distinction between direct participation by 
citizens who find themselves essentially outside of the decision-making system (indicator 6) 
and participation by their elected representatives, in concreto organised in a parliament 
(indicator 7). The first section of this chapter deals with direct, popular participation; in the 
second section, attention turns to parliamentary participation. 
1. Do citizens directly, or through CSOs have access to decision-makers? 
Two ways can be imagined through which citizens themselves can, more or less directly, 
participate in the policy process. First of all, there could be access by means of direct 
democracy. Secondly, such access could be created through civil society organizations, 
channelling people’s opinions and interests into concrete action, swaying the foreign policy 
decision-makers. Both at national and EU level procedures for direct democracy exist, meant 
to increase popular participation into policy-making. Among the Member States, only Belgium, 
Cyprus and the Czech Republic do not have any legal provisions for the use of direct 
democracy at the national level. The other 25 countries provide (at least some kind of) 
possibility for the use of such instruments. Yet, looking at their actual use, we see that these 
instruments are only very rarely employed in relation to foreign security and defence. 
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According to the Direct Democracy Database108, developed by the Swiss Centre for Research 
on Direct Democracy; in the 28 countries, nowadays member of the EU, 221 referendums (all 
institutional types included) took place at the national level from 1990 to 2016. Thereof, 175 
concern internal policies, 16 are about EU accession and 20 about other European issues such 
as treaty changes or the introduction of the Euro and 1 deals with other international regimes109. 
Hence, the last 27 years only 9 national referendums (organized by 6 countries) dealt with 
national foreign security and defence politics. Of these 9 referendums, 3 were about NATO-
accession, 3 about the organization of civil service and the army in general and 1 on the 
withdrawal of foreign troops from the country’s territory110. Finally, 2 referendums on nuclear 
weapons and military bases organized in Slovakia in 1997 did not reach the participation 
threshold. No referendum was organized about European foreign security and defence issues 
(cf. Annex 4). 
At the European level, there does not exist the possibility for compulsory referendum or binding 
initiative. Only since the Treaty of Lisbon (art. 11.4 TEU, art. 24.1 TFEU) there has been 
introduced the so-called European Citizens’ initiative (ECI), enabling one million EU citizens 
coming from at least one quarter of the Member States, to call on the European Commission to 
propose a legal act in all areas where the Member States have conferred powers onto the EU 
level. But, apart from the fact that this initiative-right is in reality very limited – as it does not 
contain a binding obligation for the Commission to act111 – this right does not concern 
CFSP/CSDP. As a multilevel policy containing a considerable intergovernmental dimension, 
foreign security and defence policy is excluded from the initiative right the European 
Commission possess in other, community policy fields. Hence, as the Commission cannot make 
legislative proposals regarding CFSP/ CSDP, the ECI does not apply to it. Indeed, among the 
44 initiatives launched, so far (May 2017)112 none relates to foreign security and defence policy.  
With regard to the second way of popular participation – through the intermediary of civil 
society organizations – it is said by the Treaty (art. 11.2 TEU) that “[t]he institutions shall 
maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with representative associations and civil 
                                                 
108 Centre for Research on Direct Democracy (c2d), Direct Democracy Databases c2d.ch/votes. 
php?table=votes [05.05.17].  
109 Irish referendum (2001) on the ratification of the statute of the International Criminal Court.  
110 Lithuanian referendum (1992) on the withdrawal of Soviet troops.  
111 As such, this European citizens’ initiative is very similar to the Dutch citizens’ initiative 
(Burgerinitiatief) or the German or Austrian petition right (Volksbegehren).  
112 All initiatives included ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/welcome [05.05.17].  
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society”. Since the last decade of the 20th century this has also led in the field of foreign security 
and defence to an increasing cooperation with a variety of organisations. Defined by the 
European Commission as “the principal structures of society outside government and public 
administration”113, numerous NGOs, think thanks and lobby groups have mobilized around 
foreign and security issues at EU level (for a descriptive overview, see: Dembinski and Joachim 
2014, 455–6). In so doing, they not only act individually, but also through networks and 
associations, such as the European Network for Civil Peace Services (EN.CPS), the 
International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) or the European Peacebuilding Liaison 
Office (EPLO). The EU from its side appears to have well understood the importance and 
advantages of cooperation with civil society114 and seems increasingly open to – and actively 
stimulating – the involvement of CSOs in foreign security and defence policy115 (cf. Dembinski 
and Joachim 2014; Rodekamp 2013, 122‑25). However, when looking into more detail at this 
CSO involvement in European foreign policy, we (still) see important weaknesses with regard 
to their actual function as channels of active participation by European citizens. 
First of all, CSO involvement relates to specific issues and topics rather than to the European 
security and defence as a comprehensive policy. There indeed are good examples of specific 
cases – especially related to humanitarian and development affairs116 – where the role played 
by CSOs in EU foreign policy and the efforts made by the European institutions in this regard 
are undeniable (cf. Irrera 2013, 90‑110; Joachim and Dembinski 2011, 1154), but so far, an 
overall coherent strategy seems missing (cf. Palm 2010). Besides, with regard to the concrete 
CSOs that are actively involved on the ground, it should be pointed out that many of them are 
not European organisations, but local players cooperating with EU delegations and missions on 
the ground117. The cooperation of these local players could help the EU’s actions on the field 
                                                 
113 European Commission, Communication from the Commission. Towards a reinforced culture of 
consultation and dialogue - General principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested 
parties by the Commission, Brussels, 11.12.2002, COM(2002) 704 final, p.6 eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52002DC0704&from=EN [08.04.16]. 
114 Cf. EEAS, Cooperation with civil society eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/cooperation_with_ngo 
/index_en.htm [08.04.16]. 
115 Cf. i.a. Council of the EU, Recommendations for Enhancing Co-operation with Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in the Framework of EU Civilian Crisis 
Management and Conflict Prevention register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/ srv?l=EN&f=ST% 
2015741%202006%20INIT [08.04.16]. 
116 EEAS, Human Rights – Cooperation with Civil Society eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/ 
cooperation_with_ngo/index_en.htm [10.05.16] 
117 On the websites of many EU delegations to third countries there is a heading “Civil Society 
Dialogue”, presenting the cooperation of the EU with NGOs and local civic organizations in that 
particular country.  
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(by providing for instance region-specific knowledge), and in that sense, could contribute to 
policy’s local success. Yet, they are no means to reinforce the democratic quality of the EU’s 
foreign policy’s internal decision-making procedures and structures. 
Figure 4: ETR - CSO fields of interest (06.2008 – 12.2016) 
At this European level, we observe a 
comparatively rather modest interest in 
foreign security and defence issues 
amongst CSOs. The EU’s 
Transparency Register gives us good 
evidence thereof. Operational since 
June 2008118, this register enlists – so 
far still on a voluntary basis119 – 
enterprises and lobbyists, but also a 
large variety of civil society 
organisations120 lobbying the European 
Commission or the European 
Parliament. When taking into account 
the totality of 37 fields of interest 
among which can be chosen, we find 
Foreign and Security Policy and 
Defence (FSPD) at a 27th position (cf. 
Figure 4) and note that of the 2653 
                                                 
118 First a single Commission register. Since June 2011 a common Commission and Parliament 
register ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/search.do?dataReport 
[14.08.17] 
119 This is about to chance. On 28 September 2016, the Commission proposed an IIA on a 
mandatory transparency register (COM(2016) 627 final), which aims to extend the register to the 
Council. It was welcomed by the Parliament on 5 October 2016. Yet, resistance from lobby groups 
remains high and so far (June 2018), this new transparency register has still not been put into 
place. But, interinstitutional negotiations started in April 2018. 
120 Upon registration, organisations choose one of six possible labels to define the type of 
organization they adhere to: I - Professional consultancies/law firms/self-employed consultants, 
II - In-house lobbyists and trade/professional associations, III - Non-governmental organisations, 
IV - Think tanks, research and academic institutions, V - Organisations representing churches and 
religious communities, VI - Organisations representing local, regional and municipal authorities, 
other public or mixed entities, etc.  
 129 
registered CSOs121 only 17.72% (470 organisations) mention Foreign and Security Policy and 
Defence as one of their fields of interests122. Compared to other fields of interest that contain 
an international dimension, FSPD is the second least chosen topic by CSOs. From the six fields 
with an essentially international dimension123, Foreign and Security Policy and Defence ranks 
fifth (cf. Figure 4). The Lisbon Treaty, and the changes it implied for the EU’s foreign security 
and defence policy (cf. Introduction), does not seem to make it a more popular field of interest 
with CSOs. With a maximum of 26.22% of the newly registered organisations mentioning 
FSPD among their fields of interests in 2011 (59 of the 225 CSOs that registered that year), 
clearly fewer organisations did so for the years that followed (cf. Annex 5). Besides, it must be 
taken into account that “many of the organisations specializing in security issues and active at 
the European level, are more akin to think-tanks than to constituency-based organizations; they 
specialize in the provision of well-researched information, policy-advising, and consultation” 
(Joachim and Dembinski 2011, 1164‑65; also: Rodekamp 2010). Findings from the 
Transparency Register seem to corroborate that observation. Amongst the 470 CSOs that 
declared Foreign Security Policy and Defence a field of interest, a significant number seems 
focussing on research and reporting. 10 of these organisations describe themselves explicitly as 
a think-tank or research organisation and at least 29 others mention the conduct or promotion 
of research and analysis, or the provision of expertise (through publications, seminars or by 
other means) as a key activity124. As none of these organisations is of type V – Organisations 
representing churches and religious communities – this means that among the NGOs in the 
Register, almost 9% (39/443) has a main focus on research. Besides, organisations such as 
Freedom House, the International Crisis Group or the general secretariat of Transparency 
International amongst others can well be labelled as NGOs, in practice their first commitment 
lies indeed with conducting research and analysis and the production of elaborated reports. In 
that way, these organisations can certainly fulfil a watchdog function (cf. Chapter XII, 2 infra) 
but they do not act as grass-roots organisations, directly connected to civil society. Hence, it 
can be doubted whether and to what extent these organizations – just as formal think thanks 
and research institutes – are representative of or speak for the general public. Also, multiple 
                                                 
121 Selected on III and V. 
122 Based on the totality of entries in the register since its start on 23.06.2008, till 31.12.2016. 
123 Development, External Relations, Humanitarian Aid, Foreign Security Policy and Defence, Trade 
and Enlargement. These fields of interest relate mainly to policies with an extra-European focus.  
124 EU, Transparency Register – Search the Register. Based on systematic, manual, search through 
the details of the 470 selected CSOs, I only considered those organisations where research seemed 
to be one of their main objectives, not those where it seemed rather a step-up to other, clearly 
more central objectives. 
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organisations registered as NGO in fact search to defend specific sectorial interest rather than 
the general interest or the population at large. This is for instance the case for the Deutscher 
Feuerwehrverband (the umbrella guild of German fireman, already in the register since the 
early beginning) or The British Academy (the umbrella and charity organisation of the British 
humanities and social sciences) and ChinaEU (an international business association, working 
on cooperation in the field of ICT), which both registered as NGOs in 2015. These organisations 
may well be non-profit, their fundamental purpose does not ly with the promotion of a certain 
common good, but with the defence of specific interests.  
According to Steffek and Nanz (2008, 8) CSOs can operate as so-called “transmission belts” 
between civil society and political institutions by giving voice to citizens’ needs. Yet, looking 
at the reality of those CSOs involved, this cannot be confirmed for European Security and 
Defence Policy (cf. Rodekamp 2010, 24). Furthermore, given the increasing professionalization 
and integration into the European political system of these CSOs, we rather see ourselves 
confronted with a situation in which “Brussels talks to Brussels” and not one of mass 
participation (Greenwood 2011, 202‑3). This is indeed not only so for the field of foreign 
security and defence but given the weak public debate (cf. Chapter IX infra) it can arguably be 
supposed to be widespread where it concerns this matter.  
Besides, even if there should be real public interest in accessing and influencing European 
foreign policy makers, it can be wondered if this would prove very successful. Given that at the 
European level most lobbying happens with the Commission and the EP, this seems 
problematic in the context of CFSP. The Commission is largely absent in the definition of this 
policy and the Parliament only plays a minor role in its implementation (cf. infra). Indeed, the 
EU’s FSDP is, as exemplified before (cf. Chapter VI supra), for an important part defined by 
the European Council and the Council of Ministers. This (European) Council now – keen to 
portray itself as an institution where no lobbying takes place (Pohl 2006, 24) – proves to be the 
least accessible of the EU institutions (Mazey and Richardson 2002, 124, 143‑48; also: 
Dembinski and Joachim 2014, 454; Fazi and Smith 2006, 31). Given its multi-headed, 
intergovernmental character, the (European) Council as such is difficult to interact with and 
therefore indirect lobbying – through Member State representatives and at national 
governments level – has become the route of choice for lobbyists (Hayes-Renshaw 2009, 78). 
This fragmented approach dilutes the impact of CSOs in matters of European foreign security 
and defence. By preferring the national route rather than the Brussels route (Greenwood 2011, 
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23‑52) the development of Europeanised civil society representations seems to be structurally 
hindered. National interests will mostly prevail when working with these national players, i.e. 
national interest groups try to influence “their” representatives. Hence, because of the dispersed 
approach of the CSOs, each trying to play just one member of a multi-headed body, their overall 
impact on the European foreign security and defence policy will be rather restricted and not 
pushing to one specific direction. 
2. Is a directly elected body being regularly consulted on European foreign policy, and 
can it actively participate in its daily conduct?  
Historically, the constitutional role of the European Parliament in CFSP is limited. Lisbon has 
not substantially changed this. Art. 36 TEU states that the High Representative “regularly 
consult[s] the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the common 
foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy and inform it of how 
those policies evolve”. Besides, the HR is also said to ensure that the views of the Parliament 
are duly taken into consideration. But, although Lisbon thus explicitly extends the 
parliamentary consultation to CSDP and raises the plenary debate on CFSP from one to two per 
year (cf. Chapter XII, 1 infra), the legal position of the European Parliament in CFSP is still 
marginal. Indeed, it is to be noted that these consultation and information rights do not cover 
individual decisions concerning concrete foreign policy actions, but only the “main aspects and 
basic choices125” (Thym 2008, 221). Besides, the Council has not conceded the EP’s 
‘maximalist’ demand that CSDP missions should be approved by an absolute majority of MEPs 
(Lord 2011, 1143). In that way, the Parliament continues as the junior partner (Cini and 
Borragan 2016, 250) in the day-to-day conduct of the CFSP.  
This weak formal position however, has not hindered the Parliament to make the best out of its 
situation by using these new treaty provisions to assert its role in the CFSP and CSDP as much 
as possible (cf. Crum and Fossum 2014, 117‑20; Wisniewski 2011). Already in a resolution of 
5 June 2008126, the EP takes a clear stance by emphasizing the stronger role it sees for itself in 
CFSP under Lisbon. This resolution states that the Parliament should be involved “in the 
                                                 
125 Art. 36 TEU, confirmed by the Declaration by the High Representative on Political Accountability, 
art. 1. 
126 European Parliament, Resolution of 5 June 2008 on the annual report from the Council to the 
European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) – 2006 (2007/2219(INI)) europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc. do?type=TA& 
language=EN&reference=P6-TA-2008-0254 [25.04.16].  
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decision-making process so as to enhance the transparency of and accountability for the main 
choices of the CFSP” and stresses that “Council-Parliament relations […] need to be 
reconsidered in order to take account of the major reforms of the future CSDP and of 
Parliament's strengthened powers of scrutiny, following the transfer of the remaining Western 
European Union competences to the EU”. This strong parliamentary commitment to enhance 
its proper position about CFSP also emerges through its involvement in the development of the 
EEAS or, for instance, its recent activism concerning the creation of a European defence union. 
Where it concerns the EEAS – as discussed in Chapter VI – the Parliament successfully 
increased its leverage on the conduct of the EU’s external action by increasing its role in the 
nomination of the HR and by intervening directly on the service funding as well as obtaining at 
least an informal impact on the appointment of Heads of Delegation (cf. Koutrakos 2012, 198). 
As to the debate on closer European cooperation in matters of defence, poked up by the election 
of Donald Trump as US-president127, the EP published on its own initiative an extensive 
report128 in which it set out its position and ideas on the matter, thus trying to give content and 
direction to the discussion.  
Furthermore, by agreeing on so-called Interinstitutional Agreements with the other EU 
institutions – a technique it already successfully used before in this context (cf. Maurer et al. 
2005) – the European Parliament has succeeded to obtain some more powers in CFSP. The IIA 
of 20 November 2002 and that of 14 June 2006 are important in this respect. The first one deals 
with the access of MEP’s to sensitive information in the field of security and defence (cf. 
Chapter X, 4 infra), while the second regulates, amongst others, the involvement of the EP in 
financing the CFSP (cf. Chapter VII supra). In accordance with art. 113 of its rules of 
procedure, the Parliament has on its own initiative also passed resolutions stating the terms on 
which it would have approved CSDP missions when it would have had the formal power to do 
so129 (cf. Barbé and Herranz Surrallés 2008, 91). The possible long-term impact of this activist 
strategy however is (still) difficult to predict. On the one hand, this could develop into a future 
source of influence in so far as the Council concludes that it is better to discuss the terms of a 
                                                 
127 EUObserver, 15.11.2016, “EU crafts defence plan in Trump’s shadow” euobserver.com/ 
foreign/135905 [10.05.17]. 
128 European Parliament, Resolution of 22 November 2016 on the European Defence Union 
(2016/2052(INI)) europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P8-
TA-2016-0435 [10.05.17].  
129Cf. European Parliament resolution of 13 June 2013 on the reconstruction and democratisation 
of Mali europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2013-0281&language 
=EN&ring=B7-2013-0254 [08.01.14].  
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mission with the Parliament than leave themselves exposed – if things subsequently should go 
wrong – to the charge that they did not take all risks into account at the time of deployment 
(Lord 2011, 1143). On the other hand, the Parliament can well give its opinion; in the end, there 
are no formal provisions preventing the Council from adopting decisions contradicting the 
views formulated by the EP (Schmidt-Radefeldt 2011, §16). So, despite these efforts and a 
general observation that the obligation to consult the Parliament on foreign and security policy 
is taken increasingly seriously (Gourlay 2004, 188) – and as already mentioned before – the 
role of the EP in the daily conduct of CFSP remains overall still marginal. Essentially, Lisbon 
did not change the CFSP’s multi-governance character. Therefore, the role of the European 
Parliament in its daily conduct is mostly restricted to being a kind of a sounding board of the 
European Council and the FAC which, supported by their intergovernmental preparatory and 
advisory organs, and the High Representative, clearly show the way where it concerns concrete 
CFSP actions.  
Within this policy’s still strongly intergovernmental context, ultimately, governments and 
diplomats remain key actors, who must resort to their national basis for acceptance of their 
activities (Wessels and Bopp 2008, 15). Under Lisbon, this national basis has officially obtained 
increased access to the European Policy system by the introduction of art. 12 TEU. In addition, 
also the already existing Protocol 1 on the role of national parliaments in the European Union 
deals with the role of national legislatures. This annex to the Treaty clarifies in its art. 10 that a 
conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs “may [...] organise 
interparliamentary conferences on specific topics, in particular to debate matters of common 
foreign and security policy, including common security and defence policy”130. However, there 
are limits to how far the European level can be controlled through the democratic institutions 
of the Member States, as for example, the costs to national parliaments of acquiring the 
specialized forms of expertise needed for effective democratic control will increase where they 
have to monitor both domestic and Union matters (Lord 2004, 181‑82; cf. also Chapter XII, 1 
infra). Besides, when looking at Licensing and Budget discussed before, it can be strongly 
doubted if their involvement in the day-to-day European foreign policy will be substantial. Even 
if a national parliament is involved in the definition of its own country’s vision and position on 
European foreign policy, this does not per se mean that it has any substantial means of control 
over the actual European foreign policy. After all, as pointed out, the High Representative, for 
                                                 
130 Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the EU, OJ C 306, 17.12.2007, pp.148-150. 
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instance, could be appointed even when an individual Member State is opposed; and the 
involvement of each individual national parliament within its own national context would not 
change this. Or, if we take national parliaments’ participation in decisions about the national 
military participation in CSDP missions, we again have to ascertain that involvement in the 
national decision about the country’s own contribution does, as such, not mean much in relation 
to the mission’s actual launch.  
And, in any case, in many Member States, the parliament seems to plays no role whatsoever 
(or only a very weak role) in the policy-making process preparing CSDP missions (cf. Chapter 
VII supra, also: Peters et al. 2010, 10–1; Born et al. 2008, 15–31). In fact, as their role in 
national foreign policy is often restricted (cf. Diedrichs 2004, 31‑32), this in European foreign 
and security policy is too. Looking at the on-going naval mission, EUNAVFOR Atalanta off 
the coast of Somalia, we see that among the twelve EU Member States that are currently on the 
ground or did so in the past, only five acted upon formal approval of their parliament. Germany 
came into action after a vote in the Bundestag on 22 December 2008. Only having the right of 
approval since 2005, following the contested Spanish participation in the Iraq War (Crum and 
Fossum 2014, 113‑14), the Spanish parliament approved the country’s participation on 21 
January 2009 and upon approval of the Senate, Italian contributions followed in March 2009. 
In Finland, a government’s bill on the country’s participation to the mission was submitted to 
the Parliament in September 2010, to be adopted in November 2010 (Klabbers 2012, 384). The 
Swedish Riksdag finally agreed unanimously for action in March 2010, after strong debate (cf. 
Österdahl 2011, 43‑45). France, the UK, The Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Portugal and 
Romania on the other hand did not (have to) pass through a parliamentary approval prior to the 
deployment of troops. Although situations vary between these countries131, they have in 
common that the executive decided on sending troops for Atalanta without real parliamentary 
say. Answers on the Questionnaire among MSP are in line with these results; showing that in 
less than half of the Member States (11 out of 25), binding parliamentary involvement (by 
mandate and/or approval) exist when the country is about to participate in EU military missions. 
This ratio is even lower in case of civilian EU-missions, in which case only eight national 
parliaments have a say about participation (Table 3). 
                                                 
131 Cf. Wagner (2006) for an overview of deployment procedures in different countries and the 
role of the parliament therein. 
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Table 3: Mandate/ approval by national parliaments of participation in EU military or 
civilian missions 
 
1 = yes, 0 = no, empty = not answered. In case of a bicameral parliament and where both houses 
answered, I combined the results.  
(source: Questionnaire among MSP) 
a. The Czech Constitution stipulates two procedures. The Government may decide on troops 
deployment for up to 60 days. The Parliament (both chambers) has to approve such deployment (ex 
post). This provision could be use in cases of rapid response forces deployment (EU Battle Group, 
for instance). Secondly, there is a provision on the participation of Czech armed forces in an 
international military operation. The Government has to ask the Parliament for approval ex ante. 
The same provisions for approval of military operations apply to Czech participation in EU civilian 
missions. 
b. Military: the answers concern military contributions to NATO or UN operations. DK does not 
participate in EU military operations due to its opt-out from EU defence cooperation. Civilian: 
follows the general procedure for Danish EU obligations. Before the government reaches a 
decision, it has to consider whether the participation is of major significance to Danish interests. If 
so the government will seek a mandate from the European Affairs Committee. If not, it just informs 
the committee. So far none of the Danish contributions to EU civilian missions have been subject to 
a mandate. 
c. In reality, parliamentary approval ex ante would always be needed; the political reality is that 
government would subject the decision to a vote. 
d. Government informs the Assembly immediately after a decision is taken, but does not need its 
approval. 
e. Under law n. 145/2016, authorizations are approved on a yearly basis. Each Chamber is free to 
express its approval through any document envisaged by its rules of procedures. A draft bill is only 
required in case penal war code is to be applied during the mission (art. 2.2, Law 145/2016). 
f. Whereas it is up to the Committee to give the ex-ante assent, it is the Conference of Presidents that 
gives its assent in the form of a grand-ducal regulation (not a law). 
g. Whenever the Government decides to involve military forces or contingents in military operations 
abroad, it must notify the parliament and submit a detailed report about that involvement (including 
the requests that call for the involvement, together with their reasons; draft decisions or proposals 
of the involvement; the military resources to be involved, the type and level of risks estimated, the 
foreseen duration of the mission). If justified by the nature of the mission, this notification occurs 
when the security term required by the action has been completed. While the formal authorisation 
by the parliament is not necessary for the involvement of military contingents in military operations 
abroad, it is nonetheless responsible, after it has been informed by the Government, for the 
monitoring of the participation of such contingents. The Government submits to the parliament a 
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detailed report on the involvement of Portuguese military contingents abroad twice a year, without 
prejudice to other occasional or urgent information that may be requested, and the Government 
submits a final report to the parliament within sixty days of completion of the mission. The 
monitoring by the parliament is undertaken by the National Defence Committee. 
h. There is no established procedure for the participation in EU civilian missions. On a case by case 
basis, similar procedures to that followed in the framework of military missions would apply. 
i. Mandate is needed only for the deployment of armed troops. 
j. If deployments are part of training etc., the UK government would submit a memorandum on the 
policy framework to ESC, which would decide whether to clear from scrutiny, ask further questions 
or recommend for debate. In most cases, it clears these missions or asks for more information. If 
the EU was engaging in a hostile deployment the House as a whole would expect to debate the 
matter. - Any EU CSDP mission must be submitted for parliamentary scrutiny. However, this can 
be overridden if there is not sufficient time to clear the decision. The decision to act rests with the 
Government.  
3. Conclusion: participation in CFSP, normatively democratic? 
As the time of the “permissive consensus” – i.e. the silent and unspoken acceptance of the 
integration process by a majority of European citizens (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970, 40) – is 
over, the EU institutions started increasingly thinking about how to involve the public more 
closely. Hence, in its 2001 White Paper on Governance132, the European Commission proposes 
opening up the policy-making process to get more people and organisations involved in shaping 
and delivering EU policy. In this regard, both participation and public debate are mentioned as 
crucial instruments for good democratic governance. When looking however at the way the 
participation-indicators are met in the context of the EU’s current foreign and security policy, 
we can identify certain drawbacks. 
Although direct democracy formally exists under some form in most Member States, it does 
not serve as a channel of participation in European foreign security policy. Only in rare cases 
does direct democracy apply to foreign security and defence, let alone to European foreign 
security and defence. Since its first foundation with the Treaty of Maastricht in the beginning 
of the 1990’s, no single referendum was organised about European foreign security and defence 
policy, with the probable exception of the Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty. One of 
the issues at stake during this referendum was defence cooperation for which Denmark – after 
initial refusal of the Treaty – obtained an opt-out. The Lisbon treaty did not lead to a change in 
this regard. Neither at a national level, nor at EU level – where Lisbon introduced some very 
limited direct democracy tools – do citizens seem to have direct access to the EU’s foreign 
policy-making process. In this sense, the EU does not essentially differ from the large majority 
                                                 
132 European Commission, “European Governance – A White Paper”, COM(2001) 428 final, OJ C 
287, 12.10.2001, pp.1-29. 
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of its Member States where direct citizens’ participation in foreign security and defence policy 
is also inexistent. Due to a formal exclusion of this policy from the scope of direct democracy, 
as is the case for the EU’s citizens’ initiative or the Estonian referendum133, or just a result of 
the traditional exceptionality of foreign affairs, the result is essentially the same: citizens hardly 
play any direct role in the development and concrete establishment of foreign security and 
defence policy.  
Where it concerns civil access to the European foreign policy makers through organised groups, 
the point is not so much if there are possibilities, but rather if there is currently demand for such 
access. Still today, interest groups do not seem particularly interested in foreign security and 
defence matters and when they do it is mostly from a strictly national point of view. Therefore, 
their approach is nationally dispersed and hence limited. Besides, those organisations being 
active at the European level not only seem to focus their efforts on the wrong institutions, but 
also somehow act disconnected from the real society out there. Regarding this last point it can 
indeed be wondered “whether, how and to what extend these organisations that are active in 
lobbying at the EU level improve the democratic quality of decision-making in the CSDP” 
(Dembinski and Joachim 2014, 450). 
The absence of (direct) civil society participation could be compensated by an extensive 
parliamentary involvement in European foreign and security affairs. Yet, both at the European 
as well as the national level, this parliamentary involvement finds itself faced with important 
difficulties. The European Parliament repeteadly gives prove of a participative eagerness and 
certainly has made efforts to enhance its role in the day-to-day conduct of the European foreign 
and security policy. However, the particularities of foreign policy mentioned before, prevent it 
from becoming a real actor in CFSP. Being indeed consulted on the general direction of the 
CFSP, the Parliament is mostly left aside when it concerns concrete dossiers. Besides, it can 
difficultly be described as an active player; governments and diplomats play the game without 
much consideration for the EP. At the same time, also national parliaments are largely pushed 
along where it concerns European foreign and security policy. This becomes clear when looking 
at their role in the deployment of troops abroad. Notwithstanding things are not necessarily 
unchangeable – as shows the Spanish case – we cannot deny that in many EU-Member States 
                                                 
133 Many exceptions exist regarding issues that cannot be treated by direct democracy. In Estonia 
for instance, national defence cannot be subject to referendum; or, in Portugal and Hungary, civil 
service is excluded. For an overview of topics and restrictions, see IDEA Direct Democracy 
Database idea.int/elections/dd/search.cfm# [06.05.15].  
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the Parliament plays no significant role whatsoever where the participation of the army in EU-
missions is concerned. Besides, the fact that some do, not necessarily makes for an 
improvement of the CFSP’s overall normative democratic legitimacy. In line with what I have 
pointed out in the previous Chapter about budget control by national parliaments; this creates a 
situation in which a common policy – binding the EU in its totality – incorporates an unbalanced 
parliamentary participation. Given that the participating armies act under one mandate; and on 
the field, operate as one organization, the involvement of some people’s representatives may 
well make for some partial public control, it does not make for public control, with political 
equality.  
In a certain way however, it should not be very surprising that especially the participation in 
the daily conduct of foreign affairs points out to be not very well developed, as it is exactly in 
this daily conduct that speedy decision-making and secrecy can have their importance and that 
executive independence is arguably necessary to be effective. This line of thought seems 
moreover to be confirmed by the observation that exactly in these situations urging for rapid 
reaction, the parliament(s) hold(s) weaker grip on the budget (cf. Chapter VII supra). 
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IX. Public debate about EU foreign policy 
Summary: This chapter evaluates public debate mainly through the proxy of media 
coverage. Based on a systematic search in three comprehensive press databases, it looks at 
the coverage of (different elements of) European foreign security policy in a comparative 
way. In a second time, I look at more specialised, so-called, Europress, and its relevance for 
the public debate. Furthermore, the chapter assess how popular EU foreign policy 
institutions and actors are on social media. 
As the then Belgian minister of foreign affairs, Louis Michel, rightly pointed out at the EU 
General Affairs Council of 16 July 2001, “a public debate on CFSP/ ESDP is becoming all the 
more important, since the original goals of the European project – the maintenance of peace, 
stability and prosperity – run the risk of disappearing from the popular consciousness” (cited 
in Ehrhart 2002, 7). Given that we cannot really find grounds to believe that there would be 
formal restraints on the possibility for such a debate134, and opinion polls point out a 
continuously large popular support for the idea of a common European foreign policy (cf. 
Chapter I, 2 supra); the question remains whether or not, and to what extent such a debate 
actually exists in Europe. 
When operationalizing public debate as a criterion for democratic legitimacy in foreign policy 
(Chapter IV, 5.1.4 supra), I argued that there are good reasons to almost equate the media and 
their contents with the public sphere, and that, therefore, we could use the proxy of media 
coverage to assess the presence and vivacity of the public debate. Building on the observation 
that the media indeed shape public opinion about the European Union (Peter et al. 2003, 306), 
there is little reason to assume that this argument does not also apply to the EU’s foreign 
security policy. That is, media content such as news reports (independent of their format: 
written, television, radio, …), newspaper articles, editorials or opt-ads can indeed serve as a 
proxy for public debate about the EU’s foreign policy. Hence, the first indicator that has been 
put forward in this regard (indicator 8) concerns the extent to which EU foreign policy is 
covered in the media. However, today probably more than ever, policy makers can 
communicate directly with citizens. Especially by means of social media they can tell and show 
the people their daily work and communicate directly to - and with the people about what they 
                                                 
134 In rankings such as World Press Freedom Index (21 EU countries in top 40) or Freedom House 
(22 EU countries marked as “free”), EU countries are traditionally scoring well. 
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are doing and why. Question then is if the people pick up this direct communication, hence 
informing themselves about the (foreign) policy in question (indicator 9).  
1. Do the media report about the CFSP on a regular basis?  
While opinions are divided with regard to EU coverage on the whole – varying notably between 
the assertion that “one out of three articles in a European quality paper makes political 
reference to Europe [and] one out of five reports directly about at least one European issue” 
(Trenz 2004, 311) and the affirmation that “overall, EU topics account for an extremely small 
proportion of reporting in […] national media” (Machill et al. 2006, 78; also: Hube 2003, 67–
90) – things seem much less ambiguous when looking at European foreign and security policy 
in particular. Although it may well be asserted that the coverage of European foreign security 
and defence policy is primarily Europeanized in a sense that there is great emphasis on EU 
actors and evaluations are rather positive (Kandyla and de Vreese 2011), news coverage of EU 
foreign policy proves also to be very limited. Following a key-word based research in three 
extensive press databases – Europresse, Genios and Gopress135 – several indications point out 
that European foreign security and defence policy is a topic poorly dealt with in many 
aspects136.  
To start with, by simply counting the number of articles for each year since Lisbon137 that cite 
the name of the High Representative, we see how in comparison with other international 
personalities, the head of the European diplomacy is rather scarcely mentioned. Looking at five 
high-level European officials – Commission president (Barroso, Juncker), Council president 
(Van Rompuy, Tusk), EP president (Busek, Schulz), ECB president (Trichet, Draghi) and the 
High Representative (Ashton, Mogherini)138 – we note that for each of the three databases the 
name of the High Representative is systematically less mentioned than that of the Commission 
president and of the ECB president. Besides, for Gopress, also Council president “Van 
Rompuy” or “Donald Tusk” have systematically more hits. And, for Europresse and Genios, 
                                                 
135 Europresse : bpe.europresse.com/, Genios : genios.de/, Gopress: gopress.be/info/nl 
136 I searched the databases from 01.01.2005 to 31.12.2016, using terms in English, French, 
German and Dutch for Gopress (thus largely covering the database, given its geographical focus 
on the Benelux). For Europresse I additionally searched in Spanish and Italian, thus covering 
65,67% of Europe’s native language use (cf. languageknowledge.eu /countries/eu27). In Genios, 
I searched in the German press. For more information on research queries, cf. Annex 6. 
137 Entered into force on 01.12.2009; for practical reasons, I understand “since Lisbon” in the 
context of this chapter as of 1 January 2010. “Since Lisbon” thus covers the years 2010 to 2016.  
138 With each person searched on for the exact time of his/ her time in office, cf. Annex 6. 
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these names are cited more often than that of the High Representative for, respectively, the 
years 2012, 2015 and 2016; and 2010, 2011, 2012, 2015 and 2016. Where, finally, it concerns 
the president of the EP, we note that – and although being mentioned less than the HR for the 
overall period 2010-2016 in both Gopress and Europresse – at least for Gopress, he seems to 
catch-up and is distinctly more mentioned than the HR for both 2014 and 2016 (cf. Figure 5) 
In that way, it should of course not astonish that “Catherine Ashton” and “Mogherini” are 
passed with distance by national leaders such as “Merkel”, “François Hollande” or “Obama”; 
but also – and more notably – by UN secretary general “Ban Ki-Moon”, or American Secretary 
of State “Hillary Clinton”, or “Kerry”. 
Figure 5: High level EU officials mentioned by the media - comparison 
What is more, the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty seems not to lead to a notable change in 
this regard. So, for instance, measured against the overall number of articles registered in each 
of the respective databases, for the years 2010-2016, the name of “Catherine Ashton” or 
“Mogherini” is not notably more cited than that of the pre-Lisbon High Representative, 
“Solana”, for the years 2005-2009. The same goes for the function as such. Although, in 
absolute numbers, an increasing number of articles exist that include a reference to the (name 
of the) High Representative, in relative terms the HR is not talked about more in articles 
published after Lisbon, than before (cf. Table 4). 
 142 
Furthermore, not only is the “EEAS” the least cited EU institution – with 8.655 hits in 
Europresse, 1.457 in Genios and 1.006 in Gopress, against respectively 16.085, 5.209 and 2.874 
for the “Court of Justice” – the second least mentioned European institution in each database – 
but also is European foreign security or defence policy overall little spoken of. Considering the 
number of articles which refere to the “European Union”, those that talk about “European 
foreign policy”, “common foreign and security” or “European defence” are comparatively few. 
Or, in comparison with other European policy topics: there is not only the “common agricultural 
policy” that is widely more mentioned, but also “Schengen” and the “Erasmus program”, which 
are both scoring always better than “common foreign and security” or “European defence” (cf. 
Table 5). Besides, where the exact interpretation of these data could still be debated; another, 
and I believe unambiguous, indication is the number of times European civilian- or military 
missions are mentioned. Searching on the acronyms of all past- and on-going missions, we see 
that they are but very scarcely mentioned: since Lisbon, all 34 EU-missions together count for 
6.658 hits in Europresse, 7.756 in Genios and 877 in Gopress. 
Table 4: HR mentioned by the media - evolution over time (2005-2016) 
 
This unequivocally confirms Stephanie Anderson’s (2013, 7‑8) findings, who based on a search 
in Google News concluded that CSDP missions are “little mentioned and little debated”. Or, 
to compare, NATO’s single ISAF mission is with respectively 21.944, 38.922 and 1.550 results 
clearly much more talked about. These findings thus seem to confirm Helmuth Kuhn’s (cited 
in: C. Bickerton 2011, 104) observation that compared to NATO missions, EU missions very 
often “fall below the radar screen”. Furthermore, the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty, 
again, does not seem to have led to considerable change in this regard. In that sense, foreign 
policy related issues seem to confirm a more general observation concerning EU topics all 
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together: based on the three press databases, EU related issues are not considerably more 
mentioned since 2010, than before (cf. Annex 6). 
Table 5: EU policy fields mentioned by the media - comparison (2005-2016) 
Certainly, systematic media coverage of EU-affairs – including foreign security and defence 
issues – exists through a specialized – mostly online – press, which daily follows the ins and 
outs of EU-politics. Emblematic examples in this regard are Politico (until end of April 2015 
European Voice), EUobserver and Euractiv139. Yet, such press can hardly be taken as a proxy 
for a larger public debate or be supposed to shape such public debate. Simply based for example 
on the likes and follows they receive on their Facebook-pages compared to other press 
sources140, it seems safe to state that at least their direct impact will be modest. Given the fact 
that they are clearly much less liked than many other press sources (cf. Figure 6); which for that 
matter have a more restrained geographical reach, it obviously follows that they are much less 
known with the public.  
                                                 
139 Politico: politico.eu/, EUObserver : euobserver.com/, Euractiv : euractiv.com/  
140 On 16.05.17, I typed the name of each press source in the FB-search field. On the individual FB-
page of the given press source, we then see the current number of likes or followers, i.e. of 
individual persons that like this specific FB-page or follow it. Given the nowadays generalized use 
of FB, this can arguably be taken as a good proxy for the public’s familiarity with this press source 
and thus their direct impact.  
 144 
Figure 6: Popularity of press sources on Facebook 
GP = General press – TP = thematic press – EUP = EU-specific press 
Total numbers of likes and followers as indicate on the Facebook page of each respective press 
source, on 16.05.2017 (source: www.facebook.com)  
This seems further confirmed by the limited readership of 1.5 million people and the 
distribution of 20.000 printed copies of its weekly edition, or even the 63.000 readers of its 
Brussels Playbook, that Politico Europe itself claims to have141. Thus, as the direct role in the 
public debate of this specialized press is narrow, it mostly has to pass through the filter of more 
general media. These general media however do not seem to rely very often on the EU-
specialized media as a source of information and only scarcely pass their message through. 
Searching in Gopress142, since the beginning of 2010 only 36 general media articles explicitly 
refer to European Voice as a source143; EUObserver is mentioned 77 times. Politico Europe 
only gave 32 results. However, the actual number of references made to this last news source 
                                                 
141 Politico, Advertising politico.eu/advertising/ [16.06.17]. 
142 Gopress is the only of the 3 press databases where specific news outlets can be (de)selected. 
This is important in order to avoid counting cross-references, (i.e. references by the Euro-press to 
itself). I searched between 01.01.2010 and 31.12.2016, by ruling out European Voice (paper and 
website) as a source of reference. EUObserver and Euractiv are not included in the database. 
143 I searched for European Voice until 19.06.16, when it was taken over by Politico. In order to 
avoid articles that only talked about this take-over, I searched on “European Voice” NOT “Politico”. 
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is difficult to evaluate. It seems often just referred to as Politico, which on the other hand, when 
searched on, would lead to a high number of unrelated hits as this can both refer to the American 
version of the news website or simply to a word repeatedly used as a prefix in Dutch or French. 
With 347 hits, finally, Euractiv is mentioned more often. Yet, taking everything into account 
and linked with the number of EU-related references that we can find in this same database (cf. 
Table 5 supra), I conclude that there seems not to be made much use of Euro-specialised press 
as source of information when dealing with EU-related topics. The about 2000 media citations 
per year, Euractiv mentions itself144, are in that sense rather an extra proof of this specialised 
media’s limited impact. 
2. Is the public informed through direct communication with the CFSP actors? 
With the emergence of social media, the possibility for policy makers to make direct contact 
with the people has increased considerably. Yet, the use of these social media not only can tell 
us how much these policy makers wish to communicate, but also how interested citizens are (in 
the topic of) that communication. That is, the degree with which the people follow particular 
political institutions and policy makers and consult the information these put online, arguably 
is a good indicator of how interested the public is in these institutions and policy makers and 
how informed they are about them. 
In that sense, the popularity of the EEAS and the High Representative on different social media 
platforms, especially in comparison to other institutions and actors, certainly tells something 
about how trending they are as topics of public debate and can serve as an indicator of how 
much public debate there is about European foreign policy more in general. In this regard, the 
consecutive graphs in Figure 7 seem to confirm the previous observation about an all-in-all 
limited public debate about European foreign and security policy. On each of the four platforms 
that have been looked at (Facebook, Twitter, You Tube and Instagram), the EEAS and the High 
representative are clearly among the lesser, or even least, followed persons and institutions.  
                                                 
144 Euractiv, Open EurActiv: Facts behind the media in 12 EU capitals, in 12 languages euractiv. 
com/OpenEurActiv [16.05.17].  
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Figure 7: Popularity of different policy institutions and actors on social media 
(*) The European Council- Council of the EU do not have separated Facebook pages. 
 
(*) Two separated twitter accounts, one in English and one in French 
(**) Almost inactive on Twitter, last message from 16 January 2017 
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(*) You Tube channels are rather linked to the office/ institution than to a person. Therefore, 
there are no You Tube channels for individual politicians. 
 
Sources: Facebook (www.facebook.com), Twitter (www.twitter.com/?lang=en), You Tube 
(www.youtube.com) and Instagram (www.Instagram.com). Consulted on 18.04.18.  
The above findings are all the more telling when we take into account that the EEAS and the 
High Representative are comparatively quite active on social media. For those three platforms 
for which the total number of communications can be seen (Twitter, You Tube and Instagram), 
both the EEAS and the HR prove to be among the more communicative institutions and persons. 
(cf. Figure 8).  
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Figure 8: Social media activity of different policy institutions and actors 
 
Sources: Twitter (www.twitter.com/?lang=en), You Tube (www.youtube.com) and Instagram 
(www.Instagram.com). Consulted on 20.04.18. 
3. Conclusion: public debate in CFSP, normatively democratic? 
The lack of public interest revealed through the assessment of the foregoing criterion of 
participation seems confirmed by the (absence of) public debate. Again, the point is not so much 
that there would exist a formal constraint on the possibility to have such a debate, but rather 
that it is currently not taking place. A good case in point for this is the overall coverage of 
European foreign policy by the press. Considering the totality of indications, it seems justified 
to conclude that European foreign security and defence is an issue not much spoken of in 
European media. Both the High Representative and her diplomatic service, the European 
External Action Service, are little mentioned in comparison to other European officials or 
offices. The same goes to a certain extent for European foreign policy as a policy domain; and 
certainly, for the EU’s military and civilian missions abroad. In this regard, it is noteworthy to 
mention that the Lisbon treaty, and the changes it implied for the EU’s foreign policy, did not 
seem to have any positive impact in this regard. It cannot be maintained that since then the EU’s 
foreign policy (or one of its aspects) is covered more extensively. Where it concerns the more 
specialised Europress, the problem is that, so far, its impact is clearly too limited to serve as a 
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representative of public debate, let alone to instigate one. Having but a limited direct link to the 
wider public, it does not seem to fulfil an important role as input-provider to the more general 
press neither. That is, based on the relevant findings, general media does not often use the 
Europress as a source of information. 
Furthermore, also the comparatively limited consultation by citizens of information that is made 
directly available by the European foreign policy players themselves through different social 
media channels, is pointing to to a rather constraint public debate about the issue.  
Given the arguable link between both press coverage and use of social media on the one hand 
and public debate on the other, and the relevance of public debate as impetus to other criteria 
of democracy – be it public participation or oversight – this limited press coverage and ditto 
social media follow up are tangible shortcomings for the EU’s foreign policy’s normative 
democratic legitimacy.  
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X. Transparency and secrecy in EU foreign policy 
Summary: This chapter deals with transparency, traditionally understood as an important 
element of good, democratic governance for the EU. While doing so, the evaluation however 
takes distance from a sole focus on the public accessibility of documents but also looks at 
the organisation of secrecy. It discusses how secrecy is justified, how it is decided, and who 
has access to highly sensitive information.  
Lack of transparency has often been invoked as a major problem of EU governance (cf. Curtin 
2009, 206; Héritier 2003) and its improvement as a crucial step to reinforce the EU’s democratic 
legitimacy (cf. Curtin and Meijer 2006, 110; Føllesdal 2003, 34; Neyer 2003, 703; Joerges and 
Dehousse 2002). The EU itself also repeatedly lauds the beneficial effects of transparency 
because it would “enable citizens to participate more closely in the decision-making process 
and guarantee that the administration enjoys greater legitimacy and is more effective and more 
accountable to the citizen in a democratic system”145. Thus, transparency has been recognized, 
certainly since Lisbon, as a key requirement for legitimate, democratic governance and as a 
fundamental constitutional principle throughout the EU legal order (De Baere, 2013, p. 4).  
However, where it concerns its foreign policy, the European Union does not escape the common 
dilemma that the demand for transparency contradicts a need for secrecy that often emerges in 
these matters. Just as is the case for classical State foreign policy – transparency in EU foreign 
policy should be understood in relation to efficiency-induced demands for secrecy. The 
question arises how the EU addresses this secrecy dilemma. Therefore, this chapter does not 
just look at transparency as the public accessibility of documents (indicator 9); but, accepting 
the idea that secrecy may be necessary for the EU’s foreign policy to function, it also discusses 
the justification of such secrecy (indicator 10), as well as the way both transparency and secrecy 
are decided and organized (indicator 11). Finally, attention will be given to if and how elected 
representatives can have ultimate access to sensitive information by (indicator 12). 
 
 
                                                 
145 Joint Cases C-92/09 & C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land 
Hessen [2010], ECR 2010 I-11063 
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1. How accessible is relevant CFSP information to the public?  
Except for art. 1§2 TEU and art. 10.3 TEU, acclaiming the general principle of openness; art. 
15.3 TFEU explicitly states that “any citizen [...], shall have a right of access to documents146 
of the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, [...]” and that “Principles and limits [...] 
governing this right of access shall be determined by the European Parliament and the Council, 
by means of regulations [...]”. Notwithstanding from a strictly legalistic point of view one could 
argue that this last article as such does not apply to CFSP/CSDP – as art. 40 TUE could be read 
as protecting CFSP from TFEU interference147 (Jacqué 2010, §370) – in practice, the formal 
commitment of CFSP, not only to the general principle of openness but also to the concrete rule 
of transparency, is undeniable. Not only has the Court of Justice (CJEU) ruled that “in the 
absence of provisions to the contrary”, documents relating to Title V of the TEU are covered 
by the transparency principles that generally apply to Council documents148, but also the CFSP 
falls within the scope of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU of which art. 42 
recognizes the access to documents in the same wording as art. 15(3) TFEU. Additionally, art. 
15(3) TFEU applies indirectly. Art. 11 of the Council decision establishing the EEAS149 states 
that the EEAS “shall apply the rules laid down in Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001150”, which exist in reference to the 
aforementioned treaty provision151. This is confirmed by the decision of the High 
Representative of 19 July 2011 regarding access to documents152. 
Looking at this formal outline, the EU seems to apply the same basic principles of transparency 
to its foreign policy as to other policies. However, what does this mean in practice? After all, 
art. 15.3 TFEU also stipulates that “each institution, body, office or agency [...] shall elaborate 
in its own Rules of Procedure specific provisions regarding access to its documents, in 
accordance with the regulations referred to [...]”; which certainly in foreign policy results in 
notable differences between key players in how they address transparency. Within the legal 
                                                 
146 “Documents” are “any content whatever its medium (written on paper or stored in electronic form 
or as a sound, visual or audiovisual recording) concerning a matter relating to the policies, activities 
and decisions falling within the institution's sphere of responsibility”. Cf. Regulation (EC) No 
1049/2001, art. 3, OJ L 145, 31.05.01, pp.43-48.  
147 Also art. 24§2; “the common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and procedures” 
148 Case T14-98 Heidi Hautala v Council of the European Union [1999], ECR 1999 II-02489.  
149 Council decision No 2010/427/EU, OJ L 201, 3.8.2010, p. 30–40.  
150 Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 (art.3), O.J. L 145, pp.43-48. 
151 Without an updated post-Lisbon version, Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 still details the treaty 
provisions (cf. infra). 
152 OJ C 243, 20.8.2011, p. 16–18. 
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framework outlined before, the HR/ EEAS, the Council and the European Council each have 
their particularities.  
Where it concerns first of all the European External Action Service, a considerable number 
of documents is directly accessible on its website. Not only explanatory files and charts about 
the EEAS’ legal basis and organisation; but also, profiles of top-ranking EEAS officials, 
speeches and statements of the High Representative, as well as information on the CFSP 
military and civilian missions can be found. These documents enable for the public to obtain a 
clear idea of the EEAS and its role in the EU’s foreign and security policy. On the other hand, 
few of the documents provided for are real policy documents. So, the actual level of 
transparency this creates should not be overestimated (cf. Stie 2012, 44). Besides, many of these 
background documents do not to come from the EEAS itself, but from the Council, the 
Parliament or the Commission. Until quite recently, it was difficult to obtain an overview of 
real EEAS documents because of the absence of a centralized public register. Although it is 
explicitly called for by art. 10 of the HR’s decision of 19 July 2011 and advanced as a key 
development by the EEAS Access to Document Co-ordinator153, a register has only been 
operational since 2015. After a little more than two years in existence154, the register contains 
606 documents of which 183 (30.20%) can be directly downloaded. Trends, however, seem 
little promising. Apart from the last trimester of 2016, the number of new documents clearly 
slows down. And, for these first months of 2016, the increase in documents lies solely with 
documents that have to be formally requested for in order to access their content (i.e., only meta 
data appears in the register), the number of directly downloadable documents continues to go 
down (cf. Figure 9). The increasing gap between downloadable documents and those that must 
be requested is even more obvious when looking at it as a percentage of the total number of 
(newly added) documents (cf. Figure 9). Where on the one hand, the actual creation of the 
register seems promising; this continuing decrease in the registration of (directly accessible) 
documents – although being assured by the EEAS to be largely coincidental (EEAS, e-mail 
12.06.17) – at least is puzzling. It will have to be seen how things evolve further over time. 
Also, at present, only documents issued since 2015 are included because the focus is on the 
consolidation of the new practice. If feasible, older documents may be added in the future 
(EEAS, e-mail 17.02.16). Currently, older documents can be requested through the Access to 
                                                 
153 EEAS, Report on Access to Documents for the Year 2011 and 2012, EEAS (2013) 1141825, 
currently not available online. 
154 e-EEAS Register europa.eu/public-register/ Date of measurement: 17.05.2017. 
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documents service155, but it is unclear how non-specialists can use this tool as documents’ 
absence from the register make it difficult to even know of their existence. Thus, older 
documents cannot be explored systematically, which inhibits a coherent public accessibility of 
pre-2015 documents. 
Figure 9: EEAS - Access to documents (01.2015 - 04.2017) 
For other institutions (except for the EC, cf. infra) such a register exists for quite some time156. 
So, the documents on foreign security and defence policy from the Council and its organs are 
in principle accessible through an online research form157. Like with the EEAS, the results of a 
request not only list documents that are available online but also documents that are not directly 
accessible. Regrettably, a request does not offer a clear overview of the totality of documents 
on a specific issue. Not only is the number of hits limited to 500, but also is the research tool 
“subject matter” based on the distribution codes of Council documents. These codes do not 
concern general themes or policy issues. For the Common Foreign and Security Policy, there 
are no less than 34 codes (for an overview, see Annex 7), which cannot be used cumulatively 
because this may generate doubles. Therefore, the register is not suited for statistical purposes 
(GSC, e-mail 22.10.14). This research method limits accessibility and the ability to obtain an 
overview of the main points (cf. Curtin, 2007, pp. 254–55) and makes it difficult to reveal 
interconnections among files and to identify policy processes. In addition, the register does not 
allow comparing transparency among different policies. However, based on data from the GSC 
(CSC, e-mail 03.05.16), it can be concluded that a significant number of documents in the 
register relates to foreign policy – between 2010 and 2015, on average 16.87% of all new 
                                                 
155 e-EEAS Register europa.eu/public-register/ [15.08.17] 
156 Council EU, Access to the public register of the other Institutions and bodies, (from 1999 
onwards) consilium.europa.eu/documents/access-to-council-documents-public-register/access 
-to-the-public-register-of-the-other-institutions-and-bodies?lang=en [15.03.16]  
157 Public Register of Council documents consilium.europa.eu/documents/access-to-council-
documents-public-register?lang=en. [15.08.17] 
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documents and 14.32% of all new original documents concern the CFSP (cf. Table 6)– and also 
that the direct accessibility of these documents is limited above average.  
Table 6: Council public register – CFSP documents 
 
* That is, they bear at least one of the 34 distribution codes related to CFSP  
(source: data received from the GSC, 03.05.16) 
 
Since Lisbon, 84.99% of the non-CFSP documents have been directly consultable through the 
Council’s register, against only 62.26% of the CFSP documents158. This difference is even more 
pronounced when only examining original documents159. For documents introduced since 
2010, 77.77% of the original non-CFSP and only 44.97% of the original CFSP documents are 
available for download160. For the period under consideration, there does not seem to be a 
notable evolution (Figure 10). Registered documents that are not directly available online can 
be requested on-line161. According to the Council’s 2016 annual report on the access to 
documents162, for the years 2012 to 2016 on average, “External Relations – CFSP” is the second 
most popular among the 28 Policy areas of requested documents that are listed. On average, 
10.46% of the documents for which access is requested concern this policy area. Yet, whether 
this is due to a genuine interest in the CFSP, or because the direct accessibility of these 
documents is more limited, is difficult to say; even more so because this category also concerns 
external relations more generally, thus also including issues such as international trade. Besides, 
                                                 
158 Non-CFSP Documents bear none of the CFSP distribution codes. CFSP documents bear at least 
one of the CFSP codes. 
159 The Register contains many translations of original documents. Original documents are original 
language versions. 
160 The different percentages of direct availability for download between original and all language 
versions is explained by the fact that a significant number of original documents only exist in 
English, of which essentially the documents that are already publically accessible have been 
translated. Thus, there is a higher ratio of publically available documents when considering all 
language versions compared with considering only original documents (GSC, e-mail 12.08.16).   
161 register.consilium.europa.eu/content/int?typ=NPDPF&lang=EN [15.08.17] 
162 Council of the European Union, Council Annual Report on Access of Documents – 2016, Table 
12 (p.14) data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7903-2017-INIT/en/pdf [31.10.17] 
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documents about “Defence and military matters” are clearly much less requested: for 2012 to 
2016 on average only 1.68% of the requested documents concern this policy area. In line with 
Regulation 1049/2001, art. 7 – also applying to the EEAS (cf. supra – initial applications shall 
be answered within 15 working days. In case of total or partial refusal, the applicant may, within 
15 working days, send a confirmatory application to ask the institution to reconsider its position. 
Figure 10: Council register - % of new documents per year, available online (2010-2015) 
 
2. Is restriction of access publicly justified?  
If the answer to a request for access is even partially negative, it must explain the reasons for 
refusal in reference to the exceptions outlined in Regulation 1049/2001, art. 4. Among these 
exceptions, especially those listed under paragraph 1(a) – “disclosure would undermine the 
protection of the public interest as regards [to] public security, defence and military matters 
[or] international relations” – apply to foreign policy. Pursuant to art. 17(1) of the same 
regulation, EU institutions also “publish annually a report for the preceding year including the 
number of cases in which the institution refused to grant access to documents, the reasons for 
such refusals and the number of sensitive documents not recorded in the register”. For both the 
Council and the EEAS, these reports present information on the totality of applications and the 
number, or percentage, of refused requests163. They show that for most initial requests, access 
                                                 
163 Reports of the Council: consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/publications/ ?top 
[]=279&fm=&to=&p=1. The reports of the EEAS since 2015 can be found in the EEAS register; 
older reports are currently not online.  
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is granted. For the EEAS164, of the 1034 requests for access between 2011 and 2016, a positive 
reply was given to 71.91% (750 requests); in 11.31% (118 requests), there was a full refusal 
(cf. Table 7)165. However, although the reasons for restricting access to documents are 
mentioned, they are generally vague (cf. Wessel, 2005, p. 234). Terms such as public security 
or international relations merely quote the above-cited art. 4 but do not explain precisely why 
access was really denied, and they seem subject to excessive executive discretion. Although 
this minimalistic argumentation regarding the reasons for secrecy has been successfully 
contested before the Court of Justice166 (cf. Abazi and Hillebrandt, 2016), the annual Council 
reports so far do not seem to have changed the use of generic arguments. Furthermore, the 
situation is even more problematic when it concerns sensitive documents. 
Table 7: Applications for access to documents treated by EEAS (2011-2016) 
 
(1) Positive reply and full access was given 
(2) Additional information was asked from the requestor, yet no answer was received 
(3) No documents matching the request were found 
(source: EEAS reports on access to documents) 
Sensitive documents are of three types, namely, top secret, secret and confidential. Regulation 
1049/2001, art. 9(2) states that they shall be handled only by the persons who have a right to 
acquaint themselves with such documents and that these persons shall also assess which 
references to these sensitive documents can be made in the register. Who these persons are, 
how they are bestowed with the right to determine the accessibility of sensitive documents, and 
                                                 
164 For the Council, only overall numbers are available; no precise numbers exist for the CFSP 
documents. 
165 Data are based on the EEAS reports on the access to documents for 2011 and 2012 
(EEAS(2013)1141825)), 2013 (EEAS.sg.1(2014)2244316), 2014 (EEAS(2015)662) and 2015 
(EEAS(2016)401) (received by e-mail EEAS SG.1, 08.03.16 and 14.06.16); and 2016, consulted 
through the EEAS Register. The 2011-2012 report mentions 389, not 362, as the number of initial 
requests. This is due to methodological problems in the preparation of the first report. On revision, 
the grand total of requests received for this period was 362 (EEAS, 10.03.16). 
166 Cf. Case T-529/09 Sophie in 't Veld v Council of the European Union [2012], ECR 2012-00000. 
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why they do so167 is not indicated (cf. infra). Even knowing the actual number of foreign policy-
related sensitive documents is unfeasible. Admittedly, the introduction to the EEAS’ annual 
transparency reports refers to art. 17(1) of Regulation 1049/2001 but none of the reports 
actually contain information on sensitive documents not recorded in the register. In fact, the 
EEAS simply does not seem to possess detailed information on sensitive documents168. The 
Council transparency reports, on the other hand indeed provide detailed information on how 
many sensitive documents it has produced in the period concerned and how many thereof are 
referred to in the register (cf. Table 8). Although no exact data are available regarding which 
of these documents concern foreign security and defence, according to the Council’s own 
statement, most of them do169. 
Table 8: Sensitive documents produced by the Council (2010-2014) 
 
(a) = produced, (b) = made reference to in the register  
(source: Council reports on access to documents)  
The low overall numbers indicate that at least the production of sensitive documents by the 
Council is rarer than suggested by urban myth (Driessen 2008, 117). However, these self-
produced secret documents are not the only ones addressed. Available data suggest that 
especially the number of “EU Confidential” documents handled by the Council is distinctively 
higher than the number mentioned in the transparency reports. For 2010 and 2011, the Council 
handled respectively 481 and 461 documents that were classified as “EU Confidential”170. This 
difference is explained by the fact that according to art. 9(3) of Regulation 1049/2001, 
“sensitive documents shall be recorded in the register […] only with the consent of the 
originator”. Given that most sensitive documents on CFSP originate from other institutions, 
including the EEAS (Statewatch 2012) but also Member States, this not only brings us back to 
                                                 
167 Cf. EUObserver, 24.09.12, “What is secret EU anyway?” euobserver.com/secret-ue/117634 
[15.08.17] 
168 Parliamentary question, 06.06.13 (E-004372/2012, OJ C 160 E). 
169 Parliamentary question, 06.06.13 (E-004374/2012, OJ C 160 E). 
170 Parliamentary question, 06.06.13 (E-004374/2012, OJ C 160 E). 
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the recentness of the EEAS register and the fact that EEAS does not seem to know the actual 
number of sensitive documents it produces, but also demonstrates the strong role of the Member 
States in this policy. As the Council is essentially an intergovernmental body in which MS 
continuously search for compromise, their pressure not to make public documents they circulate 
must not be underestimated (cf. Grigorescu 2007, 631). Relying on the originator consent 
principle, MS in practice have the last word on the documents they produce. Without explicit 
consent of the originator, the Council register will not mention a document that bears one of 
the three sensitive document classifications or is classified as “Restricted EU”171. Moreover, 
especially in non-legislative fields such as foreign security policy, MS traditionally rely on 
alternative channels of information exchange, such as the Coreu-network172 or so-called Limite 
documents. Thus, the MS bypass the transparency rules that normally apply to Council 
documents (cf. Hillebrandt and Novak 2016, 534). Although the number of documents that 
circulates per year through Coreu seems to be in decline (Bicchi and Carta 2012, 471), the total 
volumes of “Restricted EU” and “EU Confidential” obviously exceed the number listed in the 
Council register (Bunyan 2014). Furthermore, because Member States are unwilling to see their 
individual positions revealed, the Council argues that the disclosure of Limite documents173 
risks undermining “the ability of the Council and its members to carry out their responsibilities 
on the basis of frankness and mutual confidence”174. Therefore, Keohane’s (2005, 49), 
statement that ‘‘the chief source of non-transparency is government pressure for 
confidentiality’’ certainly applies to the workings of the Council, especially in a sensitive field 
such as foreign security and defence policy. 
This limiting role of national governments seems to be confirmed when examining the 
European Council. Even more so than the Council (Abazi and Adriaensen 2017, 3), the 
European Council seems resistant to transparency in foreign affairs. As noted before, the 
European Council does not have its own Document Register and does not publish a proper 
Access to Documents Report. Therefore, the access to documents concerning foreign security 
                                                 
171 Regulation 1049/2001 discusses “sensitive documents” and list three categories. The Council 
decision of 23 September 2013 (cf. infra) mentions “EU classified information (EUCI)” and adds a 
fourth category, “Restricted EU”. Although restricted documents are formally not sensitive and in 
theory should be listed in the Register similar to any other ordinary document, in practice, a large 
number of restricted documents are not referenced in the Council Register.  
172 An acronym for “Correspondance européenne “, COREU is a communication network through 
which the Member States exchange secured information related to the CFSP. 
173 LIMITE is not a classification but a distribution code.  
174 Council EU, Disclosure of Confidential Documents (14920/13), 16.10.13. 
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and defence that originate from the European Council is clearly problematic. Although the 
provisions on public access to Council documents are said to apply to the European Council 
(art. 10.2 RoP EC), the fact that “the deliberations of the European Council shall be covered 
by the obligation of professional secrecy” (art. 11§1 RoP EC) and the absence of a proper 
register strongly limits the transparency of the EC’s work. The recording of EC documents in 
the Council register does not really solve the problem, as it can be difficult for less specialized 
members of the public to distinguish from which institution documents originate. Furthermore, 
these documents are largely of a general nature. Accordingly, it is not at all easy to determine, 
for instance, when and how the EC decides the aforementioned strategic interests and 
objectives of the Union or what these interests and objectives may be. 
3. Is a directly elected body involved in the definition of the rules applying to 
transparency and secrecy? 
In the summer of 2000, a decision of then HR Javier Solana introducing classification rules for 
EU documents related to foreign security and defence policy caused controversy and was 
withdrawn when Regulation 1049/2001 was adopted (Wessel 2005, 232). Both the Council and 
the European Parliament adopted this Regulation. Although the fundamental principles on the 
access to EU documents thus seem eventually defined in a legislative act developed through 
public deliberation and in active consultation with a directly elected body, this is not the entire 
story. Resulting from an acrimonious confrontation between the EP and the Council in which 
the Council “did not want to end up giving Parliament information which Member States were 
not prepared to share with their own parliaments” (Rosén 2015, 389), the regulation has been 
a source of irritation ever since. Being a constructive document regarding the definition of 
general principles (art. 1, 2) and key concepts (art. 3), as well as the development of formal 
procedures (art. 6-8, 10) and structures for access (art. 11-12), the regulation remains vague on 
the refusal of access (art. 4, cf. supra, the classification of sensitive documents and access by 
the EP (art. 9) (cf. Maurer 2015, 13). Especially problematic, there are currently no EU-wide 
procedures for the classification of documents, and officials can classify them at their own 
discretion175. Where they exist, each institution internally decides on specific rules.  
                                                 
175 Euractiv, 25.09.14, “A roadmap to transparency and away from Sir Humphrey” euractiv.com 
/sections/eu-priorities-2020/roadmap-transparency-and-away-sir-humphrey-308698. 
[15.08.17] 
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The rules that apply to the EEAS are specified in a HR-decision from 19 April 2013176, with no 
legislative body having been involved in the definition of these rules. The Council, on the other 
hand, specified the procedures in its Decision of 23 September 2013177. At the same time – in 
defiance of art. 9(6) of Regulation 1049/2001 stating that the “rules of the institutions 
concerning sensitive documents shall be made public” – these rules were further detailed in 
hidden LIMITE documents on the handling of documents internal to the Council178 and the 
public access to Council documents179, initially revealed by Statewatch. Echoing Deirdre Curtin 
(2014, 6), the consolidation of the rules of secrecy hence has been largely achieved on the basis 
of discussions that are internal to the Council. The Council decision of 23 September 2013 (§5) 
only “underlines the importance of associating, where appropriate, the European Parliament 
[…] with the principles, standards and rules for protecting classified information […]”. Given 
that under this formulation, the Council itself decides on the appropriateness and scope of the 
EP’s involvement, it can be wondered how much say this actually leaves the Parliament. The 
European Council, for its part, seems to not even care about secrecy rules. Although the 
European Parliament already in 2008 urged the European Council to take appropriate action to 
apply Regulation 2001/1049180 – which indicates that “as a result of the entry into force of the 
TEU and the TFEU, [this] right of access to documents covers all EU institutions, bodies, and 
agencies”181 – no specifications on sensitive documents coming from the EC have been 
established. In recent years, the EP has increasingly sought to change this situation182, so far 
without result. 
All of this means that no directly elected body seems to have been involved in the establishment 
of these rules, neither for the EEAS, nor for the Council or European Council. The fact that the 
Council and European Council are composed of elected officials, in that sense does not make 
much difference. As already indicated under Licensing (Chapter VI, 1 supra, also: Hix and 
Høyland 2011, 8), in the context of the CFSP these bodies have essentially an executive role, 
not a legislative one. They carry out the EU’s foreign policy, in the context of which they use 
and produce lots of information. The fact that they can on their own, without the involvement 
                                                 
176 OJ C 190, 29.6.2013, pp. 1–46, art. 5 and Annex A. Pending the adoption of these rules, the EEAS 
applied the rules of the Council. 
177 Council Decision 2013/488/EU, OJ L 274, 15.10.2013, pp.1-50, art. 2.2. 
178 Handling of documents Internal to the Council (11336/11), 09.06.11. 
179 Public access to Council documents (17177/13), 29.11.13. 
180 European Parliament, 14.01.09, 2007/2154(INI), art. 21. 
181 European parliament, 03.11.15, 2015/2287(INI), art. 6.  
182 Cf. European Parliament, 05.06.13, 2013/2637(RSP), also: 13.04.16, 2015/2287(INI)). 
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of another, directly elected, body – either national or European – decide about which part of 
this information should be publically accessible and how this should be organised, hinders the 
public control over the actions and decision they take in the context of that policy. 
4. Elected representatives have access to information sealed from public access? 
Initially, the European Parliament was subjected to the same restrictions as the public183. This 
situation changed with Resolution 1049/2001, which states that “[…] the Council shall inform 
the European Parliament regarding sensitive documents in accordance with arrangements 
agreed between the institutions”. Such an arrangement was reached in 2002 in the form of an 
Interinstitutional Agreement184. According to this IIA, the president of the EP and a special 
committee of four MEP’s (five since September 2014) chaired by the Chairman of the 
Parliament’s foreign affairs committee shall be informed of the content of sensitive documents 
related to foreign security and defence that are held by the Council (art. 3.3 IIA). In line with 
Mogherini’s commitment to work on enabling access to classified information by the 
Parliament185, an updated agreement that formally includes the EEAS is currently being 
drafted186. Meanwhile the provisions under the 2002 IIA also apply to the EEAS187. This IIA 
represents an acknowledgement of the Parliament’s rights in foreign and security policy (Barbé 
and Herranz Surrallés 2008, 80‑81) and can improve this policy’s democratic quality by 
enabling access to highly sensitive information to directly elected persons.  
However, some nuancing comments are in order.  
A first problem is that MEP’s do not necessarily have access to all relevant information. 
“Information originating from a third State or international organisation shall [only] be 
transmitted with the agreement of that State or organisation”. The same goes for Member 
States, which can refuse transmission of information that originates from them (IIA 2002, art. 
                                                 
183 EUObserver, 23.10.02, “Green light for more acces to sensitive documents” euobserver.com 
/political/8097 [15.08.17] 
184 OJ C 298, 30.11.2002, p. 1–3.  
185 European Parliament, European Parliament’s hearings: Federica Mogherini: High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Policy and Security Policy - 6/10 europarl.europa.eu /hearings-2014/ 
resources/library/media/20141022RES75841/20141022RES75841.pdf . European Parliament, 
Evaluation letter Federica Mogherini, 08.10.14 europarl.europa.eu /hearings-2014/resources 
/library/media/20141021RES75582/20141021RES75582.pdf [18.05.17] 
186 Council of the EU, 23.11.12, 15343/12 (to consult online at: statewatch.org/news/ 2012/oct/eu-
council-ep-access-class-info-15343-12.pdf . Also: Parliamentary question, 27.02.15 (E-003149-15). 
187 OJ L 210, 3.8.2010, p. 30-40, para 6. 
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1.2). Similarly, the High Representative determines the Parliament’s access to EEAS 
documents188. Therefore, the final decision on the access to sensitive documents and the rules 
that apply to them, lies with the sending institution that acts as a gatekeeper. Moreover, it is not 
clear what the real scrutinizing power is of those MEPs who have the necessary security 
clearance. While the committee members can act through two different procedures; in both 
cases, the actual information they got access to proves altogether rather limited. First, the 
Special Committee can hold meetings with the HR (or her representative) to discuss 
confidential matters, but there will not be any disclosure of confidential document at this 
meeting. These meetings take place in an informal and irregular manner (MEP, e-mail 
18.08.16). Although initially planned to occur every six weeks (Brok and Gresch 2004, 187), 
the committee actually meets only sporadically. According to the HR annual activity reports, 
the committee only met six times between 2010 and 2015. The Parliament (European 
Parliament, e-mail 30.08.16) confirms that in each of the years 2013 and 2015, two meetings 
of the Special Committee were held and that there was no meeting in 2014 due to the EP 
elections that year. It does not have information for the previous years. Secondly, a committee 
member can request access to classified documents. If this request is granted, the viewing will 
occur in a secured reading room, initially situated in the Council buildings (EEAS, phone call 
26.04.16), and since 2011 located at the EEAS premises (CSC, e-mail 23.06.16). Accordingly, 
between 2002 and 2011, MEP’s consulted approximately 40 classified documents, seemingly 
without any refusal by the Council (CSC, e-mail 23.06.16). Data on the number of documents 
that were requested from the EEAS seems to be unavailable. However, this number is 
supposedly low, considering that there is at least no record of the consultations of classified 
documents that relate to EU sanctions (EEAS, e-mail 30.06.16) or the EU’s engagements as a 
mediator in international conflicts (EEAS, e-mail 23.05.16; Chapter XI infra).  
Secondly, it is not clear what the committee members can really do with the information they 
obtain. As stipulated by art. 9 of the EP decision on the implementation of the IIA189, members 
of the Special Committee cannot disclose, disseminate or reproduce the information obtained 
through the meetings or individual consultations. Therefore, according to MEP Neyts-
Uyttebroeck, the arrangement has questionable value for the workings of the Parliament 
because the members of the Committee cannot tell colleagues what they know and cannot claim 
                                                 
188 OJ C 210, 3.8.2010, p. 1–2 art. 4. 
189 OJ C 298, 30.11.2002, p. 4–5. 
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a superior status in decision-making190. The argument that through this instrument, the 
European Parliament “is widely privileged vis-à-vis their parliamentary counterparts at the 
national level” (Mittag 2006, 15) does not change the fact that the possibilities for the EP to 
have access to classified documents remain overall limited.  
Linked with the above, also the actual composition of the committee becomes relevant. Given 
that the committee members cannot share the information they obtain with other MEP’s, it is 
important who the selected members are and how they are chosen. To what extent are they 
representative for the European Parliament as a whole (Rosén and Stie 2017, 55‑57)? As the 
IIA (art.3.3) only stipulates that the members are designated by the EP’s conference of 
presidents (consisting of the President of Parliament and the chairmen of the political groups), 
neither the EP’s own rules of procedures, nor the IIA explains on what grounds the five MEP’s 
are selected. Mainly however, they are more experienced MEP’s, seating in the EP already for 
quite some time. Of the five members and two substitutes currently appointed, four are seating 
in the EP since 2009 and two even since 1999. AFET-chair, David McMillan is only in 
Parliament since 2014. Who the actual members are is not explicitly communicated, yet their 
names can be found in the minutes of the Conference of the Presidents meeting at which their 
appointment is confirmed (European Parliament, e-mail 10.01.2018)191. While Rosèn and Stie’s 
(2017, 56) idea that the names of the Committee members can only be obtained by filling a 
request goes too far, it is true that this information is not easy to find out. 
Taking all of this into account and considering that transparency should contribute to 
accountability by acting as an input provider to (legislative) oversight, it can be asked if the 
current mechanism is not rather an empty shell.  
5. Conclusion: transparency in CFSP, normatively democratic? 
When evaluating transparency in foreign policy, we must take into account the secrecy dilemma 
that exists in this domain. The EU’s foreign security policy is no exception to this rule. 
Therefore, this chapter not only assessed the accessibility of documents related to the EU’s 
                                                 
190 EUObserver, 18.11.10, “Secret document group was like ‘bad Le Carre novel’, MEP says” 
euobserver.com/institutional/31296 [15.08.17] 
191 Conference of Presidents. Minutes of the ordinary of Thusday 1 October 2015 europarl.europa. 
eu/RegData/organes/conf_pres_groupes/proces_verbal/2015/10-01/CPG_PV(2015)10-
01_EN.pdf [10.01.18] 
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foreign policy, but also looked at if and how secrecy is justified, and how the rules of 
transparency and secrecy are decided.  
Formally speaking, documents on foreign policy are accessible through online public registers 
in the same way as non-foreign policy related material. In practice however, as it can be 
arguably expected, these documents are clearly less directly consultable through said registers 
and more frequently they are just referred to, without giving immediate access to their content. 
In these cases, access can be requested according to the same procedure that applies to non-
foreign policy related documents and when such access is not granted reasons therefore are 
indeed communicated. As such, this should not be problematic. Though – and it is here that 
things do become problematic – when looking at these reasons in more detail, they essentially 
resemble generalized formulas rather than genuine arguments as to why the disclosure of 
specific information would be detrimental to the EU’s foreign policy’s efficiency (yet, it can of 
course be wondered how this could be done differently, without uncovering the secrecy that is 
covered by the deny of access…). Besides, also sensitive documents exist to which even basic 
reference is not made public. The reasons why their existence is kept secret are not 
communicated and the decision to do so solely results from the personal appraisal of an 
executive official.  
This is further compromised by the fact that mainly the executive alone decides the 
overreaching framework of transparency and secrecy; but even more so by the fact that its 
concrete application, afterwards, varies between institutions. In the complex executive structure 
of the EU’s foreign and security policy (cf. Thym 2011), the EEAS, the Council and the 
European Council each seem to hold on to their own interpretation of how to organize 
transparency and secrecy; each sticking to their own, internally developed practices. The 
European Parliament has only been involved in the establishment of the general rules on public 
accessibility and played no role in the respective secrecy rules of each of these executive 
institutions. The existence of such differing attitudes and especially the position of the European 
Council in this regard is problematic. The on-going discretion by the European Council 
regarding the information it holds and the secrecy rules that apply to such information impedes 
the development of a more balanced transparency-secrecy arrangement. Being the institution 
that sets out the basic principles and guidelines of the EU’s foreign security actions, this hinders 
overall public control at a fundamental level, namely with regard to the basic orientation of the 
EU’s external security and defence actions. This point clearly deserves lasting attention.  
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Furthermore, in practice there is, so far, no convincing access to confidential information by 
elected representatives in case such information is excluded from public viewing. In agreement 
with the other institutions (including the EEAS since Lisbon), the European Parliament indeed 
has created a special committee in this regard, but until now this committee does not seem to 
have actual relevance for the parliamentary overview of sensitive information. 
Conclusively, it can be contended that the EU responds somewhat inconveniently to the secrecy 
dilemma. In European foreign policy, there is not so much a transparency problem in the sense 
that no information is accessible; but rather in the way that if access is limited this is done in a 
democratically unchecked manner. The EU struggles with the secrecy dilemma in that it indeed 
accepts the transparency principle – and this not just in words – but refrains from supplementing 
it with a, democratically generated, secrecy principle and corresponding structure. Where in 
line with the secrecy needed in foreign policy a limited public access to information about the 
policy’s daily development could be justified; from a democratic perspective, the limited public 
control over why and how limiting access is decided is more difficult to accept. Given the 
secrecy dilemma, public access to CFSP related information may indeed be limited, but it is 
problematic that this is done in a way that is neither well explained, nor based on well-defined 
legal rules resulting from democratic deliberation. 
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XI. Reason-giving in EU foreign policy 
Summary: Linked with transparency, yet given its particular focus treated here as a distinct 
criterion, this chapter looks at the reasons the EU formulate to justify its daily foreign and 
security policy. To do so, this chapter discusses three key instruments of the EU’s foreign 
security and defence action and the ways they are motivated; being military and civilian 
missions, restrictive measures against third states, individuals or entities, and the EU’s 
actions as a diplomatic facilitator and mediator.  
Reason-giving is mentioned in the Treaty on the functioning of the EU as a condition for any 
legal act issued by the European Union. Legal acts, so it is stipulated by art. 296 TFEU, “shall 
state the reasons on which they are based and shall refer to any proposals, initiatives, 
recommendations, requests or opinions required by the Treaties”. At first sight it could be 
assumed that this rule does not apply to the EU’s foreign security and defence policy 
(considering that “the common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and 
procedures”, art. 24.1 TEU). But, this vision is too narrow and seems contested by the 
European Court of Justice. In a 2009 judgement, the Court ruled, “the obligation to state 
reasons […] must apply […] to any measures adopted by the institutions, whatever their form, 
which are intended to have binding legal effects”192. Given that there are good arguments to 
say that measures taken in the field of foreign security and defence policy indeed impose 
binding legal duties on Member States and institutions (Eeckhout 2011, 171–2; Hillion and 
Wessel 2008, 82–6; Peterson et al. 2012, 295), it follows that the formal rule of reason-giving 
applies to Foreign Security and Defence Policy too. Besides, even when admitting that this 
legal vision is not completely uncontested (cf. Wessel 2015), it can hardly be denied that foreign 
policy decisions are politically binding: they strongly guide and frame EU institutions and 
Member State authorities and determine Europe’s position on the world stage as well as its 
scope for future international action. Hence, if there would not already be a legal obligation for 
reason-giving in European foreign and security policy, there certainly is a strong political urge. 
To help evaluate how this demand for reason-giving is practically answered, two indicators (13 
and 14) – which obviously show clear similarities to the previous ones about the public 
accessibility of documents and the legislature’s access to sensitive information put forward for 
                                                 
192 Court of Justice, Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 1 October 2009 – Case C-370/07 
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:62007CJ0370 [08.04.16]. 
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the evaluation of transparency – have been argued for. As these indicators in fact present a 
continuum; from general, publically available explanations, to the more restrained divulgation 
of reasons to a limited group of elected representatives in case of more sensitive issues; a 
separated discussion on each of the indicators would somehow seem artificial. Therefore, this 
chapter discusses them simultaneously.  
1. Does the EU communicate the reasons for foreign and security actions to the public 
or, at least, to members of the European- or national parliaments?  
In first instance, the Treaty provides us with the fundamental reasons for the EU’s external 
action – with the inclusion of its foreign security and defence policy – by listing under art. 21.2 
TEU a set of eight objectives. Being of a general order, these rules of course do in no way 
suffice to justify the totality of Europe’s foreign actions. Hence, the real question is if the EU, 
when taking concrete action in the framework of its foreign security and defence policy explains 
why it does what it does.  
Effective presence and influence of an actor on the global playing field is based on a 
combination of the three pillars of international power: diplomatic presence, economic presence 
and military presence (Coolsaet 2006, 17, 77‑94). Relying on a series of instruments193, also 
today’s EU foreign policy indeed acts along these three classical lines of action in that it 
essentially uses (1) diplomacy, (2) restrictive measures and (3) military or civil missions to go 
after its goals (cf. Crisis Group 2005, 44‑46)194. 
To start with the last one; the EU has currently (May 2017) sixteen missions in operation; five 
military operations, nine civilian missions, and one that technically speaking “is not managed 
within CSDP structures and hence is strictly speaking not a ‘CSDP Mission’" (the EU Border 
Assistance Mission – EUBAMM – to Moldova and Ukraine)195. Except for this EUBAM 
Moldova and Ukraine (which followed on a Memorandum of Understanding between the 
European Commission and the governments of Ukraine and Moldova), each of these missions 
                                                 
193 For an extensive overview of CFSP-instruments: Federal Foreign Office, CFSP – Instruments 
auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Europa/Aussenpolitik/GASP/InstrumenteGASP_node.html [22.01.15].  
194 Cf. also the three headings – Sanctions; Conflict Prevention, peacebuilding and mediation and 
Crisis management – under Common Foreign and Security Policy on the EEAS-website 
eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/index_en.htm [13.02.15].  
195 For a detailed overview: EEAS, Ongoing missions and operations eeas.europa.eu/csdp/ 
missions-and-operations/index_en.htm [19.05.17]. 
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is launched following a decision of the Council196. These decisions contain not only information 
on the what and the how of the mission (when to start, where, budget, mandate, objectives, …) 
but indeed also mention a why. Each decision formally indicates in its preamble on which 
grounds the establishment of the mission is decided. Hence, when looking at the whole of the 
missions, five recurring reasons can be distinguished. First, four EU-missions (EULEX 
Kosovo, NAVFOR Atalanta, EUTM Somalia and EUTM Mali) justify their deployment by 
referring to a Resolution of the UN Security Council explicitly calling Member States or 
regional organisations to act. In a similar argumentation, three council decisions cite a formal 
approval of EU action by the UN Security Council as an (additional) explanation for the 
mission’s existence (Althea, EULEX Kosovo and NAVFOR Atalanta). Subsequently there are 
those missions being launched after a formal request by the host country/ies. This is the case 
for EUBAM Rafah, EUBAM Ukraine/ Moldova, EUPOL COPPS, EUMM Georgia, EUCAP 
Sahel Niger, EUBAM Libya, EUTM Mali, EUAM Ukraine, EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUTM 
RCA. Additionally, two missions point out an approval by the host country/ies (EUCAP 
Somalia197 and EUTM Somalia) or by a regional organisation (EUTM Somalia – in case the 
African Union). Thirdly, four decisions quote the EU’s previous commitment regarding the 
problem to which the mission is a response as a reason for its deployment: EUPOL COPPS and 
EUBAM Rafah hence refer to the EU’s role as a member of the Middle East Quartet guarding 
the implementation of the Roadmap for Peace. EUMM Georgia in turn points out the EU’s role 
as a mediator and the previous six-point agreement concluded under its auspice. EUNAVFOR 
MED, finally, refer to the EU’s “commitment to act in order to prevent human tragedies 
resulting from the smuggling of people across the Mediterranean” and the “indignation” it 
already expressed before about this situation. In a similar way, a fourth reason consists of an 
existing international framework. Hence, in the case of Althea, the EU explains its decision 
to launch the mission by referring to the General Framework Agreement for Peace (the so-
called Dayton Agreement). Finally, four missions explicitly invoke the EU’s strategic and 
security interests or the protection of European citizens as a reason for deployment. This is 
the case for EUCAP Nestor/Somalia, EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUBAM Libya and EUCAP Sahel 
Mali. Looking at this overview, we see that except for EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUAM Ukraine 
(both launched following an explicit request from the host country) all missions invoke multiple 
reasons.  
                                                 
196 Before Lisbon, this was done through a so-called joint action. 
197 Until March 2017 called EUCAP Nestor, then renamed as EUCAP Somalia. 
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The second type of actions, restrictive measures against third countries, individuals or entities 
(also called sanctions) “are an essential EU foreign policy tool that it uses to pursue objectives 
in accordance with the principles of the Common Foreign and Security Policy”198. Generally 
speaking, “they aim to bring about a change in policy or activity by the target country, part of 
a country, government, entities or individuals”199. Sanctions either implement (or reinforce – 
by applying stricter measures) a UN Security Council Resolution adopted under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter or are decided autonomously by the EU. They are subject to a decision by the 
Council, taken by unanimity200. Subsequently, these sanctions are directly binding on Member 
States and implemented by them (e.g. arms embargoes and travel bans); or in case of economic 
and financial measures (export bans and asset freezes) falling directly under the competences 
of the Union and implemented through separate EU legislation in the form of a Council 
Regulation, which is directly binding201. As required under art. 215 TFEU, the European 
Parliament shall be informed thereof. The Court of Justice on the other hand has the jurisdiction 
to review the legality of decisions providing for restrictive measures (art. 275 TFEU). In that 
way, sanctions are an exception to the general rule excluding CFSP and CSDP from the Court’s 
jurisdiction (art. 24.1 TEU). Deriding questions about their effectiveness and consistency – 
recurring topics in the literature (cf. Portela 2014; 2010; Franceso Giumelli 2013; Francesco 
Giumelli and Ivan 2013; Brummer 2009) – or their case by case implementation, the point at 
stake here is if sanctions – at the time of their proclamation – elude why they are decided? 
The Council guidelines on restrictive measures202 stipulate that “the decision to subject a 
person or entity to targeted restrictive measures requires clear criteria; tailored to each 
specific case […]. These clear criteria will be set out in the CFSP legal instrument”. Said 
otherwise, “proposals for listing must be accompanied by accurate, up-to-date and defendable 
statements”. Where it concerns restrictive measures, carrying out UNSC resolutions, this means 
in practical terms that the relevant decisions and/ or resolutions of the Council take over the 
consolidated list as decided by the UNSC Resolution in question. Regarding EU autonomous 
                                                 
198 EEAS, Sanctions Policy eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/index_en.htm [23.01.15]. 
199 Ibid 
200 Previous to December 2009, restrictive measures were installed by means of a common 
position, based on art. 60 and 301 TEC. 
201 Council of the EU, Factsheet. EU restrictive measures, Brussels, 29 April 2014, 3p. 
consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/135804.pdf [29.10.15].  
202 General Secretariat of the Council, Guidelines on implementation and evaluation of restrictive 
measures (sanctions) in the framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, 11205/12, 
Brussels, 15 June 2012 europeansanctions.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/eu-guidelines-on-
sanctions-2012.pdf [30.01.15].  
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sanctions, these provisions are further detailed in Annex I to the Guidelines. Under a heading 
called Reasons for listing, it is specified that “proposals for autonomous listings should include 
individual and specific reasons for each listing”. The purpose thereof “is to state, as concretely 
as possible, why the Council considers, in the exercise of its discretion, that the person, group 
or entity concerned falls under the designation criteria defined by the relevant legal act, taking 
into consideration the objectives of the measures as expressed in its introductory paragraphs”. 
It is furthermore specified that “these reasons should, in principle, be set out in a separate 
column in the Annex to the legal act containing the list of persons, groups and entities subject 
to restrictive measures”. Finally, it is pointed out, “These reasons should be capable of being 
made public” unless in exceptional cases and this “because of considerations of privacy and 
security. In these exceptional cases however, members of the EP can have access to this 
information in accordance with the mechanism set out in art. 3.3 of the IIA of 20 November 
2002 between the European Parliament and the Council concerning access by the European 
Parliament to sensitive information of the Council in the field of security and defence policy 
(cf. Chapter X, 4 supra) (EEAS, e-mail 08.10.15). However, in practice the EP Special 
Committee, so far never asked to consult a document related to sanctions (EEAS, e-mail 
30.06.16, cf. supra).  
A regularly updated list of restrictive measures, available on the website of the EEAS, presents 
an overview of sanctions being in force203. According to the version of 5 December 2014 of 
this list204, the EU, for instance, adopted four new sanction regimes in 2014, and structurally 
reviewed two others. In that year, new sanctions were taken against Russia and the pro-Russian 
insurgents in Ukraine as well as in reaction to the precarious situations in the Central African 
Republic (CAR) and South-Sudan. Existing measures against Sudan were repealed and 
replaced by an updated regime, those against Yugoslavia simply repealed. Except for the 
sanctions against the CAR and Sudan, they are autonomous measures. When looking at the 
decisions and regulations that establish these sanctions, we see that each of these legal 
instruments indeed explains why the sanctions in question are promulgated. First of all, the 
preamble lists the general motivations for the sanctions, either by referring to the UNSC 
resolution(s) that is/are being implemented; or through an account of the Council’s own 
reflexions in case of autonomous sanctions. In the context of the Union’s reaction on the 
                                                 
203 European Commission, Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/ 
sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf [19.05.17].  
204 The version currently online, May 2017, is from 20.04.2016. 
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conflict in Ukraine we find for instance that the Council “strongly condemned the unprovoked 
violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity by the Russian Federation and 
called on the Russian Federation to immediately withdraw its armed forces to the areas of their 
permanent stationing, in accordance with the relevant agreements. [… and] considered that 
the decision by the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea to hold a 
referendum on the future status of the territory is contrary to the Ukrainian Constitution and 
therefore illegal”205. Or, as formulated in a later decision: after having “condemned the 
unprovoked violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity by the Russian 
Federation” and having “urged Russia to stop the increasing flow of weapons, equipment and 
militants across the border in order to achieve rapid and tangible results in de-escalation” and 
“in view of the gravity of the situation” – the Council “considers it appropriate to take 
restrictive measures in response to Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine”206. 
Regarding the specific entities and persons being targeted, these are listed in an annex to the 
decision or resolution, which in case of natural persons always contains information on the 
“grounds”, “reasons” or “justifications” for listing. These personalised reasons explain for 
each person individually why (s)he is listed, and as such complement the more general 
motivations for listing that are given in the decision itself. The before mentioned Council 
Decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March 2014 thus lists twenty-one natural persons, among which 
Crimean leaders as well as Russian politicians publically calling for Russian military 
intervention in Ukraine. For each of them is in general terms indicated what it is that they did 
or said that led to their enlistment. In case the annex only contains legal persons, the rule of 
motivation seems to apply a bit less stringent. For instance, Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP 
concerning restrictive measures against Russia, gives a list of five legal persons (all financial 
institutions) for which the reasons for listing are not mentioned in the annex itself. However, 
taking into account the argumentation provided in the preamble as well as the specification 
given in art. 1a of the Decision, it cannot be said that there are no reasons mentioned at all. 
Thirdly, the EU is implied in international politics as a purely diplomatic actor. Although EU 
diplomacy certainly surpasses the limits of foreign security and defence, we understand it in 
the context of the present discussion as “CFSP-diplomacy” (Keukeleire 2003, 36). Dealing with 
matters of war and peace, the most concrete actions undertaken by the EU in this sense are 
linked to mediation and facilitation in situations of both international and internal conflict. 
                                                 
205 Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP, OJ L 78, 17.03.2014, pp.16-21.  
206 Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP, OJ L 229, 31.07.2014, pp.13-17. 
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Given its own historical origins as a peace project, the promotion of peace and the prevention 
of conflict have since long been a central feature of Europe’s international engagement 
(Gourlay 2013, 1). Mentioned in both the European Security Strategy of 2003 and its follow-
up report of 2008, as well as the 2016 EU global strategy, mediation and dialogue are formalized 
through the 2009 Council’s Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue 
Capacities207.  
The difficulty in evaluating these diplomatic policy tools is twofold. First, they represent a real, 
but difficultly tangible dimension of the EU’s foreign security policy in which the confusing 
interplay between EU-level and Member State actions is the most striking. The two-level 
system of European foreign policy (Ponjaert and Telò 2013, 49) reveals itself here in its daily 
practice even more than with the other CFSP-actions. Telling examples are the negotiations on 
the Iranian nuclear programme – in which the EU is an actor together with the UK, France and 
Germany – or the 2008 Russia-Georgian conflict – in which it was rather France than the EU 
who brokered an agreement, or so seems the then French president Sarkozy to tell us (Grono 
2010, 13; cf. also Sherriff and Volcker 2012, 6). This continuous mixture between different 
policy levels and actors makes it increasingly difficult to trace back the origins of decisions and 
actions. Secondly, the EU rarely has a formal mandate to act as a mediator or facilitator. 
Although some of the EU’s commitments in this respect are high-level undertakings such as 
the High Representative’s role as a facilitator in the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue or former 
Finnish president Athisaari’s participation in the Aceh peace process, most of these activities 
are confidential in nature (EEAS, e-mail 13.03.15). Given the often sensitive nature of peace 
negotiations, the previously discussed secrecy dilemma of foreign policy becomes very tangible 
here. On the one hand, the dissemination of information is a thing to be controlled carefully (cf. 
Mason 2007, 17). Especially when being in the position of neutral mediator, everything should 
be done not to jeopardize in any possible way the on-going negotiations. On the other hand, 
however – as explicitly recognised by the above-mentioned Council Concept208 – “mediation 
between conflicting parties carries certain political risks” especially with regard to credibility. 
It is exactly this political risk that asks justification and reasons for the European Union’s 
commitment as a mediator. It is not enough that the responsible EU services “assess these risks 
                                                 
207 Council of the EU, Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities, 10 
November 2009 eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/conflict_prevention/docs/concept_strengthening _eu_med 
_en.pdf [08.04.16].  
208 Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities, op cit., p.7: (c) Assessment of 
risks. 
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carefully, including the proposed timing for mediation, before accepting to become involved in 
a mediation process”; but this assessment should somehow be available, if for arguable reasons 
not to the wider public, then at least to the European Parliament. Based on the facts it is however 
difficult to know if, in practice, the Parliament would have access to these assessments, if 
wanted to. In that case – given their sensitive and confidential character – this would have to 
happen through the Special Committee of the Parliament, created in this regard. However, this 
never happened. At least since 2010 the Special Committee requested no sensitive documents 
related to EU mediation for consultation (EEAS, e-mail 23.05.16).  
Although Europe most often works together with other actors and has a rather indirect and less 
visible contribution (Gourlay 2013, 3)209, the EU has been active as a lead mediator at many 
occasions since the publication of the 2009 Concept (for a discussion of some key dossiers in 
which the EU was active as a mediator cf. Sherriff and Volcker 2012). But, concrete 
information on these EU mediation efforts is not available, let alone about the specific reasons 
which led the EU to decide in favour of taking up such role. The relevant information on the 
EEAS website is minimal. Except for generalities about underlying principles and concepts, 
and some press briefings or short declarations, no communication is made about any past or 
current mediation. The risk assessments referred to before, are not based on a formal 
mechanism, but use very varied modalities on an on-going and ad hoc basis. They are 
undertaken by the relevant actors within the EEAS and the Commission services. The reports 
of these analyses are primarily internal and occasionally shared with the EU Member States 
(EEAS - K2, e-mail 13.03.15). 
2. Conclusion: Reason-giving in CFSP, normatively democratic? 
From a strictly legal point of view, it could be debated if European foreign and security policy 
falls under the treaty obligation of reason-giving. Yet, givent that there is no doubt about the 
impact of EU’s foreign policy decisions on Member States and European citizens, there 
undoubtedly is a political need for justification in EU foreign policy. 
Looking at the three main types of actions through which the EU develops its common foreign 
policy, we see that their level of reason-giving is quite unequal. Where formally speaking EU 
military or –civilian missions do not necessary have to mention on which fundamental grounds 
                                                 
209 For an overview of different types of EU mediation involvement, cf. the 2009 Council concept, 
p.6. 
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their deployment is decided, we see that in practice, the decisions to launch such a mission 
always – though briefly – mention one or more reasons. As demonstrated before, five recurring 
reasons can be distinguished. However, the impact of this reason-giving and its relevance for 
democratic control should not be overestimated. The reasons given are of rather general order 
and do not permit outsiders, such as citizens or legislative bodies, to really grasp the essence of 
why a mission is launched. Restrictive measures, on the other hand seem to do better. Legally 
obliged to present criteria for their promulgation, they indeed give – overall, as well as 
personalized in case of individual sanctions – motivations. Although their formulation 
sometimes resembles rather standard formulations, it should be asked what more detailed 
reasons would have to consist of and in what way they would create more democratic control. 
After all, although the European Parliament has the right to do so, it seems that so far, it never 
used its prerogatives in the matter, and never asked access to more detailed information on 
sanctions that is kept away from the public. Finally, publically accessible reasons explaining 
why the European Union commits itself to the role of mediator in conflict situations are 
completely unavailable. Although the basic documents concerning this type of policy action 
clear provides for the existence of reasons, in practice it seems impossible to consult them or 
even to trace back their existence. Risk assessments circulate internal to the EU’s relevant 
foreign affairs bodies and can be made available to Member States but seem not at all (meant 
to be) shared with (the European) parliament or the public at large. 
What hence stands out regarding reason-giving in the context of the EU’s foreign security and 
defence policy is the obvious discrepancy between some rather strong formal appeals and an 
altogether quite weak implementation. Reasons are indeed reflected upon and are indeed given 
in general terms, but this is done in such a way that they – except from formally fulfilling of 
what is asked for – are not really useful to those who are interested in understanding the EU’s 
foreign policy and its deeper motivations. 
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XII. Oversight in EU foreign policy 
Summary: This chapter deals with two strands of oversight: by elected representatives, and 
directly by society. For the first strand, it looks at questions by MEP’s, general and thematic 
debates in the EP, Joint Consultation Meetings and parliamentary delegations; as well as 
oversight by national parliaments and the Interparliamentary Conference on CFSP. For 
societal oversight attention goes to media, research organisations and CSOs as well as 
individual citizens. 
I previously explained how given the elevated risk of executive discretion in foreign policy, ex-
post oversight is of central importance to assuring this policy’s democratic legitimacy. In that 
regard, we saw how there exist essentially two channels of oversight. On the one hand, an 
interinstitutional oversight that comes from elected representatives (indicator 15); that is, in 
case of the EU’s foreign policy from the European parliament or national parliaments. On the 
other hand, oversight exercised by the democratic principal himself; that is the society at large, 
through media, academic research or the work of CSO, as well as by citizens individually. Such 
societal oversight, I proposed to evaluate through three additional indicators, focussing on its 
actual presence (indicator 16) as well as the degree to which the results of this oversight is, or 
can be picked up by society (indicator 17) or by the legislature, as input to its own oversight 
(indicator 18).  
1. Does there exist an institutionalized system of oversight by elected representatives?  
Before Lisbon, Giovanna Bono (2004, 177‑78) declared that neither the European Parliament 
nor national parliaments have formal possibilities for scrutinizing decision-making in EU 
foreign policy. Anne-Elizabeth Stie (2010, 15‑16) too concluded that “the EP is deprived of 
formal rights to properly monitor on-going policy-making” and that the situation is analogue 
for national parliaments. This last point is in similar terms discussed by Christopher Lord (2011, 
1142), stating that the notion that national parliaments can adequately control Union decisions 
is open to several objections. Question is if such pre-Lisbon conclusions still apply to today’s 
EFP? 
Art. 36 TEU slightly enhances oversight of the European Parliament in foreign and security 
policy by extending its scope to CSDP. The Parliament, so the Treaty stipulates, “may address 
questions […] to the Council or the HR”; and, “twice a year it shall hold a debate on progress 
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in implementing CFSP, including CSDP”. These tools have received further backing by the 
High Representative’s 2010 Declaration of political accountability, not only reaffirming these 
treaty provisions but also announcing to enhance the practice of so-called Joint Consultation 
Meetings (DPA, art. 1). Additionally, the EP can send delegations to civilian and military EU-
missions. To this adds the Special Committee that was previously discussed when dealing with 
transparency (cf. Chapter X, 4 supra), and therefore will not be dealt with separately here. As 
to national parliaments, their role is defined by art. 12 TEU (cf. Chapter VIII, 2 supra), and 
with regard to foreign security and defence further detailed in art. 10 of Protocol I to the Treaty 
(on the Role of National Parliaments in the EU). Yet, how exactly they can monitor daily CFSP/ 
CSDP-developments is not specified. As showed before, there is no common, way of 
parliamentary involvement in EU foreign policy (cf. Verhey 2014; Peters et al. 2014, 111); also 
in respect to oversight (i.a. Russo and Wiberg 2010; Anghel et al. 2008). To remedy this, since 
2012 the EP and national parliaments hold two interparliamentary conferences per year to 
debate common foreign and security policy. According to the EP, this combined parliamentary 
scrutiny enhances legitimacy, and is essential if European external action is to be understood 
and supported by EU citizens210. 
European Parliament: questions 
According to the EP, questions are a direct form of parliamentary scrutiny211. In line with its 
Rules of Procedures (RoP), questions can be asked in three ways: orally (RoP 128), during 
question time (RoP 129) or by writing (RoP 130). With regard to foreign policy, questions are 
directed to both the Council and the Commission. All questions and answers are published in 
an online register.  
Written questions are with distance the most popular among them. From January 2010 till 
December 2016, 3.131 written questions have been sent to the Council and 79.590 to the 
Commission. In contrast, only 307 oral questions were addressed to the Council and 1019 to 
                                                 
210 Cf. EP resolution of 24 October 2013, P7_TA(2013)0453), § A europarl.europa.eu/sides/ get 
Doc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2013-0453&language=EN&ring=A7-2013-0330; EP 
resolution of 11 May, P7_TA(2011)0227, § G europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc. do?type= 
TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2011-227 [22.05.17].  
211 EP, Research Service, Parliamentary questions epthinktank.eu/2014/12/05/parliamentary-
questions/ [31.03.16].  
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the Commission212. These numbers also show that a clear majority of questions go to the 
Commission. Foreign security and defence is no exception to these trends. However, also some 
more particular, foreign policy related observations could be noted. 
First, the number of questions dealing with foreign and security policy is limited compared to 
the total amount of questions. This is indisputable for oral questions. Between 2010 and 2016 
only 10 oral questions were issued on behalf of the Foreign Affairs committee and none by the 
Security and Defence subcommittee. Although a precise evaluation of written questions per 
topic is not possible – due to limited search options (cf. infra), the register does not allow for a 
comprehensive overview of questions according to their main issue – a word-based search 
indicates a similar situation. Between 2010 and 2016, we find 913 written questions 
unequivocally dealing with main foreign security and defence issues: 162 concern 
organizational aspects of the EEAS213, 135 of them deal with EU civilian and military 
missions214 and 616 can be found that relate to restrictive measures215. Given the centrality of 
these three topics in today’s EU foreign policy – and notwithstanding they cannot pretend to 
count for the exact number – these questions arguably cover a representative deal of those about 
the EU’s foreign security and defence policy. 
Furthermore, the Commission is confirmed as the Parliament’s preferred interlocutor. 
Noteworthy in that regard is that although a similar trend can be recognized for the totality of 
questions (cf. supra, we see how in the case of foreign policy, the contrast clearly became more 
pronounced, especially for the first years after Lisbon (cf. Table 9). This arguably results from 
the integration of the High Representative within the European Commission, which leads to 
                                                 
212 As to questions for question time with the Commission, due to a change of format, they are only 
recorded in the register till 09.2011. Until then they were more frequent than oral questions, but 
compared to written questions still a very minor format. 
213 For 01.01.2010 till 31.12.2016 I searched the register for “Words in title”: “EEAS” OR 
“European External Action Service”. Then, I manually searched for those questions that concerned 
organisational aspects (<> other, policy-related aspects). 
214 For 01.01.2010 till 31.12.2016 I searched the register for “Words in text”, using al acronyms 
used for EU missions. Thus, each question was selected that mentioned one of the following 
words: "EUPOL" OR "EUFOR" OR "EUCAP" OR "EUBAM" OR "EUSEC" OR "EUTM" OR "EUAM" OR 
"NAVFOR" OR "EULEX" OR "EUJUST" OR "EUMM" OR "EUPM" OR "EUPAT" OR "EU SSR" OR 
"EUAVSEC" OR "EUMAM". This resulted in 144 hits. I manually scrutinized these results in order 
to remove the hits not relevant to the topic of study. 
215 For 01.01.2010 till 31.12.2016 I searched the register for “Words in text”: “Sanctions” OR 
“Restrictive measures”. This resulted in 1112 hits. I manually scrutinized these results in order to 
remove the hits not relevant to the topic of study. 
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questions on foreign policy being increasingly sent through the Commission to its VP, the HR 
for the EU’s foreign policy. 
Table 9: Questions about foreign policy to the Commission and the Council (2010-2016) 
 
In order now to apprehend the eligibility of these questions as tools of foreign policy monitoring 
we must look at both their profoundness – the detailedness of information they search for –and 
the answers they acquire; as well as at the time going by between a question and its answer. 
To start with the last point, we distinguish between normal questions and priority questions. 
According to EP RoP 130, priority (P) questions shall be answered within 3 weeks; normal (E) 
questions have 6 weeks. Among the selected body of 913 questions, 828 were E-questions and 
85 P-questions. Based upon the time elapsing between a question and its answer216, we can 
conclude that a large majority of questions are not answered in time; only 214 E-questions 
(25.85%) and 4 P-questions (4.71%) received a timely answer. While the Commission (= HR) 
clearly answers more within the deadline than the Council, over time there seems no notable 
change in these measures (cf. Table 10) To put these data into comparative perspective is not 
self-evident, as the Parliament does not keep information on the time it took the other 
institutions to answer (European Parliament, e-mail 19.05.15). But, looking at the 
Commission’s 2013 annual activity report (the most recent that gives data on this matter), it 
seems that written questions on foreign policy receive less timely replies than is generally the 
case. For E- and P-questions together, only 26.11% of the selected questions were answered 
within time by the Commission (cf. Table 10), compared to generally 58% for 2011 and 2012 
                                                 
216 To measure the answering time, I applied the following procedure: for each question, I looked 
in the register for the dates mentioned for the question and the answer. Then, I calculated the 
number of working days between both dates while adding 5 days for P-questions and 10 days for 
E-questions; this because the date of question mentioned is the date of registration in the register, 
not the date of reception by the addressee. Upon registration, questions undergo an admissibility 
and transmission procedure – “which can take up to one week for priority questions and two weeks 
for normal written questions, depending on workload” (European Parliament, e-mail 19.05.15). 
Thus, the deadline for reply starts to run on average one week after registration for P-questions 
and two weeks for E-questions. Hence, I considered to be answered within the deadline every 
question answered within 20 (15+5) working days for P-questions, respectively 40 (30+10) 
working days for E-questions. 
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and 69.3% for 2013217. For our selected questions, it takes the Commission on average 47 days 
to come back on E-questions and 45 days for P-questions on foreign security issues; against 49 
and 66 days for the Council.  
Table 10: Questions on EU foreign security and defence answered within time 
 
The 1st column per year contains the numbers of questions answered within time, the 2nd gives the % 
this number represents in proportion to the total numbers of that type of questions for that year. 
However, not only how promptly they got response, i.e. within the deadline or not; but also, 
their content, and that of the answer, tells us something about the oversight capacity of 
questions. Classifying the selected questions and their answers along three categories: specific, 
general, and unspecific, it follows that a clear majority thereof is of general nature. For the 
answers, the rates are comparable. Only a limited number of questions and answers can be 
described as unspecific. (cf. Table 11) 218. Specific questions contain very concrete points and 
make clear what kind of detailed information is expected. They often concern rather long 
questions that explain considerably the context and information to which they refer219; but they 
can also be very short, asking precise information about a concrete dossier or aspect220. General 
questions, on the other hand, indeed search for a better understanding of the executive’s work 
and intentions; but do not mention very specific - though rather general information themselves 
                                                 
217 Commission SG, 2013 Annual Activity Report, p.52 ec.europa.eu/atwork/synthesis/aar/doc/ 
sg_aar_2013.pdf [07.06.17]  
218 The allocation of the values to each question and answer results from a manual reading of them. 
In that sense, the data provided in Table 11 should be understood as indicative, clarifying my 
point, though without claiming to represent exact values. 
219 For instance: European Parliament – Parliamentary Questions, E-001314-14. Subject: Somalia 
in a stage of transition and stabilisation: alarm at new wave of violence in the centre and south of 
the country, 10 February 2014. 
220 For instance: European Parliament – Parliamentary Questions, E-004531-15. Subject: Male and 
female staff involved in the EU police mission for the Palestinian territories (EUPOL COPPS), 20 
March 2015. 
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and can be answered correctly in various ways. They ask for instance about the opinion of the 
HR (genre: “in the HR’s view…” or “does the Council agree…”), or about possible future 
policy choices (genre: “will the HR/ the Council consider…”) Unspecific questions finally, 
seem asked rather for the form. They ask for information that clearly could be obtained through 
other means, simply repeat an already satisfactorily answered questions or do not ask for 
information at all. This, for instance, concerns questions that only ask if “the Vice-
President/High Representative find[s] it reasonable to have a Protocol Service?”221 or if “the 
Council ha[s] any sanctions against Lashkar-e-Taiba?”222 (the answer to which can easily be 
found in the Official Journal of the EU or in the previously mentioned regularly update list 
available on the EEAS website). Where it concerns answers; specific answers contain detailed 
information such as precise numbers, they answer meticulously to the question223. General 
answers indeed answer the question, but not very precise, they do not go into concrete detail. 
Unspecific answers are clearly insufficient. They do not at all answer the question by being in 
fact non-existent or by giving a minimalistic answer, compared to the question to which they 
answer224.  
Table 11: Type of question/ answer 
In that way, written questions certainly present 
themselves as tools of monitoring, operated by 
MEP’s to create oversight over the EU’s 
foreign security and defence policy. And, 
although answers often resemble a kind of 
formality –not revealing information 
completely unknown before – the essential goal 
of questions seems fulfilled. Questions indeed 
force the Commission (and its vice-president, 
the High Representative), and the Council to 
                                                 
221 European Parliament – Parliamentary Questions, E-001712-13. Subject: Protocol Service of the 
European External Action Service, 18 February 2013.  
222 European Parliament – Parliamentary Questions, E-007637-15. Subject: Council sanctions 
against Lashkar-e-Taiba, 12 Mai 2015. 
223 For instance: European Parliament – Parliamentary Questions, E-012548-13. Subject: 
Clarification on the Eulex mission in Kosovo – Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President 
Ashton on behalf of the Commission, 23 January 2014.  
224 For instance: European Parliament – Parliamentary Questions, E-005107/2012. Subject: The 
case of Trepca Mining, in Kosovo – Reply, 16 July 2012. 
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reply, and MEP’s thereby receive a statement that they thereupon can use for their own purpose 
(Raunio 1996, 362‑63). Through the continuous stream of questions, the foreign policy- 
executives (HR and Council) know themselves closely followed. 
European Parliament: debate 
Other than by questions, the Parliament also scrutinizes CFSP/ CSDP through general debates 
(EP RoP 112). Such debates on progress in implementing CFSP and CSDP are provided to take 
place twice a year on the Parliament’s own initiative225. They are organized around two reports, 
one on the CFSP in general, drafted by the Committee on Foreign Affairs; and another on the 
CSDP in particular, issued by the subcommittee on Security and Defence226. The starting point 
for these reports is a consultative document drawn up by the HR227. Since Lisbon, nine general 
debates have been organised about the CFSP and/or CSDP (cf. Table 12). At the CFSP-debates, 
the HR is always present, but for the plenary discussions on CSDP she has been replaced by 
the rotating presidency of the Council both in 2012 and 2013. The concrete oversight power of 
these debates should, however, not be overestimated, nor misunderstood. First of all, the HR’s 
annual reports from which they depart are repeatedly criticized for their lack of clear priorities 
and guidelines, or for ignoring important questions and acute shortcomings in CSDP decision-
making228. Such shortcomings (can) hinder a to-the-point debate. Furthermore, considerable 
time passes between the period discussed and the actual debate. This starts already with the 
HR’s annual reports. According to the IIA of 2 December 2013, art. 25, these reports – 
containing an evaluation of the measures launched in the year n-1 as well as setting out the 
main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP in the year to come – shall be transmitted by June 
                                                 
225 The EP’s work organizes along 19 types of procedures (for an overview, see: Verfahrensarten 
der EU Institutionen und ihre Abkürzung mitgestalten.eu/node/187). Debates on foreign policy 
and defence follow the own-initiative procedure (INI), see: Own Initiative Reports europarl. 
europa.eu/the-secretary-general/resource/static/files/Documents%20section/SPforEP/Own-
Initiative_reports.pdf [28.04.16].  
226 EP, Fact Sheets on the European Union: Common Security and Defence Policy 
europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_6.1.2.html [28.04.16]. 
227 “Annual reports from the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basis choices of the CFSP”; since 
2016 denominated “CFSP Report - Our priorities in […]”.  
228 Cf. EP resolution of 12.09.12 (P7_TA(2012)0334), §2 europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc. do? 
type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2012-0334&language=EN&ring=A7-2012-0252; 24.10.13 
(P7_TA(2013)0453), §24 europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2013 
-0453&language=EN&ring=A7-2013-0330 [08.06.17]; also: Diedrichs (2004, 35).  
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15 of the year in question229 230. In practice, though, we see that, except for the 2010 report, the 
High Representative never lived up to the deadline. Subsequently, a period of up to eight 
months can elapse between the publication of this annual report and the start of the 
parliamentary procedure. This leads to debates taking place only at the end, or even after the 
year for which the HR’s report is supposed to set out the main aspects and basic choices. 
Although the long time-interval between the policy actions and their discussion in the 
Parliament obviously impedes the Parliament’s ability to use debates as a means of direct 
monitoring, they could be useful in that they evaluate the concrete implementation of the 
foreign policy. In that sense, general debates are not so much a tool of decision-making 
monitoring but an instrument of reflection, scrutinizing what has become. Their oversight focus 
is not on decisional output but on outcome231.  
Table 12: EP general debates on CFSP/ CSDP 
* Joint CFSP - CSDP debate  
** Yet, the annual report has been mentioned twice (paragraph 15 and 40) in the Parliamentary 
resolution of 21.11.13 (procedure 2013/2105(INI) (EP, e-mail 16.08.29 and 16.10.04). 
(source: European Parliament Legislative Observatory - europarl.europa.eu/oeil/home/home.do)  
Except for these general debates, also thematic debates take place. Through these, the EP can 
ask the High Representative for regular and timely information on the development and 
implementation of the Union's CFSP (art. 112 RoP). Such debates are organised depending on 
international events and developments and offer the Parliament more punctual insight. Annexes 
to the aforementioned annual reports, listing the appearances of the HR in the European 
                                                 
229 Interinstitutional Agreement of 2 December 2013, OJ C 373, 20.12.2013, p. 1–11. 
230 In 2016, the HR changed the methodology of the report. Henceforth it focuses on the ongoing 
work rather than looks backwards (EEAS, e-mail 15.05.17); yet it is too early to say what this will 
imply for the general debate in the EP. 
231 On the relation between output and outcome and its relevance in EU foreign policy, cf. 
Lauwerier (2007). 
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Parliament, give an idea of how often such thematic debates have taken place over the last 
years: except for the aforementioned general debates, the High Representative was present 
during plenary at 45 occasions on 21 different dates between 2010 and 2014232. Furthermore, 
also at other occasions, such as committee meetings, the Parliament seems to have the 
possibility of discussion with the HR (cf. Table 13). 
Table 13: Appearances of the HR in the EP (2010-2014) 
 
* Thematic debates often take place on the same date and are in fact just different points of discussion 
within one session - 2010: 6 different dates; 2011: 7 different dates; 2012: 3 different dates; 2013: 4 
different dates; 2014: 1 date. 
(source: Annual reports from the High Representative, annexes http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/index_en.htm 
and EEAS, SG.AFGEN2) 
European Parliament: Joint Consultation meetings 
A third way of monitoring is through joint consultation meetings (JCM), bringing together 
the bureaus of the parliamentary committees of foreign affairs (AFET) and budgets (BUDG) 
with representatives of the Council, the European External Action Service and the Commission. 
The EEAS presence (at all the meetings) includes in addition to the permanent Chair of the 
Political and Security Committee, senior officials responsible for the policy. Regular Joint 
Consultation Meetings take place at least five times a year233 to prepare for the adoption of the 
annual CFSP budget. If necessary, additional JCM’s may be arranged on top (DPA, art. 1), yet, 
so far, no additional meetings took place (MEP, e-mail 13.02.17). Briefings at these meetings 
relate in particular to CFSP missions financed out of the EU budget, both implemented and 
under preparation (DPA, art. 1). This concretely means that only civilian CSDP-missions are 
                                                 
232 At the time of writing, data for 2015 and 2016 were not available. 
233 Interinstitutional Agreement of 2 December 2013, OJ C 373, 20.12.2013, p. 1–11, art. 25.  
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discussed, as military missions are not paid through the regular EU budget234 (cf. Chapter VII 
supra). Although such a mechanism was already informally in place since 2003, its formal 
introduction in the form of regular information moments results from a tug-of-war between the 
EP and the Council about budgetary control fought out in 2005-2006 (Barbé and Herranz 
Surrallés 2008, 81) and is confirmed in the 2006 IIA on budgetary discipline (and its follow-up 
of 2 December 2013, cf. Chapter VII supra). Despite their denomination as consultation 
meetings, the purport of this exercise should not be understood wrongly. They do not enable 
the Parliament to participate actively in the establishment of the EU’s foreign policy but are 
mere information sessions on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP (Barbé and 
Herranz Surrallés 2008, 82), in particular in relation to budgetary aspects (cf. Chapter VII 
supra). In that sense, “these meetings symbolise the coming together of Parliament's 
consultation/scrutiny role and budgetary authority in the area of CFSP”235 while helping the 
EP to keep oversight of the CFSP/CSDP and the (civilian) missions organised within that 
policy. 
European Parliament: parliamentary delegations 
A last oversight tool exists in the possibility for the EP to send parliamentary delegations to EU 
military or civilian missions. Two different types of delegations exist. On the one hand, the 
SEDE subcommittee can decide to send up to half of its members (= 15 in the on-going 8th 
term, 2014-2019) on visits within the EU (for instance to mission headquarters), but 1/3 of this 
quota can go for travel outside Europe, i.e. to troops in the field. On the other hand, on request 
of SEDE, the EP can decide to create an ad-hoc delegation, usually consisting of 7 MEPs236. 
Since 2010, 20 such visits were organised, 4 to headquarters and 16 on the field (cf. Table 14). 
These visits enable MEPs to familiarize with the on-the-field situation and are sometimes 
considered to bring about more useful information than just meetings with high-level officials 
back in Parliament. The information obtained through these field visits is put in a short, mostly 
                                                 
234 During her hearing before the EP, HR Mogherini declared that she “will also instruct the services 
to show flexibility regarding the scope of the Joint Consultation meetings to keep the EP informed on 
military missions […]” europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2014/536 416/EXPO_BRI 
(2014)536416_EN.pdf [08.06.17]. It is unclear if this already has been implemented. 
235 European Parliament – DG for external policies of the Union, The European Parliament and the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy. Policy briefing europarl.europa.eu/webnp/webdav 
/site/myjahiasite/users/nsalliarelis/public/The%20European%20Parliament%20and%20the
%20Common%20Security%20and%20Defence%20Policy.doc [12.05.16] 
236 European Parliament, Subcommittee on Security and Defence, Providing parliamentary 
accountability over EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy, p.12 europarl.europa.eu/document 
/activities/cont/201203/20120308ATT40252/20120308ATT40252EN.pdf [02.05.16] 
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restricted, report by the head of the delegation. This adds to the Parliament’s understanding of 
EU foreign security and defence policy and can be used by MEPs when asking questions or in 
discussions with administrative and political dirigeants (cf. Barbé and Herranz Surrallés 2008, 
90‑91; also: Born et al. 2007, 14). 
Table 14: European Parliament visits to CSDP missions (2011-2016) 
 
(Source: European Parliament, e-mail 22.12.16) 
National Parliaments oversight of CFSP 
Although through the combination of these tools the European Parliament can keep an eye on 
the CFSP and it seems true that there is more parliamentary oversight at EU level in the area of 
security and defence than it appears on paper (Herranz-Surrallés 2014a, 5; also: Huff 2013, 16), 
one area remains out of EP reach. Council decisions relating to the launching, funding and 
conduct of military CSDP operations can well be questioned and debated, they officially remain 
a competence of the Member States, difficult to scrutinize through the European level.  
In practice, as was discussed before (cf. Chapter VII, 1, VIII, 2 supra), national parliaments’ 
abilities in this regard, proved rather limited. Only in a limited number of Member States is 
there a need of approval from at least one of the parliamentary chambers before the country can 
participate in EU military missions and even less so in case of civilian missions237. On the other 
hand, national parliaments are clearly not completely uninterested in CFSP matters. A notable 
majority holds at least one debate on the matter per year (either in committee or in plenary), 
                                                 
237 Although taking place before the actual deployment of troops, approval can be seen as 
oversight, in the way that it controls the decision of the government to participate after such 
decision has been taken. 
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and most of them regularly invite the competent ministers to debate CFSP and CSDP related 
topics (cf. Table 15).  
Table 15: CFSP oversight by national parliaments 
 
1 = yes, 0 = no, empty = not answered. In case of a bicameral parliament and where both the houses 
answered, I combined the results.  
(source: Questionnaire among MSP) 
a. At the start of each year, ministries have to send a report to the Parliament (both chambers) in 
which they give an overview on EU projects to be expected in that year. These reports are then 
debated in the respective sectorial committees. Besides MPs have the possibility to place the item 
"Debate on current issues within the remit of the committee" on the Committee’s Agenda or question 
the minister within the Question Times, or debate within the instrument of consideration of EU 
matters. 
b. Ministers are regularly invited to relevant committees of the National Assembly to discuss all 
aspects of CFSP and CSDP. In these meetings, they are obliged to answer comprehensively. 
Additionally, the ministries have to participate in committee meetings on so-called "blitz control" 
once every month. 
c. Chamber: Committees are regularly informed, but the plenary discusses CFSP/CSDP issues only 
to a very limited extent if they have far-reaching implication for the Czech foreign policy and 
international policy in general. No special debate is held about CFSP/CSDP as such. – Senate: 
CFSP/CSDP is mostly debated during the debate on the preparation and on the outcome of the 
European Council in the European Affairs Committee and in the plenary. The Foreign Affairs 
Committee debates the preparation or outcomes of FAC with a deputy minister, but not always, i.e. 
not regarding every FAC meeting. 
d. The relevant minister appears in the European Affairs Committee to inform and/or consult the 
committee on files before participating in council meetings. This applies to all ministers, including 
the Defense Minister (once or twice a year) and the Minister for Foreign Affairs (once a month). 
e. All ministers are required to appear before either the EAC or the FAC or both before and after 
every Council meeting (or equivalent). 
f. Essentially, the CFSP/ CSDP are followed by the FAC. These matters are very rarely debate in 
plenary. 
g. The government does not seek opinion in the European Affairs committee, but approval. Without 
approval action cannot be taken in the Council. 
h. Tweede Kamer: Debates or meetings are scheduled prior to FAC (Defence). 
i. The EU Affairs committee is informed about the agenda of Council meetings and on its outcomes. 
Usually there are no separated committee sittings dedicated to CFSP/CSDP, but they are discussed 
when relevant EU documents are submitted to the Committee. The Defence Committee may 
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introduce those topics to its agenda. In plenary, CFSP/CSDP are discussed in the annual debate on 
foreign policy or ad hoc on request. 
j. Although no specific report for CFSP/CSDP is published, a report of the Assembly’s participation 
in the Interparliamentary Conference on CFSP/CSDP is published after every participation. This 
usually entails updated information on the CFSP/CSDP’s state of play, as well as the views 
expressed by the Assembly’s delegation during the debate and the contribution made to the final 
conclusions. 
k. The debate about the CFSP/CSDP in National Assembly is based on an Annual Report of 
Declaration of foreign policy of the republic of Slovenia, prepared by Government. 
l. House of Com: The European Scrutiny Committee publishes reports on all significant CFSP/CSDP 
proposals. The Defence Committee and/or the FAC may each take evidence on CFSP/CSDP 
matters. On occasion, this could be structured as part of an examination of EU policy, but it could 
equally arise as part of inquiries into individual missions, or regions rather than being an explicit 
regular hearing on CFSP. UK select committees take evidence and issue reports: they are not a 
forum for debate. 
However, what this implies for their actual oversight capacity is questionable. Although the 
data from Table 15 reveal a formal presence of national parliaments, they tell little about the 
actual relevance thereof. In that sense, they do not disprove Huff’s (2013, 13) observation that 
“the EU scrutiny systems of many national parliaments […] are designed primarily to respond 
to draft EU legislation, rather than to oversee the broad direction of policy in areas where 
documents may arrive in non-typical guises, after decisions already have been taken at 
European level”. But, most of all; when looking at the additional comments provided by several 
parliaments, they reveal how foreign security is mainly just one among many European issues. 
Bearing in mind that EU matters, in turn, are but one issue among many for national parliaments 
(cf. ibid, 17), all in all it is doubtful that national parliaments could really scrutinize their 
country’s participation in CFSP matters. So, the generally limited ex ante control discussed 
under Budget and Participation, seems not immediately being remedied by ex-post oversight. 
National Parliaments and the EP: Interparliamentary Conference for the CFSP and the 
CSDP 
Besides, even if some national parliaments would have a strong grip over their country’s role 
in CFSP (as for instance seems to be case for the Latvian Saeima, cf. Table 15, comment g), it 
can be asked what difference individual oversight by national parliaments would make? As the 
increasing integration of security policy makes it more difficult for national parliaments to act 
independently from each other (cf. Wagner 2006), it could after all be argued that the 
parliaments’ role in the CFSP can only be assured when acting collectively.  
In this regard, the lack of uniformity in parliamentary oversight between Member States has 
negative consequences on the effectiveness of the overall parliamentary oversight (Anghel et 
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al. 2008, 75). Especially since the abolition of the Western European Union in 2011, and with 
it, the disappearance of its Parliamentary Assembly, common European defence activities 
risked escaping from any parliamentary control (Council of Europe 2009, 50). To anticipate 
this, parliaments searched for an alternative mechanism, resulting in the creation of the 
Interparliamentary Conference on CFSP/CSDP (IPC) in April 2012. Being aware that to 
make full use of their scrutiny rights, the European Parliament and the national parliaments 
have to intensify their cooperation; but that at the same time there is no need for new decision-
making levels or structures238; the IPC essentially “provides a framework for the exchange of 
information and best practices in the area of CFSP and CSDP, to enable national Parliaments 
and the European Parliament to be fully informed when carrying out their respective roles in 
this policy area”239. The IPC is presided by the Parliament from the country holding the EU’s 
rotating presidency, in close cooperation with the European Parliament. It convenes twice a 
year in the country of the Presidency Parliament or in the European Parliament in Brussels. The 
Member State parliaments are each represented by a delegation of up to six members; the 
European Parliament is represented by up to 16 members. National parliaments of EU candidate 
countries and NATO Member States that are not members of the EU can participate as 
observers and are represented by a delegation of up to four members240.  
However, as repeatedly discussed in the literature, the actual role this interparliamentary 
cooperation so far plays in monitoring European defence activities, and hence in ensuring its 
democratic oversight, can be arguably doubted. Interparliamentary cooperation is welcomed as 
a possible solution to the complexity and multilayeredness of CSDP (Wouters and Raube 2012, 
10) and hailed for having great potential for improved information exchange (Peters et al. 2010, 
17). And indeed, as at least the Portuguese case suggests (cf. Table 15, comment j), the IPC can 
provide input to national parliamentary debates on CFP. Yet, important shortcomings still have 
to be solved for the conference to become really an efficient and coherent oversight-instrument 
(cf. Butler 2015; Stavridis 2014). As Lord (2011, 1143‑44) argues, it is not sure that 
                                                 
238 Cf. Parliamentary scrutiny of EU external action, including the Common Foreign Security Policy 
(CFSP) and the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) following the entry into force of the 
Lisbon treaty, Note by Elmar Brok and Roberto Gualtieri, MEP, Draft, version 07.11.10 
elmarbrok.de/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/cfsp_ep_elmarbrok.pdf [28.04.16].  
239 European parliament, Relations with national parliaments – Interparliamentary Conference for 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy 
europarl.europa.eu/webnp/cms/pid/1932 [28.04.16].  
240 Interparliamentary Conference for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) parleu2017.ee/en/events/interparliamentary-
conference-common-foreign-and-security-policy-cfsp-and-common-security [23.10.17]  
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shortcomings in national or European Parliament monitoring of CSDP would be resolved by 
arrangements for coordination and distribution of parliamentary functions across the two levels. 
Or, as he continues, “it is by no means self-evident that co-ordination by national parliaments 
and the EP on CSDP matters will yield superior parliamentary control”. The main reason for 
this lies in the opposing views among national parliaments, and with the European Parliament 
about how exactly interparliamentary cooperation should be organized and what exactly should 
be the role and position of national parliaments, respectively the EP in the IPC (cf. Herranz-
Surrallés 2014b; Wouters and Raube 2012, 9‑16). In a context where the roles of the respective 
players are not clearly defined and actors have opposing visions on their respective positions, 
the search for cooperation quickly risks to block, rather than to reinforce common scrutiny. 
Regarding security and defence, national parliaments seem increasingly keen to hold thigh to 
the (few) rights they have in this field rather than to accord a reinforced role to the European 
Parliament; even if this means an overall decrease in the oversight over matters increasingly 
decided at a supranational level (Herranz-Surrallés 2014b; Huff 2013, 7‑8, 19).  
Being aware of the difficulties, the IPC proceeded towards a review of its rules of procedures. 
Under the Greece and Italian presidency, an update of the rules of procedure241 and a list of best 
practices was proposed242 to elaborate the working of the Conference. 
2. Do journalists, researchers, and CSOs or individual citizens’ act as external 
watchdogs, monitoring daily developments of the CFSP? 
Societal oversight: media 
Where it concerns the first strand of societal oversight, it is obvious that this is strongly 
intertwined with the previous dimension of public debate. However, while media coverage in 
that context has been taken as a proxy for such public debate, it also (can) fulfil(s) another 
function. That is, media coverage does not only reflect and stimulate public debate; but while 
doing so, can also act as a public overseer. By throwing the light on the acts of government and 
by sounding the alarm when they think things are not happening as they should, media can 
certainly act as an external watchdog. However, it can be doubted that they actually do so. 
                                                 
241 IPEX, Report on the Seminar of the 21st February for the review of the Rules of Procedure of the 
Inter-Parliamentary Conference for CFSP CSDP ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/dossier/files/ download 
/082dbcc54477aede0144f46f8d715e09.do [30.10.17] 
242 IPEX, Best Practices ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/dossier/files/download/082dbcc54af19e11014b 
067757271781.do [30.10.17] 
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As seen in in the previous discussion about public debate, extended media coverage would 
certainly be possible if wished for, but in practice, does not take place. Following from this, 
also the role of the media as watchdog seems generally limited. Of course, when looking for 
instance at the corruption-related problems emerging end 2014 within Eulex Kosovo, we cannot 
say that the media ignore these all together. Browsing through the results of a search on “Eulex 
AND Kosovo” in the press databases of Gopress, Europresse and Genios, teaches us that several 
articles indeed deal with these problems. In that sense, these articles can function as a fire alarm; 
informing the public about what is going wrong but also showing policy makers that society is 
watching them. However, with reference to the findings of Kandyla and de Vreese (2011, 60) 
that CFSP-coverage is primarily event-driven, it can be doubted to which extend this is proof 
of systematic monitoring by the press.  
A more positive image emerges when taking into account specialised Euro-press. Media-outlets 
such as Politico, EUobserver or Euractiv routinely scrutinize European politics with inclusion 
of foreign policy. Apart from their limited role as dispensers of information, opinions or 
analyses towards the larger public, these media certainly fulfil a role as watchdog. Through 
their knowledge and expertise of EU affairs, they closely follow daily developments and act as 
external scrutinizers. Then again, previously discarded for having little (direct) access to the 
larger public, it can be suspected that their fire alarm risks not to be heard easily.  
On the other hand, they could fulfil an important role that McCubbins & Schwartz (1984, 166) 
saw for fire alarm actors, i.e. bringing alleged violations to the Parliament’s attention. Among 
the written questions by MEP’s between 2010 and 2016, 194 questions explicitly refer to one 
of the previously mentioned specialised media as their source of information. At least 19 thereof 
deal with foreign security policy; several more are about other EU foreign affairs243. This shows 
that this specialised media is indeed a source of precise information which could help MEP’s 
in keeping oversight. But, the limited number of questions that – at least explicitly – refer to 
these sources – compared to the total number – also should temper too much enthusiasm, for 
these data give no proof of systematic use of specialised Euro-press by the EP in the monitoring 
of the EU’s foreign security policy. 
                                                 
243 I searched in the EP’s question database for “Words in text”, by using the names of each press 
outlet. Subsequently, I manually searched for those questions that concerned matters related to 
foreign security and defence matters or to foreign policy issues more in general. The same 
procedure has been applied for academia and research, and for CSOs. 
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Societal oversight: Academia and research 
In general, academia and research organisations indeed seem to take up an important role as 
external overseer of the EU and its policy’s. Meaningful in that regard is the observation that 
from the totality of initial requests for access to EU Council documents that are not directly 
consultable through the online register (cf. Chapter X, 1 supra), a clear majority comes from 
the academic world. For the years 2012 to 2016, on average 33.48% of the requests stem from 
academia (followed by civil society with 27.38%)244. Although less pronounced, with 27.30%, 
also the largest share of confirmatory requests comes from academia (again followed by civil 
society with 23.26%). More specifically with regard to foreign and security matters, the high 
involvement by academia and research seems confirmed by the even more pronounced situation 
that exists for EEAS documents. For the EEAS, on average 46.12% (481 out of 1043) of the 
initial requests come from the academic sector245.  
Multiple other observations point to a watchful academia and research too. The research guide 
for EU foreign policy for instance mentions no less than 47 think tanks and research institutes 
focussing on EU external action and the EU's role in the world246, and the Transparency 
Register enlists 220 think tanks, research and academic institutions interested in foreign 
security policy and defence247. At the same time, several academic journals are devoted to the 
issue. Among the 40 journals dealing with European politics and EU foreign policy enumerated 
by the research guide for EU foreign policy, at least 5 are primarily about EU foreign and 
security issues; the others deal with it to various degrees248. The existence of an extensive body 
of research about EU foreign policy is also revealed by scientific databases such as Web of 
Science or Google Scholar. Indicatively, Google Scholar gives 3120 results, merely when 
searching on "European foreign and security" OR "EU foreign security and defence" (730 since 
2013)249. Web of Sciences on the other hand, for instance mentions 36 articles on the EEAS 
                                                 
244 Council of the European Union, Council Annual Report on Access of Documents – 2016, Table 8 
(p.11) data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7903-2017-INIT/en/pdf [31.10.17] 
245 EEAS reports on the access to documents, cf. note 165, supra. 
246 Exploring EU Foreign Policy, Research Centres and Think Tanks eufp.eu/research-centres-and-
think-tanks [08.06.17]. Developed by the College of Europe and the University of Leuven. 
247 EU, Transparency Register ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/report 
ControllerPager.do [08.07.17]. With “registration date” until 31.12.2016. 
248 Exploring EU Foreign Policy, Journals eufp.eu/journals [08.06.17] 
249 Key-word based search scholar.google.com/ [08.06.17] 
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alone, published since 2010250. Given their extensive attention for European foreign security 
policy, scientific institutions, or individual researchers certainly (can) fulfil a watchdog 
function. As external experts of the policy field and its particularities, they develop a detailed 
understanding, enabling them to be among the first to point out possible problems and 
shortcomings.  
While a constrained public access can arguably be supposed to weight on research organisations 
too; just like specialised media, they can attract attention from the legislature. They could serve 
as input providers to the European/ a national Parliament. However, also similar to specialised 
media, it may be questioned to which degree this potential is used. With regard to the European 
Parliament, it of course can arguably be supposed that academic and external research serves 
as an (important) source to the work of the Parliament’s in-house research service which main 
task is “to assist Members in their parliamentary work by providing them with independent, 
objective and authoritative analysis of, and research on, policy issues relating to the European 
Union”251; but when just looking at the direct use by MEP’s, the situation seems similar to that 
of specialised media. On the totality of questions asked between 2010 and 2016, a limited 
number of 77 makes explicit reference to one of the 46 think tanks or research groups listed by 
the research guide for EU foreign policy. Only 21 of these questions deal with foreign security 
and defence, and just 21 of the 47 organizations are mentioned (cf. Annex 8). 
Societal oversight: CSOs 
Finally, also specific CSOs can “closely examine government policy and approaches from their 
particular areas of expertise, drawing public and political attention to aspects and approaches 
that have been ignored, overlooked or misunderstood” (Caparini and Fluri 2006, 14). Just as 
for media and research, we hereby have to distinguish between these organisations’ own 
monitoring activities and the way they can serve as input providers to the EP’s oversight. With 
regard to the first dimension; as pointed out before (cf. Chapter VIII, 1 supra), many CSOs 
active on FSDP are not so much grass-root based organisations. But then again, given their 
expert knowledge and close cooperation with the EU institutions they indeed can act as external 
watchdogs (cf. Dembinski and Joachim 2014). Hence, they could be among the first to sound 
                                                 
250 Web of Science, search on “Topic” and selected on relevant “Categories” apps.webofknowledge 
.com/UA_GeneralSearch_input.do?product=UA&search_mode=GeneralSearch&SID=Z1HauIfn4P
SAP6Auazp&preferencesSaved [08.06.17] 
251 European Parliamentary Research Service europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/20150201 
PVL00031/European-Parliamentary-Research-Service [13.05.16]  
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alarm if things are not going as they should. In relation with the oversight function of the EP, 
things seem again less promising. 
Of the 406 CSOs, interested in Foreign Security Policy and Defence, registered in the EU’s 
Transparency Register until June 2015252, only very few seem to have been used as input 
providers to questions asked by members of the European Parliament. By searching in the 
Parliament’s online database, we retrace 742 questions related to foreign security policy that 
explicitly refer to information from in total 29 of these 406 CSOs. Thereby, a large majority of 
these questions make use of information coming from only two organisations: of the 742 
questions mentioned, 305 refer to Human Rights Watch as their source and 316 to Amnesty 
International. As to the kind of input that is drawn from these CSOs, in general it concerns 
information on local situations (human rights abuses, destabilizing factors …) and how the 
responsible EU institutions (HR, Council) deal with that or think to react (cf. Annex 9). 
Although such kind of questions certainly have their utility as tools of parliamentary oversight 
(cf. supra), this also means that only in a limited number of cases we can retrace the use of 
CSOs information as ground for a direct control of the EU’s actual foreign security and defence 
policy. These few exceptions are a question refering to a report of the Transnational Institute 
in order to question the Commission about money it apparently spent on drone research253 and 
7 questions that mention the International Crisis Group as their source254. 
Societal oversight: citizens 
Where it concerns monitoring by citizens themselves, the shortcomings in transparency – 
limiting the possibility for citizens to directly and easily access the relevant documents – hinder 
their ability to directly scrutinize foreign policy. To this adds an additional dimension, generally 
forgotten in the debate on transparency and highly relevant in relation to oversight; that is, how 
well can citizens follow their elected representatives when they are scrutinizing in their name? 
In this case, how easily can citizens follow the monitoring efforts of the European Parliament 
                                                 
252 Previously (cf. Chapter VIII, 1 supra), I mentioned 470 CSOs registered until end 2016. So, to 
be clear, the data used here do not refer to these 470 CSOs, but are based on earlier research, 
carried out in June 2015. That is why only 406 CSOs are taken into account (= the total number of 
CSOs, register at 23.06.2015, mentioning Foreign Security Policy and Defence as one of their fields 
of interest). Though, I do not believe this makes a difference for the considerations and 
conclusions that follow from this.  
253 European Parliament – Parliamentary Questions, P-002891-14. Subject: VP/HR — EU support 
for drone research, 12 March 2014. 
254 European Parliament – Parliamentary Questions europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/ 
parliamentary-questions.html#sidesForm [13.06.15]. 
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or their national parliament with regard to the EU’s foreign policy? Given the repeatedly 
mentioned differences between the Member States’ approach to EU foreign policy, I only refer 
here to the European Parliament when claiming that there are important barriers to citizens 
wishing to scrutinize the scrutinizers. The EP may well claim that “Parliamentary questions, 
and the subsequent replies of the other EU institutions, are a rich source of information for 
citizens”255 in practice, their structured consultation demands for a knowledge of the 
parliamentary work which non-specialists do not possess. The online register may well contain 
all questions, it is of such design that it does not enable for a systematic search when one is not 
familiar with codes or dates. The word search on the other hand is too general to use as a focused 
research tool. The same can be said for other parliamentary documents available in the 
Parliament’s Public Register of Documents. In that sense, the European Parliament fails to offer 
citizens a better understanding of European foreign policy and does not allow them to monitor 
its own work as scrutinizer of European foreign policy or this policy as such.  
Question, of course can be asked if and how improved research tools for these questions- and 
documents registers would really contribute to their increased consultation by individual 
citizens. After all, it can be wondered if, in the end, individual citizens are much interested in 
exercising oversight; not only with regard to European foreign policy in particular, but with 
regard to European politics all together. Indeed, both the limited popularity of the specialised 
Europress, discussed before; as well as the limited share of individual citizens’ requests of 
access to documents256, seem to indicate a generally passive attitude by individual citizens 
about European politics. Following from this, it arguably could be wondered if an easier 
consultation of European parliamentary questions and documents would actually lead to an 
increased direct control. That is, even if opportunities for control would be reinforced for 
individual citizens, will they seize these opportunities? Due to a lack of expertise and technical 
knowledge, and limited cognitive capacities, many individual citizens will not just be unwilling, 
but also be unable to directly exercise public control; no matter the possibilities they are offered 
                                                 
255 European Parliament Research Service, Parliamentary Questions epthinktank.eu/2014/ 
12/05/parliamentary-questions/ [08.05.15].  
256 According to the previously cited (cf. note 244 supra) Council Annual Report on Access of 
Documents – 2016, for the period 2012 to 2016, 8.56% of the initial requests come from Others. 
13.26% of them originate from Undeclared petitioners. Even if we would suppose that all the Other 
and Undeclared requests come from individual citizens, then still only 21.82% are made by 
individual citizens. Among the confirmatory applications, their share is even more limited 
(17.22%). Of course, it should be mentioned that these data not only concern CFSP related 
documents, but all documents included in the register. 
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(cf. Maggetti and Papadopoulos 2016, 4). Bearing in mind this observation, the previously 
discussed means of both legislative oversight and oversight by external watchdogs, obviously 
gain even more relevance.  
3. Conclusion: oversight in CFSP, normatively democratic? 
Based on McCubbins & Schwarz’s (1984) distinction between police patrol by the 
Parliament and fire alarm by the larger society, this chapter looked at both legislative 
oversight by the European and national parliaments as well as at oversight by societal actors. 
In both cases, positive elements exist, but also unmistakable shortcomings; leaving us with 
mixed feelings about the oversight of European foreign security and defence policy. 
Where it concerns the first strand, especially the role of national parliaments is problematic. In 
general, they seem unfit to monitor independently a policy which scope exceeds their usual 
competences and capacities. Of course, it could be argued that this is essentially a national 
problem that will have to be dealt with at the national level... While it is indeed true that the EU 
as such can neither be blamed for these national-level shortcomings nor has much to say about 
how they could or should be corrected, it is also true that they do have importance for the EU’s 
foreign policy’s democratic legitimacy. They are national problems in their origin, but not so 
in their consequences. Similar to what I argued already when discussing Budget or 
Participation, even if some national parliaments have a certain oversight capacity (what of 
course is a good thing at their national level), this not necessarily creates good public control 
from an overall European perspective. While this essentially means that the people’s capacity 
for control over a policy they are equally concerned by depends of the national citizenry they 
are part of, this can mean an unequal control.  
To overcome this problem, a solution could lie with reinforced cooperation amongst them. But, 
based on several studies on the Interparliamentary Conference on the CFSP which has been 
created in that respect, it seems that national parliaments (so far) prove largely incapable of 
surpassing their differences and developing a mood of cooperation which would benefit their 
joint oversight. The Interparliamentary Conference on CFSP, though a potentially useful 
vehicle of common oversight, is too much disputed regarding its concrete form and functioning 
to grant national parliaments a stronger common position, enabling them to organize oversight 
together (with the EP). The European Parliament from its side cannot fill this gap. It has no say 
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over military CSDP-missions (cf. infra) and needs the national parliaments to cover this 
important aspect of the EU’s foreign action.  
On the other hand, the European Parliament has at its disposal different instrument to oversee 
non-defence related dimensions of EU foreign policy, and clearly uses them to do so. First of 
all, being the only tool of continuous oversight, questions allow the EP to communicate directly 
with the Council, the Commission and the High Representative. This indeed can lead to an 
information-gain for the Parliament; and tells these institutions that they are followed. The 
often-delayed answers however hamper this tool’s ability to follow closely the day-to-day 
policy-implementation. As the Council and HR can let pass a deadline without much 
consequence other than a possible rappel of the question257, this limits the oversight-autonomy 
of questions. Similar to what I explained previously about the EP’s Special Committee for 
access to documents related to the CFSP (cf. Chapter X, 4 supra), he fact that in practice, the 
overseen institution can decide itself about a question’s urgency, influences the final relevance 
of the oversight activity (cf. Lester 2015, 16). Yet, of course, it could be asked if the official 
deadlines are realistic, especially when considering the amount of written question asked yearly 
by the Parliament. The Commission in that regard even repeatedly complained about the 
cartload of (impertinent) questions258, taking up a lot of the institution time and resources. In 
that sense, it could at least be wondered if oversight through questions by the EP does not suffer 
from its own excess, and if less would not be better (at least it could take away an argument 
from the Commission or Council to justify their belated answers…). Being in-depth and 
providing the Parliament with useful information about on-the-field-CFSP, general debate 
from its side enables a helicopter view that could result in increased insight on long-term 
implementation and focus on policy-outcome. However, as these debates relate to events that 
took place a relatively long time before, they are no means of direct oversight. Thematic 
debates in that sense could better fulfil this role as they enable the European Parliament to 
regularly meet with the High Representative to discuss specific issues and concrete dossiers. 
Joint consultation meetings also constitute a hands-on form of oversight, giving MEP’s the 
opportunity to meet at regular intervals with high-ranking (non-political) CFSP officials. Then 
                                                 
257 Art. 130 (4) of the EP’s RoP in this regard only stipulates that “if a question cannot be answered 
within the time limit set it shall, at the request of the author, be placed on the agenda for the next 
meeting of the committee responsible”. 
258 Politico, 08.09.15, “Do MEPs ask too many questions? Do they?” politico.eu/article/meps-ask-
too-many-questions-parliament-brussels-eu/; also 15.03.17, European Commission to Parliament: 
Enough of your stupid questions! politico.eu/blogs/playbook-plus/2017/03/european-
commission-to-parliament-enough-of-your-stupid-questions/ [09.06.17]  
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again, JCM’s have the problem that they cannot incorporate the military dimension. Linked 
with the previously recalled problem of hampered control by national parliaments, this confirms 
that especially the EU’s military policy – which indeed is all in all very limited, but that should 
not be an argument – largely escapes oversight by a directly elected body. This seems somewhat 
compensated by parliamentary Delegations on the field. These delegations seem well 
accepted for bringing about useful information about the daily goings of military and civilian 
CSDP missions. 
Taking all this together, and with reference to the pre-Lisbon readings with which started this 
oversight discussion, I would not conclude that there are no formal possibilities for oversight, 
but rather that the practical implementation has limiting effects on its pertinence. Jointly, the 
instruments of parliamentary questions, debates, JCM and parliamentary delegations assure 
some oversight over important aspects of the EU’s CFSP (such as the organisation of the EEAS, 
civil missions or sanctions), but two main shortcomings gnaw away at the legislature’s 
oversight capacities.  
First of all, defence policy indeed largely escapes oversight. As the reality of the CSDP shows 
a complex, multilevel policy-making system – not supranational, but not completely national 
anymore neither – it falls between two stools: both the national parliaments (mainly for 
organizational reasons) and the EP (for formal reasons) prove unfit to oversee it efficiently. 
Besides, there are shortcomings of communicative and time-related order. In the theoretical 
framework, oversight was defined as a dialogue. It is important to reflect on this when 
pondering these findings, as they seem to tell us that problems mainly lie with the return side 
of this two-way communication and more specifically with its timing. Oversight as such is 
indeed retrospective, but in case of CFSP a main shortcoming lies with the fact that it is maybe 
too retrospective.  
The second strand of oversight by societal actors, again reveals a discrepancy between positive 
elements and hampering limits. For specialised media and research, a curious contradiction 
exists between their own (capacity of) active monitoring and the difficulty to make their fire 
alarm being heard. For CSOs finally, things are comparable in that we may conclude, in 
reference to previous research, that they have volition to monitor. As to the overall loudness of 
their fire alarm, this is however more difficult to estimate, given the large differences between 
the scope and general impact-factor of different organisations. What although can be evaluated 
for all three types of actors alike, is the degree to which the European Parliament makes (visible) 
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use of their work as input to its own oversight. The EP cannot be said to make no use of 
information from specialised media, research organisations or CSOs; but on the other hand, it 
cannot to be said to do so systematically neither. Summarized, we could state that there is at 
least room for improvement. 
Finally, we see a restraint possibility for citizens to oversee themselves the daily development 
of European foreign policy. In contrast to the European Parliament’s own confidence 
thereabout, citizens can difficultly follow the Parliament’s work when not having the necessary 
specialised knowledge. This can make us doubt their ability to monitor European foreign policy 
directly themselves. Then again, as discussed, it of course can be wondered if citizens are much 
interested in exercising such direct oversight.  
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XIII. Overrule in EU foreign policy 
Summary: In this last empirical chapter, attention turns to the overrule possibilities that 
exist directly for the people, the European Parliament or national parliaments. In that 
context, attention returns to the licensing procedure and the EU’s concrete actions of 
military and civilian missions, sanctions and mediating, discussed before; as well as to the 
overall foreign policy strategy.  
Finally, I argued for the possibility of overrule as an important criterion to assure public control; 
the evaluation of which helps to complete the picture of a foreign policy’s normative democratic 
legitimacy. A sole indicator (19) was put forward in that regard. Applied to the specific context 
of European foreign security and defence, the question is thus if the people, the European 
Parliament, or national Parliaments somehow can exercise the last word over what the EU does 
internationally in matters of security and defence. In that context, attention should not only go 
to concrete actions, but also to the overall direction of the EU’s foreign policy and the selection 
of the responsible decision-makers.  
Starting with these two last points, this chapter subsequently looks at the three types of policy 
instruments that were distinguished before as key channels of EU foreign policy (military and 
civilian missions, sanctions and mediation, cf. Chapter XI supra). Although in doing so, the 
discussion retakes multiple elements already introduced before, it adds an additional dimension 
to their democratic evaluation, by looking at them from the particular angle of overrule.  
1. Can the people, the European Parliament, or national parliaments overrule European 
foreign policy decisions? 
In first instance, where it concerns the nomination of two key decision-makers that are the 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Permanent 
president of the European Council, we saw how in practice neither the European Parliament, 
nor national parliaments have an actual say in this (cf. Chapter VI supra). The European 
Council unilaterally appoints both actors. And, even when not at all satisfied by its decision, no 
legislative body, let alone the people can repeal it. As to the HR, we also saw how this makes 
her case different from other commissioners whose individual nomination can in practice be 
undone by the EP in case the candidate’s parliamentary hearing was insufficient. Although it 
could be claimed that overrule should not per se apply to such licensing issues – as these do not 
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concern actual foreign policy as such – I argue here to the contrary. Given the pivotal role 
played by these actors in the subsequent development of the EU’s foreign action, certainly by 
the HR, these nominations can be of fundamental importance to the orientation of European 
foreign policy. Therefore – and given the executive character of these nominations in which 
neither the people nor their directly elected representatives take part – they should be subject to 
the possibility of overrule; which they are not. 
Regarding concrete European foreign policy, two levels of decision-making are to be taken into 
account. First of all, there is the overall definition and direction of the policy, i.e. the framing 
of the general principles and fundamental choices underpinning the entirety of the EU’s foreign 
action. Secondly, we should look at the definition of more concrete policy programs. 
As to the first level, the Treaty (art. 26.1 TEU), in general terms, states, “the European Council 
shall identify the Union’s strategic interests, determine the objectives of and define general 
guidelines for the common foreign and security policy”. Though, what such “general 
guidelines” are, the Treaty does not clearly define. Under what concrete form the overall 
direction of the policy is made explicit is not detailed. In practice, we see how the European 
Council sets out the general course of the EU’s foreign policy through publicly available 
conclusions issued after its meetings as well as more informal conclusions that remain 
confidential259 (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014, 160). Most of all however, it is the European 
Security Strategy of 2003 (as well as its 2008 follow-up report) that provides the conceptual 
framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, including the CSDP260. Tasked by the 
Member States, the document was drafted by the then HR, Javier Solana. It was subsequently 
adopted by the Brussels European Council of 12-13 December 2003. Four years later, the 
European Council “[invited] the SG/HR, in full association with the Commission and in close 
cooperation with the Member States, to examine the implementation of the Strategy with a view 
to proposing elements on how to improve the implementation and, as appropriate, elements to 
complement it”261. This results in a 2008 document, titled Report on the Implementation of the 
                                                 
259 European Council, European Council Decisions: “The European Council sometimes holds informal 
or exceptional meetings of heads of State or government. Following these meetings, leaders usually 
adopt a statement or declaration rather than official conclusions”. consilium.europa.eu 
/en/european-council/conclusions/ [20.05.17].  
260 EEAS, European Security Strategy eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/european-security-
strategy/ [11.04.16].  
261 European Council, Brussels European Council 14 December 2007 - Presidency Conclusions, §90, 
Brussels, 14 February 2008 consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/ 
en/ec/97669.pdf [11.04.16].  
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European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World. Given the European 
Council’s notorious opacity and secrecy (cf. Chapter X supra; also: House of Commons 2008, 
14), it is difficult to retrace the decision-making process behind these documents. However, the 
conclusions through which the European Council issues these reports as well as accepts them 
may well lack binding legal authority; they sure commit the Member States politically (cf. ibid., 
12).  
What strikes the most in this context of political obligation is that both these documents – and 
as for that matter also other guidelines – are issued as well as adopted by the same institution, 
the European Council, without a necessity for agreement by any other body or the possibility 
to refute the conclusions of the relevant European Council meetings. As the European Council 
in the context of European foreign policy essentially acts as an executive and not a legislative 
body (cf. Chapter VI, 1; X, 3), this is problematic. As conclusions are not to be controlled or 
agreed upon by any other European or national body, neither is the overall direction of the EU’s 
foreign and security policy that is decided upon in these conclusions. Neither, the European, 
nor the national parliaments have anything to say regarding their content262. Besides, as these 
Council conclusions do not contain reference to the content of the debate preceding them, nor 
mention individual positions taken by individual members, it is in practice impossible for a 
national parliament to be sure about the position of their own head of State or government. 
Thus, there is no ultimate way through which the direction of the EU’s foreign security and 
defence policy could be altered or decisions made in that context could be undone.  
In June 2015, HR Mogherini has launched a process for the elaboration of a new Global 
Strategy for the European Union, in follow up to the 2003 and 2008 documents. This process 
is presented as being inclusive – said to be developed in close cooperation with Member States, 
as well as with EU Institutions and the broader foreign policy community263. Welcomed by the 
European Council of 28 June 2016264 and by the common conclusions of the EU foreign 
ministers in October 2016265; it can however be wondered, if and how it indeed presented a 
more open process, allowing for real input and changes or amendments by the European or 
                                                 
262 Statewatch, Council of the European Union: Policymaking through Council "Conclusions" 
statewatch.org/observatory-council-conclusions.htm [11.04.16]. 
263 A Global Strategy for the European Union europa.eu/globalstrategy/en [18.02.16]. 
264 European Council, EUCO 26/16, § 20 consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/ 
2016/06/28-euco-conclusions/ [20.05.17] 
265 Council of the EU, 13202/16 data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13202-2016-
INIT/en/pdf [20.05.17] 
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national parliaments, or by the larger civil society. Just like its predecessors, this strategy is 
essentially elaborated by the services of the High Representative; and no Parliament had to 
pronounce itself on it before it was launched.  
Also in case of concrete foreign security and defence actions, decisions are principally of such 
order that they are not to be revoked by citizens or their representatives. This becomes 
particularly clear in relation to CSDP-missions. According to the Treaty, “decisions relating 
to the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a mission […], shall be 
adopted by the Council acting unanimously” (art. 42.4 TEU, also art. 31.1 TEU). However, 
within the general rule of unanimity, Member States can decide to abstain. In that case, the MS 
concerned “shall not be obliged to apply the decision, [but it] shall accept that the decision 
commits the Union [;] [and] [i]n a spirit of mutual solidarity, […] shall refrain from any action 
likely to conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision” (art. 31.1 TEU, for a 
further discussion: Wessel and Böttner 2013, §16). This means that in practice CFSP-decisions 
(including those about CSDP-missions) are Union acts and not merely decisions adopted 
collectively by the Member States (cf. Chapter VII, 1 supra, also: Naert 2013, 4‑5); and that 
regardless of their non-involvement in the decision, the MS’s actual policy choices and actions 
will be strongly defined and bound by them. Similar to what I said before about the nomination 
of the High Representative (Chapter VI supra), this arguably can lead to a situation where 
(especially smaller, less influential) Member States could be brought to abstain rather than to 
fully oppose when they do not agree with the launch of a mission. Thus, the argument of the 
Council being a purely intergovernmental body, by means of unanimity assuring the equal 
representation of each Member State’s citizens does not hold ground. In a situation where a 
procedure of formal unanimity is replaced by one that is actually about consensus, the concrete 
power and individual responsibility of each government within the Council over the final 
decision becomes more limited.  
Yet “in order for citizens and national parliamentarians to hold the politicians in the Council 
and European Council accountable, they must be able to attribute responsibility for decisions 
to their particular government” (Curtin 2014, 687). When this is no longer possible – i.e. when 
their respective government no longer holds full responsibility over the final decision – this 
means that public control through the national channel is hampered. But also afterwards, with 
regard to a mission’s concrete, on-the-ground development, the national level is limited as a 
channel of democratic control. Although, good practices exist and some individual parliaments 
 205 
have the power to decide whether or not their country will participate in a mission (cf. Table 2 
and Table 3 supra; also: Born et al. 2008, 16); as has been discussed before, this does not as 
such improve their common grip over a policy essentially developed at a European level (cf. 
Chapter XII, 1 supra). In fact, one (or even more) national parliament(s) not allowing their 
country to participate in a mission does not veto the decision to launch this mission as such. 
The decision to mount a mission is independent from a country’s subsequent (non-) 
commitment to participate in that mission (EUMS, e-mail 06.10.15). So, whereas national 
parliaments have the possibility to overrule their own country’s participation, this does not 
automatically prevent the mission from taking place.  
This contradiction between a national overrule and the limited impact this has at EU level – 
even in the context of what is essentially supposed to be an intergovernmental process – we 
have seen for that matter also at a more fundamental level; regarding the launch of a European 
Defence Policy as such. When the Danish people vetoed in first instance the Treaty of 
Maastricht, one of the main issues at stake was the question of military cooperation. Rather 
than abandoning the perspective of a European common defense policy altogether, Denmark 
was given an opt-out on this matter and the Danish people voted a second time, this time 
accepting the Treaty. A common defence policy was launched. While Denmark may well be 
officially exempted from participating in this policy, this policy is still being carried out in name 
of the EU (of which Denmark of course continues to be a full member); and in practice is relying 
on and associated with EU infrastructures in which Denmark is fully involved. Although 
formally exempt from participating, it cannot be denied that Denmark’s actual policy choices 
and actions will be strongly bound by what is decided by the others in the context of this 
common defence policy. 
As it is made explicit by art. 44 TEU, not all MS should participate in the implementation of a 
mission for this to take place. Looking at currently on-going missions, we see how in practice 
the number of participating Member States varies between a large majority (for instance 
EUMM Georgia: all MS, EUTM Mali: 22, EUPOL COPPS: 21, Atalanta: 20) and even not half 
of them (EUCAP Mali: 13, EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Niger: 11)266. Besides, in this context, 
it should be pointed out that several of the Central and Eastern European Member States 
recently even relaxed the requirements of parliamentary control of troop deployments, and this 
                                                 
266 EEAS, Ongoing missions and operations eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/ 
[11.04.16] Factsheets to be found on the webpages of various missions.  
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precisely in the context of their accessions to NATO and the EU (Peters and Wagner 2011, 
183).  
The European Parliament from its side does not fill the gap. As was expounded under Budget 
and Participation (cf. Chapter VII and Chapter VIII supra), the European Parliament has indeed 
no say in decisions relating to foreign policy; but also, it cannot undo them if it should not at 
all agree. In the context of the European foreign policy, the Council does not act in its role as 
part of the bicameral legislative regime together with the European Parliament (Tsebelis and 
Garrett 2000, 24; also: Hix and Høyland 2011, 68‑74), but as an executive. “In practice”, it 
can be stated that in that context, “the Parliament can act as an informed public overseer, but 
cannot stop a decision it does not agree with” (Furness 2013, 114). All of this means that no 
representative institution (neither national, nor European) could prevent a CFSP-decision the 
launch of a mission in the first place.  
Furthermore, it is surprising to see how the situation is even more problematic for civil 
missions. Where at first it could seem as if the EP’s grip over such non-military missions is 
more developed as it somehow holds control over their budget; in practice, the Parliament could 
not use its budget powers to veto such missions as they concern the EU budget in general and 
not that of particular missions267. For national parliaments on the other hand, current procedures 
and practices cover military deployments (if at all) but hardly civilian police deployments. Even 
less than in the case of military missions, national parliaments seem to have to approve – and 
hence being able to block – a mission before it gets deployed (Anghel et al. 2008, 56, 75). 
When restrictive measures are issued, the decision to do so is taken by the Council (art. 29 
TEU), again according to the principle of unanimity defined under art. 31.1 TEU. As was 
explained before (cf. Chapter XI supra), the measures foreseen in that Council Decision are 
either implemented at national or at EU level. In the first case, they are directly binding upon 
the Member States. In the second they are implemented through a Council regulation taken by 
qualified majority and the European Parliament shall be informed thereof (art. 215 TFEU)268. 
Again, this means that these decisions, once they have been taken, can be difficultly disagreed 
with. Only (a) natural or legal person(s) against which sanctions are taken can institute 
                                                 
267 Cf. the remark on national parliaments’ budget powers (Gourlay 2004, 195), cf. Chapter VII 
supra. 
268 Such Council regulations hence should not be confused with normal regulations adopted under 
the ordinary legislative procedure as set out in art. 294 TFEU.  
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proceedings against this act addressed to them or which is of direct and individual concern to 
them (art. 275 and art. 263§4 TFEU). Nor the European – or a national parliament, neither any 
other person has this possibility.  
Where finally it concerns the last tool that was previously discerned, that of mediation in 
situation of conflict, it is obvious that the possibilities to overrule specific actions are almost 
non-existent. First of all, given the two-level dimension of the EU’s mediation and facilitation 
efforts it is difficult to know where decisions to take up a role as mediator are taken and on 
which ground (cf. Chapter XI supra). Besides, “there is no comprehensive, exact overview of 
these activities, many of which are confidential in nature” (EEAS, e-mail 13.03.15). It follows 
from this that appealing against these decisions is practically impossible. 
Again however, when looking at the European level – in line with what already discussed before 
– it is interesting to point out how the limits imposed on the European Parliament do not define 
its activism in exploring the boundaries of its influence and how to expand these. In an already 
famous case before the European Court of Justice, the Parliament defied the Council for not 
correctly sharing information about a CFSP-decision and therefore searched to get it nullified 
altogether; at which it succeeded formally. In the so-called Mauritius Arrest from June 2014269, 
the ECJ backed up the EP and annulled a Council's CFSP-decision regarding the conclusion of 
an EU-Mauritius Agreement on the transfer of suspected pirates from the EU naval operation 
Atalanta. This was decided on grounds that the obligation to keep the EP informed, immediately 
and fully, at all stages of the procedure of concluding international agreements (art. 218 TFEU) 
had not been respected by the Council270. With this case, the European Parliament seems to 
confirm that when its rights are not correctly respected throughout a decision, it does not 
hesitate and will try overriding the decision as such. Even in those fields that politically escape 
its powers, such as foreign security policy. Of course, the overrule power displayed here is 
essentially of formal order. In that sense, it is all in all rather limited. It is based on shortcomings 
of an administrative order and as such is no proof of political overrule-power regarding the 
                                                 
269 ECJ, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 24 June 2014. European Parliament v Council 
of the European Union. Action for annulment - Decision 2011/640/ CFSP - Legal basis - Common 
foreign and security policy (CFSP) - Article 37 TEU - International agreement relating exclusively 
to the CFSP - Second subparagraph of Article 218(6) TFEU - Obligation to inform the Parliament 
immediately and fully - Article 218(10) TFEU - Maintenance of effects. Case C-658/11. eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62011CJ0658 [11.04.16]  
270 For a discussion of this case, see: Joris Larik, Democratic scrutiny of EU foreign policy: From 
pirates to the power of the people (Case C-658/11 Parliament v. Council) europeanlawblog.eu 
/?p=2469 [25.06.15] 
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content of the decision. Said otherwise, although the EP can launch out about a certain legalistic 
overrule power, its political overrule in European foreign policy is not directly reinforced by 
this.  
2. Conclusion: overrule in CFSP, democratically legitimate? 
Throughout the discussion of the previous criteria, the dimension of overrule has already been 
touched upon at multiple occasions. However, to grasp this criterion in its own right, I 
essentially retook here some of the elements discussed before while revaluating them from the 
particular angle of this last systemic norm. 
As was pointed out in the theoretical framework, overrule can be understood as participation of 
the last chance. It is the ultimate possibility for the democratic principal to have its say about 
the course of a policy. Based upon the above evaluation it has to be concluded that this 
possibility is almost non-existent with regard to European foreign policy. Not only can neither 
the people nor their elected representatives at the European or national level revoke the 
nomination of the key decision-makers of this policy, but also the general direction decided 
upon and concrete actions taken by these decision-makers stay outside their reach.  
Although the documents through which the strategic interest and guidelines of the EU’s foreign 
security and defence policy are set out have no legal force, once drawn up they have a strong 
political authority. But, executively decided, there is neither for the people nor for the 
parliament(s) a way to alter or stop the overall course of European foreign policy set out through 
these documents. In a similar way, also concrete European foreign security and strategys cannot 
be democratically revoked once decided. Although in some cases individual parliaments could 
forbid their country to participate in a military EU mission, this in no way hinders the mission 
to be launched. As for the European Parliament – just as for national parliaments in case of 
civilian mission – it can in no way influence the decision to establish a mission, neither during 
the decision-making process, nor afterwards. A similar incapacity we find with regard to the 
other main instruments of the EU’s foreign policy action, sanctions and mediation. 
The lack of overrule power as demonstrated here could be explained by the specific character 
of European foreign and security policy. Differing from community policies, it is – as has 
already been pointed out before – not simply intergovernmental either. Hence it is structurally 
undefined which level should have the last word. Where in the first case the European 
Parliament holds a veto power through the ordinary legislative procedure and in the second case 
 209 
there is a need for unanimity that could give a veto to one single country, in this case there is 
no proper way of ultimate control. The European Parliament is overall excluded and although 
national parliaments can (in some countries) override their own country’s position this as such 
does not really impact on the decision taken at the European level. Besides, also following this 
policy’s multilevel governance structure (cf. Chapter IV, 3.2 supra), in which supranational 
and national levels are strongly interlinked, decisions are the result of difficult negotiations and 
compromise. Therefore, the principal-agent line seems especially fragile in this last step of the 
policy-making process, exactly because coming to these decisions often is such a laborious 
task. Having them repealed is something the decision-makers in such a context strongly wish 
to avoid. In that sense, as it directly follows from the policy’s sui generis nature as a multilevel 
governance system, the absence of democratic overrule possibilities can even be seen as an 
inherent necessity of the EU’s foreign policy in order to function. 
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Part III: Conclusions 
-  
Main findings and possibilities for future audit  
I started this thesis with the observation that existing literature about European foreign policy 
generally omits to grasp this policy’s democratic situation in an overall manner. Although the 
question of democracy and EU foreign security and defence has certainly been looked at before, 
this is rarely done as part of a comprehensive evaluation. Individual dimensions of democracy 
are discussed, yet this is mainly done in a stand-alone approach which essentially focusses on 
a singular dimension. In that way, an inclusive appreciation of the EU’s foreign security and 
defence policy’s democratic state of affairs has been fairly lacking. Given the fragmented 
approach, it is difficult to see the larger picture. This hampers our understanding of general 
democratic strengths and weaknesses of this policy, consequentially making it difficult to act 
upon these. Therefore, the thesis proposed a systematic democratic assessment of the EU’s 
foreign security and defence policy (Introduction). Departing from an argument in favour of a 
focus on the CFSP’s normative democratic legitimacy – i.e. its inherent democratic qualities, 
legitimizing its philosophical acceptability (Chapter I), and a discussion about the need for 
democracy in foreign policy (Chapter II); the thesis aimed to do so through the development of 
a democratic audit (Chapter III). While defining democracy as public control with political 
equality, it therefore proposed a comprehensive assessment framework composed of eight 
democratic criteria and one overarching principle (Chapter IV). Finally, the EU’s foreign 
security and defence policy has been discussed with regard to each of the criteria (Chapter VI 
to XIII).  
This last part now, essentially does two things. First of all, in order to complete the empirical 
assessment carried out in the previous chapters, Chapter XIV discusses the main findings that 
have come up from this assessment. The purpose of the audit was to develop a comprehensive 
balance sheet about the CFSP’s democratic strengths and weaknesses, and not just to look at 
separate manifestations of democracy. Therefore, this discussion looks at both the main 
overlaps and commonalities between them. That is, rather than just summarizing key findings 
and observations it focusses on how they interconnect with each other. The overall question 
then is what all this tells us about the public control with political equality of the EU’s foreign 
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security and defence policy. Additionally, it can be asked how the assessment could contribute 
to possible improvements of the CFSP’s normative democratic legitimacy.  
Subsequently, the last chapter, Chapter XV, returns to democratic auditing as a method for 
assessing a policy, and in particular a foreign policy. After all, at the beginning of this thesis I 
explained how this systematic and comprehensive appraisal of the EU’s foreign policy’s 
democratic legitimacy would be a first democratic audit that does not concern a political system 
but a policy. Therefore, a return to the auditing method, and some considerations about its future 
application and possible subsequent steps, deserves attention. 
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XIV. Assessing the democratic legitimacy of European foreign 
security and defence policy: key findings 
Summary: This chapter discusses the key findings and observations that came up from the 
previous empirical chapters. To complete the assessment, it focusses on overlaps between 
these findings, as well as on general transversal trends that could help us understand the 
reasons behind them. Finally, it looks at how these findings relate to recommendations for 
democratic improvement. 
1. The normative democratic legitimacy of EU foreign policy: an inclusive appreciation 
Throughout the eight empirical chapters, I have carried out a systematic audit of the EU’s 
foreign security and defence policy’s decision-making processes and institutions, according to 
a set of democratic criteria that take their starting point from the two basic principles of public 
control and political equality. For each of the criteria, an evaluation has been undertaken about 
how the EU’s foreign security and defence policy lives up to it. Ranging i.a. from the 
appointment procedures for EEAS officials and the budget rules applying to EU military and 
civilian missions, over the ability of citizens or Civil Society Organisations to impact on the 
EU’s foreign security course of action and this policy’s media coverage, to the accessibility of 
relevant information and the organisation of secrecy, or the possibility of ex-post control; this 
has presented us with a panoply of findings and observations about how the CFSP’s normative 
democratic character takes form (cf. Table 16).  
Table 16: Summary of main empirical findings 
Criterion Indicator Main findings/ observations Pos. / 
Neg. 
Mainly relevant 
for 
Licensing 1 
The HR is appointed by the European 
Council, behind closed doors and 
without much information about the 
reasons and motivations about that 
appointment. 
- 
Public control 
 1 
The HR is appointed by the European 
Council acting with QMV: this 
hampers the involvement of smaller, 
less influential Member States. 
- 
Political equality 
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 2 
With Lisbon, the EP obtained 
increased leverage over HR 
appointment. 
+ 
Public control 
  2 
EEAS appointments: EP can 
organize exchange and has some 
informal power, yet less than wished 
for. 
+, - 
Public control 
  2 
PSC and Coreper II appointments: 
very few national parliaments have 
control… 
- 
Public control 
  2 
.. Yet, some have. 
+, - 
Public control, 
Political equality 
  3 
EC decides CFSP guidelines and 
strategic interests without European/ 
national parliamentary control. 
- 
Public control 
  3 
Especially the CSDP overall 
structure developed by European 
Council, without citizens or 
parliament input… 
- 
Public control, 
Political equality 
 3 
… Yet in the recent debates on 
European defence, other actors, 
including the EP and the IPC on 
CFSP/CSDP have become more 
involved. 
+ 
Public control, 
Political equality 
  3 
EP had important role in 
development EEAS.  + 
Public control 
Budget 4 
CFSP budget essentially integrated in 
general EU budget, thus it is 
overseen by the EP. 
+ 
Public control 
  5 
Missions financed by MS: unequal 
opportunities for national parliaments 
to control their participation in the 
budget. 
- 
Political equality 
Participation 6 
Possibilities for popular participation 
(by citizens directly, or through 
CSOs) do exist, participation is 
encouraged by the EU institutions… 
+ 
Public control, 
Political equality 
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  6 
… Yet, in practice, both forms of 
participation prove to be rather 
limited. 
- 
Public control/ 
Political equality 
  7 
EP is informed about the general 
course of the CFSP, and… + 
Public control 
  7 
...Notwithstanding the absence of a 
strong formal (legal) position, the EP 
gives prove of participative eagerness 
and tries to be involved in the daily 
affairs as good as possible 
(parliamentary consultations, 
resolutions, development EEAS, 
IIA's… 
+ 
Public control 
  7 
… But, in practice, overall EP 
involvement is still very limited. - 
Public control 
  7 
With Lisbon, national parliaments - 
at least formally - gained increased 
access to EU affairs, including the 
CFSP...  
+ 
Public control 
  7 
… But only few of them have a role 
in their country's participation in EU 
Missions. 
- 
Political equality 
Public debate 8 
The media are free to cover the 
CFSPS, no formal constraints exist 
that would hinder it being spoken 
about by the media… 
+ 
Public control, 
Political equality 
 8 
… Yet, general media scarcely does 
so. - 
Public control 
 8 
There exists a specialised Europress 
that does cover extensively EU 
politics, including the CFSP 
+ 
Public control 
 9 
The EU’s key foreign policy 
institutions of HR and EEAS are 
actively communicating, for instance 
through social media…  
+ 
Public control 
 9 
… Yet, popular consultation of the 
information thus provided is limited - 
Public control 
Transparency 10 
Detailed transparency rules exist, and 
also apply to the CFSP. + 
Public control 
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  10 
Extensive documents registers 
exist… + 
Public control/ 
Political equality 
  10 
… But, difficult in use for non-
specialists. - 
Political equality 
  11 
In practice, access is limited without 
clear rules or reasons. - 
Public control 
  
10, 11, 
12, 13 
Great differences between the 
institutions in how they deal with 
transparency. 
- 
Public control 
  12 
The rules in place are mainly 
executively decided without much 
involvement from the European 
Parliament (or, for that matter, 
national parliaments). 
- 
Public control 
  13 
Within the EP, a procedure 
concerning its access to sensitive 
information indeed exist (Special 
Committee), but this does not seem 
to lead to actual access. 
+, - 
Public control 
Reason giving 14 
Clear rules exist about the need for 
giving reasons. + 
Public control 
  14 
In general, reasons indeed are given 
and made public. + 
Public control, 
Political equality 
  14 
Public reasons are mainly of very 
general order. - 
Public control 
  15 
So far, the EP did not use its right to 
ask for more detailed reasons. - 
Public control 
Oversight 16 
The EP has many instruments at its 
disposal… + 
Public control 
  16 
… And uses them. 
+ 
Public control 
  16 
Oversight by national parliaments is 
limited and differs between Member 
States.  
- 
Public control, 
Political equality 
  16 
There is little cooperation between 
national parliaments. - 
Public control, 
Political equality 
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  17 
Media, and many academic and 
research organizations as well as 
CSOs exist that in some way oversee 
the CFSP… 
+ 
Public control 
  18 
… Yet it can be wondered if their 
alarm would be heard… - 
Public control 
  19 
… And, their use as input providers 
to the EP seems limited. - 
Public control 
Overrule 20 
Possibilities for overrule are limited. 
- 
Public control 
In the empirical chapters, the criteria were essentially looked at separately. As explained, I 
choose to proceed in that way because it is convenient for analytical purposes (cf. Chapter III, 
3). However, looked at individually, each of them tells us but a limited part of the story. While, 
these successive findings certainly are interesting, the numerous interconnections that emerged 
between the different empirical chapters and linked them together clearly showed how in 
practice they of course do not stand on their own. The systematic cross-references I introduced 
between the chapters made that tangibly clear. 
It is only when looked at together that the empirical findings gain their full meaning and can 
help us understand the overall normative democratic legitimacy of the EU’s foreign security 
policy. It is when looked at together that the evaluations that have been carried out present a 
comprehensive view about if and how the organisation and development of the post-Lisbon 
European foreign policy respects and gives effect to the key democratic principles.  
Looking at the totality of the findings summarized in Table 16, this first of all confirms Lord’s 
(2004, 221) warning against “sweeping generalizations for or against the existence of a 
democratic deficit”. The empirical assessments clearly reveal how negative and positive 
elements exist side by side. They confirm or compensate each other and together make for a 
normative democratic legitimacy that is not black or white. Yet, the findings also confirm how, 
in practice, democracy indeed takes form through interconnected and complementary 
dimensions and is difficult to grasp comprehensively when only looking at single dimensions. 
In that sense, we see ourselves repeatedly confronted with direct overlaps as well as indirect 
influences between the empirical assessments of the different criteria. 
Direct overlaps, for instance, are the case for Participation and Overrule, Budget and Oversight, 
or Transparency and again Oversight. As these pairs of criteria share common basic rules and 
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organizational set-ups, or relate to the same institutions and actions, multiple cross-overs 
emerged between their discussions. Hence, for instance, lacking overrule powers in fact results 
from limited opportunities for participation all together; and possible problems with oversight 
cannot be seen independent from how rules for transparency and secrecy are established. In a 
similar way, the limited participation of the civil society that we observed under Participation, 
goes hand in hand with the narrow public interest we noticed under Public debate. In both cases 
we saw how, the point is not so much that the people do not have the possibility to inform 
themselves, but rather that they actually do not seem much interested in doing so. 
More indirect influence, on the other hand, did not only exist between the two throughput 
criteria of Transparency and Reason-giving, but also occurred between Licensing to govern and 
Oversight or Budget. After all, the MEP’s numerous questions to the High Representative or 
the presence of this HR during the Parliament’s plenary debates on the CFSP cannot be seen 
separately from how the European Parliament assured itself a role in the HR’s nomination 
procedure. The same goes for the Parliament’s involvement in the EEAS’ set-up: this not only 
assured the Parliament’s grip over the institution as such, but also gave it an additional foot in 
the door with regard to the CFSP budget. Furthermore, a link can also be made out between 
popular participation and parliamentary oversight. Given the altogether limited interest and 
involvement of civil society organisations in the EU’s foreign security and defence policy, this 
obviously could explain the limited use that at least the EP seem to make of information 
provided for by those CSO’s.  
2. Three transversal trends 
Except for overlaps and influences between different elements and observations, we can also 
observe recurring trends running along the criteria that bind the findings together at a more 
fundamental level. When looking at the totality of observations, they not only seem 
interconnected or mutually influencing but also point to the existence of some common threads. 
Beyond the many different observations, these general tendencies offer an explanation about 
why the EU’s common foreign security and defence policy responds to the basic requirement 
of public control with political equality the way it does. Based on the previous empirical 
assessment, I argue for the existence of three such trends. First, there is the impact of an 
unsolved intergovernmental-supranational divide within the CFSP. Secondly, we can see a 
structural discrepancy between rules and practice. And, finally, European foreign policy is 
characterised by a parliamentary configuration in which an activist European Parliament 
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almost frantically searches for the limits of its own role and power, while national parliaments 
repeatedly struggle with finding theirs. As defining vectors of the EU’s foreign policy’s 
organisation and working, and while offering a common explanation for many of the individual 
observations, each of these trends has a considerable impact on this policy’s normative 
democratic legitimacy. All three trends are mutually interconnected; but, at the same time they 
are also individually relevant. From the point of view of the overall evaluation, reflexions about 
these trends, however, come in addition to the previous empirical observations, they do not 
replace them. To grasp the normative democratic legitimacy of the EU’s foreign policy in an 
overall way and to find solutions to possible problems (cf. infra), the collection of individual 
findings keeps its full relevance; yet the transversal trends add an additional layer of 
understanding. 
2.1  Intergovernmental vs supranational 
Put forward as an important characteristic of the CFSP’s current configuration (cf. Introduction, 
Chapter IV), the presence of both intergovernmental and supranational trends within the 
development of this policy has come up repeatedly throughout the empirical discussions. As 
such, the audit of course does not pretend to tell something new, but only confirms what has 
already been recognized before about this policy. Yet, while previous research has indeed 
discussed the dichotomy between Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in European 
foreign policy (cf. Radtke 2012; Thym 2011; Tonra and Christiansen 2004; Øhrgaard 1997), 
the democratic implications this involves have hardly been looked at. The audit changes this.  
In Chapter IV, I explained how the question is not one in favour or against either 
Supranationalism or Intergovernmentalism, but one about the democratic quality of the actual 
structures and procedures in place. It is in this context of actual structures and procedures that 
the audit recurrently came up against democratic problems caused by the complicated merger 
between both approaches within the EU’s foreign security and defence policy. Throughout the 
audit, it has been revealed how the complex intermingling of intergovernmental and 
supranational tendencies within the EU’s foreign policy-making indeed impacts on this policy’s 
democratic quality. Recurrently, the assessments have shown how the multilevel governance 
system is not just an organisational feature of the CFSP, but how it plays an important role in 
the way in which this policy responds to the demand for public control with political equality.  
Already during the policy’s input phase, we saw how the complicated cohabitation between 
both modes of operation impacts on the policy’s development and operation. First of all, there 
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was the nomination of the High Representative. By integrating the High Representative into the 
Commission, the Lisbon Treaty has contributed to a supranationalisation of this actor’s role and 
character; but supranational control over this nomination has not evolved accordingly. In 
practice, the European Parliament (still) has little to say over this nomination. Compared to the 
nomination of other Commissioners, the EP’s factual possibilities of control over his/her 
nomination are more limited. In that way, the only institution that really matters in the 
appointment of the HR is the European Council. However, because this appointment by the 
European Council is a matter of qualified majority and not of unanimity, as discussed, national 
governments somewhat lose their equal control over this appointment. Although formally 
resulting from an intergovernmental bargain, in practice, the nomination of the HR already at 
its starting point may escape the control of (some) individual Member States. 
Linked with the appointment of the HR, the institutional set-up of the CFSP offers another 
example of how today’s EU foreign policy incorporates an intricate mixture of 
intergovernmental and supranational tendencies. With the involvement of the PSC and Coreper 
(and their preparatory structures), intergovernmental bodies continue to hold a strong position 
in the daily CFSP policy-making. But, on the other hand – taking into account the creation of 
the EEAS as an autonomous EU body, the EP’s notable involvement in the service’s set-up, 
and the EEAS’ financing through the normal EU budget – a supranational dimension has 
become undeniable. Added to this is the fact that the previously mentioned, formally 
intergovernmental PSC, shows a considerable supranational character. Due to both its far-
reaching competencies and the fact that it is chaired by an EEAS official, it is difficult to classify 
this body as just a preparatory diplomatic meeting place. 
Another situation where a tendency towards supranationalism contrasts with the CFSP’s 
intergovernmental baseline, is the policy’s budget. While financing EU military missions may 
still be largely a Member State affair; the budget of the EU’s foreign service, the EEAS, is, as 
mentioned above, fully integrated in the EU’s normal budget and subject to control and 
approval by the European parliament. Thus, the EEAS budget partially escapes Member State 
control, or at least these Member States have to accept that a supranational body too has an 
important say over it.  
Questions about intergovernmental and supranational attitudes also played a role at other 
occasions. When dealing for instance with transparency, we saw how the most 
intergovernmental CFSP actor, the European Council, is the most reluctant about transparency 
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rules. In line with the intergovernmental tradition, the EC sees itself essentially as forum for 
Member States to find compromise, and therefore as an actor exempt from general transparency 
rules existing at the EU level. However, as it is through said compromises that the EC defines 
the basic principles and guidelines of a common foreign security and defence policy that has 
developed beyond being a mere multilateral cooperation, this claim is somewhat problematic. 
Furthermore, as has been discussed under Budget, Participation and Overrule, also the launch 
of EU military or civilian missions incorporates ambiguity along this line. At the origin of such 
missions lies a decision by the Council of the EU. Despite the formal rule of unanimity, we saw 
how Member States can abstain without blocking the decision. As explained, this means that in 
the absence of actual unanimity, a decision about the launch of EU mission still can be taken 
and this decision commits the Union all together and not just the contributing Member States. 
Also with regard to the subsequent development and execution of these missions, it is clear that 
this is not just a mere matter of purely intergovernmental cooperation. Although, as reminded 
here above, missions are formally financed outside the EU Budget, in practice it cannot be 
denied that the EEAS is closely involved. Being a Brussel’s institution payed out of the regular 
EU budget, this EEAS involvement thus further supranationalises these missions.  
This last example goes to the heart of the CFSP’s supranational-intergovernmental democratic 
problem. It is true that formally speaking the EU’s foreign security policy “shall be defined 
and implemented by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously” (art. 24.1 
TEU, cf. Chapter IV, 3.2). In that sense, democratic legitimacy seems intergovernmentally 
assured... However, in practice things are not so straightforward. Because, what does it actually 
mean, when the Treaty says ‘unanimously’? After all, unanimity can be understood both as 
‘unanimous voting’ or ‘unanimous consent’. Unanimous voting recognizes the need for every 
participant of the group that bears the responsibility of taking a decision (in case the – European 
– Council) to explicitly express their position in favour of that decision. However, in case 
unanimity is merely seen as consent, it is understood in weaker terms: not as the explicitly 
expressed agreement between all members of a group, but as the absence of explicitly expressed 
opposition. While the Treaty omits to state precisely which kind of unanimity it refers to when 
it declares that the (European) Council acts/ decides/ or adopts ‘unanimously’271, the reality of 
                                                 
271 Also the (European) Council’s webpage about the different voting systems applying to its work 
(cf. consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/voting-system/unanimity/) is not without ambiguity in 
this regard. On the one hand, it says that “unanimity requires everyone to agree or abstain [my 
emphasis] from voting”, thus apparently considering unanimity rather as consent. Yet, on the 
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the CFSP matches ‘consent’ rather than ‘voting’. Given the possibility for abstention and the 
fact that such “abstention does not prevent a decision from being taken”272 (except “if the 
members of the Council qualifying their abstention in this way represent at least one third of 
the Member States comprising at least one third of the population of the Union” – art.31.1 
TEU), this form of unanimity in practice gives room for action even if not all Member-States 
are fully convinced by (the need or form) of such action.  
Under this weak unanimity, “the rules [that] are designed for the protection of the minority 
and generally need not be strictly enforced” are considered not necessary because “there is no 
minority to protect” (cf. Robert 2011, 105). Yet, considering the need of unanimity to assure 
equality between States with considerably uneven resources and powers (cf. Chapter IV, 3.1), 
the non-necessity of explicit approval and so the abandoning of individual veto-power 
undermines the intergovernmental argument of public control through national governments, 
each assuring on an equal footing the representation of their own people. Although governments 
are still key decision-makers, their common decisions no longer are the mere result of the equal 
recognition of each of their individual decisions. Instead, their decisions are collective 
endeavours. Even when they do not agree (while at the same time they hold back from explicitly 
disagreeing), as was pointed out under Oversight, in practice individual States have to abide by 
these decisions, or at least are clearly bound by them (cf. Cooper et al. 2008, 506). With 
reference to Heywood’s (2002, 148) previously mentioned definition of supranationalism as a 
situation in which there exists an authority that is higher than that of a State; a context of 
international cooperation in which a State can be compelled by a common policy, rule or action 
it did not agree with itself, could be arguably categorized as such. In fact, the EU’s foreign 
policy finds itself confronted with a kind of ‘hidden’, latent supranationalism, the existence of 
which is often overlooked. While the EU’s foreign policy is indeed a domain in which 
intergovernmental institutions predominate, the actual working of these institutions seems not 
always to be so intergovernmental after all. By allowing members to abstain or by voting with 
qualified majority, the (European) Council somehow represents an independent position, and 
not simply the common position of the MS (cf. Dingwerth et al. 2011, 86). While we may 
indeed not be in a situation of delegated sovereignty in which supranational institutions take 
autonomous decisions (Hurrell 2007, 93), there is a pooled sovereignty in which individual 
                                                 
other hand it states that “the Council has to vote unanimously”, therefore suggesting that when 
there is talk of ‘unanimity’, this means the more stringent form of absolute unanimity between all 
members.    
272 consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/voting-system/unanimity/ [01.06.18] 
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governments give up full control (cf. Moravcsik 1998, 67). As already pointed out under 
Licensing, with regard to QMV the situation here is different from, for instance, the use of 
QMV by the EU Council within the ordinary legislative procedure. As explained, in that case, 
QMV is part of an elaborated decision-making procedure also involving the European 
Parliament.  
Considering all the above, it becomes clear that the problem is not so much that both 
intergovernmental and supranational procedures and actors are present within one policy, but 
that it is not always evident which procedure is followed or what the actual role of a given actor 
really implies. This creates uncertainty. The presence of a triple executive composed of the 
European Council, the Council of the EU and the High Representative/ EEAS – two of which 
are formally intergovernmental, but less so in practice, and one which is supranational – and 
the two-level parliamentary field; with each of these actors advocating different attitudes with 
regard to where the locus of CFSP decision-making and control lies, leaves us, as we saw, with 
a policy that combines the intergovernmental and supranational idea rather inconveniently. 
More concretely, under its current form, the not-being-intergovernmental-yet-not-being-
supranational-neither status of the CFSP creates gaps in relation to public control. For instance, 
the budget situation in which EU missions are financed outside the EU budget but in reality – 
be it indirectly, through the involvement of the EEAS – also make use of EU funds; or the fact 
that the Council launches such missions, but that the Council in practice does not need 
unanimity to do so, creates ambiguity with regard to where and how to assure public control. 
As has been pointed out repeatedly throughout the empirical assessments, and further discussed 
here: in the context of the CFSP, national governments do not so much act as representatives 
of their respective countries but rather as a kind of European executive. Therefore, their control 
at the national level is hampered. But so far this seems not to have been compensated by a more 
supranationalised public control. If we return for instance to the last example of EU military or 
civilian missions, we see how in reality public control over the launch and development of such 
missions continues to be limited at the European level. As explained under Oversight, the 
European Parliament indeed may – and does – send delegations to mission headquarters and 
on-the-ground operations, and uses the information obtained in that way in questions and 
debate. But despite the interesting – and probably promising – evolution this incorporates; we 
should be aware not to overestimate its importance. The same goes for the Interparliamentary 
Conference for the CFSP. While it indeed could help national parliaments to increase their 
common grip, so far it does not seem up to the task. 
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To summarize, as both traditions depart from a fundamentally different view about where 
public control should be organised, their unsettled combination within one policy has created 
an exceedingly complicated decision-making structure, in which the roles of the different actors 
and institutions and how they relate to each other is unclear. Interaction between actors at 
national and European level indeed is a recurring feature of EU politics in general and the 
interrelation between both approaches runs along the whole European integration process 
(Schout and Wolff 2010). Yet, at least in the context of the EU’s foreign security and defence 
policy their unsettled combination impacts on this policy’s inherent democratic quality. 
2.2 Rules vs practice 
The unresolved mixture of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism alone does not explain 
all the findings about democratic strengths and weaknesses that came out of the empirical 
assessment. Another trend running through the CFSP’s development and conduct can be 
distinguished, namely the presence of a generalised ambiguity between rules and practices. 
Although this trend follows partially from the previous one, it is not completely defined by it. 
While certain situations of disagreement between rules and practice indeed can be explained by 
what has been said previously about the complicated and unclear relationship between 
intergovernmental and supranational tendencies and methods, many others stand on their one. 
That is, at multiple occasions we saw a discrepancy between rules and practice in the EU’s 
foreign policy that does not just follow from the intergovernmental-supranational problem. 
Considering the totality of findings and observations, it is difficult to ignore the numerous rules 
that guide the EU’s foreign policy and how many amongst them relate to aspects of democracy. 
But, there are the official rules and norms… and there is the daily practice. When discussing 
the data that would substantiate the empirical assessment (Chapter V), I referred to the 
difference between democratic hardware and democratic software. This distinction – and 
especially the gap that exists between both these dimensions – forms a second transversal trend, 
determining the CFSP’s overall normative democratic legitimacy. Although such a gap between 
rules and daily practice is in no way unique for the EU’s foreign security policy, and somehow 
inherent to every policy – be it European, national or other – it certainly seems outspoken here. 
Where it concerns the formal organisation of the CFSP, we saw for instance how a set of clear 
rules is available with regard to transparency and secrecy; or concerning the publication of 
reasons. The same goes for the oversight dimension, where the European parliament has at its 
disposal no less than five instruments; each of which is formally backed by the Treaty 
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(parliamentary questions, debate), by an official declaration of the HR (Joint Consultation 
Meetings), by the Parliament’s internal rules (delegations) or by an Interinstitutional Agreement 
(Special Committee). However, in each of these cases we have seen how reality can be quite 
different from the formal norms. 
In chapter IV, I argued for the presence of clear legal rules as a necessary overarching principle 
to the actual democratic criteria, needed to assure their durability over time. At multiple 
occasions during the empirical assessment – and as briefly summarized here above – we saw 
the existence of such rules. Probably more than one would expect, the CFSP’s democratic 
dimension seems ruled by Treaty- and other legal provisions. Yet, the existence of these formal 
rules, meant to give democratic body to the CFSP, does not seem to guarantee that they are 
actually lived up to or used. In reference to the indicators that were put forward for this 
additional criterion, there is first of all a legal reason for this. Bearing in mind that the Court of 
Justice of the European Union has no jurisdiction over this policy (art. 24.1§2 TEU, art.275 
TFEU), there is a practical impossibility to denounce the non-respect of the rules. As we saw 
in the discussion about overrule (Chapter XIII), a certain legal control can occur when the CFSP 
relies on an instrument that is not formally hers – in casu an international agreement with a 
third country, Mauritius – though in general, it is difficult for the people or their parliamentary 
representatives (be it European or national) to legally challenge CFSP procedures and decisions. 
Even in the exceptional case of sanctions, where, as pointed out in Chapter XI, the CJEU does 
have jurisdiction, only those natural or legal persons who are directly concerned by the sanction 
can denounce it. So, for instance the EP could not do so when the right of information it 
possesses in these matters is not respected.  
However, although this legal reason certainly explains some of the notable discrepancies 
between rules and practice, it is not the only explanation. A second reason, less formal but not 
less relevant, adds to it. In light of the consecutive changes in the way that the CFSP has been 
run since its start under Maastricht, and the relative newness of its current, post-Lisbon form, 
those involved seem still in a learning process; i.e. they seem still in the process of getting 
acquainted with their actual role or to struggle with the opportunities and obligations involved 
for them. Examples of this we can find under Oversight. In this context, we saw for instance 
how the creation of a Special Committee in agreement with the HR acknowledged and 
formalized the Parliament’s access to sensitive documents. As has been discussed at that 
occasion; according to the rules applying to this Committee, it may request information on 
developments in European security and defence policy, including sensitive information. 
 226 
However, we saw how in practice, the Committee meets much less than was initially planned, 
and considering the totality of sensitive documents it has consulted only a limited number of 
them. Also with regard to questions, it can be wondered if the European Parliament (can) fully 
use(s) this instrument’s potential as a means of oversight. Given the generally considerable time 
interval between questions and their answers, the practical effectiveness of this instrument – 
which can formally be used by the EP to oversee, amongst others, the CFSP’s direction and 
actions – at least seems hindered. So far, the EP seems not to have found a way to bring the 
Council and the High Representative to formulate answers more promptly. 
Other examples of the rules vs practice divide we saw under Transparency or Reason-giving. 
Where both the discussion about Transparency and Reason-giving revealed the existence of a 
quite elaborated body of norms, they also exposed reservations with regard to how these norms 
are actually implemented. In case of Transparency this was exemplified by the limited 
operationally of the EEAS register (both in time and scope) and the European Council’s 
apparent reluctance to abide by the rules. Also, where a document register exists, its concrete 
format hinders actual access to documents by non-specialists. With regard to reason-giving, we 
could summarize the situation as “willing but minimalistic”. That is, reasons are indeed 
communicated – in case of military and civilian missions even without a formal necessity to do 
so; but then again, this could be seen as a straddle between rules and practice, be it in the other 
sense. But, this is mainly done in such a restrictive, formalistic way, that their actual relevance 
can at least be doubted.  
Furthermore, a gap between the formal and the actual has also come up in relation to Public 
debate or Participation. In these cases, however, the problem is not about a minimalistic 
interpretation of existing rules by an actor involved in the CFSP; but about society showing 
limited interest in an active involvement, or limited capacity to make use of the opportunities 
for control that are offered to them. But all the same, fact is that potential and reality are not on 
the same line. The democratic hardware would allow, for instance, a more elaborated public 
debate and does not obstruct the possibility of this policy’s coverage by the media or its follow-
up by citizens on different social media platforms. But, the democratic software – being in this 
case the actual existence of such coverage – proved to be limited. The same goes for the 
involvement of Civil Society organisations or – as reflected upon at the end of Oversight – 
individual citizens. Even though they could become more involved; so far, they seem not 
particularly motivated to do so. 
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From a strictly formalistic point of view the argument could be made that these recurring 
discrepancies between rules and their actual application or use are not so important and we 
should not read too much in it... After all, as I said at the start of this discussion, numerous rules 
– more than we probably would expect – do exist. Besides, looking at the discrepancies 
described here, it also seems true that in many cases, the problem is not so much one of a 
conscious disrespect of existing rules, but rather one of not using them to their full potential. 
Thus, it could be suggested that while it is of course a pity that they are not always made full 
use of, the rules are there and so, altogether, things are ok. However, I belief such an 
appreciation of the facts would not do justice to the approach I took with regard to democratic 
legitimacy. As I argued in Chapter I, to really understand normative democratic legitimacy, the 
point is not only to look at if formal democratic attributes are present or not, but also at how 
these attributes interact with reality. As we saw repeatedly throughout the empirical 
assessments, simply the formal existence of rules and procedures does not automatically 
contribute to actual democracy – i.e. actual public control with political equality. Given the 
multiple situations where rules exist without for that matter being much used or lived up to, it 
is exactly in this interaction with reality that the existing rules seem to lose some of their 
democratic strength… Therefore, it indeed is relevant to look beyond the sole existence of these 
rules as such. 
On the one hand, the overall set of rules and norms indeed involves recognition of democratic 
quality as a guiding principle for the CFSP. Being a policy of which it is hoped that it could 
provide a remedy against the legitimacy shortcomings often attributed to the EU, and that has 
been created to consolidate and support democracy (Part II, introduction), the existence of 
multiple rules that relate to (aspects of) its own democratic organization therefore is reassuring 
and can serve as valuable starting point for an actually democratic CFSP. The rules incorporate 
a potential for a comprehensive public control. In that sense, their presence is certainly not 
irrelevant. But, on the other hand, the fact that non-compliance with these rules cannot be 
legally denounced, as well as the recurring discrepancy between said rules and the actual 
implementation, weakens their on-the-field pertinence. After all, if rules exist, but their actual 
application variates among situations; that is, if their implementation depends strongly on the 
actors that are supposed to apply these rules, or to abide by them, they risk becoming 
meaningless. Just like the lacking clarity about where, how and when intergovernmentalism or 
supranationalism are in play, the main problem of this situation for the CFSP’s democratic 
legitimacy lies with the uncertainty this brings with it. It follows from this uncertainty that it 
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becomes difficult to know if the public control that the rules are meant to assure really takes 
place, and if they indeed help to make such public control to be politically equal. 
2.3 European parliament activism vs. national parliaments’ struggle 
The definition of democracy as public control with political equality shows independence 
towards actual political institutions and practices (cf. Chapter IV, 2.2) and has been evaluated 
accordingly within the context of this thesis. Yet, in retrospect, the preponderant position that 
the representative, parliamentary channel of democracy has taken throughout this evaluation, 
of course cannot be denied. In the successive assessments of different criteria and individual 
indicators, the representative channel repeatedly came up as a key way through which public 
control with political equality is (tried to be) realized in relation to European foreign policy. 
When we think about it, this of course should not be really surprising, as it lies actually in line 
with the EU’s own constitutional affirmation that “the functioning of the Union shall be 
founded on representative democracy” (art.10.1 TEU). In that sense, it is important to note that 
the connection between democracy and parliamentarism that comes forward from this thesis, 
does not so much concern a personal preference of the author or an assumption about any 
inherent qualities of representative forms of democracy, yet essentially emerges from the 
comprehensive assessment as such. Neither do I presuppose democracy to equal representative 
democracy just like that, nor are the criteria and indicators especially focussed in that direction 
(cf. Chapter IV, 5). However, when we look at how public control with political equality is 
organized in the case of European foreign security and defence policy, the European Parliament 
and the national parliaments indeed come forward as important channels. And, they do so more 
than other, more direct means such as referenda or active public debate and civil society 
participation. This being said, it is within this parliamentary setting that a third transversal trend 
running along the findings is situated. More concretely, it concerns the complicated interplay 
between the European parliament and national parliaments that exists with regard to how they 
(together) deal with/ act upon matters of CFSP. 
Just as rules vs practice, this last trend is linked with, and influenced by the first one of 
Intergovernmentalism vs Supranationalism, but it also stands apart. That is to say, in itself it 
plays throughout the organisation of the EU’s foreign and security policy and has an impact on 
this policy’s democratic organisation. 
At multiple occasions, we noticed an eagerness on behalf of the European Parliament to take 
up a central role in the CFSP, if not in its daily conduct, then at least regarding the policy’s 
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general direction and structure. The EP seems to search almost systematically for the 
boundaries of its formal powers and how it could expand these. Independently from these actual 
formal powers, the Parliament shows eagerness to define and scrutinize European foreign 
policy. This starts already at the licensing phase, where the EP sought to improve its grip over 
the appointment of the High Representative or key EEAS officials (with mitigated results), and, 
successfully, influenced the creation of the EEAS. Yet also at other occasions, the EP’s 
willingness to be an actor of relevance revealed to be outspoken. This is not only the case in 
matters of budget – where we saw the Parliament’s assertiveness confirmed by the grip it took 
over the EEAS budget – but also at the final stage of overview – in which case the Parliament’s 
enthusiasm seems to have little limits where it concerns written questions – or overrule. At the 
same time, however, at multiple occasions the EP’s seems somewhat too big for its boots and 
has to accept its altogether limited role. Not only – as has been reminded under the foregoing 
discussion of intergovernmentalism vs. supranationalism – has this been the case with regard 
to the previously mentioned appointment of the HR or that of other EEAS officials, but also 
where it concerns the Parliament’s active participation in the policy. Yet, taking everything into 
account, it can be concluded that although the European Parliament of course finds itself 
hindered by the realities of daily foreign policy, it has somehow succeeded in obtaining itself a 
position in CFSP to be reckoned with, and in doing so has incontrovertibly surpassed the role 
that is formally set aside for it. With reference to Born & Hängi’s (2005, 3‑12) distinction 
between authority, ability and attitude we can say that what the Parliament lacks with regard to 
the first two, it certainly compensates by the later.  
In contrast with this, we find the national parliaments struggling with finding their right place. 
The problem is not so much about national parliaments being altogether uninterested in the 
CFSP (data found in that regard rather seemed to indicate the opposite); but that even if they 
keep a strong stance at their national level – for instance by controlling (to various degrees) 
their national appointments to CFSP organs, as is the case in Hungary, Germany, Latvia or 
Poland – the leverage this gives them at the European level is limited. Exemplified by EU 
military missions, we essentially see how the decisions of individual national parliaments have 
little impact on the final course of action, in casu the actual launch of such missions. Although 
a mechanism for parliamentary cooperation has been established in the form of the 
Interparliamentary Conference on CFSP and with the aim of increasing the common role of 
national parliaments, so far this does not work as it should. 
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What is now the relevance of all this for the CFSP’s normative democratic legitimacy? 
When looking solely at the European Parliament, one could come to conclude that things are 
not perfect but go into the right direction. The EP’s attitude in matters of foreign policy confirms 
observations about the institution’s growing role in EU politics (see i.a. Hix and Høyland 2013; 
Judge and Earnshaw 2008; Steunenberg and Thomassen 2002), which – given the Parliament’s 
status as the EU’s only institution that is directly elected – could be seen as an improvement in 
democratic quality. Given that the European Parliament represents the whole body of EU 
citizens, it increasing assertiveness in matters of foreign security and defence thus could be said 
to reinforce both public control and political equality in this field. This position is defended by 
the European Parliament itself, which not only declares to play an essential role in ensuring the 
legitimacy of the Union273, but also repeatedly “calls for parliamentary oversight of EU 
external action to be strengthened”274, while pointing out “that the role conferred on the 
European Parliament as the body directly representing EU citizens makes [it] a vital source of 
democratic legitimacy for the CFSP/CSDP”275. On the other hand, not everyone agrees with 
the Parliament’s own positive image about its underlying democratic quality (for a summary of 
key arguments in this regard, cf. Kröger & Friedrich 2013, 177‑79). From such a more critical 
point of view, the Parliament’s activism then could be perceived differently as rather 
problematic. Due to the Parliament’s overall democratic shortcomings, it could be argued that 
its enthusiastic involvement does not actually reinforce democratic control, even to the 
contrary. 
Besides, also a focus on national parliaments would tell a different story. The problems these 
parliaments have with assuring themselves an actual role in the EU’s common foreign security 
and defence policy hinders public control. And, what is more, as argued under Budget (Chapter 
                                                 
273 European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017 on improving the functioning of the 
European Union building on the potential of the Lisbon Treaty (2014/2249(INI)), art. 8, 9. 
europarl.europa.eu /sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-2017-0049+0+ 
DOC+PDF+V0//EN [28.07.17] 
274 ibid. art.100. Also: European Parliament resolution of 7 May 2009 on Parliament's new role and 
responsibilities in implementing the Treaty of Lisbon (2008/2063(INI)), art.14 europarl.europa.eu 
/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P6-TA-2009-373 [28.07.17] 
275 European Parliament resolution of 11 May 2011 on the development of the common security and 
defence policy following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (2010/2299(INI)), art.12 
europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2011-228 
[28.07.17] 
 231 
VII), the stronger competencies of some national parliaments’ do not make up for this; as this 
essentially creates inequality amongst them, and therefore amongst the citizens they represent.  
But of course, in reality, these accounts do not stand alone. Returning to the previous discussion 
about the multilevel intermixture of supranational and intergovernmental methods within the 
development of the EU’s foreign policy, it becomes obvious that both these parliamentary 
levels have to be taken into account when evaluating this policy; not just individually, but 
together. Said otherwise, the European Parliament and the national parliaments both play a role 
in the CFSP – not just separately, but as part of an overall parliamentary system. Although, the 
existence of such a ‘multilevel parliamentary field’ (Crum and Fossum 2009) is not limited to 
the CFSP, it is of a particular nature here. Given this policy’s development, at least partially 
initiated outside the formal structures of European integration and resulting from ad hoc 
decisions by national governments, and the fact that it has only recently become increasingly 
Europeanized (cf. Introduction), it is especially true in this field that “no natural division of 
labour [exists] between the two channels” (ibid., 250). This situation presents both an 
opportunity and a challenge to the CFSP’s democratic legitimacy. On the one hand, in a setting 
where parliamentary roles and competencies are not completely clear-cut, each channel 
supposedly could more easily compensate for shortcomings of the other. From this perspective, 
the EP’s assertiveness should not just be looked at in light of the institution’s own position but 
has to be appreciated both in connection with the CFSP’s latent supranationalism and the 
national parliament’s difficulties with asserting their (common) place in the CFSP. To the 
extent that the activism of the European Parliament concerns aspects of the CFSP that escape 
the limited competencies of national parliaments, its growing involvement in this policy could 
compensate the hampered public control by national parliaments and even remedy the political 
inequality that follows from their unequal powers. Notwithstanding compensation by the EP is 
not complete – as demonstrated for instance by the case of EU military missions – the flexibility 
that is implied in the absence of a natural division of labour hence could have positive effects 
for the policy’s overall public control with political equality. On the other hand, the unclear 
definition of the parliaments’ role also creates uncertainty and causes friction amongst these 
parliaments, leading to gaps in parliamentary coverage of the CFSP. This has been most clearly 
observed in the context of the Interparliamentary Conference on CFSP (Chapter XII). In that 
case national parliaments not only proved reluctant towards a reinforced involvement of the 
European Parliament, but also towards each other. As the parliaments do not clearly know 
where each of them stands and what their respective competencies are, they seem not eager to 
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give up their own (limited) role in favour of a coordinated, common approach. In this context, 
the vigour of the European Parliament, rather than being an advantage, probably even could be 
a hindrance to the overall public control of the CFSP. That is, if the EP proceeds with respect 
for the positions and fears of national parliaments and expresses its ambitions clearly and in 
consideration with its national counterparts – and for that matter can convince them of its good 
intentions – this can be beneficial to their common grip over the EU’s foreign security policy. 
If not, the European Parliament’s activism could make national parliaments hesitant or even 
unwilling to cooperate too much with it, afraid that, in the end, this would just encourage the 
EP to become even more involved and lead to a situation where this European Parliament 
finishes by actually taking over the limited competences the national parliaments (still) have in 
this domain (cf. Liszczyk 2013, 2). 
3. An inclusive, not a singular appreciation 
The democratic audit carried out in this thesis looked at how satisfactory the EU responds to 
the basic requirements of democracy in the context of its common foreign security and defence 
policy, therefore providing this policy with moral arguments for calling itself democratic. In 
that sense, by looking at different criteria for democracy, the audit can offer an overall idea 
about this policy’s normative democratic legitimacy. But, as pointed out, while going beyond 
a one-on-one discussion of these criteria, aggregating the different assessments into an overall 
appreciation is not about a simple sum but concerns a balanced understanding of how the 
different criteria, and the way they have been lived up to, relate to each other. Similar to what 
I said about a quantifying exercise that exists in translating qualitative findings into numerical 
values (cf. Chapter III, 1), a qualitative aggregation should guard itself from making invisible 
the numerous findings and observations by replacing it with one single, final judgement. Said 
otherwise, while it should be recognized that the audit can offer us an inclusive idea about the 
policy’s normative democratic legitimacy, it does – and should not – result in one final, singular 
conclusion. Where the audit has grasped the CFSP’s democratic state of affairs in a 
comprehensive way, by taking into account different dimensions of democracy; it has not done 
so just to reach a univocal yes or no verdict. The relevance of the assessment lies precisely with 
the fact that it recognizes democracy as the combination of different elements. Rather than 
building up to one single judgement about the presence of public control with political equality, 
the audit revealed the various, interconnecting ways through which the CFSP gave content to 
these requirements, where it did so successfully or where, otherwise, it failed or neglected to 
do so. In that sense – as has been systematically resumed in the conclusion of each empirical 
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chapter, and also came forward throughout the prior discussion of the three transversal trends 
– the focus of the assessment was indeed on how the CFSP is normatively democratic, rather 
than just on if (cf. Chapter V). The inclusive appreciation resides in the association between the 
different findings, while uncovering their overlaps and distinguishing their common, 
underlying trends. 
It is the overall exposure of the CFSP’s actual strengths and weaknesses that follows from this, 
and the understanding of how they relate to each other, that makes the audit a good starting 
point for discussions about possible improvements of the CFSP’s normative democratic 
legitimacy.  
Furthermore, also in light of a more integrated understanding of the CFSP’s democratic 
legitimacy, the comprehensive approach and inclusive evaluation of its normative legitimacy 
present a more coherent point of departure. In the beginning of this thesis, I explained that an 
integrated evaluation of democratic legitimacy – i.e. an evaluation that takes into account both 
acceptability and acceptance and further factors influencing their interconnection – would need 
considerable information and knowledge about the actual facts of each dimension. The 
systematic and overall assessment of different dimensions of democracy offers such knowledge 
and information. By taking distance from the dispersed approach, characteristic for the current 
discussion about the normative democratic legitimacy of the CFSP it can serve as a structured 
starting point to understand why (not), and with regard to (the combination of) which 
dimensions of democracy, the people accept the CFSP as legitimate. 
4. From an audit of normative democratic legitimacy to guidelines for democratic 
improvement 
Democratic audits not only vary with regard to how they organize and carry out the actual 
assessment, but also with respect to the follow-up of their results. As discussed in the last part 
of the IDEA methodology (Beetham et al. 2008, 284–), democratic assessments can have 
different potential audiences as well as different short-term and long-term effects. In that 
manner, they can be mainly built for direct use by policy makers and include precise 
recommendations, they can raise public awareness and serve as the basis for public debate, or 
they can be meant to mobilize civil society organizations. Of course, they could also aim at 
cranking up academic research and serve as the basis for further study. Given the origins of this 
thesis as a response to perceived shortcomings in the existing academic literature and the 
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original use of the democratic audit method it therefore proposes, this last purpose obviously 
applies to it. Whereas this point will be dealt with in the following chapter, I propose to close 
the actual assessment by reflecting on how it connects with possible recommendations for 
democratic improvement of the EU’s foreign security and defence policy.  
The audit carried out in this thesis presents a snapshot about the democratic state of affairs of 
the EU’s foreign security and defence policy. With a focus on the CFSP as it emerged from the 
last institutional reforms introduced by the Lisbon Treaty (cf. Chapter III, 4), it looks at how 
this relatively new policy so far responds to the democratic requirements of public control with 
political equality. As summarized here above, this resulted in multiple observations about 
strengths and weaknesses and how they interconnect. Now, it can be wondered how the audit 
and the findings that result from it (can) contribute to the possible development of a democratic 
reform agenda. After all, at the beginning of this thesis, I stated that a fragmented approach 
hinders our ability to understand what has to be taken into account in order to overcome 
democratic weaknesses and to further reinforce democratic strengths, and that a comprehensive 
approach can help remedy this. While formulating concrete recommendations for improvement 
has not been the main goal of this thesis; it therefore at least deserves to be reflected upon how 
its holistic assessment of the EU’s foreign security and defence policy can be of importance for 
debate and can help the actual improvement of its normative democratic legitimacy. In what 
way could the results of the assessment help us reinforce the public control with political 
equality of the CFSP? 
As has been discussed previously in this chapter, the audit shows us how the CFSP’s democratic 
set-up exists of a complex intermingling of good practices and notable shortcomings, as well 
as how overlaps and cross-cutting trends bind together different criteria of democracy. I believe 
this complexity is a first point to keep in mind if one wishes to propose recommendations for 
democratic improvement of this policy. In line with the previous warning against too one-sided 
conclusions for or against the presence of a democratic deficit, we should also guard ourselves 
from proposing one-focussed solutions that ignore this complexity. If for the sake of simplicity 
or in an urge for rapid results, one would (decide to) ignore this complexity and make 
recommendations for the improvement of but one aspect of the CFSP’s institutional structure 
or decision-making system, while ignoring how in practice it is indissolubly linked with other 
elements, (s)he runs the risk of aggravating rather than improving the CFSP’s overall normative 
democratic legitimacy. As pointed out, for instance, the European Parliament’s enthusiasm, 
cannot be seen in disconnection from the national parliaments’ limited involvement. Hence, an 
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exclusive focus on a further reinforcement of the EP’s position would not per se be sanctifying. 
If such a reinforcement of the role of the European Parliament in European foreign security and 
defence policy is not linked with a more comprehensive reflection about the role and position 
of national parliaments too, it risks to complicate relations between both parliamentary levels 
even further.  
A further point of attention concerns the introduction of additional rules. We saw how many 
rules exist that relate to the CFSP’s democratic organisation, but also how, on the contrary, the 
actual implementation and use of these rules is lagging behind. With regard to the 
recommendation of possible democratic improvements, this should make us prudent about 
additional, more detailed rules. Rather than putting energy in a further expansion of the formal 
democratic framework, those who want to reinforce the normative democratic legitimacy of the 
EU’s foreign policy should probably first of all focus on how to make the current rules being 
more lived up to. Possibly, the existing framework of rules could be enough to assure public 
control with political equality if it were to be implemented more fully. In that sense, additional 
rules, though well meant, just risk to complicate even further an already complicated policy 
structure. When then in turn also not lived up to, this would only increase uncertainty and 
therefore hinder equal public control. Especially when actors are unwilling to abide by the rules 
that apply to them in the first place, or on the contrary, seem structurally uninterested or 
incapable of using the opportunities these rules offer them, one should be cautious about the 
introduction of additional rules as a solution to improve things. Looking for instance at the 
absence of a proper European Council document register and Access to documents reports (cf. 
Chapter X, 2); it could, for the time being, maybe prove easier to just adapt the common Council 
register in such a way that it enables to search for documents according to their originator – EU 
Council or European Council – rather than trying to push the EC to develop its own register. 
Where it concerns on the other hand the lack of interest or inability of the public – and in 
particular of individual citizens – to fully use the opportunities of control they are offered with 
regard to the EU’s foreign policy (cf. Chapter XII, 2), it can be wondered if this will be solved 
be simply giving this public even more opportunities. In that sense, for instance, just obliging 
the responsible EU institutions to render ever more CFSP related documents public, would not 
increase control when the actual consultation of these documents by the public remains limited. 
Fact is that such consultation is currently limited and most probably will continue to do so. 
While, of course, this should not bring us to conclude that we may neglect direct public control 
all together – as there is of course always the risk that a representative body does not live up to 
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its task and neglects the control function bestowed on it – it gives an argument in favour of the 
representative, parliamentary level as the principal channel of public control. At different 
occasions throughout the empirical assessments – especially in the discussions on Participation 
(Chapter VIII), Public debate (Chapter IX) and Oversight (Chapter XII) – we saw how society 
appears to have an altogether limited interest in European Foreign Policy. Following from this, 
direct public control can be considered to be limited, and this can be doubted to change soon. 
Therefore, ways to reinforced public control arguably should be searched for in the, 
representative, parliamentary realm. When doing so, the previous remarks about the connection 
between the European Parliament and national parliaments of course should be kept in mind. 
Linked with all this, is the fact that in the multilevel – and formally largely intergovernmental 
– policy field that is the CFSP, national governments play an important role. Notwithstanding 
that, at the European level, latent supranationalism may curtail their individual power, this 
should not be overlooked. Many decisions that concern the CFSP are, in first instance, taken in 
national capitals. If we take for instance the initial decision to develop a common security and 
defence policy (cf. Chapter VI, 2), or the launch of military and civilian missions, we indeed 
saw how we cannot fully grasp the way in which these come into being without considering the 
national level.  
This intermixture between both European and national levels presents an important challenge 
to the EU’s foreign policy’s overall democratic legitimacy. After all – as was pointed out under 
Budget – this means that the democratic quality of how things are done at the national level is 
important for the democratic quality of the EU’s foreign policy altogether. We saw for instance 
how national representatives in the PSC have gained autonomy towards their national 
principals, or how in many countries there is little parliamentary control over the decision to 
participate in international military missions, and how in some countries there is even little or 
no parliamentary debate about foreign security policy all together. In these cases, it is obvious 
that where it concerns the improvement of the CFSP’s democratic legitimacy, salvage cannot 
come from the European level alone. In fact, democratic flaws of the CFSP often seem situated 
at the national level, rather than at the European level. While it is true here that the EU-level 
cannot be incriminated for these shortcomings, they do have importance for the overall 
democratic legitimacy of the EU’s foreign policy. Notwithstanding, for instance, the national 
parliaments indeed are national, in case of their (absence of) control over what their government 
decides within the context of the CFSP, their role becomes European. And so too does the 
relevance of their strengths or shortcomings (cf. Chapter XII, 3). This means that although in 
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these cases the EU (meant here as the distinct political level; what we could commonly refer to 
as Brussels) cannot - and thus should not - be blamed for possible shortcomings; the EU (in the 
sense of the Union as an overall geopolitical entity) still bears the consequences. Once we 
cannot completely separate the two levels functionally, neither can we democratically. Similar 
to what I said about intergovernmentalism or supranationalism and their respective 
consequences for democratic organisation (cf. Chapter IV, 3.2), the question here is not about 
a value-judgement for or against either the European or the national level. As both are part of 
an overall policy-system, the question is just if this system creates a democratically legitimate 
policy. Therefore, we must assess where possible strengths and weaknesses are situated; and 
where and how they could be remedied. As it seems not likely that Member States will soon 
yield their competences in matters of foreign security and defence; they will, for the time being, 
continue to be important actors in the CFSP. And, as long as they do, the democratic legitimacy 
of their internal decision-making will play a role in the democratic legitimacy of the CFSP. 
Therefore, where democratic problems are actually located at the national level of individual 
Member States, solutions too will have to be searched for and implemented at the level of these 
individual Member States. It is true that the intricated mixture between different policy levels 
of course can complicate the task of those who want to better this policy’s democratic 
credentials. Yet, a first step is to recognize where possible problems are situated. In that sense 
it is important not to overlook the national level, but to take it into account too in the overall 
assessment of the CFSP’s democratic legitimacy. 
Finally, in the context of proposing recommendations, it is also important to comprehend the 
difference between the individual findings that came up from the empirical assessments and the 
transversal trends that have been pointed out, previously in this chapter. As argued when 
introducing these general trends, they do not replace the different observations as the final 
outcome of the assessment; but they present key common reasons that help us understand their 
existence. While, in that way, understanding these trends can give direction to the discussion; 
actual propositions for improvement will still have to deal with concrete aspects of the CFSP’s 
working. For instance, the opposition between intergovernmental and supranational attitudes, 
distinguished as a defining vector for the way the CFSP answers to the demand for public 
control with political equality, helps us understand certain problems in a more comprehensive 
way. However, possible solutions will still have to focus on these individual problems. Said 
otherwise, as a recommendation for democratic improvement it does not suffice to simply 
declare that “we should be aware of the complicated balance between intergovernmental and 
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supranational tendencies within the CFSP”; or something similar. To actually improve the 
situation, one has to look at the real implications this has for the daily development of the EU’s 
common foreign security and defence policy. Based thereon, (s)he will have to come up with 
concrete changes concerning, amongst others, the financing of the CFSP, or the decision-
making procedure preceding the launch of an EU military mission. However, what then in the 
end these changes actually have to be is up for debate and depends altogether from the personal, 
ideological views of those who are proposing them.  
This observation, that actual recommendations on democratic changes cannot be seen 
independent from the personal opinions and understanding of those who propose them, prompt 
us to reflect on a more general challenge posed to normative democratic improvements; namely 
how they will be subjectively received. In Chapter I, I argued for a focus in this thesis on the 
normative – acceptability – dimension of democratic legitimacy, in contrast with the empirical 
– acceptance – dimension. The assessment that has been carried out looked at the democratic 
qualities of the CFSP’s policy system as such, and not at if, how and why it is perceived by the 
public as being democratic. Although, in that way, the assessment can never completely escape 
a certain subjectivity, inherent to the assessor (cf. Chapter V, 2; also Chapter XV, 4 infra), it 
essentially has tried to present a disengaged, objective, overview of the CFSP’s democratic 
situation. But, when contemplating about what could actually be done to reinforce this policy’s 
democratic quality, the empirical dimension inevitably comes into play. Just like what I said 
about neglecting the policy’s inherent complexity, one should also keep in mind that possible 
changes to the policy’s structure and procedures act within a much larger context. Aiming 
attention exclusively at the philosophical reasons of democratic acceptability, and how they are 
lived up to, makes sense to find out objectively about democratic strengths and weaknesses. 
However, once attention turns to possible improvements, the way these are perceived cannot 
be ignored. After all, a certain change in the CFSP’s structure or decision-making might well 
make it philosophically speaking worthier of recognition; it arguably makes little sense to 
willingly propose such change, if – for whatever which reason – it is generally refuted by the 
public. If we take for instance the parliamentary situation, the audit essentially pointed out that 
the EP’s enthusiasm incorporates a certain positive democratic potential, while the general 
weakness of national parliaments and their unclear cooperation (amongst themselves and with 
the European Parliament) brings with it potential problems. When now attention turns to 
possible solutions – i.e. ways to change the parliamentary configuration in such a manner that 
it leads to more equal public control of the CFSP – this has to be done with consideration for 
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the people’s subjective perception of both parliamentary levels. In a similar vein, it can for 
instance also be wondered if focussing on the reinforcement of direct popular participation is a 
road to follow and would help the overall – i.e. integrated – democratic legitimacy of European 
foreign policy? After all, the empirical assessments repeatedly revealed how the people seem 
not much interested in such a more active, direct involvement. In that sense, the question is if 
it would prove democratically useful to willy-nilly search to improve this more direct channel? 
Linked with the representative approach advocated by the EU itself, it could therefore be 
discussed if efforts for democratic improvement should not rather focus on this representative 
road.  
As part of such a debate, also the discussion about the democratic legitimacy of the EU in 
general or of specific institutions in particular will come into play. While this thesis essentially 
assessed the democratic legitimacy of the CFSP as a policy (cf. Chapter III, 4; also: IV, 6), as 
was pointed out in the discussion about European parliament activism vs. national parliaments’ 
struggle, different appreciations for instance exist with regard to the EP’s overall democratic 
legitimacy. The arguments followed by someone in this regard (i.e. does one consider the EP 
in general to be a democratically legitimate institution or not) of course will determine his/ her 
vision on what can or has to be done to improve the democratic legitimacy of the EU’s foreign 
security policy. The same of course goes for other institutions such as the European Council. 
Throughout the empirical chapters the EC repeatedly came forward as the key executive 
decision-maker within the CFSP. Taking into account the events-oriented character of a foreign 
policy like the CFSP (cf. Chapter II, 2), this is neither astonishing nor inherently problematic 
(cf. Van Middelaar 2016, 8). Again, the empirical assessment carried out here just observed 
this fact and evaluated how this European foreign policy executive responds – within the 
context of the CFSP – to the democratic demands of public control and political equality. Yet, 
independently from what we found out about the equal democratic control of that executive 
actor, opposing opinions exist about the acceptance of a strong executive. As mentioned at the 
beginning of this thesis (Chapter III, 4) different democratic traditions can exist within the 
different EU Member States. In its assessment, this thesis tried to look at the democratic 
legitimacy of the CFSP without a preference for one of these traditions by starting from a basic 
definition of democracy and not from a more refined model of democracy276. However, once 
                                                 
276 It should be reiterated here that the parliamentary understanding of democracy that came 
forward from the assessment in that sense does not express a foregoing preference on my part, 
but simply showed itself as the most active channel of public control (cf. this chapter 2.3 supra). 
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we come to a discussion of probable democratic changes and improvements, the tradition 
someone comes from can play a role in how (s)he will intuitively appreciate the position of the 
European Council. To make it obvious: someone from France, used to a strong president having 
considerable prerogatives in foreign policy, will probable look with a different eye at the role 
of the European Council than someone from Finland, where the government’s autonomy in 
matters of foreign security and defence is more confined. 
So, a search for possible improvement of the CFSP’s democratic state of affairs, eventually, 
will happen through discussion and debate. The results of such debate will be influenced by the 
personal views and opinions of those who participate in it, as well as somehow have to take 
into account the subjective beliefs and perceptions of the society at large. The democratic audit 
of the CFSP’s normative democratic legitimacy carried out in this thesis, and the ensuing 
balance sheet, however, can serve as valuable starting point for such debate, by providing it 
with factual content and thus giving useful direction to it (cf. Hendriks et al. 2016, 71). 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter concluded the empirical assessments carried out in Part II of this thesis. With that 
aim, it summarized the key findings and observations from the CFSP’s empirical assessment. 
Yet, rather than just listing said findings, the focus of the discussion was thereby essentially on 
how these findings connect and interact, and which general, underlying trends can be 
distinguished. In that regard, I argued for the presence of three such trends. First, there is the 
presence of both intergovernmental and supranational tendencies, and the fact that the often-
unclear manner in which they are combined within the CFSP can be of hindrance to this policy’s 
equal public control. A second transversal trend was recognized in the structural discrepancy 
between the existence of multiple rules and the limited way in which they sometimes are applied 
or used. Finally, the chapter pointed to the recurring opposition between the European 
Parliament’s eagerness and the national parliaments’ limited and struggling involvement. 
Thereupon, the chapter reflected on the possible contribution of the democratic audit to an 
actual improvement of the CFSP’s normative democratic legitimacy. In that regard, rather than 
to propose concrete measures, it reflected on guiding principles that could help, or give 
guidance to, the debate about such measures. 
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XV. Democratic auditing and foreign policy 
Summary: This final chapter returns to the method of democratic auditing. It reflects on 
possible further steps and about what the thesis can tell us with regard to the suitability of 
this approach for the evaluation of a foreign policy’s normative democratic legitimacy. In 
that regard, it also ponders on the use of the framework to assess the democratic legitimacy 
of foreign policies other than that of the European Union. 
1. Future assessments of the EU’s common foreign security and defence policy 
As mentioned before, the audit that has been carried out in this thesis essentially concerns a 
snapshot of the CFSP for a given period. More precisely, the focus of the assessment has been 
on this policy since Lisbon, and data mainly run until end 2016. But, of course, like every other 
policy, the CFSP is constantly on the move. While grand reforms are not a regular thing (the 
last one dates to the Lisbon treaty, and a next one seems not very likely in the foreseeable 
future), this does not mean that the policy does not evolve. How will the next High 
Representative be appointed, and the one after that? Will the current revision of the Athena-
mechanism lead to changes in the way in which CFSP missions are financed? Will the European 
Parliament use its increasing assertiveness to demand more access to secret documents? Or, 
will the attempts to review the Interparliamentary Conference’s rules of procedures indeed 
prove to reinforce the working of this conference? But also, what will be the impact of Brexit 
on the way the CFSP is run? Or, will the fact of Donald Trump sitting in the Oval Office indeed 
lead to closer European defence cooperation (cf. Chapter VIII, 2)? And, most importantly, how 
will all of this impact on the policy’s normative democratic legitimacy? (How), for instance, 
will the increased defence integration launched in the summer of 2017 take into account 
democratic control? And, if the EU indeed takes up a stronger role in the search for a solution 
to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, (how) will citizens have a say about what that role actually 
will implies or about the general line of action that the Union will hold on to in that regard? 
The CFSP of 2021 will not be completely the same as that of 2016, that of 2026 in turn will 
show differences with that of 2021… In that way, the findings and observations of this audit in 
fact have limited tenability; they apply to the CFSP of 2016, not per se to that of 2026.  
Therefore, carrying out the audit again in the future (certainly when basic changes would be 
introduced to the CFSP, for instance in the context of a further Treaty reform), would be a 
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useful exercise. This not only because it can keep us up to date about how exactly the CFSP 
responds to the demands for public control with political equality, but also because it can offer 
us an understanding about how this response evolves over time. The present audit can thereby 
serve as a point of reference (cf. Chapter III, 2). Like the assessment of other foreign policies 
according to the same assessment framework (cf. infra), this can also help develop our view 
about what is not only philosophically desirable but also practically feasible. With regard to 
democratic shortcomings, it can help us distinguish more clearly between those that are 
fundamentally problematic and those that, in the end, appeared to be rather transient aspects of 
a currently still relatively new policy.  
2. Further use of the assessment framework and the development of an external 
measurement standard 
Hitherto being used to evaluate countries or the EU’s overall political system, this study has 
been the first to carry out a democratic audit of a particular policy. It did so on the basis of an 
assessment framework that was presented as both case-specific enough to capture the 
particularities of the policy under scrutiny, as well as general enough in order for it to be applied 
to similar types of policy (cf. Chapter IV, 4). Concretely, this means that the assessment 
framework, being developed to evaluate the specific case of the EU’s CFSP, also could be used 
for the assessment of other foreign policies; and – possibly with certain changes with regard to 
specific indicators – to public policies more in general.  
As to the employment of the assessment framework for the audit of other foreign policies, this 
would be more than just a valuable exercise with regard to each of these other foreign policies 
in itself. It would also have the advantage that it will bring with it the possibility of comparison. 
It could help understand if certain problems are typical for foreign policy in general, rather than 
being linked to a specific foreign policy in particular. Or, to the contrary, it could show the 
democratic variety that exists among different foreign policies, thus making clearer which 
problems are specific to a particular foreign policy. Although the idea of carrying out a 
comparison is as such not an objective of a democratic audit; the assessment of different foreign 
policies according to the same framework, can stir up discussion about what exactly are 
democratically acceptable practices for a foreign policy. That is, rather than leading to a simple 
good vs bad judgement of one foreign policy against another, the evaluation of other foreign 
policies could enable us to develop an external, more author-independent evaluation 
perspective.  
 243 
In order to be realistic measures of democracy, criteria and indicators should honour an ought 
implies can attitude (cf. Chapter II, 1). As I argued, ‘can’ should hereby however not just be 
understood as what already exists. But, given that the evaluation of just one policy can make it 
sometimes difficult to fully understand what may be expected, studying how other policies live 
up to the different criteria, may help us obtain a better image of what might be considered 
practically feasible. The assessment of the CFSP’s normative democratic legitimacy revealed 
the existence of certain democratic shortcomings; that is, aspects of the overall demand of 
public control with political equality with regard to which the EU’s foreign policy did not seem 
to answer convincingly. Yet, by lack of some comparative benchmark, it has not always been 
easy to make a well reflected judgement about the actual severity of these shortcomings. When 
we take for instance the way through which key decision-makers are nominated (Chapter VI), 
or the organisation of transparency and secrecy (Chapter X), the audit found certain problems. 
Yet how serious these problems really are, to what degree we may expect them to disappear, 
and in what way they are unique for the CFSP, is more difficult to say. The audit carried out in 
this thesis, does not make a comparative claim. The simple assertion, for instance, that “other 
international organisations are even less transparent” (or something similar), in that sense 
does not play a part in the current evaluation of this policy’s normative democratic legitimacy. 
In this regard, the evaluation of other foreign policies according to the same set of criteria and 
indicators would be a valuable endeavour, as in the end it could help the gradual development 
of a best- worst practice standard. To the extent that more and more other foreign policies are 
evaluated according to the same – or at least a similar – assessment framework, a better 
understanding about what can actually be demanded will occur. Ergo, a measurement standard 
based on a comparison of best and worst practices will be increasingly practicable. Given that 
this audit has chosen for the use of, what I have called an argumentative measurement standard, 
essentially because so-far such a more independent, best-worst practice standard was missing 
(cf. Chapter V, 2); it is obvious that if such a more independent standard would become 
available, it could contribute to the further development of an accurate and realistic assessment 
of a foreign policy’s normative democratic legitimacy. 
3. A democratic audit of other foreign policies: two exploratory examples 
In fact, how indeed would other foreign policies respond, if we were to subject them to a 
democratic audit? While executing such an audit is not in the scope of this thesis, I propose 
here two exploratory examples by discussing the first criterion of the assessment framework, 
i.e. Licensing to govern, for both Belgian and Swiss foreign policy. The reason for choosing 
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these cases lies with their relative similarity to the EU. As the EU’s sociocultural structure, 
institutional system and political practices bear considerable analogy to these consociational 
polities (Papadopoulos and Magnette 2010, 711‑12; also: Lijphart 1999, 33), comparison will 
presumably be more straightforward than with more differentiated cases. Although both 
democratic auditing and its basic definition of democracy are essentially model-unspecific, and 
as such do not mean to assess but one type of democracy set-up (cf. Chapter III, 3 and IV, 2.2), 
an initial focus on more similar cases therefore may be considered a justified road to follow. 
That is, rather than immediately applying the assessment framework to strongly different 
contexts, a first, exploratory application to somewhat similar cases can present a useful testing 
ground for the application of the assessment framework to other foreign policies. In that sense, 
while the following case studies about licensing to govern do not pretend final judgement about 
how the respective policies answer to that criterion, I believe that they can indeed show how 
the audit framework is not only specific enough to cover a particular case but also general 
enough to cover somewhat similar cases (cf. Chapter IV, 4), i.e. other foreign policies. Also, it 
can help reflect more practically on the development of more external best-worst practice 
standards and give indications on what that would actually imply. 
3.1 Licensing to govern in Belgian foreign policy 
3.1.1 How are key officials of Belgian foreign policy appointed? 
In Belgian Foreign security and defence policy, the central actor in the decisional process 
officially is the federal government (art. 167 Const.). Under its constitutional appellation of The 
King277 the government is said to direct the international relations and to command the armed 
forces278. In reality, however, it is not the whole government but rather a more select group 
composed of the prime minister, the minister of Foreign Affairs (FA) and the minister of 
Defence that has the lead over Belgium’s foreign and security policy. Assisted by their 
respective ministerial cabinets and administrations, this decisional triangle (Moyse and 
Dumoulin 2011, 12) holds the final decision-making power regarding the Belgian participation 
in international crisis operations and foreign security policy more in general. Although, the 
Belgian government acts officially as a collegiate body279, in reality, the decisional triangle and 
                                                 
277 The Belgian Constitution historically speaks of The King as the head of the executive. In reality, 
however, this role has been taken over by the government since long.  
278 Relevant is that by according these powers to the government, the Constitution de facto 
excludes the Parliament from foreign policy-making (cf. Vande Lanotte 2003, 710).  
279 Loi spéciale de réformes institutionnelles du 8 août 1980, art.96 ejustice.just.fgov.be/ 
cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language=fr&la=F&table_name=loi&cn=1980080802 [09.06.14]  
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more generally the Kern280 are the actors holding key political responsibility (cf. Moyse and 
Dumoulin 2011, 46). 
According to art. 96 of the Belgian Constitution, ministers officially are appointed and 
dismissed by the king. Reality however is much less straightforward. As indicated before (cf. 
note 277), the Constitution speaks of The King in a quite complicated way: sometimes it really 
is the person of the king that is referred to, sometimes the king covered by a minister, but much 
more often The King is in fact the federal government (Dewachter 2001, 15). In the particular 
case of the appointment of ministers, however, things are even more confusing, as the 
government can of course not appoint ministers without itself being in existence first. Given 
the strong fragmentation of the Belgian political landscape in which political parties play a 
preponderant role281, the parties - and often more specifically the party leaders – are the ones 
who decide about ministerial portfolios and persons. After a coalition agreement is forged and 
accepted by the general assembly of each party of the newly formed majority, it is up to each 
party to nominate the persons that will hold office for the portfolios that it obtained during the 
coalition negotiations. In that sense, a party can - with the informal agreement of its coalition 
partners - nominate whomever it wants without any real control by the Parliament (cf. Dowding 
and Dumont 2008, 128‑29). Although in the end, the Parliament (since 1995282 only the 
Chamber) has to approve the whole government, it can in no way judge the nomination of an 
individual minister. This becomes particularly clear when the post holder changes in the course 
of a legislative term. Although in recent years both the minister of foreign affairs and of defence 
stayed the same for the duration of a legislative session, cabinet changes in the course of a 
legislature are not uncommon. For instance, in the first half of the 1990’s, under the 
Government Dehaene I, the person of the minister of foreign affairs changed twice283. And, 
more recently, under the government Di Rupo, three major rearrangements have taken place. 
In such instance, the Parliament does not have to give renewed approval (Senelle 2004, 213). 
As former prime minister Mark Eyskens (2000, 49) critically points out, ministers are therefore 
                                                 
280 A restricted ministerial meeting place, developed through custom, which brings together the 
most important ministers of the government, normally the prime minister and vice prime 
ministers (Monette 2002, 42). 
281 In this context, Belgium is repeatedly referred to as a partitocracy (Cf. Devos 2006, 283‑85; 
Peters 2006, 1081; Walgrave 2004, 2; De Winter 1996, 219). 
282 Following the so called 4th State reform of 1993. 
283 Willy Claes was foreign minister from 7 March 1992 to 10 October 1994, followed by Frank 
Vandenbroucke until 22 March 1995, whom was in turn folowed by Eric Derycke until 23 June 
1995.   
 246 
first and foremost representatives of their party and party structures exercise a very strong 
power over their ministers. How exactly ministers are chosen and on what grounds is up to each 
party and seems substantially decided by the party leader (Dewachter 2001, 368, 380‑81). In 
that way, of the three pillars of the above-mentioned decisional triangle only the first one, the 
prime minister, obtains his position as a direct result of elections as (s)he generally is the leader 
of the party that won the elections – but even that should not be seen is a principle rule. Neither 
the appointment of the minister of foreign affairs, nor that of the minister of defence has 
however to be directly linked to elections. And, neither the population itself or the parliament, 
nor even the prime minister (Dehaene 2000, 29) can really control these appointments. Also, 
for the people and the parliament, having no access to the limited decision-making centre 
behind ministerial nominations, it is very difficult to know on what basis exactly these 
appointments are made. Although the parliament is searching to limit the informal power of the 
party leaders in the process of the appointment of ministers, it seems inherently condemned to 
fail in its efforts. It is common to the Belgian political system that before dissolving itself in the 
prospect of new elections the three pillars of the legislative branch - which are the two houses 
of the federal parliament as well as The King - each present a list of constitutional articles they 
wish open for revision under the next legislature. Subsequently, the final, common, list284 only 
contains these articles proposed by each of the three pillars. Given that the government (in its 
capacity of King) is an integral part of the legislature, and this government will most probably 
not be inclined to give the parliament a stronger say in its appointment, it is rather implausible 
that the relevant article 96 will be put forward for revision. Attempts, such as the amendment 
proposed in 2014 by Stefan Van Hecke, MP for the Flemish greens, seems therefore a lost fight. 
Van Hecke’s proposal to reconsider art. 96 Const. because “It is a fiction that The King still 
appoints and dismiss the ministers and secretaries of state. That in fact is done by the party 
leaders”285 - I would say evidently - didn’t make the final list. Besides, there is the traditionally 
tendency towards strong party discipline, which makes that MP’s in the Belgian parliament 
tend to vote along predefined party-lines (cf. Depauw 2002; De Winter and Dumont 2003). 
Given that party leaderships, certainly of majority parties, obviously have not much to gain by 
                                                 
284 It is the publication of this common list that according to article 195 Const. automatically 
dissolve both houses of the parliament and thus lead to new elections. 
285 Belgian Chamber of Representatives, 24 April 2014, Projet de déclaration de révision de la 
Constitution – Amandements déposés en séance plénière - N° 273 de M. VAN HECKE dekamer.be/ 
flwb/pdf/53/3567/53K3567005.pdf [09.06.14] 
 247 
giving up their informal nomination prerogative, it seems implausible that they will encourage 
this point to be brought up in political debate. 
Keeping in mind this in reality non-existent access of the parliament or the people to the 
nomination of the key foreign policy actors, the picture turns even more problematic when 
looking also at second line decision-makers. A particularity of the Belgian political system is 
the key role held by the ministerial cabinets, nowadays officially referred to as policy units. 
A minister who takes office is entitled to a ministerial cabinet consisting of advisers whom he 
can appoint or dismiss personally according to his own preferences286 (Suetens and Walgrave 
2001). Not part of the administrative hierarchy, cabinets are composed of non-elected - mainly 
party - confidents. Although the Copernicus reform (1999-2003) aimed, amongst others, to 
diminish these cabinets, in reality not much seemed to have changed since (De Jaegere 2010). 
Notwithstanding their new denomination these cabinets still have a very important say in the 
development of a policy and they essentially continue to be designated on the sole basis of the 
minister personal preferences. Linked with these strong cabinets is also the - behind the scene 
- interference of the political parties in matters of security and defence. Given the coalition 
character of the federal government287 and the general ubiquity of political parties in the 
decision-making process (cf. note 281 supra), decisions taken in matters of security and defence 
are strongly dependant on the positions taken by the different parties that are part of the coalition 
(Moyse and Dumoulin 2011, 19, 42, 51). The involvement of the parties with security and 
defence affairs however strongly contrasts with their public interest in these matters. A glance 
at the electoral programs of the 12 parties elected for the federal Chamber of representatives 
during the elections of 25 May 2014 for instance reveals a very minor attention for matters of 
foreign security and defence. Varying in a simple percentage of the number of pages of their 
overall electoral program, it does not pass 3,24% (CD&V)288. The strong party-involvement 
                                                 
286 Belgian Official Journal (Moniteur belge), Royal order of 19 July 2001 fedweb.belgium.be/nl/ 
binaries/K.B.%20van%2019.07.2001%20-%20A.R.%20du%2019.07.2001_tcm120-22281.pdf 
[09.06.14] 
287 Given the communitarisation of the political parties since the 1960’s by which parties were 
split up along linguistic lines, this makes that government coalitions with up to six parties are not 
exceptional. This also makes it almost impossible that the three actors of the decisional triangle 
would belong to the same party. Hence, except for the government Leterme II (Nov. 2009-Dec. 
2011) this has never been the case in post-WW II history.  
288 This result is based on an exploratory, evaluation and as such is just mentioned as an indicative 
example. 
 248 
with foreign security and defence, especially in contrast with their rather public apathy, hence 
at least raises questions regarding their democratic licensing in this domain. 
The larger administrative hierarchy is a last type of key actor. With regard to foreign security 
and defence policy these are the Federal Public Service for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry 
of Defence. Although the above-mentioned Copernicus reform aimed amongst others to 
professionalize and depoliticize the appointment of civil servants (cf. Thijs 2003, 468‑74), we 
see that it is still the government that decide on all top-level positions. Heads of the 
administration are appointed as the result of a package deal between the coalition partners 
without any control of the parliament, and political balances and sensibilities in the end seem 
more important than the objective evaluations executed by Selor, the federal selection office289. 
Foreign Affairs does not seem an exception to this rule. Dirk Achten, who became in 2008 
president of the board of director generals, and hence the leading official of the FSP Foreign 
Affairs, did so without any previous diplomatic experience or parliamentary say but was before, 
since 2004, chef de cabinet of then foreign affairs minister Karel De Gucht290. More generally, 
it has been criticized that also other top-ranking officials of Foreign Affairs, such as 
ambassadors are designated, without any parliamentary backing and that the nomination 
procedure lacks transparency. The constitutional origin of the problem is essentially the same 
as with regard to the nomination of ministers. According to art. 107 Const., The King “appoints 
civil servants to positions in the general and foreign affairs administrations of the State”, which 
makes that given the changing reality mentioned before this prerogative now falls onto the 
government. And, just as is the case with ministerial nominations, the appointment of top 
ranking diplomats seems under strong party control. While initial candidates for the diplomatic 
services are recruited on the basis of a selection procedure organised by Selor291, their further 
career path, especially with regard to top-level post seems much more politically defined. For 
instance, based on a list published by the journal De Tijd, we can conclude that 8 of the 29 
diplomats that are part of the so-called diplomatic movement of 2014, which normally is 
organized during the summer, were previously working on a federal ministerial cabinet. A ninth 
                                                 
289 Knack, 03.09.2013, “Afrekenen met kwalijke benoemingspolitiek: acht adviezen aan de 
overheid” knack.be/nieuws/belgie/afrekenen-met-kwalijke-benoemingspolitiek-acht-adviezen-
aan-de-overheid/article-opinion-104667.html [09.06.14]  
290 Apache.be, 18.11.2011, “(*)nvdr – Achten Dirk” apache.be/nvdr/2011/11/18/achten-dirk/ 
[10.06.14]  
291 Cf. Federal Public Service for Foreign Affairs, Procédure de sélection diplomatie.belgium.be/ 
fr/sur_lorganisation/travailler_aux_affaires_etrangeres/a_letranger/en_tant_que_statutaire/pro
cedureselection [07.02.18] 
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is working as ambassador for Antwerp Port and is of CD&V-signature292. The president of the 
Senate can invite newly appointed ambassadors to the Senate (Belgian Senate, phone call 
04.11.16), but this obviously does not give any parliamentary involvement in that appointment 
as such. A bill, introduced in 2011 by senator Karl Vanlouwe (N-VA)293, asking parliamentary 
consultation for ambassadorial nominations was rejected in the Senate Commission, mainly on 
the grounds that the proposal is unconstitutional294. 
3.1.2 How is the Belgian foreign policy’s overall governance structure defined?  
With regard to the overall institutional governance structure of the Belgian foreign policy it has 
first of all to be pointed out that it is of course mainly the result of a long history and tradition 
which was for a long time strongly defined by the king in his personal capacity. Only since the 
end of WW II and the so-called Royal Question, has the government taken over the full 
responsibility over foreign affairs (Coolsaet 2001, 357). Unable to cope with the rapid changes 
of the international setting in the post war period, the Parliament was no match for the 
government who therefore was free to define the country’s foreign policy (Witte et al. 2005, 
256). This has led to the above described situation in which the government - and more 
specifically the decisional triangle - took over the constitutional role of The King and assured 
foreign and defence policy to be one of its prerogatives. Also, the parliament has little input to 
give regarding the organisational structure of Foreign Affairs or Defence institutions, or their 
possible reorganisation, as they do not deviate from the general rule that the executive organizes 
its own services (Mast et al. 2006, 91). This we see confirmed by the last main reorganisation 
of Foreign Affairs and Defence as part of the earlier mentioned Copernicus reform. The 
structural changes and the rewriting of the organisational chart of the then Ministry of foreign 
affairs was put through as a purely administrative operation executed under the guidance of the 
government, the parliament was largely left out of the whole process and only appealed upon 
                                                 
292 Cf. De Tijd, 18.04.2014, “Didier Reynders zendt zijn zonen uit” tijd.be/nieuws /politiek_ 
economie_belgie/Didier_Reynders_zendt_zijn_zonen_uit.9491206-3136.art [09.06.14] 
293 Karl Vanlouwe, “Proposition de loi instaurant un avis parlementaire dans le cadre de la 
nomination des chefs de missions diplomatiques and de postes consulaires belges”, Belgian 
Senate, 6 July 2011 senat.be/www/?MItabObj=pdf&MIcolObj=pdf&MInamObj=pdfid&MItypeObj 
=application/pdf&MIvalObj=83887631 [09.06.14]  
294 Belgian Senate, Proposition de loi instaurant un avis parlementaire dans le cadre de la 
nomination des chefs de missions diplomatiques and de postes consulaires belges (de M. Karl 
Vanlouwe ; Doc. 5-1150) - Discussion générale senate.be/www/?MIval=/consulteren/publicatie 
2&BLOKNR=23&COLL=H&LEG=5&NR=95&SUF=&VOLGNR=&LANG=nl [09.06.2014] 
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when really unavoidable295. Besides, with regard to Defence, even the government didn’t seem 
able to put through the reform against the will of the army; reason why Defence is still not 
restructured to a Federal Public Service but continue to work under the old structure of a 
Ministry296. Within this institutional structure, and although different committees are - of course 
- involved in the strategic and operational planning of security and defence policy, the final 
decision power stays with the decisional triangle and their (chefs de) cabinet. Notwithstanding 
the principle of consensus (cf. supra, we see that the government at large merely ratifies what 
has been previously decided within the more restricted Kern or decisional triangle (Claes 2000, 
43).  
3.1.3 Conclusion: licensing to govern in Belgian foreign policy, normatively democratic? 
When looking at the Belgian foreign security and defence policy, many observations seem at 
odds with the democratic criterion of licensing to govern. Although the ambiguous appointment 
of ministers by party leaders, applies to all members of the government; it is in particular 
dubious with regard to foreign and security policy. Given the traditionally strong role of the 
federal executive in this domain, it certainly can be asked if it is democratically defendable that 
even the nomination of those holding key political responsibility, is in no way controlled by the 
Parliament. Besides, as these ministers their first line advisers and assistants are mainly party-
confidents, who obtained their post for a large part based on the personal preferences of the 
minister - and maybe some high-ranking party members - the situation becomes even more 
problematic. The problem with the ministerial nominations is not so much that they are not 
elected for their function by the people directly - in the European tradition of the parliamentary 
democracy that is in fact never the case297- but that the control of the elected parliament over 
their nomination is almost non-existent. The strong grip of the parties also manifests itself with 
regard to administrative appointments. Although the Copernicus reform tried to turn the tide, 
the nomination of top-level officials and ambassadors seems still considerably determined by 
                                                 
295 Georges Monard, “Copernicushervorming. Rol van de politieke actoren”, KU Leuven- Faculteit 
Sociale Wetenschappen soc.kuleuven.be/io/ned/vorming/studiedag/pdf/20080603_ Georges% 
20Monard.pdf [09.06.14] 
296 De Morgen, 07.05. 2011, “Tussenstand: hoe het leger een platte praatbarak werd” demorgen. 
be/dm/m/nl/2461/Opinie/article/detail/1260822/2011/05/07/Tussenstand-Hoe-het-leger-
een-platte-praatbarak-werd.dhtml?originatingNavigationItemId=2461 [09.06.14] 
297 cf. De Wereld Morgen, 17.11.2011, “Technocraten aan de macht ondemocratisch? Niet 
noodzakelijk” dewereldmorgen.be/artikels/2011/11/17/technocraten-aan-de-macht-
ondemocratisch-niet-noodzakelijk [09.06.14] 
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party-considerations and coalition balances. Just as in the case of the appointment of ministers, 
the parliament does not seem able to turn this trend around. 
Following a long tradition in which initially the King, in his personal capacity had an important 
say; the overall governance structure of foreign security and defence policy constitutionally 
stays strongly dominated by the executive power. This, linked with the preponderant role of the 
political parties, seems to strongly limit the possibly of the parliament - let alone the people - 
to influence the way in which the Belgian foreign security and defence policy is organized. 
Although individual MP’s try to change things and launch initiatives, for instance to bolster the 
parliamentary say in the nomination of individual ministers or ambassadors, they seem hindered 
by the system in place which clearly puts them in a disadvantageous position. Finally, it can 
even be wondered who holds the real key decisional power. Although, the government officially 
acts under consensus, the more restricted Kern or even decisional triangle often takes the actual 
decisions. Given the tight relation they have with their respective ministers, as factual 
appointing authority; in this context too, the party cenacles hold grip on the matter. 
3.2 Licensing to govern in Swiss foreign policy 
3.2.1 How are key officials of Swiss foreign policy appointed? 
In Switzerland, foreign relations are the competence of the Confederation (art. 54 § 1 Federal 
Constitution). While the Cantons can organize their own foreign policy within the scope of their 
competences and can deal directly with lower ranking foreign authorities (art. 56 FC), the 
federal government alone is responsible for conducting foreign policy at the national level (art. 
184.1 FC). This federal government, the Federal Council, is composed of seven ministers, 
called Federal Councillors whose selection is defined by both formal rules and informal 
practice. According to law (art. 175 FC, art. 132 LParl), Federal Councillors are elected for four 
years by the Federal Assembly298 following each general election of the National Council. Each 
member is elected individually. Complementary elections can take place when a member 
resigns or dies mid-term (art. 133 LParl). Elections take place by secret ballot, and a candidate 
must obtain an absolute majority in order to be elected. Once elected, Federal Councillors can 
neither be impeached nor be voted out of office by a motion of no confidence. On the other 
hand, given that each Councillor has to be elected individually and Councillors in office need 
the renewed support of an absolute majority of the Federal Assembly every four years in order 
                                                 
298 Both the National Council and the Council of States. 
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to stay in office, they hold individual responsibility towards the Parliament. In that way, the 
Swiss executive incorporates both a parliamentary and a presidential dimension (Lijphart 1999, 
35). While there are no formal rules concerning a Councillor’s time in office, traditionally they 
stay until they themselves decide to resign, which on average is after somewhat less than 10 
years (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008, 80). Further informal rules apply to the actual composition of 
the Federal Council. First of all, although every adult Swiss citizen is eligible for election299, in 
practice only active politicians, with many years of experience, are elected. While the 
constitution (art. 175 § 4) indeed declares that the Federal Council’s composition has to respect 
a regional and linguistic balance, the concrete interpretation that is given to this requirement 
results from unwritten agreement and tradition. Besides, the Federal Council also incorporates 
a stringent political equilibrium in which each of the main political parties holds a predefined 
number of seats, the repartition of which does not automatically change after each election300. 
In practice this means, that a resigning member is generally replaced by someone from the same 
political party. The need for a parliamentary majority for each candidate in order to be elected 
as a Federal Councillor however limits the party’s freedom in this regard, as they cannot be 
sure that their proposed candidate(s) will be accepted by Parliament. And, many examples exist 
where official party candidates had to make way for an outsider (Klöti et al. 2014, 196, 215). 
Parliament thus holds a clear grip over the initial nomination of the key executive decision-
makers.  
Within the Federal Council, there is no hierarchy among the members. Although each of the 
Councillors heads one of the seven federal departments – the repartition of which is decided by 
the government itself – with regard to actual decision-making they act as a collegial body (art. 
177.1 FC). Thus, decisions about a concrete policy or action are taken, not by an individual 
Councillor according to the policy domain involved but have to be taken by the Federal council 
as a whole. The President of the Confederation, a role exercised by rotation for one year by one 
of the Councillors, only acts as a primus inter pares and does not hold any additional power in 
comparison with the other members. Decisions are taken by consensus as a result of internal 
discussions (cf. Klöti et al. 2014, 203‑4; Kriesi and Trechsel 2008, 75‑76). This also applies to 
matters of foreign security and defence. Each member subsequently will (have to) defend the 
                                                 
299 They do not have to be a member of Swiss parliament and even do not necessarily have to be 
an official candidate.  
300 This so-called magic formula did not change between 1959 and 2003, after which it was 
adapted in favour of the Swiss People’s Party, due to this party’s consolidation as the country’s 
largest political formation.  
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decision that has been taken, even when (s)he personally does not agree. So, also with regard 
to foreign policy, this means that the key political decision-maker is the Federal Council as a 
whole.  
In contrast to the previously discussed Belgian case, Swiss ministers do not have their own 
political cabinet, but only one or two personal collaborators which they can select to their 
own discretion and who are integrated into the general secretariat of their department. These 
persons do not have to be civil servants (Göransson 2008, 14‑15). They do not so much 
coordinate or intervene in the administration but assure logistic and communication tasks for 
their councillor (Fortier et al. 2016, 81) As shown by the selection made by Ignazio Cassis, the 
new head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), a Councillor can also decide to 
take over his predecessor’s personal collaborators. Upon entering office in November 2017, 
Cassis changed but one of the two collaborators of his predecessor, Didier Burkhalter301. This, 
of course is not so astonishing when taking into account that new Councillors normally are from 
the same political party as the one they replace. Due to this absence of a real ministerial cabinet, 
the actual execution and further elaboration of the Federal Council’s decisions therefore lies 
directly with the federal administration. Given the institutional context and the political 
organisation of the country, this administration holds an important position in the Swiss 
decision-making process that goes beyond that of just an ordinary executioner (cf. Giauque 
2013, 42). From an organisational point of view, the administration is divided into seven 
departments, each of which is headed by one of the Councillors and deals with one or more 
policy domains. With regard to foreign relations in general, the Swiss case is rather peculiar 
because in practice hardly any department or office does not play a role in it. Where it concerns 
for instance the important field of foreign economic affairs, responsibility lies with the Federal 
Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research (DEA) rather than with the Federal 
Department of Foreign Affairs. But, also other departments, like the Federal Department of 
Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications (DETEC) or the Federal Department of 
Finance (FDF) are directly involved in foreign affairs that concern their competencies 
(Goetschel et al. 2002, 67-8). However, with regard to foreign security policy in particular, 
things are all in all quite straightforward, as essentially two departments are involved: The DFA 
and the Federal Department for Defence, Civil Protection and Sports (DDPS). Within the DFA, 
                                                 
301 Cf. 24 heures, 03.11.17, “Cassis nomme ses collaborateurs personels” 24heures.ch/suisse/ 
Cassis-nomme-ses-collaborateurs-personnels/story/28378359 [09.01.18] 
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it is especially the Division for Security Policy (which in itself is part of the Directorate for 
Political Affairs) that is tasked with foreign security (Goetschel 2014, 633). 
Where it concerns the selection of the federal administration’s personnel, this is formally 
organised by the Federal Regulation of 3 July 2001 (OPers) 302. For the Department of Foreign 
Affairs, further rules are set out in a separate Regulation of 20 September 2002 (O-Opers – 
DFAE)303. With regard to the diplomatic service, art. 17 of this regulation stipulates that 
candidates have to pass a concourse, an internal formation and a final exam, all of which are 
evaluated by an Admission Committee. A member of parliament can be represented in this 
committee (DFA, e-mail 12.01.18). The appointment (= transfer) of diplomats to senior posts 
abroad is a formal competence of the Federal Council (art.6.a O-Opers – DFAE), who, 
following an internal procedure, takes the final decision304. Only in rare cases, do people come 
into high level posts in the diplomatic service without taking the concours (entry exam) and 
subsequently climbing the diplomatic career ladder305. For the DDPS, the selection, 
appointment and career of the Groupement Défence, and the military personnel more in general 
is organised by the Regulation of 9 December 2003 (O pers mil)306. While the presence of such 
elaborated legislative rules seems to be in line with the traditional idea of the Swiss 
administration and diplomacy being neutral and apolitical institutions, questions can be asked 
as to how much this is actually the case. First of all, although, the number of high-level 
administrators with a formal party membership is limited, this does not imply the absence of 
ideological ties and a more general party affiliation between the head of a department and the 
top of his/her department307. Furthermore, formal politicization may well be limited and most 
positions within the administration indeed are stable and do not change when a new councillor 
enters office (Fortier et al. 2016, 78); with regard to certain top-level positions this seems to be 
                                                 
302 Ordonnance sur le personnel de la Confédération du 3 juillet 2001 (OPers) admin.ch/opc/fr/ 
classified-compilation / 20011178/index.html [09.01.18] 
303 Ordonnance du DFAE concernant l'ordonnance sur le personnel de la Confédération du 20 
septembre 2002 (O-OPERS – DFAE) admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/20021667/index. 
html [09.01.18] 
304 cf. Evaluation de la procédure de nomination des cadres supérieurs par le Conseil federal. Annexe 
au rapport du Contrôle parlementaire de l’administration à l’intention de la Commission de gestion 
du Conseil national du 20 juin 2013, pp.70-8 biblio.parlament.ch/e-docs/373229.pdf [09.01.18] 
305 Evaluation du personnel du service diplomatique. Rapport du Contrôle parlementaire de 
l’administration à l’intention de la Commission de gestion du Conseil des Etats du 10 août 2015, 
pp.4428-9 parlament.ch/centers/documents/fr/bericht-pvk-2015-08-10-f.pdf [09.01.18] 
306 Ordonnance du DDPS sur le personnel militaire du 9 décembre 2003 (O pers mil) admin.ch/opc/ 
fr/classified-compilation/20031654/index.html [13.02.18] 
307 Tages Anzeiger, 15.10.2015, “Parteien-Check bei den 65 höchsten beambten” tagesanzeiger. 
ch/schweiz/standard/die-berner-schattenregierung/story/15281409 [07.02.18] 
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changing. The replacement of a Federal Councillor is increasing accompanied by changes at 
the head of the Federal department that is concerned (Giauque 2013, 42‑43; also: Schedler and 
Eicher 2013, 382)308. If we look at the DFA, we indeed see how the last three Councillors in 
office (Micheline Calmy-Rey – 2003-12, Didier Burkhalter – 2012-17 and Ignazio Cassis since 
November 2017) changed the department’s Secretary General shortly after their arrival. Given 
that art. 2 OPers bestows the right to do so on the Federal Council, at first sight this could be 
seen as being in line with the legal rules in place. Yet, as the Parliament309 notes, in practice the 
Federal Council as a body is not involved and just accept what is proposed by the department 
in question, each of which uses its own procedures (cf. also Göransson 2008, 15). The FC does 
not debate these appointments. Thus, where it concerns the nomination of such top-level 
appointments, the Federal Council as a body mainly accepts without further discussion the 
choice of an individual Councillor and department. 
While neither the people directly, nor their elected representatives in the Parliament (can) really 
control individual appointments within the administration, the Swiss Federal Parliament proves 
rather active in keeping an eye on how in general such appointments do take place. This happens 
through the Parliamentary Control of the Administration (PCA) – the evaluation service of 
the Federal Assembly – which conducts mandated studies about the legality, opportunity and 
efficiency of the federal authority310. Especially in recent years this organised evaluation by the 
Swiss Federal Parliament has been considered as comparatively strong (Sager et al. 2017, 253). 
Among the evaluations that are carried out, a regular focus is on the Confederation’s personnel 
policy (ibid, 255). The previously cited reports of 2013 and 2015 (cf. note 304 and 305 supra) 
are clear examples of how this control indeed also covers the selection and appointment of 
personnel in service of the federal administration, including diplomatic and military personnel. 
All in all, these reports seem to show satisfaction with how such selection and appointment 
does take place. What however is recognized as problematic, is the above mentioned limited 
involvement of the Federal Council as a body in the selection of senior officers. With the so-
                                                 
308 Also: Evaluation de la procédure de nomination des cadres supérieurs par le Conseil fédéral. 
Rapport du Contrôle parlementaire de l’administration à l’intention de la Commission de gestion 
du Conseil national du 20 Juin 2013, p.2738 parlament.ch/centers/documents/fr/BB-BX-kader-
bericht-f.pdf [13.02.18] 
309 cf. Nomination des cadres supérieurs par le Conseil federal. Rapport de la Commission de gestion 
du Conseil national du 15 Novembre 2013, p.2706 parlament.ch/centers/documents/fr/bericht-
gpk-n-2013-11-15-f.pdf. Also : Évaluation de la procédure de nomination des cadres supérieurs par 
le Conseil fédéral (cf. note 308 supra), pp.58-9. 
310 The parliamentary control of the administration parlament.ch/en/organe/committees/ 
parliamentary-control-administration-pca [09.01.18]  
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called affaire Nef as a notable example of an appointment turning bad311, the limited 
involvement of the Government indeed is questionable. Although it is to be applauded that most 
selections are made on the basis of competence and merit (or that these elements at least play a 
role too), the Federal Council inclines to neglect its political responsibility over the 
administration. The Federal Assembly may well be able to oversee the way in which the 
administration works and how it selects its personnel, actual authority can only be exercised by 
the Federal Council. The current situation, in which individual departments are largely 
independent towards the Federal Council as an institution with regard to the appointment of 
high level officials leads to an uncontrolled delegation of competences. This is not to say that 
nominations to key offices within the administration should become politicised in a Belgian 
way, but that for these appointment for which the Federal Council has direct authority (i.e. these 
listed in the previously mentioned art. 2 OPers), she indeed should be really involved312. 
3.2.2 How is the Swiss foreign policy overall governance structure defined?  
In the previous study about the EU’s CFSP, we saw how foreign policy happens through a 
governance system that is (at least partially) distinct from what is common to other policy 
domains. For instance, the European Commission, which is normally the EU’s key executive, 
plays no role of real importance in matters of foreign security and defence. And, with the EEAS, 
foreign policy is mainly carried out by a body that differs in both structure and competences 
from the normal Commission and Council administration. The same goes for Belgium, where, 
in practice, we found a restricted triangle composed of the prime minister, the minister of 
foreign affairs and the minister of defence deciding on foreign policy, and not the government 
as a whole. In Switzerland, however, such difference between the governance system of foreign 
policy compared to that of other policies, does not really exist (cf. previous remark about the 
involvement of the different departments in the development and execution of Foreign affairs). 
This is arguably due to the fact that for a long time, foreign policy in Switzerland was not 
considered to be a particularly important policy field; a situation for instance mirrored by the 
fact that until the end of the 19th century, Switzerland did not have a proper foreign affairs 
department (cf. Goetschel 2014, 624). Besides, although foreign policy is considerably more 
                                                 
311 In January 2008, Roland Nef becomes head of the Swiss army. Soon afterwards, however, 
controversy arises about his appointment when it is revealed that already during the process of 
his selection, a criminal complaint is running against him for sexual abuse. In the aftermath of the 
affair, the then Federal Councillor of Defence, Samuel Schmid, is heavily criticized for his weak 
political control over this key appointment.  
312 Cf. note 309 supra. 
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executive dominated than domestic policy processes (Goetschel et al. 2002, 84-6), this still 
seems to be much less the case than in other countries (Goetschel 2014, 624). Furthermore, 
certainly since the 1990ies, we see an increasing impact on foreign policy by the Swiss 
parliament (Schneider 1999, 42; also: Lammers 2015, 91‑92). 
What however is most notable with regard to this governance system, is that in Switzerland, 
the people indeed hold the final say over its structure and change. Concretely, in Switzerland, 
there exist different instruments of direct democracy, through which the people can impact 
directly on the organisation of government and parliament, the legislative procedure and policy-
making at all levels of the federal state. Given their scope and role, these institutions of direct 
democracy “embody a truly system-formative device” (Kriesi et Trechsel 2008, 49). While, in 
practice, the basic structure of Swiss governance has changed remarkably little since its creation 
in the constitution of 1848 (cf. Varone 2014, 346), the people hold the possibility to do so. Said 
otherwise, the final word about who are to be the key decision-makers or how they are to be 
appointed, stays with the people.  
More concretely, at all time, the people can launch a popular initiative that searches to 
introduce such reform. Thus, for instance, the number of seats in the Federal Council (seven), 
the election mode of Federal Councillors (individually, by the Federal Assembly) or the 
government’s basic decision-making principle of collegiality could be changed at all time, if a 
double majority of people and cantons decides so (art. 140.1(a) FC). Four times, an initiative 
has been launched concerning the composition and election of the Federal Council313. Yet, in 
all these cases both a majority of the people and a majority of the cantons rejected the proposed 
changes. The last time, in 2013, it concerned an initiative launched by the Swiss People’s Party 
which sought to introduce the direct election by the people of the Federal Council. But the 
project received strong disapproval: 76.3% of the popular votes and all the cantons rejected 
it314. The people can also decide about the administration. If they wish to do so, they can propose 
changes to, and vote on, for instance, the exact repartition of competences between departments, 
                                                 
313 Conseil Fédéral, “L’initative populaire: 125 ans d’histoire” admin.ch/gov/fr/accueil/ 
documentation/dossiers/125-ans-initiatives-populaires.html [11.01.18] (state of affairs: 
December 2017: my count)  
314 Votation No 570. Tableau récapitulatif bk.admin.ch/ch/f/pore/va/20130609/det570.html 
[10.01.18]  
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or the internal organisation of these departments. Two initiatives have been launched in that 
regard, yet, again, neither was successful315.  
Although these results could easily lead us to conclude that the actual importance of such 
initiatives is quite limited, in practice things are less black and white. In reference to the 
dichotomy between democratic hardware and – software (cf. Chapter V, 3 supra), it indeed is 
true that while the people formally have the power of initiative, in reality they are seldom 
successful in using it to actively set the course. While this is not in the scope of this discussion 
(and in any case, this observation applies to Swiss politics in general and not to foreign policy 
in particular), it indeed can be wondered why none of the in total six popular initiatives that 
aimed to reform the Federal Council or the administration were accepted. Yet, on the other 
hand, while the people’s active power seems all in all limited, they certainly can exercise 
indirect or reactive guidance. Popular initiatives for that matter, though seldom accepted as 
such, can lead to counterproposals by the government which while being less radical than the 
initial initiative nevertheless introduce some of the initiative’s ideas (Lutz 2006, 48-9; also: 
Linder and Wirz 2014, 156-7). Besides, at multiple occasions optional referendums have been 
held about a law or federal decree that concerned aspects of the federal administration’s internal 
organisation. In 9 out of 20 cases, such a referendum has led to the annulment of the legal act 
in question316. In the other 11 cases, the people approved the proposed law or decree. In 1996, 
for instance, a reform of the Law concerning the organisation of government and 
administration (LOGA) was successfully contested by optional referendum317. Answering to 
the main critics of those who opposed the law, the government subsequently made the necessary 
changes to the proposal of law318. This new version passed without further popular contestation. 
With regard to security and defence policy in particular, it should be kept in mind that also laws 
about the organisation and working of the army can be contested. Actually, 6 of the 20 referenda 
mentioned above concerned the military. In 5 of these cases, the people in the end accepted the 
disputed act. 
                                                 
315 In 1922, an initiative “concerning the eligibility of federal officials to the National Council” was 
rejected admin.ch/ch/f//pore/vi/vis20.html. In 2000, an initiative “for a fair representation of 
women in the federal authorities” was rejected admin.ch/ch/f//pore/vi/vis235.html [12.01.18]  
316 Chancellerie fédérale ChF, “Répertoire chronologique des demandes de referendum” bk.admin. 
ch/ch/f/pore/rf/ref_2_2_3_1.html [11.01.18] (state of affairs: December 2017: my count)  
317 Votation No 431. Tableau récapitulatif bk.admin.ch/ch/f/pore/va/19960609/det431.html 
[10.01.18] 
318 FF 1996 V1 
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3.2.3 Conclusion: licensing to govern in Swiss foreign policy, normatively democratic? 
In Switzerland, the parliament decides about the key executive decision-makers and can 
scrutinize the appointment of senior officials through its evaluation service, the PCA.  
While these are obviously promising observations, some nuancing comments are appropriate. 
First of all, there is the minimalistic involvement of the Federal Council in the selection of the 
federal administration’s senior officers. According to law, the Federal Council is the competent 
authority for the appointment and dismissal of certain categories of, high-level, civil servants. 
In practice however, it is revealed that the Government barely exercises this responsibility. 
These administrative officials are chosen by individual (heads of) departments without much 
debate and control by the rest of the federal Council. This can be considered democratically 
problematic, because it leads to a situation in which the concrete nomination of important 
decision-makers happens factually uncontrolled. Given that in Switzerland the chain of 
delegation from the people over the Federal Assembly to the Federal Council is well defined319, 
this last one’s control over the appointment of senior administrative officers indeed can be 
considered to be enough in order for these appointments to be democratically acceptable. Then 
of course, the absence of such control presents a democratic shortcoming. So far, the critique 
expressed by the Parliament through its evaluation reports, did not result in any relevant change 
on the matter. 
Where it concerns the overall governance structure of Swiss foreign policy, an important point 
lies with the fact that it largely overlaps with the overall Swiss governance system. That is, at 
governance level, maters of foreign policy and security are essentially decided and executed 
through the same system and structures as other policies. This leads to a situation in which the 
discussion of the foreign policy structure largely coincides with a discussion about the 
governance structure more in general. 
With regard to the development or reform of said governance structure, we saw how the people 
can exercise control through means of direct democracy instruments. The actual power of the 
people, however, should not be understood wrongly. It essentially concerns an indirect, 
retroactive power. That is, given that they are rarely accepted as such (and in case of 
governmental or administrative reform so far never), initiatives not so much define governance 
                                                 
319 This makes the situation different from the previously discussed European case, in which the 
appointment of the appointing authority itself (being the High Representative) showed certain 
democratic weaknesses (cf. Chapter VI).  
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directly but they can push the government in a certain direction. And, as is shown by the 
successful optional referenda about law and decrees on the organisation of the administration 
or the military, the people can guide the overall governance structure retrospectively.  
3.3 Comparing the EU, Belgium and Switzerland 
As pointed out before, the evaluation of different foreign policies could help us gain insight 
into the diverse ways in which foreign policies deal with demands for democratic legitimacy 
and the possible problems they encounter in that regard. In this respect, the above discussions 
of licensing in Belgian - and Swiss foreign policy involve some interesting observations when 
comparing them with the previous assessment of the EU’s Common foreign and security policy.  
First of all, in Belgium, and even more so in Switzerland, the distinction between the foreign 
policy governance structure in particular and the overall governance structure more in general 
turned out to be much less pronounced than in the EU. We see three different situations. First 
of all, in case of the EU, the organisation of the foreign policy governance shows clear 
differences with the normal EU governance system. The appointment procedure for the High 
Representative differs from that of other Commissioners; the responsible administration, the 
EEAS, is clearly distinct from the more general Commission and Council administration; and 
compared to other policy domains, the EU Council acts more as part of the executive, rather 
than as part of the legislative. Secondly, In Belgium, we see both differences and overlaps 
between foreign policy in particular and public policy in general. While, for instance, in theory, 
the key political decision-makers are the same, namely the government, in practice, the more 
limited decisional triangle forms the real locus of foreign policy decision-making. Yet, on the 
other hand, the way in which the members of this triangle are appointed is not different from 
that of other ministers. Finally, in Switzerland, foreign policy does not dispose of a distinct 
governance system, neither in theory, nor in practice.  
This observation gives to think about the origins of possible democratic shortcomings that could 
be observed in each of the different cases. Where for the EU, the democratic problems observed 
with regard to licensing for an important part can be traced back to the particular context of 
foreign policy-making, in Belgium or Switzerland this is much less the case. Thus, for instance, 
in Belgium, the partitocratic appointment of both key political decision-makers and senior 
officials is not so much characteristic for foreign policy, but for the Belgian system all together. 
Or in Switzerland, the (possible) involvement of the people in the definition of the governance 
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structure is not particular for foreign policy. This, of course, has its relevance for possible 
rectifications of the observed problems. 
Furthermore, at least compared to Belgium, the EU seems not to be doing so badly… Of course, 
as said before, the evaluation of different foreign policies should not just lead to simple binary 
verdicts of one foreign policy against another, but this observation nevertheless gives food for 
thought. It more concretely shows how he assessment of different policies can help to put into 
perspective their respective strengths and weaknesses. Finding out about the strengths or 
weaknesses of other foreign policies and how these come about, should make us prudent about 
all too strong conclusions (be it positive or negative) about the democratic qualities of a specific 
foreign policy. In that sense, it can help us reach a more balanced and well-considered 
evaluation of a policy’s democratic legitimacy. 
Finally, from a more methodological point of view, certainly the Swiss case demonstrates very 
well why a focus on but one dimension of democracy (in this case the selection of key decision-
makers) is insufficient to develop a clear insight in a policy’s overall democratic legitimacy. 
Within the Swiss discussion, I touched upon the existence of direct democracy and the way in 
which it allows the people to decide on the actual governance system in place. Yet, initiatives 
and referenda do also play a role in the direction and development of the foreign policy as such. 
A remarkable example of popular participation is, for instance, the initiative on UN 
membership accepted in 2002320. With regard to optional referenda, we can cite, among many 
others, the 2005 vote on Swiss accession to the Schengen area321, or the 2014 popular rejection 
of the purchase of 22 Gripen jet fighters322. These referenda seem to grand a considerable 
overrule power to the people (cf. Schneider 1999, 46-48). Furthermore, a sole focus on the 
selection of key public decision-makers for instance also does not take into account the 
participation of the cantons or the involvement of interest groups in the so-called pre-
parliamentary phase (cf. Manuel Fischer’s (2012, 191‑99) chapter on Schengen/Dublin). It is 
obvious that to fully grasp the democratic state of affairs of the Swiss foreign policy’s 
democratic legitimacy, these elements have to be studied more comprehensively. Not doing so 
                                                 
320 Initiative populaire fédérale 'pour l'adhésion de la Suisse à l'Organisation des Nations Unies 
(ONU) bk.admin.ch/ch/f/pore/vi/vis292.html [23.01.18]  
321 Votation No 517. Tableau récapitulatif bk.admin.ch/ch/f/pore/va/20050605/det517.html 
[23.01.18]  
322 Votation No 584. Tableau récapitulatif bk.admin.ch/ch/f/pore/va/20140518/det584.html 
[23.01.18]  
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leads to a biased and uncomplete image of how Swiss foreign policy answers to demands of 
public control and political equality. 
4. A democratic audit of the CFSP, and of other (foreign) policies: final remarks 
Both the future study of the CFSP and the assessment of other foreign policies can contribute 
to an increased understanding of normative democratic legitimacy in foreign policy. But also, 
they could add to a further reflection on, and fine-tuning of the assessment framework in itself; 
as well as advance our comprehension about both the suitability and inconveniences of 
democratic auditing as a method for the evaluation of a (foreign) policy. Two last points deserve 
attention in that regard. 
A first element concerns the assessment framework as such. While starting from the same basic 
principles of public control with political equality as did previous audits, this thesis presented 
an original framework that is adapted to the evaluation of the democratic state of a policy, rather 
than of a political system. In that regard, it presented criteria according to the idea of a policy 
as a circular process composed of an input-, throughput- and output phase. Although, I believe, 
this makes sense from a theoretical point of view, and certainly was helpful for the selection of 
the relevant criteria that together covered the whole policy process; it has to be recognized that 
in the actual assessment, the distinction between those three phases did not really played much 
of a role. Neither when carrying out the evaluation, nor where it concerns the findings that came 
out of it, the input-throughput-output divide seemed to have been of particular importance. The 
assessment of the different indicators indeed led to a better understanding about how well 
criteria are lived up to and how they mutually connect, as well as gave us a more comprehensive 
view about the CFSP’s overall normative democratic legitimacy (cf. Chapter V, 1); but, there 
seems little evidence that findings structure themselves – or for that matter could be usefully 
structured – according the divide of the three policy phases. The findings pointed to both 
weaknesses and strengths; and revealed the existence of multiple overlaps and interconnections 
between them (cf. supra, but not so in particular along the lines of this trichotomy. 
Even though I do not think that in itself this situation is problematic for the assessment that has 
been carried out, it can make us wonder if building up the criteria according to a different logic 
could help improve the framework of assessment. With reference to the flexibility incorporated 
by the democratic audit approach (cf. Chapter III, 3), future research can argue to structure 
criteria in a different way or reconsider the way they relate to each other. Yet, it could also 
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come to conclude that the input-throughput-output divide indeed is relevant in order to fully 
grasp the actual democratic organisation of the foreign policy in question. Said otherwise, it is 
not because, in the end, this distinction seemed not particularly important to understand the 
strength and weaknesses of the current CFPS democratic setting, that it cannot be of more 
determining relevance in the future, or for another foreign policy. 
A second point of attention concerns the method of measurement and the data gathering on 
which the audit is built. While audits of other foreign policies and of the future CFSP can, as 
explained, add to the development of both the actual assessment framework and the 
measurement standard, it is inherent to democratic audit as a method of evaluation that these 
assessments will carry on to be essentially qualitative exercises. They will continue to result 
from the reasonable authoritative judgement of the evaluator, both with regard to the data that 
are used, and the judgement that is based on these data. Although, in that way, they will continue 
to incorporate some of the researcher’s inherent subjectivity; as claimed when discussing the 
method of measurement and data gathering (cf. Chapter V, 2-3), and as demonstrated in the 
second part of this thesis: when done with modesty, this should not devaluate the validity of 
findings and observations. A good case in point, in this regard, is the discussion about written 
parliamentary questions in the European Parliament (cf. Chapter XII, 1). Due to the limited 
possibility for systematic consultation of these questions, it was not possible to obtain an exact 
overview of all questions that concern CFSP and CSDP related issues. Hence, in order to 
evaluate the overview relevance of written questions, an arguably representative selection had 
to be used. Even more so where it concerned the content of said questions and their answers, 
and their validity as oversight tools, I had to opt for a purely personal judgement. Even though 
in that way, the numbers that came out of this concrete assessment, indeed, cannot claim to 
represent exact values; as argued, they give indications about a general trend that allow us to 
include these findings as relevant elements of the overall judgement.  
With this example in mind, the essentially qualitative approach and the argumentative nature 
of the assessment’s final judgements could (and should) never completely disappear from a 
democratic audit. Inherently linked with both the method’s starting points and goal, they in fact 
proved fundamental to the comprehensive evaluation of the CFSP’s normative democratic 
legitimacy carried out in this thesis. And, these methodological elements will keep their 
relevance when studying other foreign policies, or future European foreign policy. Given that 
they introduce an assessment flexibility that is most relevant when studying the, after all, 
somewhat particular field of foreign policy, and how it responds to the valid demands of public 
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control with political equality, they indeed make democratic audit a useful tool for the study of 
a foreign policy’s normative democratic legitimacy.  
5. Conclusion 
In this last chapter, attention turned to possible future use of the assessment framework that has 
been proposed and used within this thesis. It elaborated on how such future use can contribute 
to the further development of the assessment framework and the measurement standard that has 
been applied. In that regard, I explored the use of the assessment framework by applying the 
first criterion of licensing to govern to both Belgian and Swiss foreign policy. Finally, I 
discussed two methodological points that have to be taken into account in case of such further 
use. The first one was about how the input-throughput-output divide, essential to the built-up 
of the assessment framework, relate to the findings about - and overall appreciation of the 
CFSP’s normative democratic legitimacy. Secondly, I also explained why the qualitative 
approach and argumentative nature, being essential aspects of the democratic audit method, 
will keep their relevance throughout possible future audits of foreign policy. 
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Belgian Senate, information obtained by interview (telephone) 
- 4 November 2016 (about: Role of Belgian Senate in Belgian foreign policy) 
Council of the EU - General Secretariat (CGS), information obtained by e-mail: 
- 22 October 2014 (about: public register of the Council) 
- 3 Mai 2016 (about: documents in the public register of the Council) 
- 23 June 2016 (about: access to sensitive documents from the Council) 
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- 12 August 2016 (about: types of documents in the public register of the Council)  
EEAS, information obtained by e-mail: 
- 8 October 2015 (about: EU restrictive measures) 
- 13 March 2015 (about: the EU as a mediator) 
- 10 March 2016 (about: EEAS reports on access to documents and initial applications for 
access)  
- 23 Mai 2016 (about: EP Special Committee consultation of assessments on EU mediation) 
- 30 June 2016 (about: EU restrictive measures, access to sensitive information by the EP's 
Special Committee) 
- 15 Mai 2017 (about: CFSP annual reports) 
- 12 June 2017 (about: EEAS transparency register) 
- 7 June 2018 (about: Discharge of the High Representative) 
EEAS, information obtained by interview (telephone) 
- 26 April 2016 (about: appearances of the HR before European Parliament and parliamentary 
access to classified information) 
European Union Military Staff (EUMS), information obtained by e-mail: 
- 6 October 2015 (about: CSDP missions, participating countries) 
European Parliament, information obtained by e-mail: 
- 19 Mai 2015 (about: written questions, answering time) 
- 30 August 2016 (about: Special Committee for access to documents related to CFSP/ CSDP/ 
meetings with the HR) 
- 22 December 2016 (about: monitoring CSDP-missions by EP delegations) 
- 10 January 2018 (about: Members of the Special Committee for access to documents related 
to CFSP/ CSDP  
(In case of information obtained by e-mail from EU-institutions through intermediary of the 
Europe Direct Contact Centre, I list them under the EU-institution mentioned in the response 
as the one being consulted.)  
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Member of European Parliament, information obtained by e-mail: 
- 18 August 2016 (about: Special Committee for access to sensitive documents on the CFSP) 
- 13 February 2017 (about: EP control of CFSP budget) 
Questionnaire among MSP: 
- Response by national parliament, 16 December 2016 
Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs, information obtained by e-mail: 
- 12 January 2018 (about: Selection of DFA personnel/ Swiss diplomatic service) 
Furthermore, see the documents and other sources, referred to in detail in the relevant footnotes.  
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Annexes 
Annex 1: Overview of different assessment frameworks 
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Annex 2: The assessment framework - overview 
2 key principles of 
democracy 
(= fundamental 
values, essential to 
any democratic 
organisation/ 
process) 
… to be realised 
through the 
presence of … 
8 democratic 
criteria 
… each of 
which can be 
measured by:  
19 empirical indicators 
Public control 
And 
Political equality 
 
1. Licensing to 
govern 
  1. Officials, holding key positions in 
the foreign policy decision-making 
structure are either directly elected by 
the people, or appointed in a 
transparent and open way.  
  
  
 
2. There is room for close, popular or 
parliamentary, scrutiny of the 
procedure and process of appointment 
and removal. 
  
  
 
3. When not the people directly, at 
least their elected representatives have 
a clear say in the development or the 
reformulation of the foreign policy’s 
overall governance structure and the 
nomination procedures that are part of 
it. 
  
2. Budget   4. In general lines, the foreign budget 
is integrated in the normal budget and 
overviewed by a directly elected body, 
which has the final say on its adoption. 
  
    5. In case of necessary urgent 
spending, elected officials take the 
final decision; and a directly elected 
body can, at least ex-post, scrutinize 
this spending. 
  
3. Participation   6. (Popular participation) Individual 
citizens or civil society organisations 
have access to foreign policy makers 
and their visions and ideas are duly 
considered. 
  
  
 
7. (Parliamentary participation) A 
directly elected body participates 
actively in the conduct of the foreign 
policy. Not only is it regularly 
informed about the overall direction of 
the foreign policy as well as about 
specific dossiers, but it can also 
weight on the overall direction of the 
foreign policy. 
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4. Public debate   8. The foreign policy in question is 
spoken about in the media; the 
decisions, actions and actors of the 
foreign policy are reported on and 
discussed by different media sources.  
    9. The public can, and does, inform 
itself directly on the actions of the 
foreign policy actors and the 
development of the foreign policy. 
  
5. Transparency 
 
10. The public has access to all 
relevant foreign security related 
documents according to the same rules 
and procedures applying to other 
(internal) policy fields. In practical 
terms, there exist recognized 
procedures and institutionalized 
structures (such as for instance a 
digitally accessible register of 
documents) ensuring convenient 
access to documents related to the 
foreign policy in question. 
  
  
 
11. If reasons of public or private 
interest justify the restriction of such 
access; that is, when the content or 
existence of documents is concealed 
from the public; clear-cut reasons are 
formally accounted for and publically 
communicated, at least when asked 
for. 
  
  
 
12. Restrictions do not simply result 
from executive discretion but have 
precise legal foundations. The rules 
for transparency and secrecy are not 
defined by the executive holder of the 
document alone, but in active 
consultation with a directly elected 
body. Concretely this means that the 
decision to keep specific information 
hidden from the public may well result 
from the executive’s own 
considerations, but the framework of 
such considerations and the 
boundaries of the executive’s space to 
conceal are the result of democratic 
deliberation. 
  
    13. If confidential information is 
sealed from public access, at least 
some directly elected persons have 
access to these secret documents and 
highly secured information. 
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6. Reason 
giving 
  14. Reasons for foreign policy 
decisions and actions need to exist and 
as long as their disclosure does not 
jeopardize the coherent and smooth 
execution of the foreign policy, or 
endanger public or private interest, 
they are made widely and easily 
accessible, for instance through public 
statements or in policy documents, on 
websites or through the mass media. 
  
    15. When however, secrecy is 
arguably justified, at least some 
elected representatives know about 
the reasons behind specific decisions. 
  
7. Oversight   16. (Legislative oversight) There 
exists institutionalized monitoring by 
a directly elected body. Through 
regular meetings, (the possibility of) 
asking questions or formal hearings 
and audits, a legislature can monitor 
the daily actions and behaviour of the 
foreign policy actors.  
  
  
 
17. (Societal oversight) Through 
journalistic, academic non-
governmental as well as individual 
citizens’ supervision, problems within 
the daily developments of the foreign 
policy can be revealed.  
  
  
 
18. (Societal oversight) The results of 
this oversight are (or at least can be) 
picked up by citizens who themselves 
are not directly involved in the 
oversight activities. 
  
    19. (Societal oversight) The 
legislature uses oversight by societal 
actors as fire alarm input to its 
oversight efforts. 
  
8. Overrule   20. The people, or their elected 
representatives, hold the institutional 
possibility to overrule executive 
decisions with regard to the 
fundamental orientations of the 
foreign policy; or when issues of war 
and peace and the deployment of 
troops are concerned. 
  
+ Legal basis   a. Licensing, budget control, 
participation, transparency, reason-
giving, oversight and overrule are 
backed by clear legal regulations. 
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b. Those who may be affected by the 
non-respect of these legal rules, can 
denounce this through legal action. 
  
    c. A competent court can scrutinize 
foreign policy under the same 
conditions as other policies. 
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Annex 3: Questionnaire for national parliaments (example Polish Sejm) 
Role of the Polish Sejm in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 
Contact: 
Ewoud Lauwerier 
University of Lausanne - IEPHI 
+41 21 692 31 77 
(This questionnaire contains six questions)                        ewoud.lauwerier@unil.ch 
 
This survey is about the role and competences of your national parliament in CFSP and CSDP. 
It consists of six short sets of closed questions and should take no more than 10 minutes to 
complete. You can always use the “Comments” boxes after each set of questions for further 
clarifications or comments 
1. Within the Sejm, which is the competent parliamentary committee to deal with matters of 
CFSP and CSDP? 
CFSP: European Affairs committee  - In case of Other, which?        
CSDP: European Affairs committee  - In case of Other, which?       
- Comments: 
            
→ Given that Member States can participate in EU military and civilian missions… 
2. What is the role of the Sejm in the country’s decision to participate in EU military 
missions? 
 Yes No 
A mandate from the Sejm is needed (ex ante) before Poland can participate in EU 
military missions. The executive can decide the country’s participation, only when it 
disposes of a previous mandate of the Sejm that authorizes it to do so. 
  
Approval by the Sejm is needed (ex post) before Poland can participate in EU military 
missions. The executive’s decision to participate has to be approved by the Sejm before 
the actual deployment of troops and material can take place. 
  
In case approval is needed, which of the following applies? 
In plenary, always 
 
In plenary, threshold 
 
In Committee, always 
 
In committee, threshold 
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(Threshold: approval is needed only in case participation exceeds a certain level, financially or with regard to 
the number of national personnel that is involved) 
- In case of a threshold, what would this be? 
      
3. What is the role of the Sejm in the country’s decision to participate in EU civilian missions? 
 Yes No 
A mandate from the Sejm is needed (ex ante) before Poland can participate in EU 
civilian missions. The executive can decide the country’s participation, only when it 
disposes of a previous mandate of the Sejm that authorizes it to do so. 
  
Approval by the Sejm is needed (ex post) before Poland can participate in EU civilian 
missions. The executive’s decision to participate has to be approved by the Sejm before 
the actual deployment of troops and material can take place. 
  
In case approval is needed, which of the following applies? 
In plenary, always 
 
In plenary, threshold 
 
In Committee, always 
 
In committee, threshold 
 
(Threshold: approval is needed only in case participation exceeds a certain level, financially or with regard to 
the number of national personal that is involved) 
- In case of a threshold, what would this be? 
      
- Comments: 
            
→ Given that EU military missions are financed for an important part through the 
so-called “cost lie where they fall” principle; i.e. every participant covers own 
expenditure... 
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4. What is the role of the Sejm in the financing of the country’s participation in EU 
military missions? 
 Yes No 
The Sejm is informed about the costs of participation before a mission is launched.   
The Sejm is informed about the costs of participation after a mission is launched.   
The Sejm has to approve the budget of participation in a mission (as part of an overall 
approval, or in a separate act) in plenary. 
  
The Sejm’s competent committee has to approve the budget of participation in a 
mission (as part of an overall approval, or in a separate act). 
  
- Comments: 
      
→ Given that two central organs of the CFSP/CSDP are the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC) and Coreper II, which are composed of Member State 
representatives at ambassadorial level…  
5. What is the role of the Sejm in the appointment of the country’s representative in the 
PSC or Coperer II? 
 Yes No 
The Sejm is consulted about the appointment of the country’s PSC 
representative. 
  
The Sejm has to approve the appointment of the country’s PSC representative.   
The Sejm is consulted about the appointment of the country’s Coreper II 
representative. 
  
The Sejm has to approve the appointment of the country’s Coreper 
representative. 
  
The appointment of representatives to the PSC and Coreper follows a procedure, 
similar to that of other ambassadorial posts within Poland’s foreign policy. 
  
- Comments: 
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→ Given that the CFSP not only implies military and civilian EU missions, but also 
sanctions against third states or persons, the EU’s international position in matters 
of security or defence, or the EU’s role as mediator in international conflicts... 
6. What is the role of the Sejm regarding the launching, prolongation and termination of EU 
sanctions as well as CFSP/CSDP matters more in general? 
 Yes No 
The Sejm is formally informed about EU sanctions.   
The Sejm is consulted on EU sanctions. Its opinion is asked for in order to determine 
the country’s position regarding such sanctions. 
  
In general, the government regularly informs (= at least once a year) the Sejm about 
major CFSP/ CSDP developments and the country’s participation therein. 
  
The Sejm organizes regular debates (= one or more per year) about recent development 
within CFSP/ CSDP (both in plenary or in the competent committee). 
  
The Sejm publishes regular reports about recent developments within CFSP/CSDP.   
The competent minister (foreign affairs, defence, …) is regularly invited (= at least 
once a year) to appear before the Sejm (in plenary or in the competent committee) to 
comment on the government’s position with regard to matters of CFSP/CSDP. 
  
- Comments: 
           
 
Thank you very much! 
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Annex 4: Direct democracy in EU Member States 
 
Searched by: National → Selected on Country - Year selection → From 1999, To 2016 (searched on: 
05.05.2017)  
 (Source: Direct Democracy Database, c2d.ch/votes.php?table=votes)
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Annex 5: EU Transparency Register - CSO fields of interest (06.2008 - 12.2016, per year) 
 
"%" = percent of CSOs that mention the particular domain among their fields of interest in comparison 
to the total number of CSOs that registered for that year. 
(source: EU Transparency Register ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/homePage.do)
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Annex 6: EU foreign policy - media coverage (2005-2016) – results and search queries 
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European Union 
"Europäische Union" OR "Europäischen Union" OR "European Union" OR "Europese 
Unie" OR "Union européenne" OR "Union europea" OR "Unione europea" (I did not 
use "EU" because this could also refer to other things, same goes for "UE") 
 
POLITCAL FUNCTIONS 
 
Commission president 
"EU-Kommissionspräsident" OR "EU-Kommissionschef" OR "Präsident der 
Europäischen Kommission" OR "Präsident der EU-Kommission" OR "President of the 
European Commission" OR "President of the EU-Commission" OR "EU Commission 
President" OR "European Commission President" OR "Voorzitter van de Europese 
Commissie" OR "Europees Commissie Voorzitter" OR "Président de la Commission 
européenne" OR "Président de la Commission de l'UE" OR "Presidente de la Comisión 
Europea" OR "Presidente della Commissione europea"  
Federal Chancelor 
"Bundeskanzler" OR "Bundeskanzlerin" OR "Federal Chancellor" OR "German 
Chancellor" OR "Bondskanselier" OR "Chancelier fédéral" OR "Chancelier allemand" 
OR "Chancelière fédérale" OR "Chancelière allemande" OR "Canciller federal" OR 
"Canciller de Alemania" OR "Cancelliere federale" OR "Cancelliere della Germania" 
OR "Cancelliera federale" OR "Cancelliera della Germania" 
French president 
"französische Präsident" OR "französischen Präsident" OR "französicher Präsident" 
OR "Präsident von Frankreich" OR "französische Staatspräsident" OR "französischen 
Staatspräsident" OR "französischer Staatspräsident" OR "Staatspräsident von 
Frankreich" OR "French president" OR "President of France" OR "President of the 
French Republic" OR "Frans President" OR "President van Frankrijk" OR "president 
van de Franse Republiek" OR "Président de la France" OR "Président français" OR 
"Président de la République française" OR "Presidente de Francia" OR "Presidente de 
la República Francesa" OR "Presidente francés" OR "Presidente della Repubblica 
francese" OR "Presidente della Francia" OR "Presidente francese" 
High Representative 
"EU-Außenbeauftragte" OR "Hohe Vertreter der EU" OR "Hohe Vertreter der 
Europäischen Union" OR "Hoher Vertreter der EU" OR "Hoher Vertreter der 
Europäischen Union" OR "Hohe Vertreterin der EU" OR "Hohe Vertreterin der 
Europäischen Union" OR "Hohe Vertreterin für Außen" OR "Hohe Vertreter für 
Außen" OR "Hoher Vertreter für Außen" OR "High Representative of the Union" OR 
"EU High Representative" OR "High Representative of the European Union" OR "High 
Representative of the EU" OR "High Representative for foreign" OR "Hoge 
Vertegenwoordiger voor Buitenlandse" OR "Hoge Vertegenwoordiger van de Europese 
Unie" OR "Hoge Vertegenwoordiger van de EU" OR "EU-Hoge Vertegenwoordiger" 
OR "Hoge vertegenwoordiger van de Unie" OR "Haut Représentant de l'Union" OR 
"Haute Représentante de l'Union" OR "Haut Représentant européen" OR "Haute 
Représentante européenne" OR "Haut Représentant pour les affaires étrangères" OR 
"Haute Représentante pour les affaires étrangères" OR "Haut Représentant de l'Union 
européenne" OR "Haute Représentante de l'Union européenne" OR "Haut 
Représentant de l'UE" OR "Haute Représentante de l'UE" OR "Alto representante de 
la Unión" OR "alto representante de la UE" OR "Alto representante para" OR "Alto 
rappresentante dell'Unione" OR "Alto rappresentante dell'UE" OR "Alto 
rappresentante per gli affari"     
Secretary of State 
"Außenministerin der Vereinigten Staaten" OR "amerikanischen Außenministerin" OR 
"amerikanische Außenministerin" OR "Außenminister der Vereinigten Staaten" OR 
"amerikanischen Außenminister" OR "amerikanische Außenminister" OR 
"amerikanischer Außenminister" OR "US-Außenminister" OR "US-Außenministerin" 
OR "Secretary of State" OR "Amerikaanse Minister van Buitenlandse zaken" OR 
"Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken van de Verenigde Staten" OR "Minister van 
Buitenlandse Zaken van de VS" OR "VS-Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken" OR 
"Secrétaire d'État des États-Unis" OR "Ministre des Affaires étrangères des Etats-
Unis" OR "Ministre américain des affaires étrangères" OR "Secretario de Estado de 
los Estados Unidos" OR "Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores de los Estados Unidos" OR 
"Segretario di Stato degli Stati Uniti" OR "Ministro americano degli Affari Esteri"  
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INSTITUTIONS 
Council of the European 
Union 
"Rat der Europäischen Union" OR "Rat der EU" OR "EU-Ministerrat" OR "Ministerrat 
der EU" OR "Ministerrat der Europäischen Union" OR "Council of the European 
Union" OR "Council of the EU" OR "EU-Council of Ministers" OR "Council of 
Ministers of the European Union" OR "Council of Ministers of the EU" OR "Raad van 
de Europese unie" OR "Raad van de EU" OR "EU-Ministerraad" OR "Europese 
Ministerraad" OR "Conseil de l'Union européenne" OR "Conseil de l'UE" OR "Conseil 
des ministres européens" OR "Consejo de la Unión europea" OR "Consejo de la UE" 
OR "Consejo de Ministros europeo" OR "Consiglio dell'Unione europea" OR 
"Consiglio dell'UE" OR "Consiglio dei ministri europei"  
Court of Justice 
"Gerichtshof der Europäischen Union" OR "Gerichtshof der EU" OR "EU Gerichtshof" 
or "Court of Justice of the European Union" OR "Court of Justice of the EU" OR "EU 
Court of Justice" OR "Hof van Justitie van de Europese Unie" OR "Hof van Justitie van 
de EU" OR "EU-Hof van Hustitie" OR "Cour de Justice de l'Union européenne" OR 
"Cour de Justice de l'UE" OR "Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea" OR "Tribunal 
de Justicia de la UE" OR "Corte di giustizia dell'Unione europea" OR "Corte di 
giustizia dell'UE" (Name officially only introduced under Lisbon, but upon searching 
in the database it seemed already commonly used before)    
ECB 
"Europäische Zentralbank" OR "Europäischen Zentralbank" OR "EZB" OR "European 
Central Bank" OR "ECB" OR "Europese Centrale Bank" OR "Banque Centrale 
européenne" OR "BCE" OR "Banco Central Europeo" OR "Banca centrale europea"  
EEAS 
"Europäische Auswärtige Dienst" OR "Europäischer Auswärtiger Dienst" OR 
"Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienstes" OR "EU-Außendienst" OR "EEAS" OR 
"European External Action Service" OR "Europese Dienst voor Extern Optreden" OR 
"Service européen pour l’action extérieure" OR "SEAE" OR "Service des Affaires 
étrangères de l'Union" OR "Service européen des Affaires étrangères" OR "Servicio 
Europeo de Acción Exterior" OR "Servicio Exterior Europeo" OR "Servicio Exterior 
de la Unión Europea" OR "Servicio exterior de la UE" OR "Servizio europeo per 
l'azione esterna" OR "servizio per gli affari esteri dell'Unione"   
European Commission 
"Europäische Kommission" OR "Europäischen Kommission" OR "EU-Kommission" 
OR "European Commission" OR "EU-Commission" OR "Europese Commissie" OR 
"EU-Commissie" OR "Commission européenne" OR "Commission de l'Union 
européenne" OR "Commission de l'UE" OR "Comisión Europea" OR "Comision de la 
Unión Europea" OR "Comision de la UE" OR "Commissione europea" "Commissione 
dell'Unione europea" OR "Commissione dell'UE" 
European Council 
"Europäische Rat" OR "Europäischen Rat" OR "Europäischer Rat" OR "Staats- und 
Regierungschefs der Europäischen Union" OR "Staats- und Regierungschefs der EU" 
OR "European Council" OR "Heads of State and government of the European Union" 
OR "Heads of State and government of the EU" OR "Europese Raad" OR "Europese 
staats- en regeringsleiders" OR "Conseil européen" OR "chefs d'états and de 
gouvernements européens" OR "chefs d'états and de gouvernements de l'Union 
européenne" OR "chefs d'états and de gouvernements de l'UE" OR "Consejo Europeo" 
OR "jefes de estado o de Gobierno de la Unión Europea" OR "jefes de estado o de 
Gobierno de la UE" OR "jefes de estado o de Gobierno europeos" OR "Consiglio 
europeo" OR "capi di Stato o di governo dell'Unione europea" OR "capi di Stato o di 
governo dell'UE" OR "capi di stato o di governo europei"  
European Parliament 
"Europäische Parlament" OR "Europäisches Parlament" OR "Europäischen 
Parlament" OR "Europaparlament" OR "EU-Parlament" OR "European Parliament" 
OR "Parliament of the European Union" OR "Parliament of the EU" OR 
"Europarliament" OR "EU-Parliament" OR "Europees Parlement" OR 
"Europarlement" OR "EU-Parlement" OR "Parlement Européen" OR "Parlement de 
l'UE" OR "Parlement de l'Union européenne" OR "Parlamento Europeo" OR 
"Europarlamento" OR "Eurocámara" OR "Cámara Europea"  
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MILITARY MISSIONS 
EU military and civilian 
missions 
"EUPOL" OR "EUFOR" OR "EUCAP" OR "EUBAM" OR "EUSEC" OR "EUTM" OR 
"EUMM" OR "EUAM" OR "NAVFOR" OR "EULEX" OR "EUJUST" OR "EUPM" OR 
"EUPAT" OR "EU SSR" OR "EUAVSEC" OR "EUMAM" (I did not search on 
"Concordia", "Artemis", "Althea" or "Aceh Monitoring Mission", because to many 
other hits resulted from this search that did have nothing to do with EU missions --> 
So, I searched on the different abbreviations that so far have been given to the missions 
(missions here thus include both undergoing and finished") 
ISAF 
"ISAF" (NOT "International Sailing Organisation--> Makes difference of six hits for 
2005…) 
KFOR "KFOR" 
 
PERSONALITIES 
 
Barroso/ Jean-Claude 
Juncker 
2005-31 October 2014: Manuel Barroso. 1 November 2014-2016: Jean Claude Juncker 
--> I searched on "Jean-Claude Juncker" and not just on "Juncker" because this name 
seemed to result in too many unrelated hits. 
Bush/ Obama 
2005-19 January 2009: George W. Bush. 20 January 2009- 2016: Barack Obama --> 
I searched on "Bush" till 19 January 2009: from there on I searched on "Obama" --> 
Regarding "Bush", although this could include a certain number of unrelated hits, the 
use of "George Bush" or "George W. Bush" on the other hand seemed too restricted 
and seemed to exclude to many relevant results.  
Condoleezza Rice/ Hillary 
Clinton/ John Kerry 
2005-20 January 2009: Condoleezza Rice. 21 January 2009-1 February 2013: Hillary 
Clinton. 1 February 2013-2016: John Kerry --> I searched on "Condoleezza Rice", just 
"Rice" seemed to result in too many unrelated hits. For Hillary Clinton, I searched on 
"Clinton" NOT "Bill", I searched on "John Kerry", just Kerry seemed to result in too 
many unrelated hits 
Gerhard Schröder/ Angela 
Merkel 
Till 22 November 2005: Gerhard Schröder. Since then: Angela Merkel --> "Searched 
on "Gerhard Schröder", because just "Schröder" seemed to result in many unrelated 
hits.  
Jacques Chirac/ Nicolas 
Sarkozy/ François Hollande 
2005-15 May 2007: Jacques Chirac, 16 May 2007-15 May 2012: Nicolas Sarkozy. 16 
May 2012-2016: François Hollande, --> 2005-15 May 2007, I searched on "Chirac". 
As from 16 May 2007 i continued with "Sarkozy". As from 16 May 2012, I continued 
with "François Hollande" (just "hollande" gave too many unrelated hits)  
Jean-Claude Trichet/ Mario 
Draghi 
2005-31 October 2011: Jean Claude Trichet. 1 November 2011: Mario Draghi --> 
Upon testing "Trichet" did not seem to give a relevant number of hits that could be 
considered as unrelated. Idem for "Draghi" 
Josep Borell/ Pöttering/ Jerzy 
Busek/ Martin Schulz 
2005-16 January 2007: Josep Borell. 16 January 2007 - 14 July 2009: Hans-Gert 
Pöttering.14 July 2009-17 January 2012: Jerzy Busek. 17 January 2012-2016: Martin 
Schulz. --> Upon testing, just "Borell" or just "Busek" did give too many unrelated hits. 
For "Pöttering" there seemed no relevant number of hits that could be considered as 
unrelated. I searched on "Martin Schulz" and not just on "Schulz" because this name 
seemed to give too many unrelated hits. --> For each person I searched for the exact 
time of his term. For 2007, 2009 and 2012 I added the relevant numbers for both 
succeeding terms 
Kofi Annan/ Ban Ki Moon 2005-2006: "Kofi Annan". 2007-2016: "Ban Ki Moon" 
Rodrigo Rato/ Dominique 
Strauss-Kahn/ Christine 
Lagarde 
2005-31 October 2007: Rodrigo Rato. 1 November 2007 - 18 May 2011: Dominique 
Strauss-Kahn. 5 July 2011-2016: Christine Lagarde --> For November and December 
2007 I combined the results for "Rodrigo Rato" and "Strauss-Kahn". 2008 till 13 May 
2011: "Strauss-Kahn" (14 May: Sofitel Scandal breaks out. --> Supposedly too many 
hits not related to the function). From 5 July 2011: "Christine Lagarde" --> Just 
"Lagarde seemed to give too many unrelated hits" --> For 2011 I combinedthe results 
for "Strauss-Kahn" and "Christine Lagarde"  
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Solana/ Catherine Ashton/ 
Mogherini 
2005-31 November 2009: Javier Solana. 1 December 2009-31 October 2014: 
Catherine Ashton. 1 November 2014-2016: Federica Mogherini --> For December 
2009 I looked for Both "Solana" and "Catherine Ashton". I searched on "Catherine 
Ashton" and not just "Ashton" because this name seemed to result in too many unrelated 
hits --> For each person I searched for the exact time of his term. For 2009 and 2014 
I added the relevant numbers for both succeeding terms 
Van Rompuy/ Donald Tusk 
Post created under Lisbon, operational since 2010. 1 January 2010 -31 November 
2014: Herman Van Rompuy, 1 December 2014-2016: Donald Tusk. --> I searched for 
"Van Rompuy" and "Tusk") 
 
EUROPEAN POLICIES 
 
Common agricultural policy 
"Gemeinsame Agrarpolitik" OR "Europäische Agrarpolitik" OR "Europäischen 
Agrarpolitik" OR "Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik" OR "EU-Agrarpolitik" OR "Common 
Agricultural Policy" OR "European Agricultural policy" OR "Agricultural policy of the 
European Union" OR "Agricultural Policy of the EU" OR "Gemeenschappelijk 
landbouwbeleid" OR "Europees landbouwbeleid" OR "landbouwbeleid van de 
Europese Unie" OR "landbouwbeleid van de EU" OR "Politique agricole commune" 
OR "Politique agricole européenne" OR "Politique agricole de l'Union européenne" 
OR "Politique agricole de l'UE" OR "Política Agrícola Común" OR "Política Agrícola 
de la Unión Europea" OR "Política Agrícola de la UE" OR "Politica agricola europea" 
OR "Politica agricola comune" OR "Politica agricola dell'Unione europea" OR 
"Politica agricola dell'UE"  
Common foreign and 
security 
"gemeinsame außen- und sicherheitspolitik" OR "Europäische außen und 
sicherheitspolitik" OR "gemeinsamen außen- und sicherheitspolitik" OR 
"Europäischen außen und sicherheitspolitik" OR "außen- und sicherheitspolitik der 
Europäischen Union" OR "außen und sicherheitspolitik der EU" OR "CFSP" OR 
"common foreign and security policy" OR "European foreign and security policy" OR 
"foreign and security policy of the European Union" OR "foreign and security policy 
of the EU" OR "GBVB" OR "gemeenschappelijk buitenlands- en veiligheidsbeleid" OR 
"Europees buitenlands en veiligheidsbeleid" OR "buitenlands- en veiligheidsbeleid van 
de Europese Unie" OR "buitenlands- en veiligheidsbeleid van de EU" OR "PESC" OR 
"politique étrangère and de sécurité commune" OR "politique étrangère and de sécurité 
européenne" OR "politique étrangère and de sécurité de l'Union européenne" OR 
"politique étrangère and de sécurité de l'UE" OR "política exterior y de seguridad 
común" OR "política exterior y de seguridad europea" OR "Política exterior y de 
seguridad de la Unión Europea" OR "Política exterior y de seguridad de la UE" OR 
"Politica estera e di sicurezza comune" OR "Politica estera e di sicurezza europea" OR 
" politica estera e di sicurezza dell'Unione europea" OR " politica estera e di sicurezza 
dell'UE" (I did not use the german abreviation "GASP", because it seemed to include 
to many unrelated hits)  
Erasmus programme 
"Erasmus-programm" OR "Erasmus-Austausch" OR "Erasmus-Austausch" OR 
"Erasmus-Semester" OR "Erasmus-Studenten" OR "Erasmus programme" OR 
"Erasmus exchange" OR "Erasmus students" OR "Erasmus programma" OR "Erasmus 
uitwisseling" OR "Erasmus studenten" OR "programme Erasmus" OR "échange 
Erasmus" OR "étudiants Erasmus" OR "Programa Erasmus" OR "Movilidad Erasmus" 
OR "Estudiantes Erasmus" OR "Programma Erasmus" OR "Progetto Erasmus" OR 
"scambio Erasmus" OR "studenti Erasmus"  
European asylum policy 
Europäische Asylpolitik OR "Europäischen Asylpolitik" OR "Gemeinsame Asylpolitik" 
OR "Gemeinsamen Asylpolitik" OR "EU-Asylpolitik" OR "Asylpolitik der EU" OR 
"Asylpolitik der Europäischen Union" OR "Common Asylum policy" OR "European 
Asylum Policy" OR "EU Asylum Policy" OR "Asylum policy of the European union" 
OR "Asylum policy of the EU" OR "Gemeenschappelijk asielbeleid" OR "Europees 
asielbeleid" OR "Gemeenschappelijke asielpolitiek" OR "Europese asielpolitiek" OR 
"Asielbeleid van de Europese Unie" OR "Asielbeleid van de EU" OR "Asielpolitiek van 
de Europese Unie" OR "Asielpolitiek van de EU" OR "Politique d’asile commune" OR 
"Politique d'asile européenne" OR "Politique d'asile de l'Union européenne" OR 
"Politique d'asile de l'UE" OR "politica de asilo comun" OR "politica de asilo europea" 
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OR "politica de asilo de la Unión Europea" OR "politica de asilo de la UE" OR 
"Politica comune di asilo" OR "Politica europea di asilo" OR "Politica di asilo 
dell'Unione Europea" OR "Politica di asilo dell'UE" 
European Defence 
"GSVP" OR "Europäische Verteidigungspolitik" OR "Europäischen 
Verteidigungspolitik" OR "Gemeinsame Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik" OR 
"Gemeinsamen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik" OR "Verteidigungspolitik der 
EU" OR "Verteidigungspolitik der Europäischen Union" OR "Europäische Sicherheits- 
und Verteidigungspolitik" OR "Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik" 
OR "CSDP" OR "European defence policy" OR "Common security and defence policy" 
OR "Defence policy of the European Union" OR "Defence policy of the EU" OR 
"European security and defence policy" OR "security and defence policy of the 
European Union" OR "security and defence policy of the EU" OR "EVDB" OR "GVDB" 
OR "Europees Veiligheids- en defensiebeleid" OR "Gemeenschappelijk Veiligheids- en 
defensiebeleid" OR "Europees defensiebeleid" OR "Defensiebeleid van de Europese 
Unie" OR "Defensiebeleid van de EU" OR "PESD" OR "PCSD" OR "Politique 
européenne de sécurité and de défense commune" OR "Politique de sécurité and de 
défense commune" OR "Politique de défense de l'Union européenne" OR "Politique de 
défense de l'UE" OR "Politique de défense européenne" OR "Política Común de 
Seguridad y Defensa" OR "Política Europea de Seguridad y Defensa" OR "Política 
Europea de Defensa" OR " Política de Defensa de la Unión Europea" OR "Política de 
Defensa de la UE" OR "Politica di sicurezza e di difesa comune" OR "Politica di 
sicurezza e di difesa europea" OR "politica europea di difesa" OR "politica di difesa 
dell'unione europea" OR "politica di difesa dell'UE" (I did not use the old german 
(ESVP) and english (ESDP) abreviations, because this resulted in too many unrelated 
hits)  
European energy policy 
"Energiepolitik der Europäischen Union" OR "Energiepolitik der EU" OR 
"Europäische Energiepolitik" OR "Europäischen Energiepolitik" OR "EU-
Energiepolitik" OR "European Energy policy" OR "Energy Policy of the European 
Union" OR "Energy Policy of the EU" OR "Europese energiepolitiek" OR "Europees 
energiebeleid" OR "Energiepolitiek van de Europese Unie" OR "Energiepolitiek van 
de EU" OR "Energiebeleid van de Europese Unie" OR "Energiebeleid van de EU" OR 
"Politique énergétique européenne" OR "Politique énergétique de l'Union européenne" 
OR "Politique énergétique de l'UE" OR "Estrategia energética de la Unión Europea" 
OR "Estrategia energética de la UE" OR "Estrategia energética europea" OR "Politica 
energética de la Unión Europea" OR "Politica energética de la UE" OR "Politica 
energética europea" OR "Strategia energetica dell'Unione europea" OR "Strategia 
energetica dell'UE" OR "Strategia energetica europea" OR "Politica energetica 
dell'Unione europea" OR "Politica energetica dell'UE" (I did not search on 
"Gemeinsame...", "Common...", … "Commune", … because this resulted in few and 
confusing hits (for instance because they did not concern the EU policy)    
European foreign policy 
"europäische Außenpolitik" OR "europäischen Außenpolitik" OR "EU-Außenpolitik" 
OR " Außenpolitik der EU" OR "Außenpolitik der Europäischen Union" OR "European 
foreign policy" OR "EU Foreign policy" OR "Foreign policy of the European Union" 
OR "Foreign policy of the EU" OR "Europees buitenlands beleid" OR "EU-buitenlands 
beleid" OR "Buitenlands beleid van de Europese Unie" OR "Buitenlands beleid van de 
EU" OR "Politique étrangère européenne" OR "Politique étrangère de l'Union 
européenne" OR "Politique étrangère de l'UE" OR "Politique extérieure européenne" 
OR "Politique extérieure de l'Union européenne" OR "Politique extérieure de l'UE" OR 
"Política exterior europea" OR "Política exterior de la Unión europea" OR "Política 
exterior de la UE" OR "politica estera europea" OR "politica estera dell'Unione 
europea" OR "politica estera dell'UE" 
European migration policy 
"Europäische Migrationspolitik" OR "Europäischen Migrationspolitik" OR "EU-
Migrationspolitik" OR "Migrationspolitik der EU" OR "Migrationspolitik der 
Europäischen Union" OR "European Migration Policy" OR "EU Migration Policy" OR 
"Migration policy of the European union" OR "Migration policy of the EU" OR 
"Europees Migratiebeleid" OR "Europese migratiepolitiek" OR "Migratiebeleid van de 
Europese unie" OR "Migratiebeleid van de EU" OR "Migratiepolitiek van de Europese 
unie" OR "Migratiepolitiek van de EU" OR "Politique d'immigration européenne" OR 
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"Politique d'immigration de l'Union européenne" OR "Politique d'immigration de 
l'UE" OR "política de migración europea" OR "política de migración de la Unión 
Europea" OR "política de migración de la UE" OR "politica migratoria europea" OR 
"politica migratoria dell'Unione Europea" OR "politica migratoria dell'UE" (I did not 
search on "Gemeinsame...", "Common...", … "Commune", … because this resulted in 
few and confusing hits; for instance because they did not concern the EU policy) 
Schengen "Schengen" 
Eurocrisis 
"Eurokrise" OR "Euro-Krise" OR "European debt crisis" OR "Eurozone crisis" OR 
"European sovereign debt crisis" OR "Eurocrisis" OR "Europese staatsschuldencrisis" 
OR "Crise de la dette dans la zone euro" OR "crise de la zone euro" OR "crise de 
l'Euro" OR "Crisis del Euro" OR "crisis de la zona euro" OR "Crisi del debito sovrano 
europeo" OR "crisi dell'Euro" OR "crisi dell'Eurozona" (since 2010)   
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Annex 7: Codes related to CFSP or CSDP in the Council register of documents 
CFSP/PESC  COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY 
COADM  CFSP : ADMINISTRATIVE AFFAIRS 
COAFR  CFSP : AFRICA 
COARM  CFSP : (AD HOC) CONVENTIONAL AMRS EXPORTS 
COASI  CFSP : ASIA AND OCEANIA 
COCON  CFSP : CONSULAR AFFAIRS 
CODRO  CFSP : DRUGS 
CODUN  CFSP : UN DISARMAMENT 
COEST  CFSP : EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA 
COHOM  CFSP : HUMAN RIGHTS 
COJUR  CFSP : (AD HOC) PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
COLAT  CFSP : LATIN AMERICA 
COMAG  CFSP : MAGHREB-MASHREQ 
COMAR  CFSP : LAW OF THE SEA 
COMED  CFSP : MEDITERRANEAN 
COMEM  CFSP : MIDDLE EAST AND GULF 
COMEP  CFSP : MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS 
CONOP  CFSP : NON-PROLIFERATION 
CONUN  CFSP : UNITED NATIONS 
COPOL  CFSP : POLITICAL COOPERATION 
COPRO  CFSP : PROTOCOL 
CORLX  FOREIGN RELATIONS COUNSELLORS 
COSCE  CFSP : OSCE (ORGANISM FOR SECURITY & COOP. IN EUROPE) 
COSDP  COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY 
COSEC  CFSP: (AD HOC) SECURITY 
COSEE  CFSP : TRUKEY, CYPRUS, MALTA 
COSTA  CFSP : CONFERENCE ON STABILITY IN EUROPE 
COTEL  CFSP : COMMUNICATION 
COTER  CFSP : TERRORISM 
COTRA  CFSP : CANADA, UNITED STATES 
COWEB  CFSP : WESTERN BALKANS 
CSDP/PSDC  COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY 
EUCAP SAHEL EUROPEAN UNION CSDP MISSION IN NIGER 
EUAVSEC  EUROPEAN UNION
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Annex 8: Research organisations as input-providers to European Parliament questions 
 
1st column: Total number of times an organization was referred to as a source of information in a 
question asked by a MEP - 2nd column: Number of those questions that deal with matters of foreign 
security and defence - 3th column: Number of those questions that deal with matters of foreign policy, 
other than security and defence (for instance: development, economy, ...) 
Source: European Parliament, Parliamentary questions europarl.europa.eu/plenary/ 
en/parliamentary-questions.html - Research organisations: Exploring EU Foreign Policy, Research 
Centres and Think Tanks eufp.eu/research-centres-and-think-tanks 
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Annex 9: CSOs as input-providers to European Parliament questions 
 
 
Reason to include questions that essentially refer to CSOs as information sources about Human Rights/ 
Development issues and to categorize them here as FSDP: every time a question concerns concrete 
actions that have been carried out, will be carried out, or should be carried out in reaction on these 
Human Right problems (is it by sending a mission, proclaiming sanctions or taking up a role as 
mediator), the question in fact concerns the EU's foreign security and defence policy. 
Source: European Parliament, Parliamentary questions europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary 
-questions.html - European Transparency Register ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister 
/public/homePage.do 
